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ABSTRACT 
 
 
TERRORISM AND THE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IN NEW YORK CITY 
DURING THE LONG SIXTIES 
 
By 
 
David C. Viola, Jr. 
 
Advisor: Joshua B. Freeman 
 
 
 
During a period stretching from the mid 1960s until the mid 1970s, the United States and especially 
New York City experienced a wave of terrorism unprecedented in many ways.  Never before, and 
never since, have such a variety of actors from all across the political spectrum engaged in this 
particular form of political violence during the same period of time and especially in the same 
small geographic area.  New York City endured a stretch of attacks that can be labeled as terrorism 
from 1969 to mid-1970 that the Commissioner Howard R. Learly of the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) characterized it as the year of bombings in “gigantic proportions” when 
testifying before Congress.   
Scholarship on political radicalism and especially terrorism during what many scholars 
have termed “the Long Sixties” has largely focused on radical elements of the New Left such as 
the Weather Underground.  This dissertation argues that, instead of how scholarship has 
traditionally treated it, terrorism during the time and in New York city was just as likely to emanate 
from the political right, and may have in fact manifested there first.   
This dissertation also makes the argument that terrorism and the response to terrorism – 
most notably by the NYPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – coevolved during the 
period.  The actions of terror actors prompted more aggressive investigations by authorities, and 
	 v	
the actions of authorities drove terror actors further underground.  Building on “intelligence” 
operations including undercover operatives and secret informants, authorities brought to bear 
many of the practices that would soon land them in legal trouble such as occurred during the U.S. 
Senate Church Committee investigation and the “Handschu” civil liberties case brought against 
the NYPD.  And in response to these aggressive and often effective actions by authorities, groups 
like the Weather Underground in fact went underground.   
Ultimately, what this dissertation argues is that the history of terrorism in the United States 
is longer and more diverse than is commonly understood, and even more so than argued in 
scholarly history, and that the time and place of New York City during this period is uniquely 
important because of the diversity of the actors and the sheer volume of attacks illustrates how 
much more broadly accepted this form of political violence was than ever was before, or ever 
since.    
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On July 4th, 1914, the morning marking the 138th birthday of the nation was violently disrupted by 
a monstrous explosion in New York City’s Harlem, at 1626 Lexington Avenue near 102nd street.  
When the smoke cleared, dazed onlookers could see that that the top three floors of the new six-
story tenement house had been reduced to a smoldering chaos of splinters, the wrought iron fire 
escape twisted and collapsed upon itself and around the broken body of a young man, and the street 
below littered with debris, furniture, and shards from the hundreds of windows that had shattered 
with the concussion.  Five known anarchists – associates of Alexander Berkman and Emma 
Goldman – had been in the apartment constructing a bomb intended for John D. Rockefeller when 
the dynamite unexpectedly detonated.  Four were killed in the explosion; the sole survivor escaped 
with his life when the bathtub he was in fell through the floor that disintegrated beneath him.1   
The stretch from October 1914 to July 1915 was especially tense in New York City; in the 
eight months after the Harlem explosion, anarchists targeted a myriad of locations in the boroughs 
for bomb attacks, including St. Patrick’s Cathedral, courthouses, and other government buildings.2  
And in April of 1919, thirty-six mail bombs were sent by post to different political leaders, judges, 
and law enforcement officials across the country; the bombs were intended to arrive on May Day.  
Punctuating what is remembered as the first American Red Scare, that same summer eight larger 
																																																						
1 “Exploded in Apartment Occupied by Tarrytown Disturbers: Only One Escaped Alive,” New 
York Times, July 5th, 1914.  For the history of anarchism including anarchist violence such as 
bombings and assassinations – “propaganda of the deed” as famed anarchist Johann Most 
referred to it – see Anarchist Portraits (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), Anarchist 
Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1994) and Sacco and Vanzetti (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996) by Paul Avrich. 
2 Thai Jones’s More Powerful Than Dynamite: Radicals, Plutocrats, Progressives, and New 
York's Year of Anarchy (New York: Walker, 2012) is a comprehensive exploration of this 
tumultuous year in New York City.  
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bombs exploded in eight different American cities including New York, targeting similar 
individuals (and in the case of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, the same individual) as the 
mail bombs, propelling the Palmer Raids and mass anarchist deportations of 1919 and 1920.3   
The history of what we know as terrorism in New York City, then, did not begin on a warm 
and cloudless Tuesday morning in September of 2001, or even on a cold February afternoon in 
1993 when Islamic extremists first attempted to bring down the World Trade Center.  Historians 
including Beverly Gage and Thai Jones compellingly show how New York City, and the nation, 
suffered through this earlier era of anarchism-related terrorism, the most dramatic of the episodes 
– the 1920 bombing of the J.P. Morgan Bank on Wall Street –  resulting in the death of thirty-eight 
civilians.4  And a century and a half ago, the Ku Klux Klan embarked upon what is without 
question the longest, deadliest, and most impactful campaign of terrorism in U.S. history.5  
																																																						
3 Several works explore America’s first Red Scare.  See Beverly Gage, The Day Wall Street 
Exploded, A Story of America in its First Age of Terror (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008) and Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI at War (New York: Random 
House, 2012).  See also David M. Kennedy’s Over Here: The First World War and American 
Society, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) and Ann Hagedorn’s Savage Peace: Hope 
and Fear in America, 1919 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007).  Before that, Robert K. 
Murray’s Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1955) set an early standard for scholarship on the subject. 
4 See Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded. The 1920 J.P. Morgan Bank bombing was the 
deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history until the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City in 1995 claimed the lives of 168 people. 
5 The long, ebbing and flowing KKK campaign of terror, and the socio-political context within 
which it sits, is a rich area still underexplored in historical scholarship.  Mark David Chalmer’s 
still-authoritative Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1981) explores the long history of the Klan, or rather three historically distinct 
iterations of the Klan.  Also see Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy 
and Southern Reconstruction (Louisiana State University Press, 1971) 
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Terrorism has in fact been a part of the American political and social landscape since the birth of 
the nation.6   
Anarchism, anarchist terrorism, and the Red Scare subsided in the years after the 1920 Wall 
Street bombing, and, for decades that followed, terrorism was not among the major concerns for 
an America that had many things – not least among them the Great Depression and another World 
War, and the coming of the Cold War – to contend with.  Terrorism, however, was soon to 
reemerge in American society.   
 
During what Jeremy Varon and other scholars have termed “the long Sixties,” a period stretching 
from the emergence of the protest movements that characterized the era in the 1950s until it 
generally subsided in the mid 1970s, the nation underwent one of the most dramatic and volatile 
chapters in post-Civil War U.S. history. The latter half of that era was accompanied by a new age 
of terrorism that in some respects was the most violent in the history of the nation.7   
																																																						
6 Even before the rise of the KKK during Reconstruction, episodes like the Trail of Tears and 
perhaps Revolutionary actions like the Boston Tea Party can be understood through the modern 
conceptual framework of terrorism (“Perhaps George Washington, not Alexander Berkman, was 
America’s first terrorist,” Gage provocatively suggests in the Journal of American History).  
However, at those earlier points in time the word would most certainly be understood in the 
French Reign of Terror context.  
7 As scholar Simon Hall argues, ‘[t]he concept of a ‘long 1960s’ is now well established in the 
scholarly literature.”  (Hall, “Framing the American 1960s: A Historiographical Review,” 
European Journal of American Culture, Volume 31 Number 1, April 2012)  Historians from 
Arthur Marwick to Gerd-Rainer Horn to Jeremy Varon argue that the Sixties as we think of them 
actually begin in the mid 1950s – perhaps as early as the first mass civil rights actions in 
Montgomery, Alabama – and continue midway into the next decade, after the end of America’s 
involvement in Vietnam and the subsiding of much of the protest movement in the United States.  
See Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, 
c.1958-c.1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of '68: 
Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); and Varon, both in Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red 
Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004), and as co-editor of The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and 
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This work explores the span from 1965 into the first few years of the following decade; 
essentially, the latter half of the “long Sixties,” when terrorism reemerged, escalated, and peaked 
in New York City.   
In July of 1970, almost a quarter-century before the first attack on the World Trade Center, 
a Treasury Department official testified before a U.S. Senate Committee that “the figures do 
graphically reveal that terrorist acts of violence and anarchy by bombing have reached menacing 
proportions in our country.  From January, 1969 to April of this year – a scant 15-month period – 
this country suffered a total of 4,330 bombings, an additional 1,475 attempted bombings, and a 
reported 35,129 threatened bombings.”8    
																																																						
Culture.  The collected essays of The Hidden 1970s: Histories of Radicals (edited by Dan 
Berger, himself a scholar of the Weather Underground), argue that some of the most iconic 
events in the history of Sixties radicalism in fact happened in the 1970s, and this dissertation 
furthers that argument.   
8 Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomittee on 
Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-First 
Congress, Second Session, July 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, and 29, 1970 (Hereinafter referred to as 
“Senate: Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders”).  Statement of Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations, page 5343. To compare with other 
periods in U.S. history, these levels of violence can be put in historical context with Klan 
violence, which is, unfortunately, difficult to get a grasp on for many reasons.  First, the Klan 
was far from a monolithic organization or even movement between its emergence after the Civil 
War and the period under consideration.  Secondly, violence against African Americans and their 
supporters often, or even regularly, went unreported.  Some dramatic twentieth century episodes 
of violence including the 16th Street Baptist Church terrorist bombing in 1963 and the murder of 
civil rights activists in 1964 and 1965 are well documented; the more exact and inclusive register 
of Klan violence, however, is a much harder task to accomplish and well outside the scope of 
this paper.  Klan lynchings are one area where some competent historical research can be pointed 
to.  The Tuskegee University Library contains a little-known archive on KKK activities – The 
Klan Archive.  According to a report compiled by the Tuskegee University Archive Directors 
Monroe Work and Danny Williams between the 1940s and 1969, the Klan was responsible for 
4,473 verifiable lynchings between 1882 and 1968; however, current Tuskegee University 
Archivist Dana Chandler argues that due to the exacting standards for inclusion on the list by the 
Directors and because of what one must assume are a substantial number of unreported lynchings 
that occurred in that timeframe, the actual number is probably well in excess of 5,000.  (See 
“Lynchings, Whites and Negroes, 1882 – 1968,” available on the Tuskegee Library website, 
http://192.203.127.197/archive - last accessed May 18th, 2016). 
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New York City was the violent epicenter of this era of terrorism in the United States.  No 
other county in the nation was targeted by terrorist bombers as much as Manhattan, let alone New 
York City’s five boroughs combined.9  At the same Senate hearing, New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) Commissioner Howard R. Leary testified that the level of attacks in New 
York had reached “gigantic proportions… since January of 1969, there have been 368 bombing 
incidents…” – more than twice the amount of such attacks in New York City as in the eight 
preceding years combined.10   
This work explores that dramatic reemergence of terrorism in New York City during one 
of the most turbulent times in Gotham’s (and America’s) twentieth century, and the response to it 
by the authorities most directly tasked with countering it – the NYPD and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).   
 
																																																						
9 Manhattan alone, and not even New York City more broadly, was the American county with 
the most incidents of terrorism (the overwhelming majority of them bombings) between 1970 
and 2008 – by more than a factor of two relative to Los Angeles, the next county on the list – 
according to a recent work by Gary LaFree and Bianca Bersani; “Hot Spots of Terrorism and 
Other Crimes in the United States, 1970 to 2008,” Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral 
Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
College Park, MD: START, 2012.  During the decade of the 1970s alone, Manhattan more than 
doubled the terrorist attacks in San Francisco, the next closest location, the report concludes.  In 
comparison, southern racial terror, including KKK violence, was more often than not in the form 
of lynchings and similar types of physical violence, and not explosives. This work does not 
intend to make a direct corollary between bombings and terrorism; that would be a false 
equivalency.  A bomb is not always terrorism, and terrorism is not always conducted with a 
bomb.  Outside of the U.S. south, where racial terrorism manifested in other ways more 
frequently, though, almost all tracked terrorism during the era was conducted with some kind of 
an explosive device.  Exceptions certainly exist even in the south, including the 1963 bombing of 
the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham and the nearly two dozen terrorist bombings in that 
city that preceded it.  See “Six Dead in Church Bombing,” Washington Post, September 16th, 
1963.  
10 Senate: Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, (Statement of Howard R. Leary, Commissioner of 
the New York Police Department - NYPD), page 5372.  My emphasis.   
	 7	
In an era characterized by the political and social turmoil that reverberated through New 
York City, the nation, and the world, the role that terrorism played in the larger narrative is often 
reduced to the end-point in a declension narrative of left wing movements during the period: that 
after peaceful (or at least non-violent) beginnings, extremist elements of these movements turned 
to ill-advised and ultimately self-destructive terrorism campaigns and other forms of political 
violence.  Even renowned terrorism scholar David Rapoport’s highly influential periodization of 
modern terrorism into four “waves” describes the wave from 1960 through 1980 as the “New Left” 
wave.11  But what this dissertation questions is if that narrative and our understanding of the long 
Sixties oversimplifies the more complex truth of the era; was it exclusively the young, aggravated, 
long-haired extremists of the political left that turned to terrorism?  What role did right wing 
political actors play in the reemergence of terrorism during the era in New York City and the 
nation?12    
																																																						
11 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 (Spring / 
Summer 2002) 
12 The distinction between political “left” and “right” in this work relies on what would be 
understood to encapsulate these categories during the long Sixties; the left included the 
traditional left of labor activists, Students for a Democratic Society, the Civil Rights movement, 
and the Democratic party, as well as the emergent New Left; see Van Gosse, The Movements of 
the New Left, 1950–1975: A Brief History with Documents (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), 
and John McMillan and Paul Buhle, editors, The New Left Revisited (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2003).  The right included those in opposition to the change advocated for by 
the diffuse left, including anti-Civil Rights and anti-communist organizations and movements.  
These are, admittedly, imperfect categorizations.  Many on the “New Left” did not 
philosophically associate with those on the “old” left, and even many on what are considered the 
“right” – like Cuban exiles, for their opposition to the Cuban Revolution, a vanguard of the left, 
and like American anti-communist and the Jewish Defense League, for their opposition to the 
“old” left vanguard of communism and the “New Left” vanguard of Castro’s Cuba and North 
Vietnam – were also well-versed and may have adopted aspects of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist 
philosophy and tactics.  Perhaps better described as a circular spectrum than a straight line with 
binaries, the extremes of both left and right were not unlikely to find at least some common 
ground on the fringes of their politics. 
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And therein lie the first set of interrelated questions this work explores.  First, who were 
these terrorist actors?  Looking beyond the most notable and notorious actors that most scholarship 
focuses on, on the political left, this work argues that a much wider range of terrorists were active 
in Gotham than the scholarship suggests.  In New York City as elsewhere in the nation, anti-
government and anti-Vietnam War protestors like the Weather Underground and the Sam Melville 
collective, virulent anti-communists like the Minutemen, radical religious organizations like the 
Jewish Defense League, nationalists of various stripes from Cuba and Puerto Rico and as far away 
as Croatia, and a myriad of other groups and individuals from across the political spectrum, 
embraced terrorism to promote their political goals. I argue that a more accurate depiction of the 
long Sixties reveals not just, and maybe not even primarily, the political left turning to terrorism 
in New York City, where this kind of political violence was by far most prevalent.  Groups on the 
political right, largely ignored by historians just as they were ignored by Republican candidate for 
President Richard Nixon as he promoted his push for a return to “Law and Order” in the 1968 
election season, had an early and lasting impact on the era.  
The second fundamental question this work explores is, what was the dynamic relationship 
between these terrorist actors and the local and federal agencies tasked with responding to their 
actions?  The organizations this study focuses on are the NYPD and the FBI, the primary local and 
the primary federal organizations that found themselves responding to the resurgent threat of 
terrorism in New York City.  Two fundamental concepts that undergird this work are: that 
terrorism and counterterrorism during this era coevolve, that both are directly impacted by 
developments amongst the other group of actors, and that a consideration of one must also take 
into account the other; and secondly that law enforcement intelligence operations are absolutely 
central in countering terrorism.  That holds true not just in the period under consideration but 
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throughout all of modern U.S. history.  Michael Hayden, Director of the U.S. National Security 
Agency (NSA), argued soon after the 9/11 attacks that “[i]ntelligence – and how we use it – is our 
first line of defense against terrorists…”13  How did the actions of these organizations, then, build 
upon the activities and experiences of earlier generations of law enforcement and intelligence in 
response to a new era of terrorism in New York City?  How were these agencies themselves 
impacted by the tumultuous socio-political atmosphere of the long Sixties – both locally in New 
York City and at the national level – and by the actions of terrorist actors as it reemerged in 
American society?   
I argue that the law enforcement and intelligence excesses of the era, significantly exhibited 
by the Watergate and COINTELPRO scandals on the national level and the so-called “Panther 13” 
case and Handschu class-action lawsuit against the NYPD on the local level, had substantial 
impacts on the methods by which, and then the ability and effectiveness of, these agencies to 
counter the threat posed by terrorists.  Of particular note is that it is these organizations own efforts 
to thwart terrorism – such as in the case of FBI’s Squad 47, established to investigate the Weather 
Underground, and the famous so-called “Panther 13” case involving the NYPD – that resulted in 
some of the most impactful curtailments of these agencies abilities.  
 
DEFINING TERRORISM 
 
What has been called ‘terrorism’ has evolved over the centuries.  Prominent scholars in terrorism 
studies including Bruce Hoffman and Walter Laqueur argue that the term first came to prominence 
																																																						
13 Michael Hayden quoted in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
Washington, D.C., page 30, (September 2002) 
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during the French Revolution and then meant something quite different than it does in our own 
time.14  In contrast to terrorism as we generally perceive it today – and how it was perceived during 
the long Sixties15 – as being conducted by subnational or clandestine agents in the shadows, the 
French Reign of Terror (1793-1794) was a systematic use of oppression, intimidation, and 
execution by the recently ascended revolutionary government as a method of subduing perceived 
dissidents; it was a tool openly utilized by those in power, not clandestinely by those seeking 
power.16  This “terrorism from above,” as it is sometimes referred to, is a particular form of 
political oppression that, while many argue is still practiced by some nations – including perhaps 
the United States – is not a debate that this work engages in.17   
																																																						
14 Just what is terrorism is a necessary question to consider: “[b]ecause terrorism is what we are 
trying to explain, the most obvious question concerns what it is.” (Martha Crenshaw, “Questions 
to be Answered, Research to be Done, Knowledge to be Applied,” in Walter Reich, editor; 
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind [Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990], page 247).  The works of Crenshaw 
as well as Walter Laqueur and Bruce Hoffman loom large in demystifying and clarifying the 
concept and enabling the use of the word in objective analytic terms, as opposed to the 
intellectually lazy pejorative that it is too often employed as.  See Bruce Hoffman, Inside 
Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), and several works by Walter Laqueur 
over several years, including the more recent A History of Terrorism, (New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2001).  See also Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism - Is One Man’s Terrorist Another 
Man’s Freedom Fighter?” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, Volume 3, 
Issue 4, 2002; Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences (New 
York, Routledge, 2010), Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New Is the New Terrorism?” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 27, Issue 5, 2004 
15 The use of the term “terrorism” to describe the actions explored in this study is not an 
anachronistic application of a modern term or concept to a historical context that it would be 
foreign to; the term was regularly applied by the media, law enforcement, and others to describe 
these acts, even if then (as now) an exact definition of the term was difficult to ascertain. 
16 For a historical exploration, see Arno J. Meyer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French 
and Russian Revolutions, (Princeton University Press, 2000).  Hoffman offers a discussion of 
French Revolutionary “terrorism” in the context of modern terrorism studies in Inside Terrorism. 
17 See Asafa Jalata, "Terrorism from Above and Below in the Age of Globalization," Sociology 
Mind, Volume 1, Number 1, pages 1-15, February 2011 
	 11	
Terrorism as Americans became most familiar with it during the twentieth century, a tactic 
adopted by the powerless seeking power –modern terrorism, “terror from below” – is defined in 
this work as the intentional use or threat of violence by sub-national agents against civilians, 
civilian institutions, and other non-combatants in an effort to promote a political goal broader 
than the specific targets of that violence.  To create fear and terror in service of a political goal.18  
The political nature of the violence, as Hoffman convincingly argues, is essential in separating 
terrorism from other forms of violence.19  This modern, sub-state terrorism is the object of inquiry 
of this work.  
 
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY AND OTHER SCHOLARSHIP 
 
In the Journal of American History in 2011, Beverly Gage argues that despite an 
unmistakable post-9/11 increase in the scholarship on terrorism in the American experience, it 
would still be “hard to classify this surge of work as a flourishing subfield or even a coherent 
																																																						
18 The debate surrounding the definition of terrorism has been ongoing in the social sciences, 
politics, the military, and media for some time now.  The definition offered in this work, 
however, largely covers what is agreed-upon consensus ground in the definitional debate and 
steers clear of the more disputed aspects of terrorism, such as whether or not states can be 
terrorist actors.  Whether or not bombing a place and not a person constitutes terrorism is the one 
aspect of this definition that some may debate: that since no human was intentionally injured it 
falls short of terrorism, an admittedly ambiguous term.  I disagree.  The key intent of terrorism is 
the message projected and not the actual target struck, be it human or not.  The human / object 
distinction therefore is less relevant in my estimation.  Scholar of the 1960s (and particularly of 
the Weather Underground and German Red Army Faction) Jeremy Varon, for instance, has 
argued that such acts might constitute an “armed struggle” and not terrorism, arguing that usage 
of terrorism (a loaded pejorative) is a judgment of the politics behind the violence (See Varon, 
Bringing the War Home, page 329, N.3).  I might argue the opposite – that calling it “armed 
struggle” rather than using “terrorism” in an intentionally neutral fashion is, itself, a judgement 
of the politics behind the violence. 
19 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 14 
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historiography.  Almost a decade out from 9/11, most U.S. historians remain hard-pressed to 
explain what terrorism is, how and when it began, or what its impact has been.”20  More than five 
years removed from Gage’s foundational article, these words remain true.  Historians have long 
explored those events and movements that might contribute to the history of terrorism in the United 
States, such as scholarship on anarchism and labor radicalism in the United States, and the Ku 
Klux Klan and other anti-civil rights violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  However, 
the enduring indeterminateness of the subject (just what is terrorism?), or the unwillingness to 
apply what is a distinctly negative term to the subjects that many scholars study, or the hesitancy 
to appear to engage in presentism, in what is undeniably a critical issue in the modern U.S., have 
proven roadblocks to a more defined historiography.  The works that have emerged instead tend 
to be “episodic, a series of discrete interventions rather than a consistent, developing 
conversation,” as Gage puts it.  “Most historians who have engaged the subject remain wedded to 
a particular period and social context, shying away from broader conclusions.”21  This dissertation 
attempts to meet the challenge more directly, to define what terrorism is and was; to explore a 
particular period, as Gage puts it, but to look beyond a particular social context and to explore 
broader conclusions, to bring itself and the works it cites into conversation as part of or related to 
the historiography of terrorism (and counterterrorism) in the American experience. 
 
The historiography of the American sixties is vast.22  Generally and overwhelmingly, the period is 
presented as a time of political unrest largely emanating from the political left.  The evolving Civil 
																																																						
20 Beverly Gage, “Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the Field,” Journal of 
American History, 74, June 2011. 
21 Ibid., 82 
22 Broad overviews of this most important era in U.S. (and world) history, such as the 
noteworthy America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s by Maurice Isserman and Michael 
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Rights movement, for instance, has its own expansive and rich body of scholarship, and other 
scholars’ work informs this dissertation by exploring the evolution of the struggle for African 
American equality towards, in limited cases, the use of terrorism as part of the larger narrative.23     
The broad-based anti-war protest movement, and the New Left, have been the seeds from 
which the lion’s share of the scholarship exploring the era, and of U.S. terrorism of the era, has 
sprung.  This dissertation explores if that disparity accurately reflects the history of the time, 
whether the political left was indeed responsible for such an imbalance of terrorism as the 
scholarship and popular history seems to suggest.   
As far as this era goes, the Weather Underground has been by far the subject of the most 
scholarly writing and has produced a litany of memoirs by former members.24  Scholars like Varon, 
																																																						
Kazin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), prove useful for big-picture context.  Other 
notable scholarly syntheses include Mark Hamilton Lytle’s America's Uncivil Wars: The Sixties 
Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon (Oxford University Press, 2006), and David Farber’s 
The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).  Todd 
Gitlin’s memoir / history, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam, 1987) 
is an influential first-hand account of the era that largely reinforces – in fact was an early 
example of – the declension narrative of the 1960s. 
23 On especially post-King and Civil Rights in the U.S. Northeast, see Martha Biondi, To Stand 
and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (New York: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); and Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for 
Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008) which explores the movement not 
just during the long Sixties but a more expansive lens of most of the twentieth century; also see 
Clarence Taylor, editor, Civil Rights in New York City: From World War II to the Giuliani Era 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2011).   
24 Standout scholarship on the group is highlighted by Jeremy Varon’s Bringing the War Home.  
Former Weather Underground members (and their family, in at least one case) have found it 
difficult to NOT write memoirs and otherwise discuss their time as radicals.  The long list 
includes Mark Rudd’s Underground: My Life with SDS and the Weathermen (New York: 
William Morrow/HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), Cathy Wilkerson’s Flying Close to the Sun: 
My Life and Times as a Weatherman (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007), Susan Stern’s With 
the Weathermen: The Personal Journal of a Revolutionary Woman (New York: Doubleday, 
1975), and Thai Jones’s account of his family’s history of radicalism through the twentieth 
century, A Radical Line: From the Labor Movement to the Weather Underground (New York: 
Free Press, 2004).  They also frequently appear in other written historical accounts and 
documentaries, including Sam Green and Bill Siegel’s 2002 documentary, The Weather 
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and more recently Arthur Eckstein, while acknowledging that Weather Underground sat within a 
larger field of political radicals in the United States, place tremendous emphasis on this group as 
the most impactful of the era.25  Without disputing that claim, this dissertation focuses instead on 
the actions and impact of much-lesser-remembered historical actors of the era who in fact predated 
and paved the way for Weather’s actions. 
Chief among the less-remembered historical actors this dissertation explores is radical 
leftist Sam Melville and the ‘collective’ of likeminded individuals that formed around him.  
Despite what I argue is their precedent-setting campaign of bombings, the Sam Melville collective 
is largely ignored by historical scholarship of the era.  Varon credits Melville and his collective as 
a prototype for other leftist bombers to follow, even if discussing the man and the group for only 
a few pages.26  But the question this dissertation asks is if a closer look reveals an even greater 
import and relevance than most historians including Varon have acknowledged.  
																																																						
Underground and Dan Berger’s, Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the 
Politics of Solidarity (California: AK Press, 2005) which relies on many oral histories with 
former members, but gravitates uncomfortably towards hagiography. 
25 Arthur M. Eckstein’s new exploration of Weather Underground, Bad Moon Rising: How the 
Weather Underground Beat the FBI and Lost the Revolution (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2016), takes into account newly-declassified documents in an exploration of the 
emergence of Weather as well as important subjects like the organization’s relationship to 
violence and, very relevant to this work, the FBI’s obsession with capturing them that ultimately 
drove the Bureau to the illegal practices that ultimately ended up finding Bureau leadership, and 
not Weather Underground leadership, facing federal charges.   
26 Bryan Burrough’s popular history account of the leftists of the era, Days of Rage: America's 
Radical Underground, the FBI, and the Forgotten Age of Revolutionary Violence (New York: 
Penguin Random House, 2015), similarly to Varon (almost verbatim in fact) gives Melville 
credit as a trendsetter but also dedicates few pages, and in this case only of secondary-source 
recitation, to the collective’s actions.  Another account, Leslie James Pickering’s Mad Bomber 
Melville (California: Arissa Media Group/PM Press, 2007) – the only book written specifically 
on Melville – is superficial and so unrepentantly hagiographical to render itself of very limited 
scholarly use.   
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Right wing political movements of the era have been explored by scholars, and many 
resorted to violence during the era.  But the question of whether these movements and these actors 
belong in the conversation on terrorism of the era, and in the American experience more broadly, 
remain un- or under-explored.  
Anticommunism in the United States, characterized by personalities like Senator Joseph 
McCarthy and organizations like the John Birch Society and the Minutemen, was among the 
principle right wing political movements of the era.  But on the question of anticommunist 
terrorism the scholarship is nearly silent.27  On another major manifestation of extreme right wing 
politics in New York City and elsewhere in the nation – Cuban exile anti-Castro activity – the 
scholarship is also relatively silent on the question of terrorism.28  An idiosyncratic organization 
that represents the beginning and end of its particular brand of political radicalism in the U.S. – 
radical Jewish activism, as manifested by the Jewish Defense League (JDL) – has similarly been 
the subject of little historical scholarship, and none exploring them in the context of terrorism.29 
																																																						
27 See Richard Gid Powers, Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge 
Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977); David Farber and Jeff 
Roche, The Conservative Sixties (New York: Peter Lang, 2003).   See also Ellen Schrecker’s No 
Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1986), 
and Victor Navasky’s Naming Names: The Social Costs of McCarthyism (New York: Viking 
Press, 1980).  The two principal anticommunist organizations of the era, the John Birch Society 
and the Minutemen, have been discussed by a limited number of scholars; see J. Harry Jones, Jr., 
The Minutemen (New York: Doubleday, 1968) for a still-unrivaled study of that group; and D.J. 
Mulloy, The World of the John Birch Society: Conspiracy, Conservatism, and the Cold War 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014) for the only scholarly study on the JBS. 
28 The few more general accounts of anti-Castro activities in the United States include Warren 
Hinckle and William T. Turner’s The Fish Is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1981), and William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluth’s more 
recent and scholarly Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between 
Washington and Havana (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014).   
29 Little scholarship exists on the JDL.  An unpublished 1981 CUNY Graduate Center Ph.D. 
dissertation, “The Zionist Hooligans: The Jewish Defense League,” by Shlomo Russ (Sociology 
Department) is the most extensive historical accounting of the JDL. While Russ’s dissertation is 
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For each of these movements and organizations on the political right, what little scholarship 
that has emerged is characteristic of the “discrete interventions” that Gage spoke of in her JAH 
article; terrorism is at best an ancillary consideration in these few works, and in any case does 
nothing to put JDL, or Cuban exile, or anti-communist activity, into a greater context of the era of 
terrorism in the U.S. more broadly. 
 
Beyond but related to the scholarly intervention in political violence and terrorism of the era, how 
historians and other scholars have explored the policing and especially political policing of the era 
is also of central significance to this work.  In keeping constant with the scholarly interpretation 
of terrorism of the era, the interpretive direction of scholarship on policing leans heavily toward 
the exploration of the excesses of authorities in opposition of various organizations, movements, 
and individuals on the political left.30  
The FBI has been a popular subject of historical scholarship almost since it emerged in the 
first decades of the twentieth century, but the Bureau’s image was carefully controlled by Director 
																																																						
tremendous scholarship on JDL not to be outdone in the pages dedicated to the group in this 
dissertation, the framework this dissertation applies – putting both the terrorist acts and the 
response to it in context of the broader picture of terrorism and counterterrorism in New York 
City during the era – is not one that Dr. Russ endeavored to in his own scholarship. See also JDL 
leader Meir Kahane’s The Story of the Jewish Defense League (Pennsylvania: Chilton Book 
Company, 1975), which necessitates a tremendously circumspect reading, and Alan 
Dershowitz’s memoir The Best Defense (New York: Random House, 1982), which includes a 
chapter on his defense of JDL members on charges relating to their terrorist acts.  
30 Only a scant few journal articles from outside of the discipline of history including a 2014 
article by William Rosenau discuss the issue directly (See Rosenau, “The ‘First War on 
Terrorism?’ – U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism during the 1970s and Early 1980s,” Washington, 
D.C.: CNA Center for Strategic Studies, October 2014).  Rosenau, a former political scientist at 
the RAND Corporation, employed a focus that was broadly national.  Generally, no scholarly 
writing explores the specific question of the rise of terrorism in New York City during the era; 
the closest exception is Jeffrey A. Kroessler’s 2014 journal article, “Bombing for Justice: Urban 
Terrorism in New York City from the 1960s through to the 1980s,”in Criminal Justice and Law 
Enforcement Annual: Global Perspectives, Vol. 6-1. 
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Hoover during his long tenure that lasted until his death in 1972.31  The FBI-as-counterterrorist-
actor is a small subset of the scholarship that has largely, in past decades, focused on the illegal 
practices and intelligence excesses of the Bureau.32  Characteristic of this subset of the scholarship 
is Pulitzer Prize winning author Tim Weiner’s Enemies: A History of the FBI, which explores the 
century-long history of the Bureau and places intelligence and terrorism at the center of that 
history: “We think of the FBI as a police force, arresting criminals and upholding the rule of law,” 
Weiner explains.  “But secret intelligence against terrorists and spies is the Bureau’s first and 
foremost mission today, and that has been true for most of the past hundred years.”33  Weiner’s 
work, however, generally fails to make the important distinction between secret intelligence 
utilized against peaceful political protest, radical politics, and terrorism, creating an uncomfortable 
conflation of terrorism and other types of political dissidence, including peaceful and lawful (if 
vocal and vibrant) protest. 
																																																						
31 The most notable instance of this controlled image is Don Whitehead’s popular 1956 history 
of the Bureau, The FBI Story: A Report to the People (New York: Random House, 1956) – a 
whitewash, really, with careful guidance by the FBI and an introduction by Hoover himself.   
32 Bryan Burrough argues “[t]he FBI has been America's punching bag… ever since the first 
stories of its 1960's excesses began appearing in the wake of J. Edgar Hoover's death in 1972,” 
so much so that “store shelves sag under the weight of books” taking the FBI to task (Bryan 
Burrough, Review of Broken: Not Your Father's F.B.I., by Richard Gid Powers, New York 
Times, October 24th, 2004).  Other works to consider on the FBI include Burrough’s reviewed 
work by Richard Gid Powers, who has written extensively on the Bureau including this most 
recent work that argued the “battering” that the FBI was subject to in response to revelations 
about its illegal excesses in the 1960s and 1970s led to the “timid” FBI that failed to prevent 
9/11.  Also see Peter Lance’s 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI 
(New York, William Morrow & Co., 2003), and David Cunningham’s There’s Something 
Happening Here - The New Left, the Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), which argues that the Bureau was only reluctantly brought to investigate 
the radical right – most notably the Klan – through substantial efforts by the Department of 
Justice, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and President Lyndon Johnson. 
33 Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI at War, author’s note. 
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Some very accomplished scholarship argues an entirely different view than does Weiner.  
Frank Donner’s Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America 
remains, a quarter center after publication, the most thorough examination of political policing not 
only in New York but elsewhere in the nation.  In exploring federal authorities but more 
importantly local authorities like NYPD, Donner makes the opposite argument – that the 
intelligence operations Weiner lumps in the category of counterterrorism were in fact political 
policing.  In making his argument, Donner never suggests that the political organizations and 
persons under investigation by the FBI and these local authorities were indeed sometimes 
threatening and committing violence or the terrorism that Weiner explores.34  This dissertation 
explores whether, as in many things in life, the truth lies closer to the middle of these two binary 
arguments.  
 
As far as NYPD is concerned, much of the scholarship on the police department is either general 
overview or specific to a particular incident of note, such as the highly impactful Knapp 
Commission investigating police corruption during the 1970s.35  Gage and select others, however, 
have done exceptional work in exploring the NYPD in the earlier era of anarchist terrorism, and 
there have been a number of recent accounts of post-September 11th NYPD counterterrorism and 
																																																						
34 Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).  Donner’s analytical bias is not surprising; an 
accomplished scholar and lawyer, he served as the Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union's (ACLU) Project on Political Surveillance and had worked tirelessly throughout his long 
legal career to further left-leaning, anti-policing, and anti-intelligence practices in the United 
States.  See Bruce Lambert, “Frank J. Donner Is Dead at 82; A Lawyer in Civil Liberties Cases,” 
New York Times, June 11th, 1993.   
35 See James Lardner and Thomas Reppetto, NYPD – A City and its Police (New York: Henry 
Holt, 2000) for a general overview, and for a study of the Knapp Commission, see Michael F. 
Armstrong, They Wished They Were Honest: The Knapp Commission and New York City Police 
Corruption (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
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intelligence activities.36  But very little scholarly work explores the central questions of this study 
in any kind of depth, other than Donner’s standout work.  The lone addition is former Detective 
Anthony Bouza’s recounting of the operations of the Bureau of Special Services, or BOSS, 
NYPD’s premier intelligence unit for decades including during the long Sixties.37   
This work engages with that shallow pool of scholarship that has explored NYPD 
counterterrorism and what those like Donner allege was political policing, and questions whether 
or not what is alleged to have been political policing – in violation of civil liberties – may have in 
fact been legitimate law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism.  
 
  
																																																						
36 The most notable of works on the modern NYPD is a lauded work by Matt Apuzzo and Adam 
Goldman, Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and bin Laden’s Final Plot 
Against America (New York: Touchstone, 2013), which was based on their Pulitzer Prize-
winning Associated Press reporting.   
37 Anthony Bouza, Police Intelligence: Operations of an Investigative Unit, (New York: AMS 
Press, 1976).  Bouza details how BOSS “grew into an effective intelligence operation rather 
naturally and unconsciously” because of the challenges presented by the times – including 
“terrorist acts of sabotage” and “the proliferation of radical political organizations.” (Bouza, 
Police Intelligence, 3).  Frank Donner’s Protectors of Privilege also includes a very well-
researched chapter on BOSS. While there is scant scholarship on NYPD’s efforts in 
counterterrorism during the era, there have, however, been a surprising number of memoirs by 
other former members of the police department, beyond Bouza, that are tremendously useful 
despite the obvious caveats of caution that must be acknowledged when considering any memoir.  
Those memoirs of most relevance are selections by former Chief of Detectives Albert Seedman, 
who investigated the Melville collective and the Weather Underground; former NYPD 
Commissioner Patrick Murphy, whose dramatic restructuring of the Detective Division had a 
substantial impact; former BOSS Detective Jack Caulfield, who investigated Cuban Power; Ed 
Howlette, who infiltrated Revolutionary Action Movement; and former BOSS undercover 
operative Richard Rosenthal, who infiltrated the Jewish Defense League as a rookie policeman. 
See Albert Seedman & Peter Hellman, Chief! Classic Cases from the Files of the Chief of 
Detectives, (New York: Arthur Fields Books, 1974); Jack Caulfield, Caulfield, Shield #911-
NYPD (iUniverse, 2012); Ed Howlette Sr., Eric-83: Patriot or Traitor? A Precursor to Modern 
Day Terrorism (Maryland: PublishAmerica, 2007); Richard Rosenthal, Rookie Cop: Deep 
Undercover in the Jewish Defense League (New York: Leapfrog Press, 2000) 
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THE REEMERGENCE OF TERRORISM 
 
The question of why terrorism reemerges in New York City is a compelling historical inquiry.  
Terrorism had already reemerged elsewhere in the United States, most graphically illustrated by 
the KKK and the violent reaction to the Civil Rights movement in the south.  Alabama’s 
Birmingham was often referred to as “Bombingham” well before terrorism reemerged in New 
York City, and even before the deadly 1963 terrorist attack on the 16th Street Baptist Church in 
Birmingham, because of the numerous bombs that had exploded there to counter the Civil Rights 
movement.  At the Congress of Racial Equality’s (CORE) national convention in the summer of 
1963, just months before the Baptist Church bombing, one delegate told a journalist that “[i]t is 
not easy to tell a man that is being beaten not to reach for his gun or his knife.”38  Perhaps given 
that sentiment it is unsurprising that some decided to no longer turn the other cheek, and that some 
of those who decided to respond to violence with violence turned to the same tactic – terrorism – 
that was often being used against them.39   
As recently as 1962, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) – the origins from which the 
Weather Underground would spring – proclaimed in their “Port Huron Statement” that “[i]n social 
change or interchange, we find violence to be abhorrent… [i]t is imperative that the means of 
violence be abolished and the institutions – local, national, international – that encourage non-
																																																						
38 M.S. Handler, “Militancy Grows, CORE Aides Warns,” New York Times, June 28th, 1963 
39 This work, however, does not make the claim that all of the violence / reactionary violence 
that often characterizes the second stage of the Civil Rights movement was terrorism; there was a 
wide spectrum of violence ranging from the nationwide riots, assaults and assassinations of 
police officers, violent rhetoric from the Black Panthers, RAM, and others, and to a much lesser 
degree, terrorism and terrorist plots such as the Statue of Liberty plot.  
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violence as a condition of conflict be developed.”40  The Weather Underground “Declaration of a 
State of War” that would emerge not eight years later, needless to say, adopted a much different 
approach to social change.  Those eight years were violent years – in Vietnam, on college campuses 
like Kent and Columbia, at events like the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago in 
August of 1968.  RAT Subterranean News, emerging as one of the most prominent underground 
press publications, argued after the Chicago DNC that “[t]he cops don’t understand.  It’s not 
‘hippies’ who are fighting with them in the streets…  It’s white drop-outs who have buried their 
flowers and joined the community.  It’s the kids who made the scene during the summer of love 
and then had to survive the New York winter.”41  Jeremy Varon quotes flyers that had appeared 
plastered around New York City during the Columbia University protests earlier that same year: 
“We must prepare ourselves to deal with the enemy. Our weapons: political education and tactical 
organization for students and workers: rocks, clubs, fire bombs, plastique, guns — but most of all 
— commitment and courage.”42   
That the left, or rather some on the left, adopted violence in response to violence (as the 
CORE delegate warned) is not surprising.  That it manifested as terrorism is only evidence of the 
dirty secret that, historically, terrorism as a tool of the less-powerful sometimes works.43  
But terrorism in New York City, and political left terrorism in the U.S. more generally, 
shouldn’t be seen as exclusively or even primarily a reaction to violence from the political right, 
																																																						
40 Tom Hayden et al, “Port Huron Statement,” Students for a Democratic Society, June 15th, 
1962 
41 Thorne Dreyer, “Lower East Side,” RAT Subterranean News, July 26 – August 8, 1968 
42 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 26, citation number 15, “DARE WE BE HEROES?” 
(anonymous flyer, 1968, University of California – Berkley) 
43 See Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, especially Chapter 1, for a short discussion of the historical 
instances from Northern Ireland to French occupied Algeria to mandate Palestine where 
terrorism had a positive impact for those who employed it.   
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violence that had perpetuated ever since Reconstruction and had, in response to the Civil Rights 
movement, turned to the more blatant and visible terrorism of bombs.  The reemergence of 
terrorism from the political left during the long Sixties can and should also be seen as a component 
of an increasingly radicalized left and, often, an increasing abandonment of the tenets of non-
violence as espoused by the Dr. Kings and Port Huron Statements of the world.  Terrorism was 
just one such manifestation of increasing levels of violence in all quarters.  The SDS / Weatherman 
“Days of Rage” in 1969.  Rioting that spread through urban ghettos.  It was a violent time and 
terrorism was perhaps a way to cut through the noise with your message, to achieve the headlines 
that too often were buried for lack of enough front pages to cover all of the tumult of the era.   
Further, as Varon argues, the violence of the long Sixties in the U.S., including the 
reemergence of terrorism, must not be seem in a domestic vacuum – international considerations 
must be taken into account.44  These include the war in Vietnam, the Cuban Revolution, 
international communism and anti-communism more generally, international independence 
movements from Algeria and Palestine to just over the northern border in Quebec, and the 
emergence of New Left and revolutionary political ideologies as espoused by the likes of Regis 
Debray, Frantz Fanon, and Mao Tse Tung. 45 
																																																						
44 As Jeremy Varon argues, it is important to keep in mind that while these terrorist acts 
manifested in the U.S., they are often not uniquely American.  Movements and organizations 
discussed in this work to include Weather Underground, Cuban Power, the Minutemen and the 
Sam Melville collective, to name just a few, had either (or both) international influence or 
objectives.  See Varon, Bringing the War Home. 
45 Regis Debray’s Revolution in the Revolution? (1967) is a well-known and frequently cited 
book amongst New Left activists and extremists during the long Sixties.  See Avi Shlaim, Israel 
and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations, (New York: Verso, 2009) for a discussion 
of terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian context, and Bruce Hoffman, Invisible Soldiers, Anonymous 
Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917-1947, (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2015) for a 
discussion of terrorism by both Jews and Muslims during mandate-era Palestine. Frantz Fanon’s 
highly influential The Wretched of the Earth (1961), which had a tremendous impact on anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist movements and the justification of violence in service of them. 
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In conclusion, then, this work explores the reemergence and response to terrorism in New York 
City during the long Sixties, among the most dramatic periods of terrorism in U.S. history.  Broadly 
and at its most ambitious, this work endeavors to shed light on a place and time of unique 
importance to the history of terrorism in the American experience that has not previously been 
explored in such a way – the importance of both periodization and geography – and to expand on 
the literature that has previously overwhelmingly only explored terrorism of the era from the left.  
Why did such a variety of actors from such a wide swath of the political spectrum engage in 
terrorism during the long Sixties?  
By exploring the law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism in New York 
City during this time period, this work contributes to the scholarship on political policing and law 
enforcement / intelligence excesses of the time and engages the work of scholars like Frank Donner 
who have argued these efforts were purely political in nature (and not in response to potential or 
actual threats and crimes), and contends with the historiographical assertions  that largely claim 
these law enforcement practices exclusively targeted the political left.  
Finally, this work serves as a deliberate contribution to the still-emerging historiography 
of terrorism in the American experience that Beverly Gage discusses in the Journal of American 
																																																						
Another highly influential international theoretical publication is famed terrorist Carlos 
Marighella’s Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla (1969), that laid out specific plans for how to 
utilize sabotage and terrorism (a distinction that isn’t clear from his work) in the plight of 
underground organizations.  “Terrorism,” Marighella argues in the Minimanual, “is a weapon the 
revolutionary can never relinquish.” Finally, Mao was often celebrated by radical leftists and his 
writings were highly influential; for instance, Mao published an essay discussing the utility of 
symbolic acts others might find futile, in 1930.  The title of that essay, “A Single Spark Can Start 
a Prairie Fire,” was to be parroted by the Weather Underground in their own publication, Prairie 
Fire, in 1974. 
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History.  By engaging with the concept of terrorism directly, by engaging with much of the 
scholarship of the long Sixties, and by engaging directly with other scholars who have explored 
the issues of terrorism and counterterrorism in the United States, this work intends to both fill gaps 
in the existing scholarship on the era as well as create new questions for future scholars to explore.
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PART I : NYPD, FBI, and Early Terrorist Plots in NYC During the Long Sixties 
Chapter 1 : The FBI and NYPD   
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The FBI and the NYPD were the constants.  From the very first failed plots that would mark an 
understated start to the new era of terrorism in New York City, and through the rest of the turbulent 
period when terrorism in city streets became commonplace enough to be buried in the filler pages 
of local newspapers, this federal organization and this local organization would be at the center of 
it all.  Their centrality was not accidental.  The primary positions that FBI and NYPD had in 
countering terrorism arose from those organizations’ positions as the foremost law enforcement 
and intelligence operations existing in New York City at the time. 
We look first at the authorities who would become the central counter-terror actors in this 
period, and not terrorism itself, because these authorities and the structures and practices they 
brought to bear against terrorism predate the terrorism of the era.  As we shall see, FBI and NYPD 
did not, intentionally and specifically, develop intelligence programs to counter terrorism; not in 
this era at least.  During this historical period, these two organizations possessed vast political 
intelligence operations, some decades old, similar to those proliferating throughout the nation – at 
the federal, state, and municipal levels – to counter what they deemed to be political subversives, 
potentially dangerous (at least politically dangerous) organizations and individuals, mostly in the 
context of Cold War fears and civil rights upheavals.1  Terrorism, being political in nature, 
reemerged from among some of the alleged political subversives that these intelligence operations 
targeted; not every political movement spawned terrorists, but every terrorist was inherently part, 
at least tangentially, of a political faction that the FBI and NYPD would argue they had cause to 
monitor. 
  
																																																						
1 See Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege 
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THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) 
 
By 1965, the FBI had grown from the original thirty-four agents of the Bureau of Investigation to 
6,336 agents and 8,533 support staffers, with a Congressionally allocated budget of more than 
$161 million.2  During the turbulent years to come, these numbers increased substantially; by 1971 
there were 8,548 agents and 11,130 support staffers with a ballooned budget of $295 million.3  
That the FBI of this era maintained a robust domestic intelligence program and dedicated a 
substantial amount of these mounting resources to investigating and thwarting what the 
organization perceived as dangerous and “subversive” elements in American society is the most 
commonly explored aspect of the organization’s history; but as Beverly Gage, Tim Weiner, Frank 
Donner and others point out, the FBI-as-domestic-intelligence-agency was not a new development 
for the Bureau.  During the era of anarchism, as Gage argues, the nascent Bureau of Investigation 
and a young J. Edgar Hoover cut their teeth on some of the most compelling cases of the time 
including the 1920 Wall Street Bombing.4  In 1918, Hoover had been appointed as the Chief of 
the Bureau’s newly emerged Radical Division, so gathering intelligence on and combating 
subversives and terrorists are in fact a crucial early step in the long trajectory of both the man and 
the organization he would be singularly responsible for shaping.5 
																																																						
2 The FBI traces its roots back as far as 1909; despite congressional prohibition of spending any 
funds on the initiative for fear of creating an American “secret police,” Attorney General Charles 
Bonaparte quietly recruited a number of former detectives and Secret Service agents to work 
within the Department of Justice, and to report to the Chief Inspector and to the Attorney 
General himself.  This force of “Special Agents” was renamed the Bureau of Investigation by the 
next Attorney General, George W. Wickensham, when he took office in March of 1909. See 
Athan G. Theoharis, editor, with Tony G. Poveda, Susan Rosenfeld, and Richard Gid Powers; 
The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1999), 361 
3 Athan G. Theoharis, et al, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, 5 
4 See Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded 
5 See Weiner, Enemies; and Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded 
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The Bureau established a presence outside of Washington, D.C., almost immediately upon 
its creation.  The New York field office was one of the Bureau’s first two satellite offices, opened 
in 1910, and remains to this day the largest of its dozens of field offices.  At first, the New York 
field office was located in the City Hall Post Office and Courthouse on the site of the present-day 
City Hall Park.  The New York office moved several times over the following decades, landing in 
1956 at a newly renovated silver warehouse at 201 East 69th street, just east of Third Avenue; it 
would remain there for almost a quarter century, moving in 1980 to the site it currently occupies 
at the Jacob Javits Federal Building near Foley Square.6 
By the mid 1960s, the FBI was composed of ten divisions, structured around functional 
instead of geographic lines.  Many large field offices, including New York, included 
representatives from most if not all divisions.  Assistant to the Director Cartha DeLoach was 
responsible for the three investigative divisions: Division Six, General Investigative; Division 
Nine, Special Investigations; and most relevant to this study, Division Five, Domestic Intelligence.  
The Intelligence Division, given its mandate to “develop intelligence information concerning the 
activities of individuals and organizations who aimed to subvert or overthrow the United States 
government,” is from where much of the FBI’s response to terrorism would emanate. 
The Intelligence Division is also where the COINTELPROs – or Counter-Intelligence 
Programs – were housed, under the guidance of Intelligence Division head William C. Sullivan, 
who served as Hoover’s de-facto agent in charge of the programs.7  The use of the term 
“intelligence” in the COINTELPROs, however, is a euphemism for programs of not just 
questionable legality but, often, clear illegality.  The COINTELPROs utilized a number of 
																																																						
6 Theoharis, et al, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, 258 
7 Ibid., 226 
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aggressive tactics to “disrupt and neutralize” targets, including but not limited to: expansive 
surveillance operations using informants and undercover agents; illegal “black bag” jobs, or 
breaking and entering and theft; leaking of embarrassing information or lies about the group or 
individual targets; disinformation campaigns; and legal and physical intimidation.8  Historian Seth 
Rosenfeld argues that the COINTELPROs “took techniques originally developed for use against 
foreign adversaries and turned them on domestic political groups whose politics they considered 
un-American.”9   
The programs ran, hidden from public eye, from 1956 until 1971 – closed down only when 
public knowledge about them became likely following a theft and dissemination of FBI documents 
by a left wing protest group in Media, Pennsylvania.  But through much of the long Sixties, the 
various COINTELPROs were brought to bear against a broad spectrum of potentially subversive 
elements in American society, including right wing groups like the Ku Klux Klan.  The vast 
majority of targets, however, were on the political left – from the Communist Party USA and civil 
rights leaders and groups, and organizations and individuals in the New Left.10  
																																																						
8 Theoharis, et al, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, 125 
9 Seth Rosenfeld, Subversives, 213 
10 COINTELPRO began with Hoover’s unilateral authorization of the first operation, in 1956, 
against the U.S. Communist Party; see Alan Belmont to L V Boardman, FBI memorandum, 
August 28, 1956, found in Church Report ‘Volume VI. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’, 
pages 372-376.  The list grew to include perceived threats to internal security from other 
communist and socialist organizations in the U.S., right wing extremists (mostly the KKK but 
also a small number of programs targeting the John Birch Society and the Minutemen), Civil 
Rights leaders and groups and student activist groups (including Martin Luther King, Jr., King’s 
SCLC, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee [SNCC], the Revolutionary Action 
Movement [RAM], the Congress of Racial Equality [CORE], and Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of 
Islam), and the burgeoning Vietnam War protest movement.  COINTELPRO – NEW LEFT was 
initiated in April of 1968; this would be the last of the five formal COINTELPROs.  See Director 
J. Edgar Hoover to SAC (Special Agent in Charge-Albany), FBI Memorandum, “Counter 
Intelligence Program: Black Nationalist – Hate Groups, Internal Security,” May 14, 1968.  
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Despite its centrality to the narrative of FBI intelligence investigations during the era, the 
focus in the case of this dissertation must not rest entirely on this single set of programs.  Between 
1965 and 1975, according to a Government Accounting Office (GAO) study, intelligence 
investigations (both foreign and domestic, including COINTELPRO operations) constituted 20% 
of the FBI’s workload, although COINTELPRO operations in fact constituted less than a quarter 
of one percent themselves.11  Those who would turn to terrorism in this era were subject to both 
COINTELPRO “disruption” and “neutralization” operations, as well as unrelated non-
COINTELPRO intelligence operations (both lawful and unlawful) by the FBI, as well as criminal, 
espionage, and other investigations stemming from different divisions within the Bureau. 
 
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYPD) 
 
With the consolidation of New York City’s five boroughs in 1898, the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) as we know it today began to emerge.12  By the middle of the 1960s it was 
one of the largest, most highly trained, and professional municipal police forces in the world.  In 
1969, the Department added 3,187 new recruits bringing the total number of policemen to 31,641, 
																																																						
11 Theoharis et al, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, 81 
12 The NYPD emerged from rowdy and disorganized beginnings in the middle of the nineteenth 
century when an array of magistrates, justices of the peace, night watches, constables and 
marshals composed law enforcement in Gotham.  In May of 1845 the city council adopted an 
ordinance creating a unified full-time police force of 800 men, the Municipal Police, and in 1856 
a larger Metropolitan Police force was established, bringing together the disparate forces in New 
York City (then only the island of Manhattan), Brooklyn, Westchester, and Staten Island.  See 
James Lardner and Thomas Reppetto, NYPD: A City and its Police.  
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then the largest number in the history of the NYPD.13  In 1965 the number had stood at just over 
28,000; in 1953 it had been less than 20,000.14  
The members of the NYPD Detective Division were spread throughout each of the 
Department’s dozens of precincts in all five boroughs; the Chief of Detectives, a high-profile and 
senior member of the department, served as the Commanding Officer of all the detectives 
throughout the force, and exercised great autonomy from both the Police Commissioner as well as 
the Mayor’s office.   
In addition to the detective squads at precincts, special units of detectives existed for 
dedicated purposes, organized as “Central Office Bureaus and Squads;” the most relevant to this 
study being the Bureau of Special Services (BOSS).   
As the long Sixties unfolded, the NYPD was on the verge of entering a period of 
unprecedented violence and social unrest in the city they were tasked to protect, strained relations 
with city government and with the public, internal turmoil, and debilitating scandal.  The upheavals 
would greatly impact how the policemen of the NYPD reacted to the escalating threat of terrorism 
of the era. 
 
Like the FBI, despite what would become a long history of countering terrorism in New York City, 
NYPD’s efforts didn’t start, specifically, as intentional counterterrorism programs.  The Chicago 
Haymarket bombing in 1886 largely precipitated the first major red scare in American history, and 
																																																						
13 Annual Report of the Police Department of the City of New York – 1969, page 3 (New York: 
Police Dept., City of New York), Special Collections - NYPD Collection, Lloyd Sealy Library, 
John Jay College, CUNY (henceforth “NYPD Collection, LSL, JJC-CUNY”) 
14 Remarks of Mayor Robert F. Wagner at NYPD Graduation Ceremony, December 1st, 1965; 
Box #060029W, Folder #14, page 6; Robert F. Wagner, Jr. Documents Collection, La Guardia 
and Wagner Archives, Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College, CUNY (henceforth “RFW JR 
Documents, LWA, LCC-CUNY”) 
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“resulted in the establishment of the first sustained American police intelligence operation aimed 
at leftist groups” according to a 1976 report by the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
cited by Donner.15  However, as Gage argues, New York City in this early period in fact was the 
target of substantially less acts of terrorism than “rough and tumble western outposts such as 
Chicago, Idaho, and California” and thus other threats were law enforcement priorities in Gotham, 
such as organized crime, labor tensions, and wartime sabotage.16 
The long list of various NYPD units created, named and renamed, tasked and re-tasked 
with assorted clandestine functions can be somewhat confusing.  What became known as the 
Italian Squad was initially formed as an elite, secretive unit within NYPD by Police Commissioner 
Theodore A. Bingham in December of 1906 to combat the Black Hand – an underground group of 
Italian extortionists preying on their own communities in New York City.17  A favorite tactic of 
the Black Hand was the use of dynamite to intimidate or murder its victims, and the Italian Squad 
became the de facto specialists in investigating instances of “bomb throwing” in the city.  But the 
Italian Squad receded after the 1909 murder, in Italy, of undercover Lieutenant Joseph Petrosino, 
leader of the squad – still the only member of NYPD to die in the line of duty in a foreign country.18  
Despite the escalating pace of dynamite bombs in the coming years, members of the greatly 
diminished Italian Squad were diffused throughout the Police Department in November of 1910.19 
It was in the middle of this second decade of the century that the use of dynamite by 
extortionists and gangsters was greatly overtaken by the use of dynamite by political radicals and 
clandestine foreign government agents in New York City.  Fears of the Black Hand were drowned 
																																																						
15 Donner, Protectors of Privilege, 5 
16 Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded, 102 
17 “A Secret Service Squad to Hunt the Black Hand” New York Times, December 20th, 1906 
18 “Petrosino a Terror to Criminal Bands” New York Times, March 14th, 1909 
19 “Five Bombs Set Off in Fifteen Days” New York Times, January 17th, 1913  
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out and largely forgotten as fear of “bomb-throwing” anarchists and German secret agents 
escalated, and as Gage shows the NYPD responded quickly after the Lexington Avenue explosion 
in Harlem in 1914: “[i]n August, police commissioner [Arthur] Woods announced the creation of 
an undercover bomb squad to infiltrate the anarchist movement and the [Industrial Workers of the 
World, the IWW or the “Wobblies” as they were commonly known].  Within a few months, the 
new squad found itself in the midst of the city’s first full-blown dynamite epidemic.”20  In 1921, 
the remnants of the Italian Squad were officially merged with the Bomb Squad, and the modern 
NYPD Bomb Squad today traces its roots to that older unit.21 
The creation of the Bomb and Neutrality Squad, as it was first called, also came just weeks 
after the First World War began in Europe, and the fear of war-related sabotage plots and attacks 
would soon become at least as much cause for concern as the rash of anarchist-related terrorism.  
The massive explosion of war munitions caused by German saboteurs at Black Tom Island off the 
southern tip of Manhattan in July of 1916 was felt in five states and as far as 100 miles away, and 
proved with sobering clarity how dangerous this wartime threat could be.22  The thirty-four man 
Bomb Squad headed by Captain Thomas Tunney looms large in NYPD’s response to the Red 
Scare that prompted the Bureau of Investigation to create their own Radical Division.  It was the 
Bomb Squad that investigated the aftermath of the Wall Street bombing and the St. Patrick’s 
Cathedral bombing before that; it was a Bomb Squad undercover detective who thwarted a second 
bombing attempt at that famed Fifth Avenue cathedral.23 
																																																						
20 Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded, 103 
21 “Fiaschetti Reduced in Police Shake-Up,” New York Times, August 26th, 1922 
22 “First Explosion Terrific,” New York Times, July 31st, 1916 
23 “Young Detective Joins Anarchist Group; Learns Secrets,” The Sun (New York), March 3rd, 
1915 
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It may have come as a surprise to New Yorkers of the time who expected it to be the 
harbinger of even more dangerous times to come, but as Gage, Thai Jones, and other scholars 
show, the wave of anarchist bombings in fact slowed dramatically after the 1920 Wall Street 
bombing.  By 1924 the various and sundry units of NYPD tasked with these similar missions were 
combined in the Radical Squad, which housed three sub-units: the Bomb Squad, the Industrial 
Squad, and the Gangster Squad, which largely disappeared after the end of Prohibition a decade 
later.24 
Various NYPD units including the Alien Squad, then the Radical and Alien Squad, 
continued on.  In 1931, the Bomb Squad was separated from these other units and reconstituted, 
fundamentally, as an explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) and technical expertise unit organized 
within the Detective Division, like BOSS, and has remained as such to this day.  Responsibility 
for investigation of subversives, anarchists, and other radicals would fall to other detective squads 
in the Division. 
 
Terrorism and other dynamite attacks in the decades following the era of anarchism continued to 
fade in New Yorkers’ collective memory, for the most part, but the thud of bombs exploding 
around the city never truly disappeared.25  The exceptions to the quiet of the decades following the 
end of the anarchist era of terrorism illustrate the police response.  The most notable exception 
during this period of relative quiet is the campaign of the so-called “Mad Bomber.”  Between 1940 
																																																						
24 Anthony Bouza, Police Intelligence, 24 
25 An important wartime exception is the July 1940, bombing of the British Pavilion of the 
World’s Fair in Queens – two Bomb Squad technicians were killed as they attempted to remove 
the bomb. The case was never solved and no credit taken.  The Bomb Squad and the special 
World’s Fair Precinct investigated, with units like the Espionage Squad assisting with leads 
when they pointed to German and Irish links.  See “Police Die in Blast,” New York Times, July 
5th, 1940 
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and 1956, with a long hiatus between 1941 and 1951, a rash of bombings by someone protesting 
the Consolidated Edison Company (ConEd) plagued New York.  More than thirty small devices 
exploded throughout the city, first at ConEd locations but then expanding to movie theaters, Grand 
Central Station, the New York Public Library, Radio City Music Hall, and elsewhere.  Various 
NYPD units were involved in the long investigation into the bombings, most centrally the Bomb 
Investigation Unit (BIU), a taskforce contingent of as many as fifty detectives charged with 
working nothing else but the Mad Bomber case.  The Bomb Squad, police forensics, police 
psychologists, and various other units in the department all assisted in the investigation that Police 
Commissioner Patrick Kennedy, in 1956, ordered to be “the greatest manhunt in the history of the 
Police Department.”26  In January of 1957 George Metesky, a disgruntled former ConEd 
employee, was arrested in Waterbury, Connecticut, by NYPD detectives. 
A similar bombing campaign – albeit much shorter – emerged in New York City in late 
1960.  No less than five simple dynamite bombs were placed in subway cars, city parks, and other 
public places, always on a Sunday, injuring nearly sixty and killing a fifteen-year old girl.  No 
motive, political or otherwise, was ever offered or divined.  Despite nearly a quarter of the NYPD 
detective force being placed on the “Sunday Bomber” case, nobody was ever charged with the 
crimes.27 
 
George Metesky’s long bombing campaign was not terrorism, or politically motivated in any way 
– it was clear from the first bomb that the Mad Bomber bore a personal grudge against ConEd and 
not political aims, and Metesky was found to be “incurably insane” and committed to a state mental 
																																																						
26 “Kennedy Orders Wide Manhunt for Movie Bombing Perpetrator,” New York Times, 
December 4th, 1956 
27 “600 Police Press Hunt for Bomber,” New York Times, November 8th, 1960 
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hospital instead of standing trial.28  The distinction of terrorism or not terrorism is not one that 
would have been relevant to most New Yorkers during the bombing campaign.  It does well, 
however, to illustrate the organization of the department at the time in terms of responding to 
political subversion and violence. 
The NYPD Bureau of Special Services and Investigation emerged in 1946, a continuing, 
postwar evolution of what was earlier the Radical Squad and then the Criminal Alien Squad; its 
name was shortened to Bureau of Special Services (BOSS) in August of 1955.29  The unit would 
over time emerge as the most robust municipal police political intelligence operation in American 
history, exchanging intelligence, information, and training with the FBI and even CIA, before its 
eventual disappearance in the 1970s.  By the beginning of the period under question, BOSS 
initiated and conducted some 2,500 investigations per year in the “subversive, nationalist, pacifist, 
racial, right-wing and/or political fields.”30  The categorization of an organization as “hostilely 
subversive” was the prerogative of the Police Commissioner or the Chief of Detectives; it was not 
																																																						
28 “Psychiatrist Finds Metesky Incurably Insane,” New York Times, April 11th, 1957.  Despite the 
oversimplified and usually uninformed rhetoric from politicians and law enforcement, the 
overwhelming degree of evidence-based research not only illustrates the lack of any identifiable 
psychopathology in terrorists, but demonstrates how frighteningly 'normal' and unremarkable in 
psychological terms those who engage in terrorist activity usually are.  Terrorism and insanity 
are distinctly different phenomena; see John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: 
Routledge, 2013) 
29 Bouza, Police Intelligence, 24; see also “Public Relations Squad Again Gets Name Change,” 
New York Times, April 14th, 1946.  NYPD has not shared the records pertaining to the rationale 
for the formation of BOSS / reorganization of the Radical and Alien Squads.  The Annual Report 
of the Police Department of the City of New York – 1947 (Organization Chart), is the first year 
where “Bureau of Special Services and Investigating” appears. NYPD Collection, LSL, JJC-
CUNY 
30 “Chief of Detectives to Chief Inspector, NYPD, RE: Estimate of the Cost for Services 
Provided by Units of the Detective Division to Surrounding Governments,” December 23rd, 1966 
– Box 70 Folder 867, John Vliet Lindsay Papers, New York Municipal Archive record, La 
Guardia and Wagner Archives, Fiorello H. LaGuardia Community College, CUNY, (henceforth 
“JVL Papers/NYMA, LWA, LCC-CUNY) 
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a decision officially made lower on the chain of command, and was officially not a political 
decision made by the political infrastructure of the city, including the Mayor.31 
It’s location an open secret, BOSS was headquartered on the fourth floor of a non-descript 
office building at 56 Worth Street, near Church Street, in lower Manhattan.32  It had moved here 
from 400 Broome Street, a building across from Police Headquarters, where it had previously been 
located.33  By the late 1960s, the commanding officer, usually the rank of Inspector, administered 
a unit composed of captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and approximately sixty detectives, both male 
and female, the majority of whom worked undercover.34  It was Deputy Chief Inspector Sanford 
Garelik and Captain William Knapp who would shepherd BOSS through this tumultuous decade;35  
Garelik would eventually retire from NYPD and be elected to the New York City Council and 
even run for Mayor;36 Knapp would himself rise to the rank of Deputy Chief Inspector and continue 
to be involved with memorable NYPD cases such as the 1972 assassination, inside a Nation of 
Islam mosque in Harlem, of Police Officer Phillip Cardillo.37   
Tasked, ostensibly, with escort and protection of distinguished visitors to the city including 
national and international politicians, it was common knowledge by no later than the early 1950s 
that BOSS was the core of NYPD’s intelligence, anticommunist, and anti-subversive efforts.  
																																																						
31 A BOSS Sergeant discussed the unit’s chain of command and categorization process in State 
Supreme Court testimony during the Panther 13 case; see Edith Evans Asbury, “Policeman 
Describes Panther Inquiry,” New York Times, June 4th, 1970 
32 Bernard Weinraub, "Police Undercover Unit Kept Tabs on Minutemen," New York Times, 
November 1st, 1966 
33 Police Department of the City of New York: Rules and Procedures – 1956 (New York: Police 
Dept., City of New York), NYPD Collection, LSL, JJC-CUNY 
34 Bouza, Police Intelligence, 31 
35 Not to be confused with Whitman Knapp, appointed by Mayor John Lindsay in 1970 as head 
of what became known as the Knapp Commission, to investigate corruption within the NYPD. 
36 Matt Flegenheimer, “Sanford Garelik, Former Mayoral Candidate, Dies at 93,” New York 
Times, November 20th, 2011 
37 “Inspector Quitting Over Mosque Killing,” New York Times, April 25th 1972 
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Publically available Annual Reports and NYPD Manuals directed police officers to report to BOSS 
any activity that might fall under these categories, including the seizure of anarchistic literature, 
arrest of foreign aliens, or “any suspected espionage, sabotage or other subversive activities.”38  
According to long-time NYPD BOSS Detective Anthony Bouza, BOSS “grew into an effective 
intelligence operation rather naturally and unconsciously” because of the challenges presented by 
the times – including “terrorist acts of sabotage” and “the proliferation of radical political 
organizations.”39  The 1956 NYPD Manual gives BOSS responsibility for conducting three explicit 
functions: investigate labor disputes, guard visiting dignitaries, and cooperate with U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Services; all functions that allowed BOSS detectives to closely 
monitor traditional “subversive” elements and adversarial foreign influences.40  The Manual also 
gives BOSS the responsibility (or ability, depending on one’s outlook) to conduct “other 
investigations as directed by the Chief or Detectives or other competent authority.”41 
In service of its responsibility to protect dignitaries, BOSS provided security for – and kept 
tabs on – U.S. presidential candidates and foreign leaders ranging from the Pope to Yasser Arafat 
and Fidel Castro.  But it is this responsibility to “conduct other investigations” that Bouza claimed 
became the central focus of BOSS; “[i]n practice, this duty… evolved into the most important 
function of the unit: the investigation of subversives or potentially disruptive people or groups.”42  
What BOSS didn’t do much of was actually arrest suspects; “[a]ctual arrests and related 
																																																						
38 Police Department of the City of New York: Rules and Procedures – 1956, page 38b.  See also 
pages 96, 115, 127 (New York: Police Dept., City of New York), NYPD Collection, Lloyd Sealy 
Library 
39 Bouza, Police Intelligence, 3 
40 Police Department of the City of New York: Rules and Procedures – 1956, page 15 (New 
York: Police Dept., City of New York), NYPD Collection, LSL, JJC-CUNY 
41 Ibid. 
42 Bouza, Police Intelligence, 21 
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operational responsibilities” Bouza explains, were “delegated to other units of the Police 
Department, because arrests are not a function of [an] intelligence unit.”43  Typically, field units 
such as the Bomb Squad and the Safe and Loft Squad, who often worked closely with BOSS, 
would be involved with any arrests that occurred as a result of their investigations. 
 
That BOSS was not the primary investigative body within NYPD to work the “Mad Bomber” 
George Metesky case might very well be a function of the fact that it was clear, since 1941, that 
the bombings were not political in nature.  The bombings were not terrorism, they were not the 
work of communists or other subversives, but clearly the work of an individual with a personal 
and not political vendetta.  Despite an investigation that spanned most of the decade, and what the 
commissioner argued was the greatest manhunt in the department’s history, Bouza argues that the 
1950s “were a quiescent time…” there was “little real activity in NYC of a threatening nature, and 
[BOSS] settled into a rut of inactivity and disuse.”44  BOSS was involved in other instances where 
political subversion and terrorism were suspected, including a credible 1948 threat of 150 bombs 
across New York City that mobilized police all throughout the city.  The threat turned out to be a 
hoax, but it is telling that not only Bomb Squad responded but also BOSS.45 
As Bouza explains, after what he calls the relatively “quiescent” 1950s, the following 
decade “burst with fury upon the city’s life…  groups of the far left and far right reemerged as the 
1960s began.  Groups like the John Birch Society, SDS, and the Minutemen appeared.”46  Given 
the political focus of BOSS’s mission, that this secretive unit would also become the primary 
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NYPD effort in countering terrorism when it reemerged with such intensity in the 1960s is of little 
surprise. 
BOSS utilized the breadth of methods commonly associated with an intelligence unit, 
including informants, the placement of undercover infiltrators, surveillance, and the use of 
technical equipment like “bugs” and wiretaps.  And the coverage of those individuals or 
organizations targeted for investigation could be exhaustive; according to Bouza, BOSS often had 
“two or more investigators, infiltrators, or informants working on the same case at the same 
time.”47  The intelligence files that accumulated through this process were substantial; BOSS 
maintained a massive data bank of files on persons, groups, and events that at its height in the 
1960s included well over one million entries.  These records were not solely – not even primarily 
– on those suspected of terrorism, or any criminal act for that matter.  There were dossiers on 
suspected political dissidents; individuals who had joined law-abiding protest groups; students; 
activists; anyone who did or might even possibly, one day, cause an economic or political 
disturbance, no matter how legal.  BOSS detectives, like FBI officials, created a vast network of 
intelligence gathering and undercover infiltrators who penetrated not only groups and individuals 
from across the political spectrum that would turn to terrorism in the 1960s, but also law-abiding 
political and civil rights groups and individuals in alarming numbers.48 
Within the larger category of intelligence operations, confidential informants and 
undercover infiltrators were, in fact, the primary tools used by both the FBI and the NYPD in their 
political policing, and would emerge as key tools in the related objective of countering terrorism 
as well.  In its 1975 investigation, the U.S. Senate Church Committee found that “[t]he paid and 
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directed informant [was] the most extensively used technique in FBI domestic intelligence 
investigations. Informants were used in 85 percent of the domestic intelligence investigations 
analyzed… [b]y comparison, electronic surveillance was used in only 5 percent.”49  The 
investigations into NYPD’s operations, running almost on a tandem timeline to the Church 
Committee, resulted in similar findings. 
 
BOSS’s massive trove of intelligence records would, in time, become a source of constant hassles 
and litigation for the police department; they were first reduced dramatically and then ultimately 
ordered to be destroyed by the courts.50  But early in this period, through what can be considered 
the first half of the long Sixties, the NYPD in fact had considerable public support and a strong 
advocate in City Hall in the person of Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr.  First taking office in 1954, 
Wagner would ultimately serve three terms, staying in office until the last day of 1965 – a period 
of dramatic transition for New York City. 
Generally a progressive who gets little credit or scholarly attention, Wagner – following in 
his prominent father’s footsteps – was largely favorable to workers’ rights, brought more minority 
appointees into city government than ever before, and vocally supported the legal and social 
victories of the Civil Rights movement.51  But, ultimately, he was a law and order man, an advocate 
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of the steady and gradual change he believed he saw occurring in American society – change that 
wasn’t fast or complete enough for an increasing number of his own constituents.  Vincent J. 
Cannato, biographer of John Lindsey (who would follow Wagner in City Hall), argues that even 
though Wagner “had always been sympathetic to black and Puerto Ricans, the aggressive style of 
the Civil Rights movement clashed with [his] personality.”52 
Wagner enjoyed a close relationship with the Police Department that he often boasted of 
expanding by more than 42% during his time in office.  He “always felt a close relationship with 
(New York’s) men in blue”53 and, as crime rates and social protest increased across the nation (and 
in New York City), Wagner tried in vain to balance the voices of the protestors and rioters with 
his predisposition toward law and order. 
On July 18th, 1964, fifteen-year old James Powell was shot and killed in Harlem by a white 
off-duty police officer.  Large-scale rioting exploded first in Harlem and then spread through the 
city, bringing fires, looting, and – over six days – one death and hundreds of injuries and arrests.  
There were a number of claims of both police brutality as well as claims of violence directed at 
police officers. 54  Returning early from a trip to Geneva after the riots began, Wagner told New 
Yorkers that he believed “[t]he proper complaints of reasonable people must be heeded and acted 
upon.  The human rights of every individual must be zealously safeguarded.  Every action we are 
taking is to do the fair, the reasonable, the right thing.”  But calling the rioters “the loose 
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gunpowder of our day,” he made a full-throated defense of the police department and law and 
order:  
 
“the police are under legal mandate and obligation to protect with all the force that 
is necessary and justified.  The mandate to maintain law and order is absolute, 
unconditional and unqualified.  It is the primary obligation of local government… 
Let me also state in plain language that illegal acts including defiance of or attacks 
upon the police, whose mission it is to enforce law and order, will not be condoned 
or tolerated by me at any time.”55 
 
In his public address, he voiced his “complete confidence” in the Police Commissioner and brought 
up what was increasingly becoming a contested issue in New York City – the Civilian Complaint 
Review Board (CCRB), whose job it was to investigate claims of misconduct by police officers.   
There were increasing calls for civilian oversight of the police department; by 1964, the review 
board was composed entirely of three policemen (Deputy Commissioners) who elevated what they 
found to be legitimate civilian complaints to the Deputy Mayor.  The process, however, excluded 
any civilians from oversight or review, and the perceived lack of impartiality was an increasingly 
sore subject as racial tensions and claims of police misconduct in the city and especially in minority 
neighborhoods escalated dramatically.56 
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Wagner’s staunch defense of the existing review board against increasing criticism was 
representative of his approach to policing in New York City; hands off, and letting the department 
police itself.  Speaking to a graduating class at the Police Academy, newly-appointed Police 
Commissioner Vincent Broderick singled out Mayor Wagner for praise at great length: “Your 
brothers in the Police Department have had a rare privilege in being able to serve for many years 
under Mayor Wagner… when he took office twelve years ago, he recognized that the health of 
New York City depended upon a climate of law and social order. And he realized that a climate of 
law and order could only be provided by a strong, a vigorous and alert police department…” The 
Commissioner spoke to the debate on the CCRB: “in my judgment the principal contribution which 
he has made has been firmly to establish the principle that there is to be no outside interference 
with the operations of the Police Department.57  Mayor Wagner himself boasted, to another 
graduating class of policemen only months earlier, “[o]urs is a police force that has been kept free 
from political interference.”58  Free of political interference meaning free from outside supervision 
and civilian oversight that not just the incoming mayor, but the courts and the city’s population 
would find the department was wanting of in coming years.   
A former military intelligence officer himself, Wagner’s administration fostered a hands-
off climate of policing that BOSS had thrived in. 
 
John Vliet Lindsay succeeded Robert F. Wagner, Jr. as the Mayor of New York City, taking office 
on the first day of 1966.  Joseph Viteritti argues that “[t]he transition from Robert Wagner’s 
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mayoralty to John Lindsay’s represented a historic point from the moderate liberalism of a city 
dominated by white working class traditions to the angrier politics of a city growing more diverse 
and disconnected from the old institutions.”59  The relationship between the Mayor’s office and 
the NYPD changed dramatically between the last day of Wagner’s mayoralty and Lindsay’s first.  
Lindsay, a liberal Republican whose previous work in Congress, his support for civil rights 
legislation, and the measures he supported to curb the activities of the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC), all seemed to make him less likely to completely defer to the police 
department in the way that Wagner had.60 
In his first campaign speech in May of 1965, in fact, then-Congressman Lindsay had come 
out strongly in support of a revised CCRB that would incorporate four civilians as members.61  The 
move brought strong reactions from the police department unions, and the statements from then-
Mayor Wagner and Police Commissioner Broderick.  The issue became a major component of 
Lindsay’s campaign, and when elected, he stuck to it.  After taking office, Lindsay replaced 
Commissioner Broderick, who was insistent on maintaining the status quo, with Howard R. Leary, 
a liberally-minded former Philadelphia Police Commissioner praised by civil rights organizations, 
just a month into his term as mayor.62  
The Civilian Complaint Review Board as Lindsay and Leary imagined it was short-lived – 
it was voted down by overwhelming white disapproval of it in a referendum in November of 1966 
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– but the battle over it defined much of Lindsay’s first year in office and firmly set the tone for a 
new relationship between City Hall and the Police Department.63  
 
After twelve years of staunch support from the Mayor’s office and what Anthony Bouza calls a 
“quiescent” time, the NYPD entered a time of vastly increasing public criticism, scandal, 
investigative commissions, and involvement by the Mayor’s office that would all have a 
substantial impact on the way that the Department countered the escalating threat of terrorism in 
New York City.   Even though Lindsay very rarely, if ever, directly interfered or directed BOSS 
operations, the impact on BOSS was substantial as the administration continued on in office.  As 
Bouza argues, “the election of a liberal mayor, John V. Lindsay, and his appointment of a tough-
minded, liberal police commissioner, Patrick V. Murphy, (who would follow Leary in 1970) 
created a political climate, reflecting a prevailing public attitude, that was not hospitable to 
operations of an intelligence unit.”64  Major issues including the corruption scandals that lead to 
the Knapp Commission, the impact of the so-called Panther 13 trial, new Surveillance Guidelines 
governing the intelligence activities of the department, the so-called Handschu case, and the 
evolution and dissolution of BOSS will be discussed in coming chapters. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The political intelligence operations of the FBI and the NYPD were justified, internally, by the 
need to counter the subversive elements in society that officials in those agencies, none more 
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notably than J. Edgar Hoover, saw everywhere they looked.  Terrorism being political in nature, 
these intelligence officials at FBI and NYPD were looking in the right places (among the multitude 
of wrong places), when terrorism burst back upon the American scene during the long Sixties. 
Yet while BOSS arguably cast as wide a net as did the FBI in collecting intelligence on 
those perceived to be potentially subversive, NYPD was never accused – even by its detractors – 
of collection methods or intimidation tactics as illegal or intrusive as those employed by FBI in 
COINTELPRO operations, and no records have emerged that would suggest that was ever the 
case.  Yet, as with the FBI, perceived excesses by NYPD would result in a backlash that would, 
by the end of the long Sixties, greatly restrict the scope of their actions.65 
Something of note to emerge from the published memoirs of those that served in the 
specific parts of two organizations most relevant to this study – FBI’s New York office and 
NYPD’s Bureau of Special Services – is the close cooperation between the two intelligence units, 
a fact that is borne out by records.  Even in the era that preceded the development of the FBI Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to formally combine their efforts, NYPD and FBI did not act in a 
vacuum, autonomous of one another.  As we shall see, it was quite the opposite.  Danny Coulson 
was assigned to New York City in 1967, at the beginning of his long career with the FBI.  Coulson 
landed on “internal security” cases – intelligence – where he worked what would become the 
Panther 13 case, and was intimately involved with the infamous bank robberies and police murders 
perpetrated by the Black Liberation Army, a radical offshoot of the Black Panther Party.  In telling 
of his time in New York City working these and other notable terrorism cases of the time, Coulson 
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describes a close relationship with NYPD; Bureau Special Agents and NYPD Detectives were on 
first-name basis, sharing information and intelligence freely, and often participating in raids and 
other operations together.66  Testimony by FBI agents in a number of cases describe the same.  
From the NYPD side of the equation, Bouza’s account illuminates what he argues was an 
“extremely close” relationship with the FBI;67 former BOSS Detective Jack Caulfield echoes this 
characterization.68 
Finally, while it is beyond question that these were the primary two agencies combatting 
terrorism in New York City, they were certainly not the only federal and local agencies involved 
in the effort.  It is, for instance, unsurprising that New York City’s firefighters (FDNY) found 
themselves on the front line of the response to terrorism in the city, as they had since the days of 
anarchism.  The men of the FDNY regularly responded to fires resulting from exploded anarchist 
bombs – including the Lexington avenue Harlem explosion and the 1920 Wall Street bomb – and 
the FDNY’s Bureau of Combustibles attended unexploded bombs and explosive material in much 
the same fashion as NYPD’s Bomb Squad.  A “professional opener of bombs,” FDNY Bureau of 
Combustibles Inspector Owen Eagan became a minor celebrity disarming as many as 7,000 
“infernal machines” in New York City before his death in 1920.  In reporting on his death, the 
New York Times referred to Eagan as a “Famed Anarchist Foe.” 69  When terrorism reemerged in 
the long Sixties, FDNY again found themselves playing a similar role.  That this work focuses on 
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FBI and NYPD (especially the NYPD Bureau of Special Services) is a function of their centrality 
in counterterrorism in New York City, not their exclusiveness.   
	 50	
PART I : NYPD, FBI, and Early Terrorist Plots in NYC During the Long Sixties 
Chapter 2 : The Monumental Plot 
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Scholarship exploring the Civil Rights movement in the U.S. has largely focused on the American 
South.  But as historians including Martha Biondi, Thomas Sugrue, and Clarence Taylor have 
discussed, the struggle for African American rights emerged in New York City in the immediate 
aftermath of WWII.  Biondi argues that African American activists and politicians in New York 
from Paul Robeson to Adam Clayton Powell Jr. pursued desegregation, economic equality, and 
other campaigns well in advance of Rosa Parks and Bull Connor putting civil rights center stage 
elsewhere in the nation.  “The first civil rights laws since Reconstruction were passed in New York 
City and state, including the first fair housing, employment, and education laws,” Biondi explains.  
“These inspired similar laws in dozens of other states, and became models for national legislation 
in the 1960s.”1  And as Taylor argues, the largest civil rights boycott of the entire era took place 
in New York City in February of 1964 when 465,000 schoolchildren – nearly half of the city’s 
student body – stayed home from school to protest segregation in their school system.2 
Additionally, the Civil Rights movement is often characterized as two overlapping periods 
characterized largely by the peaceful leadership of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. more 
prominent on one end, and the more militant, fiery black nationalism of the Black Panther Party 
and the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) that dominates the narrative in the wake of 
assassin James Earl Ray’s bullet.3  However, as Sugrue compellingly argue, this more militant, 
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more radical manifestation of the African American struggle emerged before King’s death, and 
perhaps especially so in the North.4  The most illustrative example of the early, angry reaction to 
the civil rights situation in New York City must be the previously-discussed Harlem riots of 1964 
– the violence sparked by the death of a fifteen-year old African American boy at the hands of a 
white off-duty policeman.  The riots, starting in Harlem in July of 1964, spread throughout the city 
for six days and later that summer spread throughout other northeastern cities like Philadelphia 
and Newark.5   
 
It is from the extreme fringe of this more militant African-American movement in New York City 
that emerge one of the earliest examples of terrorism in Gotham during the era.  In early 1965, 
amidst escalating tension between the African American community and the authorities on the 
national level, and certainly between the community and both the Wagner administration and the 
NYPD in the wake of the riots, a plot to bomb national landmarks in New York City and other 
northeastern cities to bring attention to the plight of African Americans was thwarted by BOSS 
and the FBI.  The case is perhaps the earliest example of a major terrorist plot in New York City 
during the long Sixties, and illustrates the already existing relationship between the FBI and NYPD 
(especially BOSS) that countering terrorism over the latter half of the period would largely build 
upon.   
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THE 1965 MONUMENTAL PLOT 
 
Early on the morning of February 16th 1965, on West 239th street in the Riverdale section of the 
Bronx, two African American men drove a 1965 Chevy into an overgrown parking lot not much 
more than a stone’s throw from the Riverdale Jewish Center.6  Robert Steele Collier, twenty-eight, 
was an Air Force veteran who had received an other-than-honorable discharge after slashing a man 
with a knife in London during a fight in 1956.  In 1965, Collier was working at the iconic main 
branch of the New York Public Library on 42nd Street in Manhattan, and lived in Manhattan’s 
Lower East Side.7  Given the staunchly anti-communist atmosphere that permeated the nation at 
the time, Collier raised many eyebrows when, just a few months earlier in July of 1964 (the same 
month of the Harlem riots), he and four others made a public announcement that they had visited 
Cuba by way of Europe in defiance of the U.S. State Department ban on travel to the island nation.  
There, in a move that made them few friends in the American government, Collier and the others 
dined and spoke with Castro’s right-hand man, Che Guevara.8  
In the Chevy’s driver’s seat that February morning was thirty two-year old Raymond 
Woodall, a former Chester, South Carolina high school football star.  Arriving in New York after 
leaving the Air Force himself, Woodall bounced from job to job including stints at a paper products 
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company, Chase Manhattan Bank, Texaco, Sinclair Oil, and as a teletype operator, and took 
courses at NYU, Fordham, and at City College, where he was asked to leave in 1963 after one 
semester because of poor grades.  The previous July, right around when Collier was making 
headlines with his trip to Cuba, Woodall made his own when he was arrested with local civil rights 
leader Herb Callender and other members of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) for 
attempting to stage a citizen’s arrest of Mayor Wagner.  Woodall was also well known and 
respected for coordinating activities and protests for CORE during the July riots.9   
Woodall and Collier had known each other for less than two months, since December 14th, 
1964, when the men were first introduced at a rally for the Progressive Labor Movement at the 
Manhattan Ballroom by Paul Boutelle, a common acquaintance of the two and an African 
American socialist leader of the short-lived Freedom Now political party. 
 
A few hours before their drive to Riverdale, at 1:00AM that February morning, the phone rang in 
Woodall’s apartment at 1640 Topping Avenue in the Bronx.  It was Michelle Duclos calling.  
Duclos, a twenty six-year old French Canadian national, was a member of Rassemblement pour 
l'lndépendance Nationale (RIN), an organization that when it emerged in 1960 marked, according 
to Canadian historian Louis Fornier, “the political debut of the Quebec sovereignty movement,” 
and from which would emerge Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), the Quebecois terrorist 
organization responsible for well over 100 bombings between 1963 and the early 1970s.10  Duclos 
had driven her 1961 Rambler through the day and then through the night, traversing the almost 
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400 miles and an international border between Montreal and Manhattan’s Upper West Side.  She 
asked Woodall to meet her at the Colonial House Hotel on West 112th street right away; he hung 
up the phone and hopped in a taxi.  After they rendezvoused, Duclos told Woodall that she had 
successfully smuggled thirty sticks of dynamite and several blasting caps into the U.S. for Collier 
and Woodall, and that it was hidden at the parking lot on West 239th street.  Using her glove to 
illustrate a map of the parking lot on the hotel wallpaper, Duclos detailed the scene – pass by a 
double fence which marked the boundary of the parking lot and the dynamite would be in a 
Benjamin Moore Paint box in the shrubbery in the adjacent empty lot.  The blasting caps were 
wrapped in a Canadian newspaper, which she left for them under the fourth car in the parking lot.  
Not long after, Woodall and Collier were driving the Chevy through the still-dark February 
morning uptown through Manhattan towards the Bronx.11  
When they arrived, Woodall put the car in park and both men got out.  Collier proceeded 
through the double-wire fence and found the Benjamin Moore box that Duclos had described; he 
handed it over the fence to Woodall, who set it down.  Collier then came back across the fence, 
picked up the box and walked back toward the car, placing the box into the front seat. 12 
Within moments of placing the explosives into the car, Detectives Clifford Leinberger, 
George Waslyciow, and other members of NYPD rushed forth from hidden positions and 
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immediately descended upon the men.  They seized the dynamite, and after a search, found the 
blasting caps hidden in the snow near where Duclos said they would be.13  
Soon after the arrest in the Bronx, the FBI sprung into action to arrest other known 
conspirators.  Michelle Duclos was taken into custody at the Hotel Excelsior on West 81st street.  
Special Agent Anthony Constantino and other members of the Bureau moved on the Go-Rite Deli 
in Brooklyn where twenty two-year old Khaleel Sayyed worked.  Sayyed, born to a Muslim family 
in Brooklyn, was a former National Honors Society scholar at Eastern Vocational High School.  
He went on to spend four years studying engineering at Howard University, where he was both a 
member of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) program and became involved in the 
campus chapter of SNCC.  But Sayyed had taken a leave of absence from Howard the previous 
year and returned to Brooklyn; when the FBI arrested him they found him with two canvas bags, 
each one containing a U.S. Army .30 caliber carbine rifle and ammunition.14   
Special Agent Phillip Brooks of the FBI went with other agents to the home of Walter 
Bowe at 368 East 10th street in Manhattan.  Bowe, like Woodall thirty two-years old and also 
African American, was a former musician who, like Sayyed, had also recently attended Howard 
University and was working as a group counselor and judo instructor at the Henry Street 
Settlement, an iconic Lower East Side social service agency.  FBI agents arrested Bowe at his 
home, and during the arrest and search found and seized two .30 rifles.15 
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That same morning, BOSS Detective Bernard Mulligan searched Collier’s apartment and 
seized, among other things, a red container of gasoline, several boxes of nails, five Pepsi bottles, 
four rolls of cotton, a bottle of benzene, a U.S. Army FM 5-25 Explosives and Demolition manual, 
and a U.S. Army carbine rifle with ammunition.16   The bottles and other supplies, as the charges 
would go, were intended by Collier “to show the kids how we make Molotov cocktails.”   
The detectives who searched Collier’s apartment also found two Statue of Liberty 
postcards – the iconic statue in New York Harbor was the alleged primary target of the 
conspirators.  The group had planned to use the Canadian dynamite not just to bomb the then-
seventy-nine year old monument, the “damned old bitch” as Bowe referred to her, but also the 
Liberty Bell in Pennsylvania and the Washington Monument in the nation’s capital, in order to 
bring attention to the plight of African Americans, so recently illustrated by the riots that began in 
Harlem and spread over the coming months to Philadelphia, Chicago, Newark and several other 
cities in New Jersey.17   
As the New York Times noted the day after the arrests, it was not the first time the Statue 
had been intended to make a political statement; on November 18, 1956, during the Hungarian 
uprising, nationalists from that country draped American and Hungarian flags from the balcony 
surrounding the torch.  And just over a month before the arrest of Collier and his accomplices, on 
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January 3rd, a total of nineteen Cuban exiles chained themselves to the base of the Statue for a half-
hour to protest Fidel Castro’s rise to power.18   
The Statue of Liberty bomb plot had developed rapidly.  The day after Paul Boutelle first 
introduced Collier to Woodall they met again at another rally at the Renaissance Ballroom in 
Harlem, and again the day after that in order for Woodall to assist Collier in getting technical books 
Che Guevara had asked for from the CORE library.19  During their meetings and lengthy 
conversations, Collier had expressed his frustration with the inactivity of the protest organizations 
then  operating in New York City and the nation, including CORE and even the more militant 
RAM that Collier had been a member of.  Collier also discussed the lengthy training he had 
received in weapons, explosives, and sabotage at the North Vietnamese Embassy in Havana during 
his trip there.  Hearing Woodall’s history and his proclivity toward direct action, Collier was eager 
to include him in the plans he was formulating.20   
On January 19th, Collier phoned Woodall to ask him to bring certain supplies to his 
apartment for what Collier said would be an “arts and crafts class.”  The supplies included the 
Pepsi bottles and other components of Molotov cocktails that the detectives would seize in his 
apartment when he was arrested a month later.  Woodall arrived first for the “class” – Sayyed and 
Bowe soon after.  It was the first time that Khaleel Sayyed or Walter Bowe ever met Raymond 
Woodall.   
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But what Collier, Bowe, and Sayyed didn’t know at the time was that Raymond Woodall, 
pot-smoking civil rights activist with a badge-of-honor arrest on his record, was actually Raymond 
A. Wood, an undercover NYPD officer with the Bureau of Special Services.   
 
Raymond Wood joined NYPD in April of 1964.  In a highly unorthodox trajectory for rookie cops 
– but a trajectory not uncommon for undercover “spy” members of BOSS – Wood began work as 
a police officer with no training whatsoever.  He would finally begin his formal law enforcement 
training on February 17th – the day after the arrests he was instrumental in making happen.21   
BOSS often used untrained or inexperienced police for its undercover work. "You just can't 
act like a cop," explained Joseph Jaffe, assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York. "And after police training you just can't help but act that way. That is why (BOSS) 
took them right out of the police academy before they acquired their police mannerisms."22  In the 
case of Wood and other infiltrators, BOSS took them before attending the Academy. 
Ray Wood infiltrated the Bronx chapter of CORE as his first assignment on the force, given 
to him the very day after he joined the Department.  CORE had become among the most vocal 
protest organizations in the Civil Rights movement, and was among those with the greatest 
penetration into New York City.  By the middle of the long Sixties it had become a thorn in the 
police department’s side, with several chapters throughout New York – more than in any other 
city.  It was a New York City chapter of CORE that had organized the “citizen’s arrest” of Mayor 
Wagner that Wood took part in in 1964; several months earlier, in November of 1963, then-Police 
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Commissioner Michael J. Murphy lashed out angrily against the New York chapters for the 
allegations of police brutality CORE had made following a protest picket of Governor George 
Wallace and Attorney General Robert Kennedy during their visits to the city.  The allegations of 
brutality, Murphy insisted, were “aimed at destroying respect for law and order and are, in effect, 
calculated mass libel.”23  And in the summer of 1963, the Bronx CORE chapter that Wood joined 
first came into prominence with large-scale, widely publicized protests against the White Castle 
hamburger chain for discriminatory hiring practices in the Bronx.24    
CORE was also of particular interest to the FBI.  Although Reverend King was singled out 
by Director Hoover as “the most dangerous negro” in the nation, the Bureau, at his direction, 
targeted a much broader spectrum of civil rights activists and organizations for intelligence 
operations.  CORE – long suspected of communist infiltration by Hoover – was, in fact, one of the 
initial targets of the COINTELPRO operation, formally initiated in 1967, targeting African 
American activists.25  
Wood remained in CORE until September of 1964, serving as the chapter’s housing and 
voting registration chairman for a month each, rising steadily through the ranks and even being 
appointed as a delegate to CORE’s national convention in Kansas City; he took part in sit-ins and 
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sleep-ins; he even, ironically, captained picket lines at NYPD headquarters on Centre street;26 and 
earned his street cred with his arrest during the “arrest” of Mayor Wagner.  Wood’s infiltration of 
CORE turned up no illegal activity, and after passing on the intelligence he gathered on that group 
and with his civil rights activist image burnished, in September he joined the Freedom Now Party 
as a dues-paying member, and remained with that organization until December – when he was 
given orders to follow up on his chance meeting with the intriguing Robert Steele Collier.   
 
Wood testified in court that it was Walter Bowe who first suggested they blow the head off of the 
Statue of Liberty during their first meeting on January 19th; that when Bowe arrived and saw the 
others looking at a map of New York City and asked what they were doing, Collier replied that 
they were discussing different ways – all violent acts – that might help promote the African 
American struggle.  Bowe suggested the Statue: “that old girl out there in the harbor… If we could 
make that girl blow her top we would really put a hurt on that damn old bitch.”  Collier quickly 
warmed to Bowe’s idea, but Sayyed objected to an operation of such a scope and size; he was also 
hesitant given that he had never met Wood prior to that evening.  Sayyed instead suggested they 
“pull a couple of stick-ups up there in Harlem” to send a message.  Wood admitted that he 
intentionally downplayed the stick-up plan, arguing “I think Walter has the best plan and I think 
we ought to go along with that one.”  The question of entrapment based on Wood’s zeal would 
come up later at trial. 
The plot, then, began to take shape that very first day that all of the men met as a group.  
During their trial, star witness Wood testified that the defendants showed “no remorse, none 
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whatsoever” at the potential loss of life; Bowe argued “if anyone was killed or injured in the blast, 
they would just have to be sacrificed for the cause,” and that in any case they could place the 
explosives just before closing and the only people who might be guarding it and who might die 
would be “a couple of fancy-pants Marines.”27   
They began to plan for the operation; Collier said he would try to go to the Statue on Friday 
to take a look around, Bowe that he would go the day after that.  Each of the men did in fact visit 
the Statue that coming week.  Playing his part, Wood also visited, bringing along a large paper bag 
in order to see if security personnel would check its contents.  On the 26th, Wood testified he went 
to Collier’s home and found Collier, Bowe, and Sayyed discussing the plot; on the coffee table 
was a small replica of the Statue of Liberty that Bowe had picked up on his trip to the landmark.  
Bowe acknowledged that both he and Sayyed visited the monument, and that he “wanted to show 
you guys that this is the best place where I think you could place the stuff at” and used a pencil to 
indicate a spot on the left side of the statue.  “Over here, there is a large crevice which leads all the 
way down to a point in the hand.  Now, if we could take some stuff and prime it… light a fuse and 
just lower it into the crevice and then drop the string…”28  When he was arrested, Collier, the 
alleged ringleader, was found with a small pocket diary detailing his own thoughts on where to 
place the explosives: “Statue arm is the most vulnerable but it has ¼ inch steel angle structure 
support.  Charges for neck to be effective have to be planted in four places at least.  Blowing the 
support for arm could topple or tear off a good part of statue.”  By placing the explosives near two 
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support beams he identified, they could “tear the whole damn thing down.”29  Making his 
contribution to the plot, Sayyed produced an envelope on which he’d written the departure times 
for ferries going to the Statue in order to plan their travel to and escape from the island.  Collier, 
intent on projecting his political message, suggested they print up leaflets to let the world know 
why they did what they were doing; Bowe objected, saying they needed to “lay cool” after the 
attack to avoid the massive investigation that was sure to come.30   
Bowe did, however, suggest that they consider additional targets, arguing that the Statue 
of Liberty operation wouldn’t require all four of their efforts.  He suggested they also include the 
Liberty Bell in Philadelphia and the Washington Monument in the Washington, D.C., to the list of 
targets; Bowe even offered to recruit from his acquaintances for the additional manpower needed 
for those other attacks.31  The plan to attack all three monuments had materialized. 
 
On January 29th, Wood picked up Collier in a car – rented by the NYPD –and together they traveled 
to Montreal where Collier had connections with leftist radicals who he believed could be helpful 
in acquiring the dynamite they needed for their plans.  It was very late when they arrived at the 
home of Michelle Saunier, a radical Quebec separatist friend of Collier’s – a connection made in 
Cuba – who had agreed to help him obtain the explosives.  The following day, when Saunier asked 
how much “stuff” Collier needed, he suggested about thirty pounds of plastic explosives, six feet 
of primer cord, and after consulting with Wood, about ten blasting caps.  Michelle Duclos soon 
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appeared at Saunier’s apartment to help facilitate the acquisition; Duclos and Collier knew each 
other, having met in New York the past November through Saunier.  The two exchanged 
pleasantries, and spoke about Collier’s trip to Cuba and his meeting with Che Guevara – not a bad 
feather in a leftist radical’s cap in 1965.   
It was here in Saunier’s apartment that Duclos met Wood for the first time.  Collier and 
Duclos discussed various subjects that must have been of concern to the undercover policeman in 
their midst, including how to build weapons out of common objects, like a bazooka made of a pipe 
and gunpowder, and the concept of funding operations by robbing armored cars.  Duclos, like 
Collier, had little hesitancy to commit violence to further her political objectives.  The two also 
discussed security; noting that keeping a secret organization like his safe meant keeping it 
undercover, Duclos asked Collier if he was sure they had not been infiltrated by the police. “Yes,” 
Collier responded as Officer Wood listened, “I am sure.”32 
Getting down to business, Collier told Duclos that he and his accomplices needed 
dynamite; that they had “three important things to do” but refrained from giving her details.33  
Duclos wondered why Collier had come to Canada to get explosives when her organization usually 
bought them in New York state, but consented to request the explosives from the persons in charge 
of her organization.  Ultimately, she told the men that she would come to them on February 15th, 
just two weeks away, and hoped to bring the explosives with her.34  The following day, satisfied 
																																																						
32 The concept of criminal activity such as robbery or “expropriations” for the purpose of 
supporting revolutionary activity is explored by Eric Hobsbawm in Bandits (1969) 
33 Testimony of Michelle Duclos, May 27th, 1965, stenographers notes page 1737, U.S. v Bowe, 
65 crim. 0189, S.D.N.Y., Docket 29881, Box 8A, 9A, No. 161, Ascension # 021-73A-0825, 
Location #32728, NARA-NYC 
34 Ibid. 
	 65	
that Duclos would come through for them, Collier and Wood drove back to New York City, leaving 
their contact information and even Collier’s house keys with Duclos.  
 
The plot moving swiftly, on February 12th Wood and his supervisors at BOSS met with FBI Special 
Agent John O’Connell, who would lead the investigation for the FBI, Special Agent Anthony 
Constantino, and other members of the Bureau at the Waldorf Astoria hotel, to brief them on the 
plot.  As former members of BOSS like Jack Caulfield and Anthony Bouza explain, the NYPD 
and FBI by then had already developed a close coordination in intelligence sharing.35  The meeting 
in the Waldorf Astoria is a very early and unmarked example of counterterrorism liaisons between 
the two agencies.   
Immediately upon receiving the early-morning phone call from Michelle Duclos on 
February 16th, Wood let his superiors know he was on the way to the Colonial House Hotel to meet 
her.  Captain William Knapp of BOSS and Detective Waslyciow waited for Wood to emerge from 
his meeting with Duclos at the Colonial House, and followed him in a car for a few blocks before 
picking him up to debrief him.  It was then that the undercover policeman let them know that the 
explosives had arrived and the wheels were set in motion.  Waslyciow and another member of 
NYPD proceeded to the Bronx to take up a hidden position from which to observe Collier when 
he arrived with Wood, who went to NYPD headquarters on Centre Street to requisition a rental 
car – the 1965 Chevrolet – with which to pick up Collier.   
Later on that same morning of February 16th, NYPD Bomb Squad Detective Clifford A. 
Leinberger was staked out in front of Collier’s house.  His standing orders were to arrest Collier if 
he came into possession of the dynamite that Wood had warned the Department might soon be in 
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play.  Before Wood picked Collier up to make the drive to the Bronx, he let Detective Leinberger 
know that the dynamite had successfully been smuggled into New York City and that he and 
Collier were en route to pick it up in the Bronx.36  Leinberger followed as Wood drove the rented 
Chevy uptown towards the Bronx; it Collier’s last ride as a free man for some time to come. 
 
THE TRIAL 
 
On May 13th, before the trial even commenced, Duclos plead guilty to illegally transporting the 
dynamite into the U.S. and thereafter became a witness for the prosecution.  The additional charge 
of plotting to destroy the landmarks was dismissed after sentencing, a result of her assistance in 
the prosecution of the three American defendants.  Showing leniency, Duclos was set free on 
September 20th, 1965, and her suspended sentence replaced with five years of probation with the 
understanding that she would leave the country and not return; she left North America altogether 
for a job opportunity in Paris.37  
The trial of the remaining plotters commenced May 17th of 1965 at the Federal Courthouse 
for the Southern District of New York in downtown Manhattan, and went to the jury on June 14th.  
At trial, the central element of the defense strategy was arguing the defendants were entrapped by 
an overeager and untrained policeman.  Despite each of the men admitting to visiting the Statue of 
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Liberty after the plot was first discussed they argued there was no intent to bomb it. 38  Each of the 
men claimed that the plots against the Statue, the Washington Monument, and the Liberty Bell, 
were all conceived of by Wood.39  Sayyed claims that when Wood continued to press his violent 
plans, the young man responded “this is getting ridiculous, let’s talk about something else.”40 
Bowe argued that he’d only visited the landmark at Wood’s urging “to pacify him as a 
future (judo) student who would be giving me three dollars a week for the next fifty-three weeks… 
I figured Mr. Wood was part of the sit-in generation, which I was no longer a part of, and he was 
over-zealous.  I figured some judo practice would give him a chance to vent his aggressions and 
give him some outlet for his emotions.”41  Bowe explained that he bought the small replica of the 
Statue to give to Wood, jocularly suggesting that if he had any aggression to take out on the Statue 
of Liberty he could take it out on the statuette instead.42  Bowe claimed he’d never even heard of 
Michelle Duclos or Michelle Saunier until after his arrest, and that he’d never heard the name of 
the organization he allegedly belonged to – the Black Liberation Front – until it was printed in a 
magazine a week after the FBI took him into custody. 
The men’s attorneys furthered the entrapment defense by pointing out how Wood had not 
only suggested and aggressively promoted the plot, but had bought and paid for many of the 
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supplies found in Collier’s apartment, including the Army explosives manual, had rented the car 
to bring Collier to Canada, had paid Bowe for judo lessons for the men, and had rented the car to 
bring Collier to the Bronx on the day of his arrest.   
The jury found the entrapment defense unconvincing; given the physical evidence and the 
damning testimony of Duclos, an accomplice to the plot, the guilty verdicts are unsurprising.  
 
According to the prosecutors, Collier was “unquestionably the agitator, the ringleader, the 
man who prodded the other defendants into the attempted consummation of the crime they had 
planned… it was he who insisted on making the trip to Canada to get the necessary dynamite.”  
Bowe and Sayyed, who the court argued were intelligent and moral men, were “goaded and 
prodded” into the plot by Collier but should have known better.43  One can only look at the 
evidence mounted against Collier – the notebook found in his possession when he was arrested, 
the damning testimony of Michelle Duclos, the fact he was caught red-handed with a box of 
dynamite in his possession – and wonder how compelled he hoped the jury would be by an 
entrapment argument.  Collier was sentenced to five years in prison and five additional years of 
probation.  He was released from Lewisberg Federal Penitentiary after serving twenty-one months; 
but it was not the last time Collier would find himself wrapped up with NYPD undercovers and 
alleged terrorist plots.  Robert Steele Collier and twenty other members of the New York chapter 
of the Black Panther Party were arrested in 1969 and charged with conspiring to bomb New York 
City landmarks and assassinate members of the NYPD in what became known as the Panther 21 
case. 
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Walter Bowe and Khaleel Sayyed were shown relatively more leniency, no doubt because 
of the belief that Collier was the ringleader and because the most damning evidence didn’t involve 
them.  Bowe was sentenced to three years in prison and three years of probation, and Sayyed to 
eighteen months in prison followed by two years of probation.44  All things considered, all three 
men got off with light sentences compared with terrorist conspirators in New York City in the 
post-9/11 era – Najibullah Zazi and his coconspirators, in a plan to bomb New York City subways 
on the anniversary of 9/11 in 2009, were sentenced to life in prison for their plot  (including one 
conspirator who was sentenced to life plus 95 years).45  But the Statue of Liberty plotters’ 
sentences, compared with right wing terrorists and would-be terrorists of their own era, is another 
thing, as the following chapters discuss.   
 
POLITICAL POLICING / BECOMING COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
It bears pointing out that BOSS did not send Raymond Wood into the field as an undercover 
infiltrator to investigate suspected terrorist activity; there frankly was not much terrorism, per se, 
to be concerned with in New York City in 1964.  Wood was tasked, as Frank Donner has argued 
BOSS was primarily engaged with, with investigating the political activity of CORE.46  The 
Congress of Racial Equality, the first assignment that Wood was given and that ultimately led to 
his involvement with Collier, had never at that point been accused, nor would it after, of being 
involved with terrorism or any other kind of violent, unlawful activity, despite the increasingly 
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volatile Civil Rights movement and despite aggravating the NYPD and the Mayor as a result of 
their civil rights protests, and garnering the attention of the FBI for suspected communist leanings 
that virtually every civil rights organization was suspected or accused of. 
The rookie cop made a total of seventy-eight written and oral reports to Captain Kinsella 
of BOSS during his time as an undercover infiltrator.47  Not only did he report on all of his 
involvement with Collier’s group – what became known as the Black Liberation Front – but Wood 
also submitted dozens of verbal and written reports on CORE and Freedom Now Party activity. 48  
Presumably, this reporting involved a great deal of protected speech that should not have been part 
of a police report – reports that are very likely have been included in the first purge of BOSS 
records in 1973, and certainly included in the later elimination of virtually all BOSS records.  That 
Wood ultimately found his way into Collier’s orbit, and into involvement with the plot, did not 
exhibit a specific intent on the part of NYPD to disrupt terrorism but rather a coordinated effort by 
the Department to keep tabs on organizations and individuals it believed to be anti-establishment 
subversives.  Political policing, even if it was political policing that would ultimately lead to 
violent criminal plots.  That anti-establishment organizations would lead to terrorism was still, in 
the United States in 1964 and early 1965, a conceptual leap despite the fact that it would become 
unmistakably linked within a few short years, and despite the fact that white supremacists in the 
American south had been resorting to terrorism for generations and specifically terrorist dynamite 
bombings for at least a decade.   
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As with the political policing that Donner discusses in his own work, an emphasis on 
intelligence and infiltration would become the preferred method of counterterrorism at NYPD in 
the years following the plot disrupted by Raymond Wood.  And as with Richard Rosenthal five 
years later, NYPD recruited young men (and often women) who could easily blend into the 
organizations and movements they were to infiltrate.  Wood, an African American, was tasked 
with infiltrating civil rights organizations predominately comprised of African American 
members; as Chapter 9 discusses, Richard Rosenthal, a young Jewish man from Brooklyn, would 
be ordered to infiltrate the Jewish Defense League (JDL), an organization where he fit the 
demographic perfectly.  The targeted recruiting proved effective; BOSS undercover operative 
Gene Roberts was so effective at fitting into his role in Malcolm X’s inner circle that he was 
literally standing at the Civil Rights leader’s side when he was assassinated at the Audubon 
Ballroom in Washington Heights only five days after Collier and his cohort were arrested.  “In 
CORE we suspected the white folks as the cops,” Brooklyn CORE member Dwayne Bey later 
explained.  “But who would have looked at (Wood)?”49 
Sending Wood into the field as an undercover infiltrator less than a day after joining NYPD, 
with absolutely no law enforcement or legal training was in fact not a unique event.  Little is known 
about the vast majority of undercover operators that BOSS sent into the field, but the few who 
have told their stories – like Richard Rosenthal who infiltrated JDL, and like Ed Howlette, who 
infiltrated Revolutionary Action Movement in 196550 – and whose experiences made it into 
newspapers and court documents like Ray Wood and Gene Roberts – show an organization that 
																																																						
49 Susan Brownmiller, “View From the Inside: I Remember Ray Wood,” Village Voice, June 3rd, 
1964 
50 See Ed Howlette Sr., Eric-83: Patriot or Traitor? A Precursor to Modern Day Terrorism, 
(Maryland: PublishAmerica, 2007) 
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placed a tremendous emphasis on the ability of their infiltrators to gain access with no traces to 
the police department, and not an organization that placed an emphasis on professional, or even 
necessarily legal, police practices.  Longtime BOSS Detective Anthony Bouza, reflecting on the 
case, has this to say: 
 
“What made Ray Wood such an outstanding agent in the Statue of Liberty case was 
his lack of familial ties, his being from out of town, and his ability to devote himself 
totally and exclusively to his job.  His knowledge of the jargon and workings of the 
NYPD was minimal, while his commitment to the assignment was total… He had 
never set foot in any official police installation during the first months of his career 
except as a prisoner to be booked!”51  
  
The inner workings of BOSS have, to this day, remained largely obscured.52  The courts proved to 
be complicit in the aura of mystery surrounding the secretive organization.  During the trial, 
defense attorneys repeatedly asked Wood and other officers under cross examination what their 
orders were; the prosecution consistently objected and the court consistently sustained those 
objections.  The same held true each time the witness was asked who his superior officers were.  
The defense frustration boiled to the surface on more than one occasion; Mark Lane, Collier’s 
defense attorney, exclaimed in frustration on one such occasion, “[e]very time I asked (what the 
instructions were or who Wood’s superiors were) the court said it was not material.”  Judge 
																																																						
51 Bouza, Police Intelligence, 64 
52 Other than the previously discussed memoirs, and some court records, nothing exists in the 
public realm on BOSS, and NYPD responded to this scholar’s dozens of FOIL requests a year 
and a half later with a form letter denying access to any records save a bland four-page report on 
the New York City Black Panther Party. 
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William Herlands responded “I think it is a fishing expedition and it is peripheral and collateral, 
and a fishing expedition of the most conjectural kind up to this point.”53  
It is also worth noting, again, that BOSS was not the only organization within NYPD that 
would become increasingly involved with countering terrorism.  Detectives from the Bomb Squad 
became involved almost immediately after it was known that dynamite was being discussed, and 
detectives from that unit were not only involved on the day of the arrest but also removed the 
dynamite from the 1965 Chevy in the Bronx, and took the explosives to Fort Tilden, where the 
thirty sticks were examined and later destroyed.  As in an earlier generation of terrorists, because 
of the fact that explosives (commonly dynamite) were the preferred method of violence, the Bomb 
Squad would play an important role in responding to, if not investigating, terrorist activity.   
 
Raymond A. Wood received an on-the-spot promotion to detective the day the arrests were made, 
received a bevy of commendations from the police department, the U.S. Department of Justice, 
and even the press.  Detective Wood went on to testify in front of the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) during the investigation into communist activities of CORE 
member Blyden Jackson in 1967.54  He earned his Bachelor’s degree in 1972 and his Master’s 
degree in 1982 (both from CUNY John Jay College); his master’s thesis was on Transnational 
Terrorism.55  
  
																																																						
53 Testimony of Detective Raymond A. Wood, NYPD, May 20th, 1965, and stenographers notes 
page 862, U.S. v Bowe, 65 crim. 0189, S.D.N.Y., Docket 29881, Box 8A, 9A, No. 161, 
Ascension # 021-73A-0825, Location #32728, NARA-NYC 
54 Testimony of Detective Raymond A. Wood, NYPD, “Subversive Influences in Rioting, Looting, 
and Burning,” Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 1967, page 1034 
55 Biography of Raymond A. Wood from FBI National Academy Brochure - 2000, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It hadn’t only been the cynical critics of the Civil Rights movement like Hoover that had been 
warning for some time that some elements of the movement might turn to violence.  As mentioned 
in the Introduction, even CORE officials had conceded, as early as the summer of 1963, that some 
members were leaning toward reacting to the difficult circumstances differently than in the past; 
to meet violence with violence.  “It is not easy,” said one delegate at CORE’s annual national 
convention in June of 1963, “to tell a man that is being beaten not to reach for his gun or his 
knife.”56  It was that same year that RAM emerged, eventually becoming one of the first national 
organizations to openly advocate greater militancy in the name of self-defense and African 
American rights;57 sixteen members of RAM would be arrested in New York City in June of 1967 
on charges including conspiracy to commit murder, assault, and anarchy.  One of the alleged 
assassination targets was Roy Wilkins, the moderate Executive Director of the NAACP; another 
was former CORE National Chairman James Farmer.58  Another undercover BOSS infiltrator, Ed 
Howlette, was instrumental in those arrests.59  And in April of 1968, as previously mentioned, 
twenty-one members of the New York chapter of the Black Panther Party – including Statue of 
Liberty plot ringleader Robert Collier, recently released from prison – would be arrested on 
charges relating to multiple terrorist bomb plots in New York City with targets including police 
																																																						
56 M.S. Handler, “Militancy Grows, CORE Aides Warns,” New York Times, June 28th, 1963 
57 See Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty 
58 Emanuel Perlmutter, "16 Negroes Seized; Plot to Kill Wilkins and Young Charged," New York 
Times, June 22nd, 1967; and McCandlish Phillips, "3 Names Added as Plot Targets," New York 
Times, June 23rd, 1967.  In 1966, the formerly interracial and non-violent CORE had moved in a 
distinctly different direction, embracing the militant Black Power approach of the era and even 
disassociating its white members.  See Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty.   
59 See Howlette, Eric-83 
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stations, department stores, and railways.60  Those arrests were also facilitated largely by BOSS 
infiltrators.   
“The Monumental Plot” is what Time would call it when the weekly magazine reported on 
Collier and his accomplices’ plot not much more than a week after their arrests.61  As the plot 
shows, the escalating militancy of some elements of the Civil Rights movement, especially in the 
North as Sugrue argues, manifested earlier than most acknowledge and were an important first 
marker in the history of terrorism in New York City during the long Sixties.  
Ultimately, the arrests in New York City in February of 1965 can been seen as a harbinger 
of things to come; that the tactic of terrorism already being employed by opponents of Civil Rights 
in the American south was migrating north and being embraced by a wider political cross section 
of Americans.  The authorities, however, do not seem to have foreseen this.62   
After the Statue of Liberty arrests, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover proudly announced “[t]his 
investigation conducted by the FBI and the New York City Police Department, is an excellent 
example of cooperation of law enforcement agencies at the federal and local level.”63  Director 
Hoover’s praise of the cooperation in this case was not undeserved.  Despite a local law 
enforcement agency being solely responsible for infiltrating the plot, both the briefing that NYPD 
officials including Wood gave members of the FBI at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in the days before 
the arrests, and the coordination that occurred between the FBI and NYPD on the actual day of the 
																																																						
60 Morris Kaplan, "Bomb Plot is Laid to 21 Panthers," New York Times, April 3rd, 1969 
61 “New York: The Monumental Plot,” Time Magazine, February 26th, 1965 
62 In 2017, thousands of BOSS records thought to have been destroyed were discovered intact by 
the New York City Municipal Archive; when they are released to the public, they may shed light 
on the question of whether or not authorities at BOSS and elsewhere were indeed predicting the 
emergence of terrorism from the wider political spectrum or not.	
63 FBI Press Release, February 16th, 1965, Court Exhibit, U.S. v Bowe, 65 crim. 0189, S.D.N.Y., 
Docket 29881, Box 8A, 9A, No. 161, Ascension # 021-73A-0825, Location #32728, NARA-
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arrests, attests to that cooperation.  After Collier’s arrest by NYPD early on the morning of 
February 16th, it was the FBI who rounded up the remaining suspects.  Of course, that the alleged 
intended targets were all federal property in three different states, and that the charges would be 
federal and not state in nature, suggests that the FBI would, logically, be involved.  Attorney 
General Nicholas Katzenbach, echoing Hoover in a letter to NYPD Commissioner Michael 
Murphy, commended both the department and Wood specifically: “The success of American law 
enforcement depends, at root, on the kind of cooperation possible among law enforcement agencies 
at all levels.  Your work in this case gives great support to that principle.”64   
Despite what can be seen as a personal stake in the matter – Wood had after all been 
arrested while undercover for trying to arrest him – Mayor Wagner was absent from the self-
congratulatory parade that followed the arrests.  The communications, the congratulations, the 
back-slapping, were all between the FBI, the NYPD, and the Attorney General.  The Mayor, given 
his deference to the Police Department, almost certainly knew nothing about the specifics of the 
investigation; even his successor, who deferred to police department officials exponentially less, 
was not involved in day-to-day or even the broad-picture of BOSS operations.  The plot emerged 
less than four months before Wagner would publically announce he was not seeking another term 
as Mayor, in any case, so it is likely his attention was elsewhere.65  What the plot did represent, in 
hindsight, was a view into how the NYPD and the FBI would approach the re-emerging threat of 
terrorism in New York City, and to the kind of cooperation that would characterize their efforts in 
the volatile years to come.  
  
																																																						
64 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to NYPD Commissioner Michael Murphy, February 
16th, 1965, reprinted in NYPD 3100, RFW JR Documents, LWA, LCC-CUNY 
65 “Wagner Says He Won’t Run for a 4th Term,” New York Times, June 11th, 1965 
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PART I : NYPD, FBI, and Early Terrorist Plots in NYC During the Long Sixties 
Chapter 3 : The 1966 Minutemen Plot
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As this dissertation argues, a closer look at the reemergence of terrorism in this era of United States 
history shows something largely ignored by scholars of both the era and of terrorism in the 
American experience more broadly: even beyond the racist terrorism of the KKK, actors on the 
political right like the largely-forgotten Minutemen – an American anticommunist organization 
that counted thousands of members at its zenith in the mid 1960s – were not only part of the history 
of American terrorism in this period, they in fact preceded those on the left.  In 1966 the New York 
City Police Department, investigating the Minutemen alongside the FBI, uncovered a plot to bomb 
several targets associated with the political left in the New York area.  Even the earlier thwarted 
terrorist attack on the Statue of Liberty and other national monuments in early 1965 was predated 
by right-wing attacks like the long terrorist bombing campaign in “Bombingham” that was capped 
by the 1963 bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church that killed four young schoolgirls, one of 
the deadliest and certainly one of the most abhorrent attacks of the era.1   
 
Paralleling the scholarly focus on left-wing political violence of the era, the much-explored 
excesses of law enforcement at both the federal and state level – the political policing, the illegal 
and disconcerting intimidation and “intelligence” operations, the oppressive crackdown on anti-
war and anti-government protest – are similarly almost exclusively talked about in the context of 
how these disquieting practices were brought to bear against individuals and organizations on the 
																																																						
1 One notable bombing prior to the 1963 Baptist Church bomb is the 1958 bombing of The 
Hebrew Benevolent Congregation Temple in Atlanta.  The Temple’s leader, Rabbi Jacob 
Rothschild, was an outspoken proponent of civil rights and a friend to Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr.  See Melissa Faye Greene, The Temple Bombing, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1996) 
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political left.  The massive files developed on and intimidation of King and other civil rights 
leaders;2 the FBI COINTELPRO operations against the New Left, the Civil Rights movement, and 
the Communist Party USA; the NYPD’s alarmingly violent and widely-covered crackdown on 
Columbia University protestors in 1968; and NYPD’s intelligence outfit, the Bureau of Special 
Services (BOSS) and their infiltration of Malcolm X’s inner circle, the Black Panther Party, and 
other left-leaning organizations.  But while focus on the left illustrates a general truth, the fact of 
the matter is that exploring law enforcement’s aggressive posture toward the left during the long 
Sixties only tells part of the story.  Law enforcement and intelligence operations were not nearly 
equal opportunity offenders, but as we shall see, political policing and other excesses of the time 
were similarly, if not nearly as regularly, brought to bear against those on the political right – like, 
as this chapter argues, the Minutemen.  
 
THE MINUTEMEN EMERGE 
 
Despite regular appearances in public discourse of the time, the Minutemen can’t even claim to be 
relegated to the history books; today the organization barely registers in the footnotes of history 
books.  Even the much more mainstream John Birch Society, which emerged in 1958 and persists 
to this day as a shell of its former self, has largely been lost to history despite being “the largest, 
most important, best organized, and most formidable ‘radical’ or ‘ultra’ right-wing group of the 
period,” according to the lone historian, D.J. Mulloy, who has considered them at length in the 
																																																						
2 Outright harassment was far from uncommon. Among the most salacious episodes is the FBI’s 
sending of an anonymous and vicious letter to King suggesting he commit suicide.  See Beverly 
Gage, “What an Uncensored Letter to M.L.K. Reveals,” The New York Times Magazine, 
November 11th, 2014 
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past half-century.3  More generally, scholarship exploring right-wing movements in the United 
States during the 1960s has been overwhelmed by works considering the important movements on 
the political left.4    
The extremes of right wing politics of the time manifested most explicitly in the racist and 
often violent reactions to the Civil Rights movement, and by a rabid anticommunism best 
characterized by the dramatic rise and fall of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) and then by the 
John Birch Society and Minutemen.  Scholar of right-wing movements Sara Diamond argues that 
by the early 1950s “anticommunism had become the raison d’être of U.S objectives abroad… [and] 
permeated the political and social scene at home…”5  There was, then, both – on one hand, a 
sustained commitment to countering communism abroad, a through-line that continues from 
Truman all the way to Reagan, and certainly includes the liberal Democrat presidencies of 
Kennedy and Johnson, who started and escalated the war in Vietnam in the name of countering 
communism.  But on the other hand there was also social and political anticommunism within the 
United States, countering perceived red subversion, a movement with a longer history than usually 
acknowledged, lasting with ebbs and flows from the Russian Revolution to the fall of the Iron 
Curtain.  And anticommunism was not always, or exclusively, a conservative-only prerogative.  
Historians including Richard Gid Powers have shown that anticommunism was, over the years, in 
fact a pluralistic endeavor embraced varyingly by liberal Jews, African American activists, and 
																																																						
3 D.J. Mulloy, The World of the John Birch Society, 7 
4 Beyond studies on anti-communism, much of the scholarship on right wing / conservative 
politics in the Sixties explores Barry Goldwater’s miserably failed 1964 presidential campaign, 
arguing it was, at best, a long prelude to the rise of Reagan conservatism.  Perhaps the most 
noted work exploring the impact of Goldwater on conservative politics is Rick Perlstein’s Before 
the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (2001).  See also 
Lisa McGirr’s thoughtful exploration of the rise of the conservative movement in Southern 
California, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (2001).   
5 Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion, page 37 
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labor leaders; not just right wing extremists like McCarthy, the Birch Society, and the Minutemen.  
But the traumatic experience that McCarthyism was for the United States irrevocably altered 
anticommunism in the United States; Powers argues that “[i]n the popular mind, anticommunism 
and McCarthyism were one and the same, and American anticommunism would never recover 
from the effects of that fatal embrace.”6  By the end of the 1950s, despite what Powers argues is a 
passive but “instinctive rejection” of communism by virtually all Americans, assertive domestic 
anticommunism had become the exclusive endeavor of the extremes of the far right like the Birch 
Society and the Minutemen.7 
 
According to the Minutemen’s official version of how the organization came into being, the 
genesis was a duck-hunting trip in Missouri in June of 1959.  Ten hunters got to talking as they 
rambled through the Missouri backcountry over the course of their hunt; one of the men casually 
remarked that if (and when) the communists invaded, they could melt into the woods and fight on 
as a guerilla band.  The offhand remark quickly became a serious project.  Joseph McCarthy had 
been dead for less than two years.8    
Robert DePugh was the most prominent of the duck hunters that June day; he would soon 
become the national chairman of the organization that emerged and the person whose name would 
remain forever most closely tied to the Minutemen.  More than a decade and a half earlier, in 
August of 1944, just one year after entering the Army, DePugh had been discharged from active 
duty after a military medical board found he suffered from “anxiety, nervousness… mental 
																																																						
6 Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor, 272 
7 Ibid., prologue  
8 J. Harry. Jones, Jr., The Minutemen, 39, quoting an undated official Minutemen pamphlet 
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depression… and schizoid personality.”9  Based in DePugh’s hometown of Norborne, Missouri, 
the organization began to quickly spread throughout the nation, and it did so as publically as it 
could manage.  In October of 1961 an example of the public outreach appeared in no less than the 
pages of the New York Times: “Join the Minutemen,” an advertisement read. “Help put real 
strength in civilian defense.  Pledge yourself and your rifle to a free America…”10 
A 1961 Minutemen brochure titled "What Chance for Minutemen?" discussed the various 
ways communists might take over the government of the United States, including by democratic 
elections.  Democrat John F. Kennedy had, of course, been sworn into office just that past January.  
In the case of a democratic takeover by communists, the Minutemen argued, they must “be willing 
to continue the fight for liberty even though we no longer have the legal support of established 
authority… Prepare to take any action — no matter how brutal — that may be required to renew 
the protection of the United States Constitution for future generations.”11  
Despite a shared belief that the threat of communist subversion in the United States was as 
much or more of a threat than the foreign threat of communism, the John Birch Society and 
Minutemen had different postures when it came to adopting violence to defend against the 
perceived threat.  The Minutemen had vowed to fight in the streets since they first emerged; Powers 
argues that the Birch Society was “if truth be told, more in the nature of a study club devoted to 
the reading and discussion of [JBS Founder Robert] Welch’s literary productions than a threat to 
																																																						
9 DePugh Army discharge papers related in Jones, The Minutemen, 27 
10 “FBI Memorandum, Director, FBI, to SAC, New York, ‘Minutemen’ (Internal Security), 
Bureau File no. 62-107261,” December 6th, 1961 includes details of New York Times advert; FBI 
Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-1, 31/178, IA 
11 “FBI Memorandum, SA Walter A. Higendorf, ‘Minutemen’ (Internal Security), Bureau File 
no. 62-107261,” February 20th, 1964, FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-1, 
112/178, IA 
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the country.”12  Sara Diamond concurs, arguing that the Birch Society “did not promote violence 
or particularly undemocratic action to achieve victory,” but instead promoted a tremendous public 
awareness program to educate citizens and to counter the perceived all-encompassing threat of 
internal communist subversion; according to Welch, even sturdy Cold Warriors Dwight 
Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers were part of this vast conspiracy.13  As J. Harry Jones, Jr., the 
original and still-unrivaled chronicler of the Minutemen, argues, “[w]hat most distinguishes the 
Minutemen from their ideological allies is the urgency of their belief that a Communist takeover 
from within the United States is so imminent, coupled with their preparations – through training 
and the acquisition of weapons of war – to defend the country from this threat.”14 
 
Anticommunism in the United States had already been tempered by President Eisenhower and 
other national leaders when, in January of 1961, the incoming Kennedy administration further 
steered the nation away from the peak of public anticommunism reached in the mid 1950s.  The 
administration, for instance, immediately began vigorously curtailing anticommunist rhetoric and 
indoctrination within the military,15 and in the fall and winter of 1961 the so-called “Reuther 
Memorandum” emerged.  Conceived and drafted by UAW labor leaders and administration allies 
Victor and Walter Reuther at the request of Robert Kennedy (after they’d made the same 
																																																						
12 Powers, Not Without Honor, 287 
13 Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 54 
14 Jones, The Minutemen (New York: Doubleday, 1968), 7 
15 In July of 1961, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-AR) 
warned about the dangers of a revolt by right-wing military officers against the Kennedy 
Administration in a then-secret memorandum often referred to as the Fulbright Memorandum.   
Just two months earlier, Major General Edwin Walker was relieved of his post for indoctrinating 
his troops in Augsburg, Germany, with John Birch Society propaganda.  It was less than three 
months after Kennedy took office, and only the most notorious case of uneasy political activity 
by senior right-wing military officers.  See Powers, Not Without Honor.  
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arguments to him in person), the memorandum called for a comprehensive government approach 
to counter elements of the radical right to include a public information drive to discredit these 
groups, FBI infiltration, ending of their tax-exempt status, and disbanding of guerilla groups like 
the Minutemen.16   
When anticommunists in organizations like the Minutemen believed, then, that the 
government was turning away from them after a period of ideological alignment (if not outright 
allegiance), they were right.  In a speech at a Democratic fundraiser in Hollywood in November 
of 1961, President Kennedy called out the Birch Society and the Minutemen as “the discordant 
voices of extremism… armed bands of civilian guerillas” who incorrectly saw the threat of 
communism coming from within, from their fellow citizens, and not from abroad.  As he continued 
his speechmaking swing through the country that month, he repeated his points about the danger 
of extremists on both the left and the right in North Carolina and in Seattle; in response, Barry 
Goldwater made a point of articulating his belief that “extremist groups on the left are far more 
dangerous than those on the right… They are the ones raising hell with his country.”17  It the years 
that followed, neither men would be proven entirely wrong.  Violent extremists from both ends of 
the political spectrum would emerge, even if it is those from the left that Goldwater warned of that 
we remember most. 
 
In 1961, just two years after the Minutemen emerged, FBI Headquarters in Washington directed 
every field office to monitor any chapters in their area of operations, but without actually 
																																																						
16 See Powers, Not Without Honor, 300-302 
17 See “Kennedy Asserts Far-Right Groups Prove Disunity,” New York Times, November 19th, 
1961; and “Transcript of the President’s News Conference on World and Domestic Affairs,” 
New York Times, November 30th, 1961; and “Goldwater Solicits G.O.P Votes from Southern 
Segregationists,” New York Times, November 19th, 1961 
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commencing an actual investigation.18  The year was a busy one for the FBI’s domestic intelligence 
agents; it had expanded the COINTELPRO operations from the initial target, the Communist Party 
USA (CPUSA), to an alarmingly broad number of targets that might be communist sympathizers 
or even fellow travelers like Dr. King and a local Boy Scout troop, and added the second 
COINTELPRO target, the Socialist Workers Party.  But while the CPUSA, civil rights leaders, 
and a handful of Boy Scouts were getting proactive covert action operations directed at them 
despite an overwhelmingly peaceful agenda, the Minutemen, with their clear, unambiguously 
subversive and threatening language, were only getting a passive file developed.   
But this passive monitoring of the Minutemen would not last for too long.  The 
assassination of President Kennedy in November of 1963 (the first of a sitting president since 
anarchist Leon Czolgosz shot William McKinley in 1901) immediately and dramatically elevated 
scrutiny of potentially violent subversives on both the left and the right.  In January of 1964, new 
directives came down from FBI Headquarters; field offices were instructed to not only monitor 
but start an active intelligence investigation into Minutemen chapters in their area; to discern if 
there were local chapters, and if so, what were their numbers, their leadership structure, and any 
activities they were involved in.  Included in the new direction to field offices was the order to 
coordinate with local intelligence, law enforcement agencies, and even military liaisons.  In New 
York City, the primary point of contact was the NYPD Bureau of Special Services (BOSS).19  
																																																						
18 “FBI Memorandum Director FBI to SAC Albany, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security), Bureau 
File no. 62-107261,” FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-1, 57/178, IA 
19 “FBI Memorandum, SA Daniel J. Quigley to SAC, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security) (Kansas 
City),” January 24th, 1964; details interactions with BOSS and other New York law enforcement 
agencies over several pages; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-1, 73/178, 
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The FBI Headquarters-directed canvas yielded negative results, the law enforcement and 
military officials all reporting that they’d heard of the group from news reports, but had not heard 
of any local chapters of the Minutemen.20  On January 28th, 1964, a detective from BOSS advised 
the FBI New York office that “there is no information in the files of [BOSS] indicating that there 
are any units of the ‘Minutemen’ established in New York City, nor had [BOSS] any information 
concerning persons who were individual members of the "Minutemen."21  The only blip on the 
radar was from Poughkeepsie, eighty or so miles upstate from New York City, where agents 
learned that the local American Legion junior band was commonly known, also, as the 
Minutemen.22  On April 29th, 1964, the New York field office reported to the Kansas City field 
office – the office leading the Minutemen investigation – that after concluding its active 
investigation “no information concerning the formation of ‘Minutemen’ units or individual 
memberships in the ‘Minutemen’ within the NY Division” could be found. 23  
Earlier that month, however, Special Agent George Arnett of the Kansas City office 
advised that the Minutemen were divided into four regional commands, and that an individual by 
the name of Milton Kellogg of Syracuse, New York, was the Northeast regional coordinator.  
Kellogg had come to the attention of the Bureau as early as 1961, when as the Commander of the 
																																																						
20 “FBI Memorandum, Director FBI to SAC Albany, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security),” January 
16th, 1964; and “FBI Memorandum, SA John V. Griffin to SAC New York, ‘Minutemen,’ 
(Internal Security),” February 16th, 1964; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-
NYC-1 57/178; and Minutemen-NYC-1, 57/178 and 82/178, IA 
21 “FBI Memorandum, Report of Daniel J. Quigley, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security), Bureau 
File no. 62-107261” February 17th, 1964; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-
NYC-1, 93/178, IA 
22 “FBI Memorandum, SA Robert E. Jenkins to SAC New York, Attn. SA Daniel J. Quigley, 
‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security), RE; SA Quigley’s Memo SAC, NY dated 1/24/64,” February 
27th, 1964; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-1, 147/178, IA 
23 “FBI Report of SA Daniel J. Quigley, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security),” April 29th, 1964; FBI 
Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-2, 20/117, IA 
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local American Legion, he approached the local Syracuse FBI office with information regarding 
communist infiltration of the motion picture industry; he had recently organized a picket of movies 
including Spartacus and Exodus for their employment of communists (presumably blacklisted 
screenwriter Dalton Trumbo, who wrote both).  He and his associates handed out more than 
160,000 fliers in protest at nearly 100 screenings. 
During that same spring and summer of 1964, several individual civilians in the New York 
City area, including at least one member of the Army, also reached out to the FBI to let them know 
that, although they were not members, they had corresponded with the Minutemen and received 
their publications in the mail. More than a few individuals were also reported to the FBI by their 
friends, and in one case a man by his own wife, as having received Minuteman literature.24  Most 
of the self-reporting was done by what seemed to be genuinely patriotic citizens who had concerns 
about the Minutemen program.   
The year before, 1963, BOSS had provided the FBI New York office with a list of 
individuals who had corresponded with the organization; how they came about the list is unclear.25 
When BOSS or NYPD more broadly began tracking Minutemen is also unclear, but if BOSS was 
in possession of a list pertaining to Minutemen in 1963 – a year prior to the FBI directive to open 
an active investigation into the organization – NYPD’s interest in them, then, isn’t spawned 
specifically in response to the FBI’s request for information during the 1964 canvas.  What this 
illustrates is that, just as the FBI had decided to do, BOSS was investigating the Minutemen and 
potentially subversive political organizations on the right just as it did those on the left.   
																																																						
24 “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to Director FBI, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security),” 
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Redacted] “a list of Minutemen members on 5/2/63,” FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, 
Minutemen-NYC-3, 57/182, IA	
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So, despite the FBI’s conclusion in April of 1964 that there was no Minutemen activity in 
the New York region, there clearly wasn’t nothing: there was a regional organizer, local recruiting 
in the press and in the public including in schools, and correspondence between the organization 
and New Yorkers.  The conclusion that the Minutemen had no presence in New York is indeed a 
curious conclusion to have come to.   
 
More than a year and a half after wrapping up the investigation, in January of 1966, the FBI and 
NYPD reported internally for the first time that the Minutemen were, indeed, active in New York 
City.  A BOSS detective shared with the FBI a confidential Minutemen correspondence in NYPD 
possession.  The detective claimed that it was uncertain how BOSS came into possession of the 
letter that included the names and addresses of several New York members of the organization; 
that it was obtained illegally or by an NYPD member infiltrating the organization is certainly 
likely.  As had been the case a year earlier when undercover rookie policeman Raymond Wood 
uncovered the plot to bomb the Statue of Liberty and other national monuments, developing 
confidential informants and infiltrating the organizations with undercover FBI and NYPD 
members emerged as the primary tool used to combat the Minutemen.   
The letter NYPD confidentially shared with the FBI clearly indicated there were between 
twenty and thirty members in the area, and another dozen or so that “could be brought in in due 
time.”26  It was after the discovery of this letter that FBI and NYPD cooperation into the 
investigation increased dramatically.  Between January and March of 1966, a substantial amount 
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of FBI records indicate BOSS interviewing and investigating several persons for possible 
membership in the group and a great deal of information sharing between the two agencies.27   
In addition to information the FBI and NYPD were developing in secret, the Minutemen 
were busy becoming much more visible on the local scene.  Open recruiting through newspapers 
and the mail continued, but not all mail was as benign.  One person reported to the FBI the receipt 
of an anonymous letter, postmarked from Newburgh, about fifty miles from New York City.  The 
letter – on it the Minutemen logo of a silhouetted image of a man with a rifle – cryptically stated 
“[t]his is to inform you that your name has been duly noted.”  The recipient, who had recently 
published a piece in a local newspaper critical of the House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC), understood the implied threat clearly.28   
Some actions moved beyond threats; in March of 1966, the Minutemen were suspected of 
bombing a vehicle at an anti-Vietnam War meeting in Huntington, Long Island.  While members 
of an organization opposed to the war met at the Huntington Library, a homemade bomb was 
placed on the windshield of one of their trucks in the parking lot; when the bomb exploded, it 
shattered the windshield and damaged the interior of the car.  When the startled participants of the 
meeting came out to investigate, they found Minutemen stickers attached to several cars and to the 
library itself.29   
																																																						
27 See, as examples: “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to SAC Newark, ‘Minutemen,’ 
(Internal Security),” March 25th, 1966; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-
4, 114/193, IA; and “FBI Memorandum, SA [Name Redacted] to SAC, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal 
Security),” April 5th, 1966; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-4, 121/193, 
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March 25th, 1966; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-4, 114/193, IA 
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In mid-April 1966, a confidential informant who attended a National Renaissance Party 
(NRP) meeting at the organization’s headquarters on Manhattan’s Upper West Side reported to the 
FBI that he had learned that at least one Minutemen cell was active in New York City.30   The 
informant reported that a Minuteman speaker claimed “each cell contained 13 members and 20 
pieces of armament such as automatic rifles, bazookas, and pistols, and grenades,” that they were 
responsible for the bomb in Long Island some weeks earlier, and that they trained in weapons and 
guerilla warfare in upstate New York.31  The same FBI confidential informant attended the 
Minutemen convention that June.  Some of the information that the informant returned to the FBI 
as a result of the trip was the identity of the state coordinator – Milton Kellogg – as well as the 
existence and location of Minutemen training camps in the region.32  A confidential informant – 
perhaps the same one again – also explained that at one such meeting it was suggested that a 
Minutemen member could infiltrate college peace groups and attend a meeting with a suitcase of 
explosives timed to explode after their departure.33   
By 1966, FBI infiltration of groups on the political right had become a not-uncommon 
occurrence.  The FBI initiated COINTELPRO WHITE HATE against the Klan and other white 
																																																						
30 According to FBI Records, the NRP was “an anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, anti-Negro, and neo-
Fascist organization with activities generally confined to the New York City area. It was founded 
in 1949 by James H. Madole…” and was headquartered at his residence at 10 West 90th Street.  
See “FBI Memorandum, SAC Albany to SAC New York, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security), 
Appendix” May 13th, 1966; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-5, 31/204, 
IA 
31 “FBI Informant Report, [Name Redacted] to SA Edward A. Uzzell, ‘Minutemen Operations,’” 
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supremacist groups on July 30th, 1964, even before the FBI initiated similar programs against the 
Black Power movement and the New Left.  Informer Gary Thomas Rowe, a member of the KKK, 
had already provided the Bureau with years of useful intelligence by March of 1965, when he 
served as the linchpin in securing the arrests and convictions of three Klansmen for the murder of 
thirty nine-year old Viola Liuzzo, a white suburban Detroit mother of five, on the last night of the 
Selma-Montgomery march.34  Unlike the other COINTELPRO operations, though, the WHITE 
HATE operations largely did not expand beyond the initial named targets; the Minutemen, after 
they began stockpiling weapons, emerged as the subjects of those few exceptions.  The Minutemen 
would become the target of FBI COINTELPRO operations, if only a very limited number that 
pales in comparison to those operations directed at the Civil Rights movement or New Left.35  
 
By early 1966, BOSS had its own confidential sources inside the New York Minutemen.  In 
addition to BOSS’s possession of the confidential list of New York City Minutemen shared with 
the Bureau in January, in late May BOSS advised the FBI that it learned from inside the 
organization that Robert DePugh himself had traveled from Syracuse (where, coincidentally or 
not, Milton Kellogg the regional coordinator lived) to New York City for an unknown purpose.36  
																																																						
34 See Church Committee, Book III, pages 239 – 245.  Cunningham, in There’s Something 
Happening Here, argues that the Bureau was reluctantly brought to investigate the right – most 
notably the Klan – by a Justice Department and mostly AG Robert Kennedy and President LBJ.  
The national attention brought by white supremacist murders made it impossible for the Bureau 
to remain passive any longer, and this is where COINTELPRO WHITE HATE came from (page 
70-73).  This is what got the Klan investigation moved from GID (General Investigative) to DID 
(Domestic Intelligence Division).   
35 See Church Committee, Book III, especially pages 18 and 19, for COINTELPRO WHITE 
HATE info.  The Committee found that the few operations under WHITE HATE program, other 
than the named targets, targeted the Minutemen. 
36 “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to SAC Kansas City, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security),” 
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BOSS also advised that it learned that as many as fifty members planned on attending guerilla 
warfare training maneuvers in upstate New York’s Catskill region near Ellenville in June of 1966, 
echoing what FBI informants had learned.37  When upstate police were alerted to be on the lookout 
for individuals who might be part of the group, it wasn’t hard to pick out the Caucasian men in 
camouflage gear running around the woods with rifles; the license plate numbers the local law 
enforcement officers dutifully copied were transmitted to BOSS, who in turn gathered information 
on the owners of the vehicles and shared it with the FBI.38 
The FBI and NYPD investigations into the Minutemen were clearly more than political 
policing.  The Minutemen organization was urging its unknown number of members to purchase, 
stockpile, and hide weapons for what they expected to be a coming fight with foreign communists 
and maybe even American citizens for the future of the United States.  It was preparing its members 
for an underground campaign that included intelligence gathering and violent activities.  Although 
never known to have been explicitly spelled out like this by either agency – perhaps it was obvious 
enough that it didn’t need to be – what FBI and NYPD were increasingly seeing, if they didn’t see 
it at first, was an organization that had the stated intentions and the increasing capability to conduct 
illegal violence in the service of their political goals.  
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THE 1966 NEW YORK MINUTEMEN PLOT 
 
 On October 30th, 1966, in a series of raids beginning in the borough of Queens but quickly 
spreading throughout the rest of New York City and even throughout the state, NYPD and other 
law enforcement officials arrested twenty men and confiscated what Queens District Attorney Nat 
H. Hentel called “the biggest haul of weapons and death-dealing material seized in this area in the 
memory of veteran law enforcement officers.” Among the cache were automatic rifles, mortars, 
bazookas, machetes, crossbows, homemade bombs, garrote wires, and more than a million rounds 
of ammunition.  On the stock of the one of the rifles was stamped “Liberty or Death,” echoing 
Patrick Henry’s famous 1775 proclamation.39 
Hentel charged that the twenty men – all members of the Minutemen – were committed to 
“destroying and demolishing” three separate “communist, left-wing, and liberal” camps later 
identified to be in Wingdale, New York, near Wanaque, New Jersey, and a 40-acre commune run 
by the Committee for Nonviolent Action in Voluntown, Connecticut.40   
New York State Police (NYSP) searched Camp Webatuck in Wingdale and found nine 
gallon-sized jugs filled with gasoline, configured as “electrified Molotov cocktails” with crude 
timing devices made of cheap watches attached to flashlight batteries and candles.  The bombs had 
been armed and activated but failed to ignite.41   
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It was later revealed that the Brooklyn headquarter of Herbert Aptheker, a Marxist 
candidate for Congress, was also targeted.42    
 
The news of the dramatic raids and arrests broke on Halloween; the New York Times covered the 
news on the front page, above the fold, along with a photo of District Attorney Hentel surrounded 
by a small fraction of the massive cache of weapons that had been seized.  The FBI New York 
office immediately informed Headquarters and the St. Louis office that it had been maintaining 
contact and sharing information with BOSS in the months leading up to the arrests, and by that 
time the New York office had no less than six confidential informants within the Minutemen 
organization – at least one of whom was almost certainly rounded up in the raids and arrests.43   
The arrests were clearly an NYPD operation with a BOSS infiltrator at the center of it.  
Informants and infiltrators from both organizations, however, had been reporting on the 
organization for some time and continued to do so all the way up to the arrests.  An FBI informant 
report from the day after the arrests reads: “Six members of the Minutemen from the Long Island 
area met at Goldies Diner, North Conduit Avenue and 130th street, Queens, at 5:30am on this date.  
At 5:45am on this date about twelve NYC detectives entered the diner and arrested the members 
of the Minutemen.”  With a bit of wry humor at what was almost certainly his own arrest, the 
informant concludes his report: “This ended the maneuvers for this date.”44 
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Alarmingly, those rounded up included a New York State Trooper suspected of passing 
confidential law enforcement information to the group, an FDNY fireman, an Army Special Forces 
reservist from Queens, and Milton Kellogg, the Syracuse-based regional director for the 
Minutemen.  As the investigation grew and two hundred possible members were identified, the list 
included a number of other soldiers with the 11th Special Forces Group Reserve Unit at Miller 
Army Airfield in Staten Island; the FBI had good reason to believe that stolen arms and 
communication gear from the Reserve Unit constituted a large part of the arsenal found when the 
Minutemen were arrested.45   
Several NYPD officers were also on the list – perhaps unsurprising given that a controversy 
had erupted just a few months earlier over New York City policemen in the John Birch Society.  
In an illustration of a much less hands-off approach to the police department than his predecessor, 
Mayor Lindsay – who derided the JBS as “hostile to everything I think is decent” – directed 
Commissioner Howard R. Leary to report on Birch Society activities on the part of policemen after 
a JBS spokesperson estimated that there were about 500 Birchers amongst the roughly 27,000 men 
and women in uniform.46  Ultimately, Leary would concede that as much as it displeased him that 
any members of the force were also Birch Society members, because of New York Corporation 
Council J. Lee Rankin’s official opinion on the matter stating the guaranteed constitutional right 
of association, “I can’t do anything about it.”47  Combined with the new Mayor and new 
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Commissioner’s efforts in support of a restructured CCRB, it had been a busy first half-year of 
confrontation with department rank and file and before too long would impact NYPD intelligence 
and counterterrorism activities. 
 
Despite the huge weapons cache seized during the raids, the Bureau’s ongoing interaction with 
BOSS also found the FBI downplaying the seriousness of the arrests, at least internally.  The day 
after the statewide roundup, the New York office sent a confidential teletype to Director J. Edgar 
Hoover that heavily relied upon the ongoing interaction with BOSS.  The massive seizure of 
weapons and ammunition had been “greatly exaggerated” according to BOSS’s commanding 
officer, Captain William Knapp.  The confidential conversation between BOSS’s senior officer 
and the FBI also characterized the atmosphere that led to the arrests – rather than intelligence that 
suggested an imminent attack on the horizon, BOSS and FBI analysis and informants suggested 
that nothing was in fact planned other than “routine maneuvers” such as the guerilla warfare 
training upstate that had occurred before and that they believed the “alleged plot to bomb or burn 
three ‘red camps’… refers to past non-specific discussions of such contemplated activity.”  The 
FBI’s informants had already reported on these vague discussions and suggestions in the past – at 
NRP meetings – without causing enough alarm to warrant rounding up the organization.  Captain 
Knapp informed the FBI that the arrests were made “with virtually no advance warning” at the 
direction of Queens District Attorney Hentel, who took “complete personal charge of the matter” 
and made “exaggerated public statements;” the reasoning, NYPD argued and the New York Field 
Office shared with the Director, was that it had more to do with capitalizing on the publicity 
																																																						
Society, Henry di Suvero, would three years later come back into the spotlight as defense council 
for left-wing bombers Jane Alpert and Sam Melville. 
	 97	
windfall given the District Attorney’s candidacy for re-election just a week later.48  Future press 
reports would echo this suggestion of politically-timed arrests, but even before the issue was raised 
in public, Hentel countered it, explaining that investigators had learned that the attacks were 
supposed to happen on the day of the arrests under the pretext of a hunting trip.  
The fact that Captain Knapp downplayed the plot to the FBI, and that the FBI in New York 
communicated this without criticizing it to Hoover, is certainly curious given the fact that nine 
bombs were found at the intended targets.  A vague plot, bravado and loose talk with no action, is 
one thing – but nine bombs already at their targets and a massive cache of weapons found on the 
suspects during their arrests is something else altogether, and not something that seems easily 
discounted by law enforcement officers from the same department that, just one year earlier, had 
made such a big deal of the arrests of those who plotted to bomb the Statue of Liberty but actually 
had an infinitesimal fraction of the arms, explosives, or specific plans that the New York 
Minutemen did in October of 1966.  
Also, despite the NYPD and FBI assertions that only regular maneuvers were planned for 
October 30th, an FBI source reported a full week before the dramatic arrests that upstate 
Minutemen members were scheduled to supply the New York City area members with a detonating 
material known as Primacord “and possibly TNT and dynamite.”  At the same meeting where the 
FBI source heard these plans, various explosive timing devices were displayed and one of the 
members leading the meeting, Jim Britt of Freeport Long Island, instructed the assembled 
Minutemen to build facilities for hiding equipment and literature in the next two weeks because 
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“something big was going to happen.”49  It was not like the FBI or NYPD had no evidence that the 
Minutemen had violent intentions, even outside of the plot to bomb the ‘red camps’ – one FBI 
source disclosed that a number of weeks prior to their arrest, several Minutemen, whose names 
were not disclosed, planned to set fire to a building in Brooklyn by using some sort of bomb, but 
somehow managed to ignite the device in the car while en route to their target, badly burning one 
of the would-be terrorists.50  BOSS, through their undercover operative, had also learned that 
Minutemen members practiced with homemade bombs in Long Island, and had carefully “cased” 
the offices and surrounding area of a national communist newspaper, The Daily Worker, based in 
Manhattan’s Chelsea neighborhood, which was subsequently smoke-bombed on September 4th.51 
 
What seems to be a double-standard, when comparing the alarm raised by NYPD and the FBI in 
the wake of the Statue of Liberty plot, and at least the internal dismissal when the Minutemen plot 
was revealed, is worth considering.  Authorities, both federal and local, were considerably more 
concerned by plots emerging from what would generally be considered the political left – as was 
the Statue of Liberty plot – than those on the right, such as the ultra-conservative Minutemen.  The 
color of the skin of the Statue of Liberty plotters – African American and Arab – versus the 
overwhelmingly Caucasian Minutemen is also impossible to ignore.  It certainly does not seem a 
leap to think that if the Statue of Liberty plotters had already planted bombs, as did the Minutemen, 
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and maintained a weapons cache of such immensity, as did the Minutemen, the alarm raised by 
law enforcement would have been ringing loud enough to drown out reason.  That some of those 
arrested and otherwise suspected in the plot were police officers, firemen, and even Army 
reservists – and not left-leaning college students, African American activists, or members of a 
socialist or communist organization – most certainly played into the discounted threat assessment 
by both FBI and BOSS officials.   Despite rhetoric and not insubstantial effort from Presidents 
Kennedy and then Johnson, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, among others, the political 
right was not nearly as much a priority to old conservative Cold Warriors like Hoover and 
traditionally conservative organizations like NYPD’s BOSS, despite massive weapons caches, 
despite their unambiguous language challenging the government, and despite being the source of 
some of the most barbaric political violence of the era, like the 1963 bombing of the 16th Street 
Baptist Church in Birmingham. 
  
In mid-December of 1966, the Queens Grand Jury finally returned indictments for sixteen of the 
arrested men, charges ranging from weapons possession to conspiracy to commit arson.  The 
charges would all be state; no arrested Minutemen in New York would be charged with any federal 
crimes, as members of the organization would be elsewhere in the nation.  Most of the New 
Yorkers were charged with felonies; the FDNY fireman and one other man were charged with 
misdemeanors only.  All charges against four of the men, including Milton Kellogg, were 
dismissed.52   
																																																						
52 Emanuel Perlmutter, “16 Are Indicted in Rightist Case,” New York Times, December 15th, 
1966 
	 100	
For his part, Minutemen leader Robert DePugh did chime in when the indictments came 
down.  He first accused District Attorney Hentel of the politically-motivated arrests and dubious 
timing to coincide with the elections.  He also frankly admitted that the arrested men were or had 
been Minutemen and that they had, in fact, drawn up plans to raid the camps as charged, but that 
they had no intentions to actually attack it; “it was an academic training program,” DePugh argued.  
“The men picked live targets to make it more interesting, and to give a feeling of reality to the 
proposed training program.”53 
A Minutemen letter to all members dated December 4th, 1966, continued to argue that the 
members didn’t really have any intention on bombing the camps – no mention was made of the 
nine bombs actually found there – but went on to argue “the other side of the story” by explaining 
how all three “hard core training camps” were part of a “vast interlocking network… used by the 
communists and various pro-communist organizations to corrupt young Americans and recruit 
them into the folds of the communist party… The facts make up a picture so hideous and so vulgar 
as to be unbelievable to the mind of a decent human being.”  The bulletin goes on to describe in 
great detail the “depravities” including interracial sexual relations that the leaders of the “work 
camps” force upon the “wholesome American children” to convert them into “depraved young 
Communists.”  Young girls are taught “exotic” sexual techniques in order to win “negro men” 
over to the communist cause.  Apparently, Minutemen believed African Americans more 
susceptible to sexual manipulation than whites.  One targeted camp – Camp Midvale – specialized 
in training homosexuals in addition to communist indoctrination, the bulletin claimed.  “Actually,” 
the bulletin pointed out, “there are not as many homosexuals among hard core communists as is 
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generally believed but many communists pretend homosexual tendencies in order to strongly tie 
natural perverts to the party.”  The letter waffled on DePugh’s earlier assertion that no attack was 
planned, but justified it just in case.  “We don't know for certain whether or not the New York 
Minuteman really intended to raid these camps. We do know that both State and Federal 
Authorities have been aware of these conditions for many years and have never made the slightest 
effort to correct them. Just how long do they expect decent citizens to restrain themselves?”54    
If the Minutemen indeed had no actual intent of bombing the camps, on the day of the 
arrests or at some point soon after, they were having a hard time convincing even themselves.  
 
Far less is known about the BOSS undercover policemen who infiltrated and disrupted the 
Minuteman plot in New York City than is known about NYPD officer Ray Wood’s infiltration of 
the Statue of Liberty plot a year earlier; in that earlier plot, the defendants were proven guilty after 
a court case that lasted nearly a month.  The preserved testimony and depositions of the earlier 
case have shed considerable light not only on the details of the plot, but also on how NYPD 
discovered the plot and prosecuted the investigation.  As a general rule, those who served with 
BOSS did not appreciate the publicity that came along with splashy cases.  The detectives did their 
best work outside of the watchful gaze of the press, the public, and potential critics.  What’s more, 
as one police source told the New York Times, “After a big case, BOSS always loses some of its 
																																																						
54 “Minutemen bulletin - Special Bulletin To All Members Of The Patriotic Party And To All 
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best people because of the publicity.”55  Raymond Wood, in the year since the Statue of Liberty 
investigation, had left BOSS to reassignment as a detective in Brooklyn.   
The 1966 case against the Minutemen would not go nearly as well for NYPD as did the 
Statue of Liberty case.  Almost a full five years after the initial dramatic arrests in 1966, on October 
18th 1971, the last of the charges against the last of the suspects was dropped by Queens Chief 
Assistant District Attorney Frederick Ludwig.  Not a single person would plead guilty, or even go 
to trial, for a single charge.  Ludwig, maintaining that he was convinced that there was in fact a 
violent Minuteman conspiracy in 1966, admitted the case “went down the drain” over the years as 
court after court found the original search warrants defective.56 
In June of 1968, New York State Supreme Court Justice Peter T. Farrell found the warrants 
faulty on grounds of insufficient affidavits and stipulated the evidence be suppressed – a reading 
of the Judge’s finding seems exceedingly technical, almost an argument built to support a pre-
determined decision.  In June of 1970, the Appellate Division in Brooklyn upheld the previous 
order, adding that the sworn affidavits by an NYPD detective “did not indicate who the informant 
was or in what way the information was reliable,” despite the detective later testifying that he 
eventually learned the information came from undercover NYPD operatives.  The appellate court 
found this insufficient.  The remaining state charges, misdemeanors of conspiracy to commit arson 
and to endanger life by maliciously placing explosives near buildings, against the final seven 
defendants who had not by then been completely cleared, were dropped in 1971 in recognition of 
the prosecution’s failure to comply with the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial.57   
																																																						
55 Bernard Weinraub, "Police Undercover Unit Kept Tabs on Minutemen," New York Times, 
November 1st, 1966 
56 Peter Kihss, "Minutemen Case is Dropped Here," New York Times, October 19th, 1971 
57 Ibid. 
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Whether or not any information gleaned from FBI informants in the Minutemen, or from 
the close working relationship between FBI and BOSS, came up in court proceedings is unclear, 
but given that no federal charges were ever imposed upon the men the FBI receded into the 
background as the state court case began to fall apart.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In February of 1967, a letter from the Minutemen national headquarters alerted members that, 
moving forward, there would in fact be no more national headquarters.  The Minutemen were 
going “completely underground” and each member would be assigned to a ‘network.’  “The fight 
against domestic communism is entering into a new phase which will require greater independence 
and freedom of action by local groups.  Greater discipline and personal sacrifice will be required 
and expected by individual members.”58  But what DePugh envisioned – something that might 
have become the right-wing equivalent of the Weather Underground or the anti-communist version 
of the KKK, a decentralized underground politically motivated organization embracing terrorism 
among other tactics to forward its agenda – never emerged.  The Minutemen would soon begin to 
fade from whatever prominence they found in the first half of the long Sixties.  Just a week after 
the arrests in New York City, Minutemen leaders went on trial in Missouri; Robert DePugh and 
his associates Troy Houghton and Walter Patrick Peyson were charged with various conspiracy 
and firearms charges.  In January of the following year, DePugh would be sentenced to four years 
after his federal conviction, but would jump bail and evade capture – ironically by sometimes 
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dressing as a hippie – for two and a half years.  An investigation by the New York State Police the 
next year, however, found that the overwhelming majority of those whose names appeared on 
Minutemen lists were not “hard-core” members but rather individuals who had written the 
organization for information and had little or no further correspondence.59  The NYSP findings are 
actually representative of the Minutemen as a whole; the vast majority of the numbers that DePugh 
often claimed were in the organization – upwards of 30,000 at times – were simply those who had 
written for information or who politically supported the idea of anticommunism, liberal gun laws, 
and the like.  Even among the actual dues-paying membership – DePugh would later admit that it 
was a fraction of the larger number, perhaps about 2,500 – the vast majority of those had no interest 
in the type of violence that the New York area group found themselves accused of.  An upstate 
New York Minutemen who agreed to speak with the FBI in June of 1967 said he was unhappy 
about the state of the Minutemen and that they previously had a “nice, friendly little group in 
Buffalo” which occasionally met until the arrests of DePugh and then the New York City arrests. 
“The guys around New York City sure ruined everything,” he told the FBI.60 
Not all of the names that appeared on the Minutemen membership lists faded into obscurity 
after the arrests.  George Demmerle, a machinist from Brooklyn, was interviewed by FBI agents 
and BOSS detectives after his name emerged, but ultimately accused of no wrongdoing.  An 
avowed anticommunist, Demmerle would soon decide that his energies were better suited for 
infiltrating organizations on the left; offering his services to the FBI, Demmerle became a well-
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60 “FBI Memorandum, SAC Newark to Director FBI, ‘Minutemen,’ (Internal Security),” May 
31st, 1967; FBI Records Request #62-NY-12699, Minutemen-NYC-11, 190/204, IA 
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known left activist, an associate of Abbie Hoffman, and was ultimately the indispensable factor in 
uncovering the Melville collective of terrorists in New York City in 1969. 
Even though left wing political violence would eclipse right wing violence toward the end 
of the decade, right wing terrorism did not dissipate as the Minutemen declined.  In August of 
1967, Bronx District Attorney Isidor Dollinger and NYPD detectives arrested four men, including 
at least two members of the John Birch Society, and charged them with an earlier failed bomb 
attempt on the life of Herbert Aptheker – who the Minutemen targeted less than a year before.  The 
bomb failed to detonate when Aptheker was nearby but did explode days later, causing damage to 
the building it was placed in.  The group was charged with plans to kill Aptheker as well as attack 
a left-leaning anti-poverty group in the Bronx.  As with the earlier case against the Minutemen, an 
NYPD undercover operative was at the center of the case, and also as in the earlier case, a massive 
haul of weapons including bazookas and homemade bombs was netted.61  Two suspects were given 
suspended sentences, one was dismissed, and the final defendant, Peter Pysras, was derided as 
“nothing but a punk” when the Judge, Arthur Markewich, compared his activities to early Nazi 
conspiracies and sentenced him to two years in prison.62  In February of 1968, two Minutemen 
were busted by undercover detectives as they attempted to bomb The Jefferson Book Shop, a 
Marxist book store near Union Square.63  And in August of 1968 the same camp in Voluntown, 
Connecticut that the New York Minutemen targeted not two years earlier was attacked by other 
members of the organization who had not been arrested in New York City.  The Minutemen 
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brought gasoline bombs with them during the raid and attempted to burn the camp down, but were 
intercepted by state police who had been alerted to the plan by the FBI.64  In the ensuing gunfight, 
six Minutemen, a Connecticut State Trooper, and a camp member were shot before the men were 
captured.  Minuteman Louis Rogers, only twenty-four at the time, lost his sight as a result of a 
gunshot to the face.  Camp member Roberta Trask was hit by a shotgun blast in the crossfire and 
almost blead to death on the way to the hospital, a policeman saving her life by keeping pressure 
on her exposed artery in the back of the ambulance.  Six Minutemen eventually pleaded guilty to 
reduced charges such as conspiracy to commit arson and carrying a weapon at night and were 
given not-insubstantial sentences ranging from one to nine years despite the pacifist campers 
refusing to testify, under threat of contempt of court, and their petitions for clemency for their 
attackers; one Minuteman, Thomas Fowler, was sentenced to twenty-two months in prison but 
remained unapologetic even thirty years later.  “I have no regrets,” Fowler told a journalist in 1999.  
“I’m an American patriot… what we did that night was purely patriotic.  These people were 
supplying our enemy, the North [Vietnamese] who were shooting and killing American soldiers.  
What put me over the edge was Jane Fonda and her activities.”65   
The August 1968 re-attack on the camp in Voluntown occurred the same day that, a 
thousand miles away, the Democratic National Convention burst into violence as Hippies, Yippies, 
and thousands of other Vietnam War protestors clashed with police on the streets of Chicago and 
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on live television screens across the nation and the world.  Neither left nor right monopolized 
political violence that day.    
  That same month, two men known to be associated with the American Nazi Party, the 
KKK, and the Minutemen were arrested after a BOSS infiltrator, Detective William Plackenmeyer, 
exposed their operation to bomb the residences of known leftists; the men were arrested actually 
placing a bomb, which was deactivated by Bomb Squad.  Police found nine other bombs and a list 
of leftist targets on the men.  Both men plead guilty in the face of what seemed damning testimony 
by the Detective and the physical evidence, and were sentenced to serve between three and nine 
years in prison.  One of the men, William Hoff, had a brother who was a minister in upstate New 
York; Reverend Donald Hoff was a member of the Draft Resistance Movement and the NAACP.  
The leaders of both organizations were targeted by his brother and his brother’s accomplice. 66   
And, as will be discussed in the following chapters, in 1968 and 1969 anti-Castro (and 
some CIA-trained) members of an organization calling itself Cuban Power began a wave of 
dynamite bombings in the New York area as well as in Florida and elsewhere. 
 
By all accounts, all members of the Minutemen organization weren’t terrorists or terrorist 
wannabes.  Very, very few likely were.  As long-time BOSS detective Anthony Bouza remarked, 
though, despite a Minutemen membership that was not “numerically large… terrorism requires 
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few plotters to disrupt public life.”67  And like virtually all terrorist actors in this time period – and 
perhaps much more broadly – those Minutemen that did, most likely did not start out intending on 
turning to terrorism.  But that some members of the New York Minutemen and their ideological 
brethren decided upon terrorism to achieve their goals, even if they themselves called it patriotism, 
is beyond much of a doubt.  Ultimately, the 1966 Minutemen case in New York City illustrates 
the existence of terrorist plots from the full political spectrum, including the far right, during an 
era known for famous and infamous radical actors on the left like the Weather Underground and 
the Black Liberation Army.  The case also illustrates the continuing and extensive coordination 
between NYPD and the FBI in political policing of the right, even if it was considerably less 
vigorous than political policing of the left. 
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PART I : NYPD, FBI, and Early Terrorist Plots in NYC During the Long Sixties 
Chapter 4 : Cuban Power 1968
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On New Year’s Day, 1959, the first day of the last year of the decade, the long-simmering 
Cuban Revolution finally ousted American-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista and brought Fidel 
Castro’s 26th of July Movement to power in the small island nation.  By the end of the year the 
Eisenhower administration, in concert with the State Department and especially CIA, had begun 
to take steps to undermine the Castro-dominated government that was increasingly hostile to the 
United States and fast moving into the Soviet orbit. 
The success of Castro’s revolution, and his declaration in December of 1961 (to the surprise 
of few in the U.S. government) that he was a Marxist– Leninist, and would be “for the rest of [his] 
life,” and that Cuba was on the way to establishing a communist government – not a hundred miles 
off the coast of the Florida – would have a dramatic impact on the political history of the United 
States.1  Sensational episodes in U.S. history like the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis the following year, were born of the seeds planted by the Revolution and the 
American response to it.  What is less accounted for in the historiography and popular discourse, 
though, is the diffusion of anti-Castro political activism and low intensity warfare throughout the 
United States and the rest of hemisphere that was also borne of the tension.  Groups of Cuban 
exiles and their American supporters formed groups like the Cuban Nationalist Movement, Alpha 
66, the International Anti-communist Brigade (IAB), Commandos L, and with the often-direct 
support of CIA engaged in political subversion and even limited military raids to the island nation.2   
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As had occurred with anti-communism more broadly, and as was discussed in the previous 
chapter, in what seems a recognition of the dangers of individuals and private organizations 
upsetting volatile international and even domestic politics, the Kennedy administration began to 
increasingly reign in and stymy sub-state, anti-Cuban activity.  The day after the 1961 Bay of Pigs 
invasion ended in failure, Attorney General Robert Kennedy announced that, in view of the 
nation’s neutrality laws, some of the oldest in the U.S. books, groups “organized as a military 
expedition” were prohibited from “departing… the United States to take action as a military force 
against a nation with whom the United States is at peace.”3  In early April of 1963, with the near-
catastrophe of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the rear view mirror, the President took the effort further 
and announced that there would be a stepped-up effort by the Coast Guard and law enforcement 
to prevent raids against Cuba from being launched from U.S. soil, as violations of World War II-
era Neutrality Acts. 4 
 
While the Kennedy administration increasingly restrained sub-state action, what the administration 
didn’t do, however, was to abandon their own plans to subvert and attack the Cuban dictator.  Even 
before the Missile Crisis in October 1962, the administration launched Operation Mongoose, a 
joint Department of Defense and CIA set of covert plans to subjugate and ultimately cause the 
downfall of the Castro regime.  The initiative relied, in large part, on the recruitment and training 
of Cuban exiles – just as did the Bay of Pigs fiasco before it.   
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Among a long, sordid list of other things, the operational plan had even considered 
“sabotage” – American supported terrorism on the island.  While it is uncertain if any such acts 
were actually carried out under the plan, a report from Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, who 
headed up Mongoose for the administration, acknowledged that as early as July 1962 “[p]lanning 
for such action by CIA has been thorough, including detailed study of the structures and 
vulnerabilities of key targets.”5 
A related proposal, Operation Northwoods, was considered and actually approved for 
further planning by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff – the most senior military advisors to the 
president – before being rejected at the final stage, the desk of Kennedy himself.  The plan 
suggested a number of covert courses of action to promote “a period of heightened US – Cuba 
tensions” that would justify an American military intervention.  Among the many proposals was a 
series of sabotage actions aimed at the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, including 
blowing up the U.S.’s own aircraft and ammunition dumps and sinking a ship (a “Remember the 
Maine incident,” the Joint Chiefs called it), stateside airliner hijackings, and – perhaps most 
ominously – developing a “Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area… and even in 
Washington… [e]xploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots…” and “the release of 
prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement.”   
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the Secretary of Defense and the President 
that they commence planning for a false-flag campaign of terrorism in the United States to justify 
a war with Cuba.6 
																																																						
5 Brig. General Lansdale to Robert Kennedy et al, “Review of Operation Mongoose," July 25th, 
1962, National Security Archives, George Washington University 
6 Chairman L. L. Lemnitzer, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 
“Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba,” March 13th, 1962, National Security 
	 113	
 
As it would turn out, it wouldn’t be Cuban agents loyal to Castro – or Americans playing that role 
– that would characterize Cuban terrorism in the United States during the long Sixties.  Among 
the least discussed aspects of this Cuban drama is that it did precipitate a wave of terrorism within 
the U.S. and throughout much of the Caribbean and North and South America, but carried out by 
a very small number of the hundreds of thousands of exiles who fled Cuba in the wake of the 
Revolution, instead of Castro’s agents.  Terrorist attacks against Cuban interests, as well as 
countries and companies that dealt with Cuba, would become the first widespread terrorism 
campaign on American soil in decades, outside of the continuing terrorism waged against African 
Americans and other civil rights activists in the South.   
Largely ignored by scholars, the mid- to late 1960s found bombs exploding from Miami – 
the epicenter of Cuban exile terrorism in the United States7 – to the other side of the continent in 
California.8   But beyond the ground zero of Miami, the secondary front for Cuban exile terrorism 
was unequivocally the New York City area.  “Zona Norte,” as it was known in the exile 
community, comprised of the epicenter of New York City and towns like Union City, New Jersey, 
																																																						
Archives, George Washington University.  Also see James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy 
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7 The lion’s share of the Cuban exile community settled in Miami.  Bombs, sniper attacks, even 
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Hinckle and Turner, The Fish Is Red, for a sometimes less-than-scholarly, but nonetheless 
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“Bookshop Bombed in Union Square,” New York Times, July 22nd, 1968).  In August the British 
consulate there was bombed; Cuban Power leaflets were found at the scene (see “3 Cubans 
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	 114	
just across the river in Hudson County – known as “Havana on the Hudson” for its abundant Cuban 
community.  In “Zona Norte” as in Miami, many CIA and U.S. Army-trained Bay of Pigs veterans 
and other Cuban exiles, like former CIA functionaries Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carrilles – 
who would both rise to international notoriety in the 1970s for dramatic attacks such as the 
bombing of a Cubana Airlines flight in 1976 that killed seventy-three civilians – retained their 
hatred of Castro, their American training, and maybe even their American-made munitions.9 
 
ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN TERRORISM EMERGES IN NEW YORK CITY 
 
A campaign of bombings in New York City in 1968 by elements of Cuban Power, an umbrella 
organization of anti-Castro Cuban exiles nominally led by Orlando Bosch, is the first prolonged 
series of successful terrorist attacks in the city by a single organization during the long Sixties, and 
the first such sustained campaign of terrorism in Gotham since the age of anarchism.  It is this 
campaign of bombings from the political right that would exemplify tactics and a template that 
would be mirrored by other groups, many on the political left, as New York City entered into the 
years of bombings in “gigantic proportions,” as Police Commissioner Leary would characterize it 
in 1970.   
The Bureau of Special Services and other units in the NYPD, including the Bomb Squad, 
would bring to bear many of the investigative tools and practices used in previous counterterrorism 
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Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana.  See 
also Hickle and Turner, The Fish is Red, 315 – 325. 
	 115	
efforts, such as the thwarted attacks by the Statue of Liberty plotters and the Minutemen in the 
years before.  The important difference is that, in the Cuban Power bombings, NYPD seemingly 
launched an intentional counterterrorism investigation, as opposed to political policing of potential 
subversives that inadvertently revealed terrorist plotting.  Unsurprisingly, an NYPD infiltrator lies 
at the heart of the 1968 Cuban Power story.  The investigation of the terror campaign also illustrates 
the ongoing relationship between the NYPD and the FBI as terrorism in New York City rose to 
the dramatic levels it would very soon reach.  
 
Even before the Cuban Power bombings and subsequent arrests in 1968, anti-Castro politics had 
precipitated a number of terrorist plots and attacks in and around New York City in the preceding 
years.  The first major anti-Castro plot to emerge in Gotham was in late 1964, just as the Statue of 
Liberty plotters case – themselves avid supporters of the Castro revolution – was also developing.  
On December 11th, 1964, in the middle of the East River between midtown Manhattan and Long 
Island City in Queens, a bazooka shell exploded a few hundred feet from United Nations 
Headquarters that sits on the eastern shore of Manhattan, facing Queens.  
NYPD Detective Jack Caulfield was in the U.N. Assembly Hall with Che Guevara, who 
was delivering a speech, as part of the Cuban leader’s NYPD security detail, when the bazooka 
shell exploded short of the building.  Caulfield, BOSS’s expert on “all things pro- and anti-Castro 
at the time,” had been part of the BOSS team escorting Castro himself during his famous visits to 
the U.N. and New York City in 1959 and 1960.  During the 1960 visit, the Detective was even 
asked by the FBI to passively gather intelligence on Castro’s diplomatic party, but an alert Castro 
aide noticed Caulfield’s interest and notified the Cuban Premier, who good naturedly let Caulfield 
	 116	
know that he was aware of what he was up to.10  Because of his experience with and knowledge 
about the Cuban community in New York City (BOSS Detective Anthony Bouza claims BOSS 
had been gathering intelligence on Cuban exiles in the city since at least 1958),11 Caulfield took 
on the lead role in the investigation into the bazooka attack for BOSS.  But despite working closely 
alongside the FBI to locate what he suspected would be Cuban exile suspects from within the 
community he knew well, eight days after the attempted attack there were only dead ends.  The 
case finally broke when a cousin of two of the plotters, who Caulfield was indeed very familiar 
with, ratted them out.  Eleven days after the attack, three Cubans were arrested by the NYPD.12  
One of the exiles arrested for the bazooka plot was Julio Carlos Perez, a former Cuban 
Naval Officer during the Batista regime who had worked for the CIA in Havana before being 
caught by the new Castro government, tortured in prison, and then hiding in a cemetery while he 
secured the appropriate forged documents to escape to the United States.13   
The other exiles arrested that December were brothers Ignacio and Guillermo Novo, whose 
cousin turned them in.  The Novo brothers would, over the next decade and a half, emerge as key 
figures in the wave of Cuban exile terrorism in the United States.14   
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The attackers confessed that the intent wasn’t necessarily to damage or destroy the U.N. 
building, but to divert attention from Che Guevara’s speech.  In another example of lackluster and 
halfhearted prosecutions of terrorist plots emerging from the political right (as compared to those 
from the left, like the Statue of Liberty plot and others to follow), the indictments were later 
dismissed by State Supreme Court Justice J. Irwin Shapiro when it came to light the defendants 
had been denied access to their lawyer prior to the confessions.  The indictment had little merit 
without the confessions, the Judge argued.  Because of a “loophole” in the law, no appeals by the 
prosecution would be permitted, he continued.15     
Detective Caulfield speculated that the connection between the attackers and CIA wasn’t 
just in the past; at a meeting at the District Attorney’s office, the defendants’ “dapper American 
attorney arrogantly… introduced himself” and walked around the room passing out his business 
card.  The Wall Street address on the card wasn’t of note to anyone else in the room, but Caulfield, 
given his extensive interactions with the intelligence agencies, immediately recognized it as the 
address of a covert CIA New York City station.16  There is no proof that CIA officials directly 
intervened on behalf of their former (and perhaps current) employee, or had any impact on the 
disinterested Judge Shapiro – who just the year before presided over the infamous murder trial in 
the Kitty Genovese case – but there is certainly enough circumstantial evidence to suggest that, 
somewhere between the successful identification of the plotters by NYPD and an attempt at a 
vigorous prosecution by the DA and, ultimately, the case somehow evaporating into the ether, 
somebody’s delicate touch tipped the judicial scales.  
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In April of 1967 – a year and a half after the U.N. bazooka attack case was thrown out of 
court – Ignacio Novo, speaking to a large group of exiles in Manhattan, announced that a “sabotage 
campaign” directed against both Cuban interests and the interests of “any other nation that supports 
Castro” would soon be unleashed.17  That same month, a bomb exploded at the Cuban Mission to 
the U.N., injuring the acting chief of the mission.18  The Novo brothers were arrested again two 
months later, in July, when police found high-order explosives, blasting caps, timing devices, 
attaché cases, and other bomb-making materials in their shoe store in Jersey City.19  The bomb 
components found in their possession were strikingly similar to what would be used just months 
later in parcels addressed to Cuba that detonated prematurely in postal facilities in New Jersey and 
in New York City, and again the following year in attacks in Midtown Manhattan.  None of the 
arrests, unsurprisingly, would result in convictions or jail time.20  
 
THE 1968 CUBAN POWER BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN NEW YORK CITY 
 
On October 23rd, 1968, Manhattan Chief Assistant District Attorney Alfred J. Scotti announced 
the indictment and arrest of nine Cuban exiles for a bombing campaign that had rattled New York 
over the previous six months.  Cuban Power leader Orlando Bosch, along with eight others, had 
																																																						
17 “Cuban Exile Groups Plan Wide Sabotage Campaign,” New York Times, April 17th, 1967 
18 Juan de Onis, “Cuban Official at United Nations Slightly Burned by Explosion of Package 
Sent Through the Mail,” New York Times, April 4th, 1967 
19 High-order explosion sites are usually characterized by destruction determined to be caused by 
a powerful supersonic concussive blast, as opposed to low order explosions, which do not 
usually include the damage caused by this type of concussive blast.  High-order explosions are 
almost always caused by powerful explosives including dynamite and military-grade explosives 
like C4.  They are, therefore, usually determined by investigators to not occur accidentally.   
20 “Blast Injures 8 at Postal Branch,” New York Times, December 8th, 1967 
	 119	
been arrested in Miami less than two weeks earlier on bombing charges; Cuban exile terrorism had 
stretched the length of the east coast during the spring and summer of 1968.21   
The first bombs in New York City exploded on April 22nd at the 41st street building housing 
the Mexican Consulate and the Mexican Permanent Mission to the United Nations, as well as at 
the Spanish National Tourist Agency on Fifth Avenue.  Windows and doorways were shattered, 
but the late-night bombs caused no injuries.  There was little doubt what the political motive behind 
the attacks was; a cardboard Cuban flag bearing the name Cuban Power was found at the scene.22  
There was also little doubt of the expert training of the bomb maker – evidence found at the 
Mexican Consulate by Bomb Squad detectives included fragments of a U.S. Army M1 Delay 
Firing Device, which NYPD detectives reported “functions when an acid eats through a wire and 
releases a firing pin thereby activating a non-electric blasting cap and detonating a high explosive 
charge.”23  This was not the work of an untrained amateur.   
In an intelligence report to NYPD’s Chief Inspector following the bombing, BOSS 
Commanding Officer William Knapp described Cuban Power as “an anti-Castro organization… 
alleged to have its main base of operations in Miami, Florida,” which was reported to NYPD by 
federal authorities “to have been responsible for numerous bombings of stores, autos and night 
clubs in the Miami area since January 1968.”24  As early as the first bombing by Cuban Power, 
there was clearly already an exchange of information, then, between the FBI and BOSS.  After the 
second time the Spanish tourist agency was bombed not two months later, FBI agents were 
																																																						
21 "9 Cuban Exiles Indicted in Plot to Attack Ships," New York Times, October 12th, 1968 
22 “Two Bombs Damage Midtown Buildings,” New York Times, April 23rd, 1968 
23 BOSS and Bomb Section to Chief of Detectives and Leary to Lindsay, RE Cuban Bombs, 
April 22 1968 - Box 85 Folder 1621.6, JVL Papers, NYMA/LWA 
24 Commanding Officer, Bureau of Special Services, to Chief Inspector, RE: Explosion in 
Doorway of Mexican Consulate…,” April 23rd, 1968.  Box 85 Folder 1621.6, JVL Papers, 
NYMA/LWA 
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working alongside NYPD detectives once again, collecting and evaluating evidence including 
pamphlets titled “A Declaration of the Principles of Cuban Power” found at the scene.25 
More bombs followed in quick succession after the start of the terror campaign in April.  
The Midtown offices of Channel Thirteen were bombed the night they broadcast an interview with 
an author, Jose Yglesias, whose recent book was sympathetic to the Castro regime; the Spanish 
tourism office was bombed again; and just a few nights later and a few blocks up Fifth Avenue, a 
building housing Canadian and Australian tourism offices and another building housing the 
Japanese National Tourist Agency was attacked.26  The attacks followed a nearly identical pattern: 
the targets were tourism or diplomatic offices of the twenty-six non-Communist nations that traded 
with Cuba; the bombs were high-order explosives with U.S. Army timing devices; late-night or 
early morning detonations ostensibly intended to avoid injuries; and claims of responsibility by 
Cuban Power.  BOSS continued to investigate and Bomb Squad continued to collect evidence, but 
no arrests were made. 
After the first week of July, a period of just a week and a half that saw four bombings 
occur, NYPD Commissioner Howard Leary established the first task force to investigate bombings 
since the exploits of “Mad Bomber” George Metesky more than a decade earlier.  Responding to 
																																																						
25 “Spanish Travel Agency in the City is Bombed for the Second Time,” New York Times, June 
22nd, 1968 
26 Commanding Officer, Bureau of Special Services, to Chief Inspector, RE: Explosion at 
Channel 13…,” June 15th, 1968; and Commanding Officer, Bureau of Special Services, to Chief 
Inspector, RE: Explosion at Spanish Tourist Office…,” June 21st, 1968; and Commanding 
Officer, Bomb Section, to Chief of Detectives, RE: Explosion at Canadian Government Tourist 
Bureau…,” July 4th, 1968.  All found in Box 85 Folder 1621.6, JVL Papers, NYMA/LWA.  Also 
see Robert E. Dallos, “Bomb Explodes Outside of Channel 13 Injuring No One,” New York 
Times, May 31st, 1968, and “Spanish Travel Agency in the City is Bombed for the Second 
Time,” New York Times, June 28th, 1968; and “Fifth Avenue Bombing Damages Two Foreign 
Tourist Offices,” New York Times, June 5th, 1968; and “Japanese Agency in City in Bombed,” 
New York Times, June 8th, 1968. 
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what was then an outbreak of terrorism unprecedented in the career of anyone in the NYPD, the 
task force combined elements of at least BOSS, the Midtown North Precinct (where most of the 
bombs had occurred), the Bomb Squad, and Manhattan South Command.27  In another example of 
pre-FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) coordination between local and federal agencies, the 
FBI and even the CIA would contribute bodies and expertise to the terrorism investigation.28  
On July 8th, after a conversation with Lindsay, Police Commissioner Leary forwarded a 
number of reports from BOSS and the Bomb Squad to the Mayor’s office covering the various 
Cuban Power attacks of the previous four months.29  Despite a distinct separation between the 
Mayor’s office and the operations of BOSS that the records reveal, the first prolonged terrorism 
campaign in decades in New York City and emerging counterterrorism within the NYPD had 
closed the gap between City Hall and BOSS. 
The bombing campaign continued to escalate.  The day after the NYPD announced the 
creation of the task force, bombs exploded at the Cuban and Yugoslav Missions to the United 
Nations.30  By July 16th, barely a week after the task force was formed, the ninth device since April 
was planted at the French Government Tourist Office at Rockefeller Center.  But this time the task 
force caught a break; the beefed-up security near Midtown Manhattan diplomatic offices paid off.  
An alert NYPD patrolman noticed four men walking on East 49th street after 2:00AM; his curiosity 
piqued, moments later he noticed a large paper bag hanging from the door of the Tourist Office.  
Running over to inspect the package, he found the bomb inside.  Bomb Squad detectives, who 
																																																						
27 “A Massive Search on for Bombers,” New York Times, July 9th, 1968 
28 Tom Buckley, “A Deadly Way to Make a Point,” New York Times, July 21st, 1968 
29 Leary to Lindsay, RE Cuban Bombs, July 8th, 1968 - Box 85 Folder 1621.6, JVL Papers, 
NYMA/LWA 
30 “Cuban and Yugoslav Missions Rocked by a Bomb Explosion,” New York Times, July 10th, 
1968 
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were immediately called to the scene, disarmed the device with less than three minutes left before 
it was set to detonate.   
The unexploded device – quizzically wrapped in a copy of the International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) official newspaper, Justice – yielded the detectives the 
physical evidence they had thus far been lacking, and it proved some of their previous assumptions 
correct.31  The bomb did indeed utilize high-order explosives – a pound of C4, a military-grade 
explosive even more powerful than dynamite, that the government soon after confirmed was only 
produced in the United States by the Army.  The powerful explosive was not legally or at all easily 
attained by civilians, giving the investigators clues to pursue.32  The blasting cap, a 1.5-volt battery, 
and the cheap clock timing device were also intact; the design and construction, a Bomb Squad 
detective concluded; was clearly executed by someone with “expert” training.33   
The bombings continued despite the thwarted attempt.  On July 21st, a new type of target 
was attacked – the Jefferson Book Shop, the same Union Square bookshop that specialized in 
Marxist and antiwar literature that had been targeted by members of the Minutemen less than five 
months earlier.  The earlier plot was disrupted by NYPD undercover operatives;34 this time, the 
bomb smashed the store’s windows and blew apart scores of books and pamphlets, as well as 
shattering windows up and down East 16th street.35   
																																																						
31 Commanding Officer, Bomb Section, to Chief of Detectives, RE: Unexploded Bomb Found 
Outside of French Tourist Office…,” July 15th, 1968 - Box 85 Folder 1621.5, JVL Papers, 
NYMA/LWA 
32 David Burnham, “Army is Only Producer of Plastic Explosives Used in Bombs Found Outside 
2 Foreign Offices Here,” New York Times, July 23, 1968 
33 “Bomb Deactivated at French Offices,” New York Times, July 16th, 1968 
34 Martin Gansberg, “2 Seized in Plot to Bomb Union Square Bookstore,” New York Times, 
February 20th, 1968.  See also this dissertation, page 108 xx 
35 Ralph Blumenthal, “Bookshop Bombed in Union Square,” New York Times, July 22nd, 1968 
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On August 3rd, the fourteenth bomb in the Cuban Power campaign exploded at the Tokyo 
Trust Company Bank on the street level of the iconic Waldorf Astoria Hotel.  Japan traded 
modestly with Cuba, exchanging textiles, chemicals, tires and sugar.36  Causing substantial 
damage, but again no injuries, it was the first attack against a bank and front-page news in the city.  
Just hours before the bombing, a spokesman for Cuban Power, Arturo Rodriguez Vives – who was 
among those arrested two months later – told the New York Post that there would be a bombing 
that night; he was only misleading in the selection of target, which he said would be another 
consular or tourist office.  As they’d been getting used to doing, NYPD detectives and FBI agents 
scoured the scene for clues.37    
Other Cuban exile activity in the area was also causing authorities concern.  A week and a 
half after the Waldorf Astoria bomb, FBI agents, alongside New Jersey State Police and local 
authorities, raided a farm in rural Johnsonburg, New Jersey – barely 60 miles from New York City 
– owned by American-born Cuban exile sympathizer Michael DeCarolis.  There, they found nearly 
a half-ton of dynamite along with a massive cache of weapons including automatic rifles, mortars, 
grenades, and ammunition.  Cuban exiles, including some of those arrested during the bombing 
campaign raids not two months later, had been coming to the farm for years for target practice and 
guerilla training.  Sitting in the middle of one of the tucked-away fields that had been turned into 
a training obstacle course for the 2506th Cuban Assault Brigade – an organization of veterans of 
the Bay of Pigs invasion – was a target practice scarecrow with “Fidel” painted on it.38 
																																																						
36 David K. Shipler, “Japanese Bank in Waldorf Bombed,” New York Times, August 4th, 1968 
37 Jack D. Robbins, “Bomb No. 14 – At The Waldorf,” New York Post, August 4th, 1968 
38 “Arms Linked to Anti-Castroites Found on a North Jersey Farm,” New York Times, August 
14th, 1968; and Joseph Novitski, “Farmer Jailed in Cache Seizure,” New York Times, August 
15th, 1968.  Ivan Acosta, one of the mem arrested in October, discussed visiting the farm in the 
months prior to his arrest, in an interview with the author, October 20th, 2016. 
	 124	
Just days later, on August 19th, the final bomb thought to be linked to the Cuban Power 
terror spree exploded in front of the West Side Liberal Club just before 4:00AM at Broadway near 
84th street.  The attackers phoned in to take credit for the bomb, this time claiming it targeted the 
“liberal” American government for not taking a stand against Castro; “We hate terrorism and 
bombs, but this is the only road left to us Cubans,” the caller declared.  An official from the Hebrew 
International Aid Society, which ran the Liberal Club, pointed out that the attackers must not have 
known about their strong anti-Castro position or the fact that they’d resettled more than 5,000 
exiles from Cuba since Castro took power.39  Again, no one was injured, but this time just barely 
– two NYPD patrolmen happened to be walking just a few dozen yards from the explosion when 
it violently broke the early-morning silence.  It would be the final bomb attributed to Cuban Power 
before the arrests of the exiles two months later.  
 
The late-night October raids that netted the nine Cuban exiles was front cover, above-the-fold news 
in the New York Times.  NYPD Commissioner Howard Leary appeared at the press conference 
with Chief Assistant District Attorney Scotti to announce the arrests; also present were NYPD 
Chief Inspector Sanford Garelik and Chief of Detectives Frederick Lussen, the police officials 
directly in charge of the Bureau of Special Services.  The police brass and District Attorney’s 
Office big shots present that October day illustrate the priority that city officials had placed on 
bringing about the end of the six-month investigation. 
At least three of the Cuban exiles arrested that day – Oscar L. Acevedo, Gabriel Abay, and 
Carlos Fernandez – were veterans of the CIA–orchestrated Bay of Pigs invasion.  Acevedo had 
																																																						
39 Kathleen Teltsch, “Liberal Club Becomes 16th Victim of Bombings,” New York Times, August 
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also served as an Active Duty U.S. Army Officer from 1963 to 1966, and at the time of arrest was 
a Captain in the Army Reserve; Carlos Fernandez had, like U.N. bazooka plotter Julio Carlos 
Perez, worked with the CIA after fall of the Batista regime before taking part in the Bay of Pigs 
invasion.  Another indictee, Ivan Acosta, swept up in mass arrests as a teenager in Havana after 
the Bay of Pigs and then escaping to Jamaica and New York City with his family, had recently 
returned from time as an active duty U.S. Army Paratrooper to begin film classes at New York 
University.40  
Ultimately, only three of the men were charged with the bombings – Miguel, Fernandez, 
and Arturo Rodrigo Vives, who had also acted as a spokesman for the group.  The rest of the men 
were charged with plotting to raid the 106th Infantry Armory in Brooklyn to steal arms and 
explosives; Acosta claims to have not even met those charged with the bombings prior to their 
arrest.41  
																																																						
40 Author’s interview with Ivan Acosta, New York City, October 20th, 2016.  Also see Morris 
Kaplan, "9 Cuban Exiles Held in 6 Bombings Here," New York Times, October 24th, 1968, and 
Norma Abrams, “Nab Cubans in Bombing, Terrorist Plot,” New York Daily News, October 24th, 
1968; and Supreme Court: New York County, Trial Term XXXVIII, The People of the State of 
New York vs. Gabriel Aboy et al, Sentencing, January 6th, 1971, NYS Supreme Court Records, 
NYMA District Attorney Records, page 15; and Haynes Johnson’s The Bay of Pigs: The 
Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506 (1964) which includes first-hand accounts of Acevedo’s actions 
at the Bay of Pigs. 
41 Morris Kaplan, "9 Cuban Exiles Held in 6 Bombings Here," New York Times, October 24th, 
1968; see also The People of the State of New York vs. Gabriel Abay, Oscar L. Ascevedo, Jose 
Rondone, Ivan Acosta, and Carlos Fernandez, Defendants.  Supreme Court of the State of New 
York, County of New York.  Indictment no. 4638 1/2-68, NYS Supreme Court Records, NYMA 
District Attorney Records.  Acosta’s telling of the story in an interview with the author in 
October 2016 largely mirrors the kind of entrapment that the Statue of Liberty plotters had 
charged a different BOSS detective with a few years earlier; the plot, Acosta claims, was devised 
by the detective, was mostly promoted by the detective, and then foisted upon the men when they 
were arrested.  His version is difficult to substantiate, but does bring up an interesting parallel 
with the earlier claim.   
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As became evident through the court proceedings – but never discussed in the press, public, 
or scholarship – another BOSS infiltrator, Detective Eddie Rodriguez, was the key to the arrests 
of the Cuban Power terrorists in New York City that October.  Rodriguez, known for his abilities 
to fully immerse himself in undercover roles, had successfully penetrated the Cuban exile 
community and worked his way into the group.  His testimony and surreptitiously recorded 
conversations with the defendants proved the vital elements to the indictments.  But in an important 
distinction between Detective Rodriguez’s infiltration of Cuban Power and, for instance, the 
previous BOSS infiltrations of the Statue of Liberty plotters and even the Minutemen plot, this 
more recent operation was specifically directed to disrupt terrorism and attacks that had been 
occurring for six months.  Detective Rodriguez’s successful infiltration was counterterrorism; the 
previous infiltrations were unintended discoveries of terrorist plots through the course of 
investigating politically subversive individuals and groups by BOSS and the FBI.  In any case, the 
detective had made dangerous enemies; the month after the arrests, a “rather macabre doll” with 
Rodriguez’s name written on it, painted red with a nail driven into its head and a noose placed 
around its neck, was found in front of his house.42   
 
The resources devoted to the investigation of the bombings by both the NYPD and the FBI 
indicates a legitimate effort to capture the responsible parties.  Yet, in contrast to the accolades 
heaped upon Raymond Wood – the BOSS undercover who penetrated the pro-Castro Statue of 
Liberty plotters – there were no such public proclamations of gratitude towards Detective 
																																																						
42 See The People of the State of New York vs. Gabriel Aboy et al.  Sentencing, January 6th, 
1971. NYMA; and Supreme Court of the State of New York: New York County.  The People of 
the State of New York vs. Edgar Rivas and Ramiro Cortel, Defendants.  Memorandum in 
Opposition, April 6th, 1969, Page 1, NYS Supreme Court Records, NYMA District Attorney 
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Rodriguez for breaking up the anti-Castro Cuban Power members, who had moved past plotting 
and carried out more than a dozen bombings.  There was no photograph with the Commissioner, 
no on-the-spot promotion, no awards from civilian organizations.  After taking credit for the bust 
at the widely publicized press conference the day of the arrests, police department and City Hall 
officials very quickly receded to the background and the press completely lost interest; there was 
no glory to be had in impeding Castro’s foes, even if the targets they attacked were in Midtown 
Manhattan.  Even the trial of the men would be colored by the politics inherent in the terrorist acts; 
Oscar Suarez, defense attorney for three of the defendants, argued during sentencing (when they 
finally got there in January of 1971) that “[i]t seems ludicrous to ask that while we are spending 
money and the lives of many American youngsters in the jungles of Viet Nam, that we have to 
stand here to apologize to this Court and to society for what we consider an overzeal (sic) on the 
part of these defendants… who had shown their rabid disregard for the principles advocated by 
the red dictator of Cuba.”43  
Lawrence E. Goldman, the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting the case for the 
government, made substantial efforts to counter this political valuation as a factor in the 
consideration of the case: “…the law cannot make a distinction based on the politics that a person 
holds.  They cannot make a distinction as to whether a person is anti-Castro or pro-Castro in 
bombings… It is just as much a crime to bomb the Cuban Mission as it is to bomb the British 
Mission.”  Goldman argued his belief, and hope, that “people regardless of their politics are treated 
evenly and equally in our courts.”44   
																																																						
43 The People of the State of New York vs. Gabriel Aboy et al.  Sentencing, January 6th, 1971.  
Page 7; NYS Supreme Court Records, NYMA District Attorney Records. 
44 Ibid., page 27 – 28 
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Goldman’s petition for a politically unbiased judgement on the part of the court failed.  
Despite vigorous pleas to hold two of the defendants in particular accountable and sentenced to 
long terms in jail – Carlos Fernandez and especially Guillermo Miguel, who had admitted to the 
bombings, and to a plot to assassinate the Cuban Ambassador to the U.N. – the presiding judge, 
State Supreme Court Justice Harold Baer, expounded a lengthy, and in hindsight embarrassingly 
biased, dismissal of the seriousness of the crimes as portrayed by District Attorney Goldman, 
sympathizing with Miguel, who he argued had “a very good work record… a wife and family… I 
am not going to sentence Miguel to prison,” the Judge noted, “because of the political activity that 
has been rampant for the last couple of years, whether they be against Cuba or any other country.  
I’m not going to take it out on him.”  The Judge proceeded to sentence all of the men, including 
Miguel, to no prison time and a few short years of probation despite “vigorous prosecution 
objections.”45  
Those on the political left charged with similar, and even less serious terrorism charges 
during the long Sixties in New York City – including the Statue of Liberty plotters and particularly 
Sam Melville, the subject of the following chapter – would not find the courts so gracious.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As would be the case involving Cuban exile terrorism throughout the 1970s, law enforcement 
efforts to investigate would not be matched by a similar zeal within the criminal justice system. 
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Of course, not all right-wing terrorists escaped prison; the Connecticut Minutemen in 1968 were 
indeed sentenced to prison for the attack on the Voluntown camp; but they weren’t just charged 
with attacking institutions of the political left, they were charged with engaging in a shootout with, 
and injuring, a State Police Officer.  The two former Minutemen charged in New York City that 
same month for their attempted bomb attack were also given prison terms, but they were caught 
red-handed placing a bomb at a residence and a hit-list of more than 150 people they sought to 
kill.46  Regardless, there was clearly less appetite to hold those on the political right accountable, 
and certainly those with political objectives aligned with those of the U.S., than those on the left.   
Whether or not an application of behind-the-scenes political pressure factored into 
sometimes spiritless prosecutions and almost always pillow-soft sentences is hard to determine for 
certain, but as BOSS Detective Caulfield speculates, sometimes behind-the-scenes influence from 
CIA lawyers may have had an impact.  What is certain, though, is that the Cuban exile community 
did have political heavyweights on their side.  This was especially so in Florida, where the exile 
community wielded considerable political power, but was the case everywhere in a time when 
other irregular forces like the Afghan mujahedeen were seen to be at the vanguard of those fighting 
communism around the world.  In 1989, a young Jeb Bush lobbied his father, then President of the 
United States, on behalf of convicted terrorist mastermind Orlando Bosch.47  Florida 
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, at the beginning of what has been a long career, also lobbied 
the administration on behalf of Bosch, who she considered a hero in the war against Castro.48  
																																																						
46 See Chapter 3 
47 See Ann Louise Bardach, Cuba Confidential  
48 Jeffrey Schmalz, “Furor Over Castro Foe's Fate Puts Bush on Spot in Miami,” New York 
Times, August 16th, 1989.  Ros-Lehtinen has long celebrated anti-Castro Cuban extremism and 
lobbied on behalf of several Cuban terrorists; she is also a loud denouncer of Democratic 
administrations for “whitewashing” reports on other terrorists who do not share her conservative 
worldview.  See Statements by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), June 22nd, 2015, 
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Bosch was released from prison in 1990 and granted U.S. residency two years later, blocking 
efforts by other nations to have him extradited for terrorism and murder charges.49  As the Castro 
Revolution became a cause célèbre amongst leftist in the U.S. and around the world, anti-Castro 
fighters became the right wing equivalent.   
 
Most of those Cuban exiles identified in the New York wave of terrorism in the 1960s faded back 
into the community after their legal troubles dissipated.  The majority are difficult to track after 
1968, but at least one went on to be noted members of the Cuban-American and New York City 
communities.  Ivan Acosta’s claim to never have been involved in the 1968 bombings is perhaps 
substantiated by his never being charged with them; he went on to put his NYU film school 
education to work.  His highly successful Off-Broadway play, El Super, the story of a Cuban exile 
and his family trying to adjust to life in New York City, was adapted as an independent film that 
became something of a Cuban-American cult classic.50  Acosta, who claimed to never have met 
admitted bomber Guillermo Miguel until the day of their arrests, tells of running into him driving 
a bus in Miami several years later.  From bomber to bus driver, the soft touch of the judicial system 
allowed for many on the political right to fade back into the obscurity they had come from. 
Not all of those involved in Cuban exile terrorism moved on to obscurity or a career in 
socially aware arts, however.  Arturo Rodriguez Vives, another of the Cuban Power members 
charged with the New York City bombings, was murdered in his Washington Heights apartment 
																																																						
available at http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/state-department-whitewashing-terrorism-
reports-cuba-and-iran-says-ros-lehtinen, last accessed July 5th, 2016. 
49 Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man's in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post, April 
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in 1974; his wife told police he’d asked her to leave when a man she couldn’t identify showed up 
to talk to him.  She came home to find him shot dead.51  And in May of 1969, Guillermo Novo 
was arrested – again – by the FBI for allegedly plotting to bomb a number of ships and buildings 
in Montreal.  Canada and Mexico were at the time the only western hemisphere nations holding 
normal economic relations with Cuba.  Continuing the trend, a confidential informant close to the 
subjects had been the key to this particular case.52  Including the bazooka arrest in 1964, and then 
the bomb materials arrest in 1967, this was Novo’s third arrest on terror-related charges.  None 
stuck.  Guillermo Novo would, along with his brother, emerge as central figures in the infamous 
assassination of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier.  Orlando Bosch, unsurprisingly, 
was another central player in the assassination.  Then working for a Washington, D.C., think-tank 
and continuing as a vocal critic of the Pinochet regime, Letelier was killed by an expertly 
constructed, remote detonated, high-order explosive charge placed under his car as he and two 
associates – also killed – drove through Sheridan Circle in the capital on September 21st, 1976.53  
Guillermo and Ignacio Novo would finally be found guilty for the assassination in February of 
1979 – but just a year later, those convictions were overturned on a technicality.  They were found 
not guilty at a retrial in May of 1981.54   
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The wave of Cuban exile terror in New York City in 1968 was an important marker – it was the 
first sustained terrorism campaign in New York City during the long Sixties, moving terrorism in 
the era in Gotham beyond failed plots and individual attacks and onto the front pages and onto the 
desk of the Mayor.  And importantly, it illustrates a shift, perhaps a subtle shift, by NYPD – instead 
of stumbling upon a terrorist plot within a potentially subversive element of an increasingly 
volatile society, the NYPD seems to have responded, this time, to terrorist attacks and directed a 
BOSS member, Detective Eddie Rodriguez, to investigate and infiltrate.  The NYPD response was 
counterterrorism, not political policing that unintentionally unearthed terrorism.  And in 1974, this 
particular brand of Cuban exile terrorism evolved with the emergence of Omega 7, one of the most 
prolific terrorist organizations on U.S. soil during the long Sixties.   
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PART II – The Melville Collective and the Year of Gigantic Proportions 
CHAPTER 5 -  The Melville Collective : Emergence
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In a decade littered with turning points, 1968 was a crossroads, and it appeared the United States 
had finally started to come apart at the seams.1  The civil and political strife that had plagued the 
United States boiled over into rioting in dozens of American cities.  Mired in a fantastically 
unpopular war getting less popular and more deadly by the day,2 and in an increasingly volatile 
domestic civil and political situation, President Lyndon Johnson shocked the nation by announcing 
on March 31st that he wouldn’t seek or accept reelection the coming year.  Just four days later, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis.  Two months after that, an assassin’s bullet 
took the life of Robert Kennedy in the midst of his campaign to replace Johnson.  The Democratic 
National Convention in Chicago in August, already under the shadow of Johnson’s abdication and 
Kennedy’s assassination, devolved into anti-war protests marred by dramatic violence by 
protestors, police, and the National Guard – all broadcast to the world on live television.  The 
turmoil wasn’t just in the United States; cities across the world from Paris and Prague, to Tokyo 
and Berlin and Mexico City, erupted with special force and drama that year.3  And the onset of 
dramatic levels of terrorist bombings in New York City, first characterized by Cuban Power, 
continued and was embraced by the increasingly radical political left. 
 
																																																						
1 A great emphasis is placed on the year 1968 in the scholarship of the era.  The year has its own 
historiography, including David Farber’s influential Chicago '68 (University of Chicago Press, 
1994), that chronicles the dramatic events around the Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago that year, and the compelling but less-scholarly 1968: The Year That Rocked the World, 
by Mark Kurlanky (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998).  Some important if dated scholarship 
exploring this watershed year include David Caute, Sixty-Eight: The Year of the Barricades 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), and Ronald Fraser, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).     
2 The Tet Offensive and the Mylai Massacre in the first few months of the year added urgency to 
the Vietnam War protest movement.  See Frederik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an 
Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012) 
3 See Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home, page I 
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Although far from unscathed, following Reverend King’s assassination New York City escaped 
the worst of the riots that broke out around the nation.  As soon as he was notified of King’s death, 
as Vincent Cannato explains, Mayor John Lindsay traveled to Harlem against the advice of his 
closest aides and the police department and made an impassioned plea to the thousands who had 
gathered to remain peaceful.4  But it was hardly a tranquil year in Gotham.  Crime rates, on the 
rise for more than a decade, continued to set new levels.  A nine-day sanitation strike in February 
found virtual mountains of trash collecting on sidewalks and everywhere else, and burning garbage 
blowing down city streets.5  A city-wide teachers strike highlighted not just the pitiful state of the 
city’s educational system but also of its deteriorating labor relations, and exposed deep divisions 
between the city’s black, Puerto Rican, and Jewish communities.6  And in protests at Columbia 
University in upper Manhattan that began in March and quickly and dramatically escalated, 
students occupied campus buildings and even forced the closure of the university before a violent 
crackdown by NYPD eventually brought the protests to an end.7  But while the crackdown ended 
the protests and occupation of the university, it only deepened the fissure between the NYPD, the 
city, and many of the protesters including SDS and future Weatherman members like Mark Rudd; 
																																																						
4 See Vincent J. Cannato, The Ungovernable City, 209 – 213  
5 Emmanuel Perlmutter, “Cleanup is Begun by 1,400 Workers,” New York Times, February 11th, 
1968 
6 See Jerald Podair, The Strike That Changed New York: Blacks, Whites, and the Ocean Hill-
Brownsville Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).  See also Cannato, The 
Ungovernable City for an exploration of the strike (and the rest of the tumultuous year) in 
relation to Mayor John Linday’s administration; and Freeman, Working-Class New York, for 
discussion of the receding influence of working classes and labor unions in New York City 
during a high point following WWII.   
7 Cannato argues that Mayor Lindsay was extremely hesitant to get involved in the situation at 
Columbia as it moved toward police action.  The Mayor “understood that he “little to gain and 
much to lose from an active involvement in the controversy” and thus the direction was decided 
on by Columbia Administration officials and the NYPD.  Cannato, The Ungovernable City, 252-
253 
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Cannato argues that the violent overreaction of the NYPD “solidified the view of an out-of-control 
police force.  Even Sandy Garelik, the NYPD official in charge at Columbia, believed (some 
actions) were ‘uncalled for.’”8  Lindsay, having very intentionally kept his distance from tactical 
decision-making during the Columbia protests and crackdown, at best equivocated in the days 
after, citing the right to protest as well as the need for law and order, and discussed both the 
violence on the part of the protestors as well as perhaps an overreaction on the part of the police.9   
 Columbia also marked the beginning of the FBI’s most direct program to counter the 
increasingly radical left movement – COINTELPRO NEW LEFT was initiated on May 14th, just 
two weeks after the violent conclusion of the Columbia protests.10 
 The Columbia protests are an important milestone in the evolution of the radical left protest 
community.  RAT Subterranean News, emerging as one of the most prominent underground press 
publications in large part because of its reporting from within the Columbia protests, argued in 
August that “[t]he cops don’t understand.  It’s not ‘hippies’ who are fighting with them in the 
streets…  It’s white drop-outs who have buried their flowers and joined the community.  It’s the 
kids who made the scene during the summer of love and then had to survive the New York 
winter.”11  Jeremy Varon quotes flyers that had appeared plastered around New York City during 
the Columbia protests: “We must prepare ourselves to deal with the enemy. Our weapons: political 
																																																						
8 Cannato, The Ungovernable City, 254 
9 Cannato, The Ungovernable City, 260-261 
10 “FBI Memorandum, Director to SAC Albany, Counterintelligence Program: Internal Security: 
Disruption of the New Left,” May 14th, 1968, Subject: (COINTELPRO), New Left, San Antonio; 
FBI FOIPA Series # 100-449698-45  
11 Thorne Dreyer, “Lower East Side,” RAT Subterranean News, July 26 – August 8, 1968 
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education and tactical organization for students and workers: rocks, clubs, fire bombs, plastique, 
guns — but most of all — commitment and courage.”12   
 From among the masses of young white protestors at Columbia, one – an engineer with a 
family, no less, and not from one of the affluent white college kids – would embrace this escalation 
to “firebombs” and “plastique” first and pave the way for others from his “community” to follow.  
Samuel Joseph Melville and the loose “collective” of individuals who would form around him – 
and a load of dynamite – would take the template illustrated by Cuban Power and others and claim 
it for the political left.   
 
SAM MELVILLE  
 
On September 9th, 1971, upwards of 1,000 inmates at the Attica Correctional Facility in upstate 
New York broke into open rebellion, seizing various parts of the prison and taking forty-two 
correctional officers and civilians as hostages.  The prison, according to historian Heather Ann 
Thompson, was commonly known to be “overcrowded and governed by rigid and often capricious 
penal practices,”13 and the prison rights movement of the era was at fever pitch after the death of 
“Soledad Brother” George Jackson during a San Quentin escape attempt just weeks earlier.14 
With negotiations at a standstill four days after the Attica uprising began, on Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller’s order, New York State Police, the National Guard, and Attica correctional 
																																																						
12 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 26, citation number 15, “DARE WE BE HEROES?” 
(anonymous flyer, 1968, University of California – Berkeley) 
13 Heather Ann Thompson, “The Lingering Injustice of Attica,” New York Times, September 8th, 
2011 
14 Several works explore the Attica Riot in the context of the prison rights movement or as a 
historical event on its own.  See especially Heather Ann Thompson, Blood in the Water: The 
Attica Prison uprising of 1971 (New York: Pantheon Books, 2016) 
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officers launched a violent operation to retake the prison.  By the time the smoke cleared and the 
echo of gunfire had faded, forty-three inmates and hostages lay dead in the bloodiest prison 
rebellion in modern American history.  Among the dead inmates was thirty-six year old Sam 
Melville – killed by a sharpshooter, the state claimed, as he allegedly ran with four homemade 
bombs to blow up a 500-gallon fuel tank on prison grounds during the retaking of the prison.15   
Samuel Joseph Melville had been producing headlines in New York for more than two 
years before his violent death at Attica.  He and three associates were indicted in November of 
1969 after a string of bomb attacks in Manhattan that began in July of that year, making Gotham 
“rapidly becom(e) Scare City” according the New York Times.16  Even after the arrests of Melville 
and his associates, the headlines continued to come, with the revelation that an FBI informer in 
their midst had finally brought the group down, a foiled jailhouse escape attempt, at least one co-
conspirator on the loose, and another one of the defendants skipping bail and going underground.   
 
As Bryan Burrough argues, before the Weatherman faction of SDS (later Weather Underground) 
would turn to a similar bombing campaign that would spawn a great deal of historical scholarship 
and popular writing, the Melville collective “was the first to take antigovernment violence to a 
new level, building large bombs and using them to attack symbols of American power.  While 
later groups would augment his tactics with bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder, Melville’s 
																																																						
15 Michael T. Kaufman, “Bomb-Carrying Convict Killed by Sharpshooter,” New York Times, 
September 14th, 1971.  There were many contradicting stories of how Melville died; many 
prisoners said he was alive at the end of the retaking of the prison and executed by vengeful 
guards.  Others point out inconsistencies and logical faults with the official story surrounding his 
death.  See Thompson, Blood in the Water, especially Chapter 21.  
16 Sidney E. Zion, “Bombs: To Topple Establishment,” New York Times, November 16th, 1969.  
A fifth person would be added to the indictment in 1970. 
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remained the essential blueprint for almost every radical organization of the next decade.” 17  While 
Burrough largely misses, dismisses, or ignores the plots on the left and the actual terrorist attacks 
on the right that preceded Melville – including the virtually identical campaign waged by Cuban 
exiles in New York City less than a year before, making perhaps long-forgotten Guillermo Miguel 
the actual “Patient Zero” in Gotham – the inarguable point is that Melville and his collective were 
living, working, socializing, and protesting alongside a great many other members of the radical 
left movement who would later turn to the identical methods they established a format for.  
Melville, Burrough argues, “was the first, the trailblazer.  In death he became perhaps their greatest 
martyr.”18  Here Burrough echoes Jeremy Varon, almost verbatim, who argues that after his 
bombing campaign and then death at Attica, Melville became “one of the New Left’s few and most 
beloved martyrs.”19 
 
Melville was born Samuel Joseph Grossman on October 14th, 1935 in New York City.  The young 
Grossman spent his troubled youth in upstate New York near Buffalo with two half-sisters, his 
impoverished single mother, and a string of her abusive boyfriends.  He changed his name later in 
life, apparently in recognition of author Herman Melville, whose famous Captain Ahab, like Sam 
Melville, ultimately met his end battling the white whale that consumed him.  After reconciling 
with his estranged father and after graduating from Amherst Central High School in 1954, Melville 
moved to the Bronx to be with his father’s family there.  He never spoke to nor saw his mother or 
sisters again.20  
																																																						
17 Bryan Burrough, Days of Rage, 10 – 11  
18 Ibid., 25 
19 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 118 
20 Accounts of Melville’s life prior to his radical activities – largely prior to 1968 – are taken 
from Melville’s testimony at trial in federal court (U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 70 CR. 28, 
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After spending a year at City College in Harlem, Melville spent a short time as a short-
order cook, and then a number of years as a plumbing engineering professional.  Melville married 
early, at about twenty-two, and fell into a comfortable urban middle-class life as a plumbing 
engineer and steam-piping instructor with his wife Ruth and then their son, Joshua.  But that life 
increasingly offended and bored the growing radical in him.  
Melville’s father was a devoted member of the Communist party; the previously apolitical 
younger man took quickly to the leftist ideals and even overtook his father’s zeal; “(w)hile Sam 
despised the cowardice of the Communist Party,” Melville’s lover and bombing accomplice Jane 
Alpert would later write, “its political analysis of imperialism and the inevitability of socialist 
revolution was the first and last political doctrine he ever learned.”  According to Alpert, Melville 
became disillusioned with his father, who in the end “could not stand up to McCarthyism, left the 
party and abandoned his ideals…”21  His father died in April of 1968, just as Cuban Power’s first 
bombs were echoing through New York City.22 
“The only thing you have to teach a plumber is that payday comes on Friday and shit don’t 
go uphill,” Melville would say later in life to Alpert.23  A long middle-class life as a plumbing 
engineer and instructor wasn’t Sam Melville’s fate and by 1968 he had left his career, never to 
return.  Melville and his wife separated when Joshua was barely a year old, and he was increasingly 
																																																						
S.D.N.Y. 1970) December 1969, FBI biographical data found in intelligence files, and accounts 
relayed by Jane Alpert in her introductory essay to Melville’s book of prison letters: Letters 
From Attica (see especially pages 11-15).  While Alpert’s accounts of Melville’s early life are 
her recollections of his anecdotal stories and thus potentially flawed, they remain among the 
limited source available on these years.   
21 Alpert, Letters, 13 
22 Many New Left leaders, and many who would turn to terrorism, were the children of former 
Communist Party activists; beyond Melville, the long list includes at least Weather Underground 
leaders Judy Clarke, Kathy Boudin, Jeff Jones, and Eleanor Raskin.	
23 Ibid., 15 
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estranged from his son; after early 1968 Melville never spoke to him again in person.  Melville’s 
son would, decades later in 2000, be awarded $25,000 as part of a settlement awarded to the 
families of inmates killed during the 1971 riot.24 
During that tumultuous year of 1968, Sam Melville began to take radical protest activities 
considerably more seriously.  Becoming increasingly involved with the Columbia University 
Community Action Committee (CAC), an organization of local residents and Columbia students 
formed primarily in opposition to the University’s expansionist real estate program in historically 
African-American Harlem, Melville befriended John Cohen.25  Cohen was at the time a vocal 
leader of the CAC who had been arrested for protests not just in New York City but also at the 
infamous March on the Pentagon in 1967, and often quoted in underground publications like RAT 
Subterranean News for his speeches at campus and community events.  A future member of the 
bombing collective and the only public link to Melville during his time in jail, Cohen would remain 
an important figure for the remainder of Melville’s life.26 
It was also through the Columbia CAC that Melville first met Alpert, a young, recent 
Swarthmore College graduate from Forest Hills, a quiet middle-class enclave in central Queens 
not far from where the 1964 World’s Fair took place while she was still a teenager.  Despite left-
leaning politics and some protest activities, she seemed already on the path to financial and social 
mobility as an up-and-coming editorial assistant at Cambridge University Press.27  
																																																						
24 David W. Chen, “Compensation Set on Attica Uprising,” New York Times, August 29th, 2000 
25 Records pertaining to the Columbia CAC during the period Melville and Cohen belonged to it 
can be found at the Columbia University Archival Collection, University Protest and Activism 
Collection, 1958-1999, Box 10 Folder 23 
26 Cohen is the person referred to by the pseudonym “Greg Rosen” in Alpert’s memoir, Growing 
Up Underground, and wrote an introduction in Letters From Attica. 
27 Alpert, Growing Up Underground, and FBI FOIPA Records (Request #1315776-0) pertaining 
to her arrest. 
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Their relationship developed quickly amidst the turbulent times.  Alpert and Melville 
moved to the East Village in November of 1968 to an “awful” place on 11th street between Avenues 
B and C that “smelled of cat semen.”28  In May of 1969, the couple would relocate to a second 
floor apartment at 235 East 4th street; Patricia (Pat) Swinton and her sometimes-boyfriend John 
David Hughey, III, lived three floors upstairs from them in a corner fifth-floor apartment 
overlooking East 4th street and Avenue B.  Hughey and Swinton would, along with Alpert and 
Melville, form the core of the bombing collective, making 235 East 4th street something of a 
terrorism hub in New York City in 1969.  
 
THE CANADIAN CONNECTION 
 
The Front de Liberation de Quebec (FLQ) was a revolutionary separatist movement that emerged 
in the French-Canadian (Quebecois) province in 1963.29  Michelle Duclos and Michelle Saunier, 
who had helped Robert Collier and the Statue of Liberty plotters obtain dynamite in 1965, were 
allegedly both members of the organization.30  Dynamite explosions became common occurrences 
																																																						
28 Alpert, Letters, 17 
29 The three founding members of FLQ were all young members (Georges Schoeters, Gabriel 
Hudon, and Raymond Villeneuve) of the Rassemblement pour l'lndépendance Nationale (RIN), 
an organization that dated to 1960 and was the beginning of the political Quebecois separatists 
movement. For general background on FLQ and the Quebec separatists movement, few English-
language sources exist, but the English translation of Louis Fournier’s F.L.Q.: The Anatomy of 
an Underground Movement (Toronto: NC Press, 1984) is a hard-to-find but valuable source.  See 
also Walter Reich, Origins of Terrorism, for a valuable, albeit short, scholarly secondary source.  
The October Crisis, 1970 by William Tetley is mostly restricted to the dramatic events of that 
month, and White Niggers of America, a memoir by FLQ’s Pierre Vallières written while held 
for four years in the same New York City Men’s House for Detention (“The Tombs”) that Sam 
Melville would be held. 
30 Fournier, F.L.Q., 137, and elsewhere in his book, cites RMCP reports that link them with the 
group, although they were never arrested specifically for any of its actions (they were both 
arrested in connection with the Statue of Liberty plot, however). 
	 143	
throughout Quebec between 1963 and at least 1970, when various cells – the organization “was 
not a monolithic whole but was composed of related and often discordant groups,” according to 
FLQ scholar William Tetley31 – carried out more than one hundred bombings of military recruiting 
offices, institutions of Canadian capitalism like banks, and even foreign diplomatic posts.32  On 
February 13th of 1969, an FLQ cell dramatically upped the ante, carrying out the most impactful 
bombing of its long campaign; just as the trading day was starting to wrap up, a massive bomb 
exploded at the Montreal Stock Exchange, hospitalizing twenty-seven people.33   
That month – February 1969 – Alpert was in England on a two-week business trip for her 
“straight” publishing job with Cambridge University Press.  Upon her return, she discovered to 
her great surprise that two FLQ fugitives – Jean-Pierre Charette and Alain Allard – had been 
staying in the apartment she and Melville shared.   Pierre-Paul Geoffroy, the leader of the FLQ 
cell responsible for the Stock Exchange bomb, was under arrest in Canada, and in early April was 
sentenced to 124 concurrent life sentences.34  The two other members of the small cell, fleeing the 
Canadian dragnet, arrived in New York City with a single contact, an African-American radical – 
																																																						
31 William Tetley, The October Crisis, 18 
32 See the previously mentioned English language sources; short of a quantitative accounting of 
FLQ attacks, the author relies on the narrative of events in Fournier’s F.L.Q. and the estimation 
that Reich provides in Origins of Terrorism, without quoting a more-defined number that is hard 
to justify without original exploration of the subject.  
33 “Bomb Explodes in Montreal Stock Exchange, Wounding Many,” New York Times, February 
14th, 1969.  See also Fournier, F.L.Q., 150.  At the same time, Cuban exiles continued their own, 
quite ideologically distinct, campaign of terrorism in Canada, who along with Mexico were the 
only western hemisphere nations still openly trading with Cuba.  In 1966 Cuban exiles attacked 
the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa in a rocket attack, in 1967 several exiles including Orlando Bosch 
were arrested for plot to bomb ships at port in Canada and elsewhere, and in May of 1969 two 
exiles, Guillermo Novo one of them, were arrested for a plot to bomb buildings and ships in 
Montreal. See “Bomb Blast Damages the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa,” New York Times, 
September 23rd, 1966; "Bombing Plot Laid to 6 Cuban Exiles," New York Times, July 20th, 1967; 
"2 Cubans Seized in Jersey in Montreal Bomb Plot," New York Times, May 21st, 1969. 
34 “Quebec Terrorist Receives 124 Concurrent Life Sentences,” New York Times, April 2nd, 1969 
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who wanted nothing to do with them.  The Canadian pair then proceeded to ping-pong around New 
York’s underground leftist radical community until eventually being given Melville’s name and 
number.35   
From the moment they first came into his orbit until he helped to facilitate their departure, 
Melville “devoted his whole existence to caring for their needs.”36  He provided or found them 
shelter and provisions so they wouldn’t need to venture out in the city where, with their extremely 
limited English skills, they would attract more attention than they wanted.  He kept them informed 
by purchasing Canadian newspapers every day to monitor for information on the developing 
situation at home.  He attempted different ways to secure identification for them so they could 
legally travel out of the United States to another nation, ideally Cuba, where they might find refuge.  
Finally, Melville traveled several times to Canada to contact their FLQ colleagues – efforts that 
would eventually come back to haunt him.37  Alpert, fully committed to both the movement and 
to Melville, obligingly embraced the men into their home and life.  
 
More than a welcoming host, Melville was also an astute and committed student.  “Sam’s brief 
involvement with the overground (sic) movement was gradually coming to an end” in late 1968, 
Alpert remembers. “Movement gossip bored him; talk that was not supported by action aroused 
his anger… The more he informed himself about the war, about foreign policy, and about the 
economic structure, the more he felt it was all doomed and that the only right action was whatever 
would push its physical destruction a little closer.  He began to fantasize about sabotage.”38  The 
																																																						
35 Alpert, Underground, 154-157 
36 Alpert, Letters, 24 – 25  
37 Alpert, Growing Up,152 – 160; Melville’s travel to Canada and the Canadian-American 
border is discussed at great length in his declassified FBI files. 
38 Alpert, Letters, 20 
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Canadians taught Melville a great deal that he would come to utilize, including how to acquire and 
care for explosives, and how to build time bombs.39  He was a quick study; the technical skills that 
Melville had spent many years employing as an engineering professional were now being put to 
altogether different purposes.  In March of 1969, after a winter in which Melville moved downtown 
and when John Cohen saw him infrequently, Melville told him “he couldn’t bear inactivity 
anymore; he wanted to do something, to know indisputably that he had helped in a real way…”40  
He was well on his way to learning how to do so.   
 
While Melville was learning his new trade from the Quebecois visitors, twenty-one members of 
the New York City Black Panthers (including Statue of Liberty plot ringleader Robert Collier) 
were arrested in a hugely public spectacle of raids and press conferences on April 2nd, 1969.  The 
indictment alleged that the Panthers had attacked NYPD police stations with bombs over the 
previous several months, and that they were in the final stages of preparation to bomb several 
popular New York department stores including Alexander’s and Gimbels, railway tracks, and, 
curiously, the Bronx Botanical Gardens.  Unsurprisingly, BOSS was at the very center of the 
Panther 21 case – no fewer than six members of BOSS had infiltrated the New York City Black 
Panther Party, and according to federal prosecutor-turned-Panther 21 scholar Peter Zimroth, BOSS 
agents “were among the earliest members of the New York branch, indeed among the founders” 
when it first appeared in 1968.41  BOSS detectives briefed the nearly 150 NYPD officers specially 
																																																						
39 Alpert, Growing Up, 156 
40 John Cohen, Letters, 48 
41 Peter L. Zimroth, Perversions of Justice: The Prosecution and Acquittal of the Panther 21 
(London: Viking Press, 1974), page 48.  Zimroth’s excellent account is among the few serious 
scholarly examinations of the Panther 21 case; Murray Kempton, The Briar Patch: The Trial of 
the Panther 21 (Boston: De Capo Press, 1973) is the lone other.  Other broad historical accounts 
	 146	
chosen to perform the numerous raids across the city to arrest the nearly two-dozen indicted 
Panthers.42  Three BOSS infiltrators – Ralph White, Carlos Ashwood, and Eugene Roberts – would 
play crucial roles in the prosecution.43   
BOSS leadership, including the Commanding Officer, Captain William Knapp, met with 
Lindsay in advance of each summer to brief the Mayor on the outlook of threats and potential 
issues of concern as the season approached.  Just four weeks after the Panther arrests, Jay Kriegel 
– the Mayor’s close aide, designated with the responsibility to oversee law enforcement matters – 
suggested that Lindsay request a more in-depth briefing this time around, rather than the very 
general briefing usually delivered.  Kriegel also suggested that the Mayor request that some of 
BOSS’s “undercover men” be present, so that Lindsay could “have the opportunity to confront 
first hand some of the people who really have a sense of what might be happening.”  Even Kriegel 
admitted, though, that the Department and BOSS might “refuse this as too risky, but I think it’s 
worth a try.”  That Kriegel acknowledges that NYPD could very likely refuse this request of the 
Mayor illustrates the independence of the department.  
The issues on Kriegel’s mind as the summer of 1969 approached were “guerilla-type 
actions, such as bombings…” that would indeed emerge as the temperature rose.44 
Whether or not the Mayor did receive a more substantial briefing from BOSS as the 
summer approached, or if the “undercover men” did in fact take part in that briefing, is unclear.  
																																																						
of the Black Panther Party, including Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr.’s Black Against 
Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party, examine the case in some depth. 
42 As recounted by Zimroth, Perversions of Justice, 25 
43 Eugene Roberts, especially, had a long and successful career as a BOSS infiltrator of African 
American movements.  He had so successfully penetrated Malcolm X’s inner circle that he was 
present on stage when Malcolm X was assassinated in February of 1965, and attempted to save 
the civil rights leader’s life by performing CPR.   
44 “Jay L. Kriegel to Mayor John V. Lindsay, RE: Police briefing on the summer,” April 30th, 
1969 - Box 15 Folder 176.1, JVL Papers, NYMA/LWA 
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What would become clear, however, is that as terrorist bombings escalated, BOSS would in fact 
become considerably less of a factor than it had been in the past, and considerably less a factor 
than its mission would suggest.  And as this chapter explores, City Hall would also take a lesser 
role than one might imagine given the Lindsay administration’s interest in these matters and given 
the proactive role he himself took in previous unrest such as that threatened the city in the aftermath 
of the assassination of Dr. King – but as following chapters argue, City Hall’s lesser role was not 
to last long.   
 
The trial of the Panther 21 (eventually referred to as the Panther 13, in reference to the number of 
Panthers who would make it to trial) would take more than two years to very publically play out 
in New York City.  Melville and Alpert, on the other hand, made quicker work with their plan to 
help the Quebecois escape to safety.  On May 5th 1969, after exhausting what they thought were 
the alternatives, Alpert and Melville assisted the men in making their way to Cuba by helping them 
prepare to hijack a National Airlines flight bound from LaGuardia Airport in Queens to Miami.  
The men diverted the flight, a Boeing 727 with seventy-five passengers aboard, to Havana.45  
Alpert had even withdrawn cash from her own personal bank account to purchase the airline tickets 
for them.  Listening on the radio that night, Melville and Alpert gleefully heard reports that it was 
the twenty-fourth successful hijacking since the beginning of the year.46  “He never saw them 
																																																						
45 Alpert describes the hijacking in Growing Up, but obscures the factual details as she does with 
other aspects of her story that may have resulted in further legal action against her.  Details of the 
flight found on the Aviation Safety Network website, www.aviation-safety.net, accessed 
8/3/2015, and in National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report 
of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Appendix 6: “Chronology of Incidents of 
Terroristic, Quasi-Terroristic Attacks, and Political Violence in the United States: January 1965 
to March 1976,” by Marcia McKnight Trick, 1976 
46 Alpert, Growing Up, 170.  See also Brendan I. Koerner, The Skies Belong to Us: Love and 
Terror in the Golden Age of Hijacking (New York: Crown Publishers, 2013) 
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again, but he talked of them often and I believe that they had a greater influence on him than 
anyone else in those last months of his freedom,” Alpert remembers. “He was now determined to 
imitate their exploits.”47   
 
The influence and impact of the radical elements of the nationalist movement and Quebec 
separatists, and especially of the FLQ, on the reemergence of terrorism in New York City 
(particularly from the political left), and therefore in the United States in this period, has been 
entirely overlooked in the scholarship.  In the first place, the Quebecois movement represented a 
model, just north of the border, for ideologically-aligned leftist radicals in the United States to 
observe and mimic.  But the Canadian connection extended beyond inspiration.  In 1965, Michelle 
Duclos and her associates acquired and transported dynamite from Canada to New York City for 
Robert Collier and his group of Statue of Liberty plotters, putting in motion the first major arrests 
for a terror plot in New York City in decades.  Melville, looking for an outlet for his increasingly 
radical drive, found it when the two FLQ terrorists serendipitously landed on his doorstep, 
ultimately setting in motion not only the exploits of his collective but also the many others those 
exploits would later inspire.  Just as he would imitate the FLQ approach, so would others including 
Weather Underground imitate his.  Of course, similar bombings had also been occurring in New 
York – the Cuban Power bombings in 1968 were an example of front-page terrorism in practice 
that Melville and his associates could not have avoided as they went about their lives in the city 
during that six-month period.  But while they may certainly have considered concepts like 
																																																						
47 Alpert, Letters, 25.  The men would remain in Cuba for a decade, ultimately returning, 
voluntarily, to Canada to face justice just as Alpert would herself come out of hiding to do.  
They, along with other separatist terrorists in Quebec who did likewise, would all receive 
sentences of less than two years.   
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bombings for political protest, avoidance of civilian casualties, target selection, and examples of 
post-bombing press releases that were offered up by the Cubans, the FLQ bombers contributed all 
of this and significantly more.   The Quebecois illustrated not only how this tactic of terrorism 
could be brought to bear to support the leftist politics that Melville and his collective fully 
identified with, they also brought technical and practical tutelage that it would have been 
impossible for the Americans to move forward without.  
In fact, as Jeremy Varon similarly argues, other than white racist terrorism – the KKK and 
similar groups – much or most of the extraordinary levels of terrorism during the era must be seen 
through an essentially transnational lens.  Some of the groups and individuals, like Cuban Power, 
were essentially engaging in a foreign conflict on U.S. soil; others like the State of Liberty plotters 
and Melville collective were trained in their craft and influenced by both foreign individuals or 
groups, and compelled by events abroad like the war in Vietnam.  Even the Minutemen were 
compelled to terrorism by their fear of a foreign enemy infiltrating the homeland.   
  
ENTER THE FBI 
 
By the time Sam Melville first met Jane Alpert in September of 1968 he was already on the FBI’s 
radar.  On July 26th, 1968, a reliable confidential informant reported to the FBI that Melville had 
designs on visiting Cuba; the New York office initiated what appears to be a routine internal 
security investigation.48  A credit check was run.  NYPD files – most likely those of BOSS – were 
																																																						
48 It was a not-uncommon protest activity for radicals to visit Cuba in vocal support of the Cuban 
Revolution and in opposition to the American government sanctions of the island nation.  See 
Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of the New Left (New 
York: Verso, 1993) 
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checked.  His former employer and the superintendent of his most recent known residence were 
interviewed.  Several confidential informants familiar with various pro-Cuban organizations and 
movements in New York City were asked about Melville; none were familiar with him.49  The 
case was closed, but not before Melville was identified and officially given an FBI case number in 
the 105 series (Foreign Counterintelligence).50  If not for what transpired over the next year and a 
half, the FBI’s investigation of Melville would have disappeared into the stacks of files of countless 
other Americans who were similarly investigated, and he himself might never have known.   
Instead, Melville reappeared on the FBI’s radar not long after his initial case was closed in 
late September of 1968.  In early April of 1969, the Royal Mounted Canadian Police (RMCP, or 
“Mounties”) reported to the FBI that Melville and Alpert were reported to be meeting with a known 
French radical suspected of being a member of FLQ, Pierre Cattelier, in a hotel in Champlain, New 
																																																						
49 FBI Memorandums, “SAC NY to Director FBI, RE: Samuel J. Melville, Internal Security – 
Cuba,” July 26th, 1968, and September 18th, 1968; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776-0 
50 Melville’s FBI case number was designated 105-183379.  The investigation into Melville 
originated in the FBI’s Series 105 investigations (Foreign Counterintelligence) because of his 
suspected ties to pro-Castro Cuban elements in New York City and throughout the nation; others 
in the New Left and Black Panther movement would be similarly investigated for their statements 
of support and travel to the island nation and Vietnam.  NARA’s own Finding Aid notes the all-
encompassing nature of Classification Series 105 that would include COINTELPRO operations: 
“In the mid 1950s, Classification 105 was used to investigate aliens, especially from Russia and 
Eastern Europe. It was also to investigate the Ku Klux Klan, anti-Semitic groups and other hate 
groups. In 1959, these investigations were transferred to Classification 157: Extremist Matters; 
Civil Unrest. In the late 1950s and early 1960s investigations focused increasingly on Puerto Rican 
groups and especially on pro-Castro and anti-Castro Cuban groups. In the 1960s, Classification 
105 was also used to investigate Chinese communist activities.  In 1971 the classification was 
renamed Internal Security-Nationalistic Tendency (Foreign Intelligence), but investigations went 
beyond the activities of foreign intelligence services to include groups working for foreign political 
movements, such as IRA supporters, Arab terrorists, the Jewish Defense League, Yugoslav émigré 
groups, and Cuban groups…” National Archives website, last accessed June 23rd, 2016: 
https://www.archives.gov/research/investigations/fbi/classifications/105-counterintelligence.html 
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York – a small lakeside town on the Canadian border.51  What the Mounties didn’t know then was 
that Melville was in contact with Canadian radicals in an effort to obtain fake identification for the 
FLQ fugitives hiding out in New York.52  Regardless, the Mounties sent an officer to their hotel 
room, ostensibly on a “routine check,” to make copies of their identification papers and obtain 
their home addresses.  Alpert thought it a coincidence at the time.53  It wasn’t.  Their investigation, 
and the intelligence they had gathered on Melville, quickly made its way back to the FBI.  Just one 
week earlier, Melville had been mentioned in the FBI Legal Attaché in Montreal’s report on anti-
war demonstrations at McGill University in that city.  According to a reliable FBI source, Melville 
had been officially deported from Canada on the day of the protests, March 28th, 1969.  He had 
been on the train from New York City to Canada that morning and was rejected by Canadian 
immigration; he tried to gain entry again, a short while later, at Blackpool, Quebec, and was once 
more rejected entry.  This time, though, Melville caused “such a disturbance that Canadian 
immigration held him, provided him a hearing, and officially deported him.”54 
That Melville was so vigorously trying to get into Canada, that he met with known French 
radicals who were already under observation – radicals who had only days earlier met with 
members of the Black Panther Party from Boston who had traveled to Montreal – got the FBI much 
more intrigued about him than they had previously been.  It was after the RMCP notified the 
Bureau of Melville’s activities that the FBI – specifically the Domestic Intelligence Division – 
																																																						
51 FBI documents suggest it was Cattellier; see “FBI Memorandum, Legat Ottawa to Director 
FBI, Subject: Front De Liberation Quebec (FLQ) Internal Security – Canada,” April 22nd, 1969; 
FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776, HQ pg 24 
52 “FBI Teletype, FBI Director to Legat, Ottawa, [Subject Redacted], Internal Security – 
Canada,” April 3rd, 1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776, HQ, page 9 
53 Alpert, Growing Up, 162 
54 “FBI Memorandum, [To / From Redacted], RE: Samuel J. Melville, [Subject Redacted], 
Internal Security – Canada,” June 25th, 1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776-0 HQ, 
pages 28-32 
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began to more vigorously look into Melville’s activities in the U.S., as well as those of the Black 
Panthers who had also traveled to Canada.55  On the heels of the RCMP tip, in April of 1969 Agent 
Thomas J. Dowling of the FBI New York office was put on the Melville case, just days after his 
deportation from Canada.   
Many months before a man by the name of George Demmerle ever came into his life, then, 
Sam Melville had been unknowingly under the watchful eye of FBI informants.56  
 
DYNAMITE 
 
The timing of the increased FBI scrutiny that emerged from his travels to Canada couldn’t have 
been worse for Melville.  The FBI’s vigorous investigation of him commenced just as Melville 
was moving from frustration at inaction to actual plotting.  
Melville had never stopped talking about bombs and dynamite since the Canadians were 
in town; in the weeks after their successful hijack-exit from New York City, Melville’s desire to 
acquire explosives continued to escalate.  Alpert suggested a simple solution – looking up 
																																																						
55 T.D. Pawley and Doug Miranda, senior Black Panther Party leaders from Boston, met with the 
French separatists on March 26th in Montreal.  (See “FBI Memorandum, [To / From Illegible], 
[Subject Melville etc.],” April 1st, 1969, page 2 of 2, FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776-0 
HQ pg 7-8/49); Jennifer B. Smith, in An International History of the Black Panther Party, page 
98, (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 1999) discusses other activities that Pawley took in Canada 
on behalf of the Black Panther Party before he was allegedly “purged” from the organization 
later in 1968. 
56 “FBI Airtel, SAC New York to Director FBI, Subject: Alleged Matters With Canadian French 
Separatists and Black Panther Organization, Champlain, New York,” April 2nd, 1969, and “FBI 
Memorandums, SAC NY to Director FBI, RE: Samuel Joseph Melville, Internal Security – 
Canada,” June 25th, 1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776-0 HQ  
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“explosives” in the yellow pages, which to Melville’s surprise yielded all the information he 
needed.57   
Dynamite in New York City was controlled much tighter than it was in surrounding areas 
– the main reason Robert Collier elected to travel to Canada to acquire the explosives the State of 
Liberty plot required.  Explo Industries on Zarega Avenue in the Bronx had been granted a 
monopoly of dynamite sales in New York City in order to keep strict controls on the dangerous 
material; dynamite wasn’t even allowed to be stored overnight at construction sites – it had to be 
picked up and dropped off every day by Explo.58 
John Katzenberger, the lone night watchman for Explo’s compound of two concrete 
blockhouses – one for dynamite, one for blasting caps – was in the office at 1:00AM on the night 
of July 7th reading a copy of the New York Post.  Suddenly, Melville and two other men with red 
bandanas covering their faces like an old train robbery movie burst through the door, demanding 
dynamite at gunpoint.59  The perturbed night watchman told them where to find what they wanted; 
the three robbers tied Katzenberger up with a clothesline and walked out the front gate with three 
fifty-pound boxes of dynamite (65 sticks per box), and two boxes of blasting caps (50 caps per 
box).60  
NYPD officials would later wonder why anyone would risk serious time in jail for armed 
robbery for something they’d have no trouble purchasing just outside the city for less than $200.61   
																																																						
57 Alpert, Growing Up, 188 
58 Albert Seedman, Chief!, 230 
59 The identities of the other collective members who took part in the robbery are known but 
have not been publically identified. 
60 “FBI Memorandum, SAC NY to Director FBI, Subject: Samuel Joseph Melville AKA 
[Redacted], Fugitive, IO#4337; et al, DGP,” January 9th, 1970; FBI FOIPA Records Request 
#1315776-0 
61 Seedman, Chief!, 230.  As terrorism scholars including Randall Law have pointed out, the 
advent of dynamite by Alfred Nobel in the 1860s had a profound impact on terrorism (Randall 
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Years later, Alpert recalled her thoughts of that night: “It hadn’t been real until [then], when four 
boxes of explosives lay on the kitchen floor.”62  Having heard that cold storage prevented 
deterioration of the explosives, they stored it in their refrigerator.  It had barely been two months 
since the Canadian terrorists had made their way to Havana, and after escalating devotion to their 
radical politics and to the movement, the emerging collective had taken the first irrevocable steps 
on the path that their Quebecois compatriots traveled. 
 
THE MELVILLE COLLECTIVE 
 
This Melville collective resembled what is known of the FLQ cells in Canada, and very much how 
Ivan Acosta, arrested during the Cuban Power roundup in New York City, describes the myriad 
Cuban exile groups: a loosely structured assortment of like-minded friends and associates with 
nothing but an ideological association with any other similar “collectives” or larger organization.  
The exact size of the Melville collective is probably indeterminable because of the lack of 
structure.  There were at least seven or eight members and almost certainly more than that, but 
outside of the core individuals the others largely came and went, and there were varying degrees 
																																																						
Law, Terrorism: A History, Polity Press, 2009, page 83).  It was with this powerful and much 
easier to acquire, store, and transport, explosive – relative to gunpowder – that terrorists across 
the world for more than a century found their weapon of choice.  As Gage argues, “anarchist 
circles were awash with praise for dynamite as a transformative revolutionary tool. As a weapon, 
it required little skill or effort; dynamite was cheap, available, and easy to use.  Like a gun or a 
knife, it could be easily hidden… Dynamite gave its owner the ability to act anonymously; 
bombs could be planted on an enemy’s doorstep or tossed from afar.” (Gage, The Day Wall 
Street Exploded, 45).  Not coincidentally, it was only in the wake of the widespread use of 
dynamite in terrorist attacks during the long Sixties that the procurement of dynamite became as 
regulated as it is today in the United States.   
62 Alpert, Growing Up, 192 
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of commitment, varying commitment to violence, and differences in opinion on questions like 
harming civilians.63  The core consisted of Alpert, Melville, Swinton and Hughey, along with John 
Cohen and friends Robin Palmer and Sharon Krebs.64  As Jeremy Varon argues, none of the rigidity 
or “seemingly single-minded commitment to revolutionary violence, or tight group discipline” that 
would characterize Weather Underground cells to emerge in the coming months and years, for 
example, existed in the Melville collective.  Furthermore, those associated with the collective 
remained above-ground during their activities, also starkly different from many who would follow; 
various collective members “remained active in their careers and in a range of activism, including 
alternative education, underground journalism, and guerrilla theater…. The life of the Melville 
collective, unlike that of the hyper-disciplined Weathermen, had a haphazard, make-it-up-as-you-
go-along quality, punctuated by moments of exhilaration and great danger.”65   
The central members of the collective all lived at 235 East 4th street – Melville and Alpert, 
and three floors above them, Hughey and Swinton.  The four of them “had become a kind of 
family” by the spring of 1969.66  John David Hughey, III – known as David – was the son of a 
prominent Baptist minister from Sumter, South Carolina, where his family had been for 
generations.  Twenty-two years old in 1969, Hughey had no cash in bank accounts, no property, 
																																																						
63 Alpert, Growing Up, 209   
64 Other New York radicals that moved in the same circles are possible members, for as much as 
membership did or didn’t mean.  Varon, in recounting his conversation with Palmer, mentions at 
least three members who have never been named publically, including an Ivy League professor 
(Varon, Brining the War Home, 118).  Wolfe Lowenthal, named as an unindicted co-conspirator 
in the Chicago 8 trial, later explained that “”[b]y the end of the sixties, I was near the forefront of 
the anti-war movement. I had become a terrorist... My new playthings were guns and dynamite.” 
(Wolfe Lowenthal, Gateway to the Miraculous: Further Explorations in the Tao of Cheng Man 
Ch'ing, Berkley: Blue Snake Books, 1994) 
65 Varon, Bring the War Home, 119 
66 Alpert, Growing Up, 188 
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no car, no driver’s license.  His only arrest at the time was for attempting to hang a Vietnamese 
flag on the arch of Washington Square Park during a protest in 1968.67 
Hughey was Pat Swinton’s sometimes live-in partner in her apartment on the fifth floor of 
the East 4th street building.  Older than Hughey by a decade, Swinton had lived and worked in Italy 
and Tanzania after graduating university in 1962; she had married, borne a daughter, and divorced 
before returning to the United States and New York City.68      
Richard (Robin) Palmer and his girlfriend at the time, Sharon Krebs, were also members 
of the collective but never identified by authorities and never prosecuted for any of the bombings 
carried out by the group.  The couple, closer in age to Melville than to other young radicals in the 
movement, were well-known in leftist circles in New York.  During a November 1968 Humphrey-
Muskie rally, the two were famously photographed while presenting the startled well-dressed 
attendees with a pig head on a platter – while naked themselves.69   
Palmer, at the time of the bombings, lived at 90 Bedford Street in the West Village, almost 
a direct straight line west, one and a half miles across town, from the building where Alpert, 
Melville, Swinton, and Hughey lived on East 4th street.70  Born in Harlem in April of 1930, Palmer 
was even older than Sam Melville and considerably older than the other members of the collective.  
A former Army paratrooper, Palmer’s short military career ended as a conscientious objector to 
																																																						
67 Bail Hearing for John David Hughey III, November 19th, 1969, Trial Transcript pg. 25 – 27, 
U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 69 CR 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), Box #6, Ascension # 021-76A-0877, 
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68 Francis X. Clines, "Bomb Suspect Tied to Radical Paper," New York Times, December 5th, 
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69 Francis X. Clines, "Bomb Suspect Tied to Radical Paper," New York Times, December 5th, 
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70 “FBI Report of SA Vincent A. Alvino, ‘Richard Robin Palmer,’ Security Matter – Anarchist, 
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the Korean War in 1954.71  He went on to graduate from Cornell University in Ithaca, NY – where 
he would spend the latter half of his life – and by 1965, the increasingly activist Palmer had become 
involved with SDS, veterans’ protest groups, and would find himself in the center of the famous 
October 1967 anti-war rally and riot at the Pentagon where he became friendly with future Yippie 
leader Abbie Hoffman.  
In 1968, Palmer also found himself at the center of the protests at Columbia University.  It 
was there that he and Sam Melville came into the same orbit.72  In recounting his personal 
experiences with historian Jeremy Varon, Palmer found his trajectory toward bombing buildings 
with Melville (and eventually with Weather Underground – more on this to follow) a 
“disillusioning journey” that started out in the mid-1960s with confidence in the “perfectibility of 
man” and filled with optimism after episodes like the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Like 
many of his peers, his outlook was ruined by the Vietnam War and by what he perceived to be the 
deterioration of democracy at home.  By 1969, Varon later argues, Palmer had “directed his outrage 
at the entire system.”73 
Sharon Krebs and her ex-husband, Dr. Allen Krebs, were instrumental in establishing the 
Free University of New York (FUNY) in 1965, the largest of the non- “corporation-backed” 
universities that had sprung up around the nation to serve as homes for radical and leftist 
professors, many who had been dismissed from other universities because of ideological stances 
opposing the war in Vietnam.  The list of classes taught at FUNY usually included courses with 
																																																						
71 Palmer received a General Discharge for refusing to go to Korea, and successfully fought to 
have it changed to an Honorable Discharge.  See “FBI Memorandum, SAC Albany to Acting 
Director, FBI, Subject: Richard Robin Palmer, SM: Revact (Extremists),” June 21st, 1973; FBI 
FOIA Case File 100-HQ-417909 
72 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 147-149 
73 Varon, from interview with Palmer recounted in Bringing the War Home, 139 
	 158	
titles such as “Revolution in Latin America” and “Theory and Practice of Radical Social 
Movements;”74 Sharon Krebs taught Russian Literature.  She later became involved with the 
guerilla-theater feminist group WITCH (Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell), 
which made a name for itself by colorfully protesting HUAC and the famous trial of the “Chicago 
8,” notable activists including Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin who had been brought up on 
charges for the protests at the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention.75  After her separation from 
Allen Krebs, Sharon Krebs – keeping his now-notable name – got involved with Robin Palmer 
and the various groups they’d belong to together.  
 
HUMBLE BEGINNINGS 
 
The United Fruit Company, the American company that elevated bananas from an exotic unknown 
fruit to one of the most consumed food products in the world, was in the last few years of its 
century-long existence in July of 1969, and had stood out for years as a symbol of so many of the 
things left-leaning radicals of the era took serious issue with.  Throughout much of the twentieth 
century, the company exercised a dramatic and often volatile influence in almost a dozen countries 
in the Western Hemisphere including Costa Rica and Guatemala, fostering close ties with pliable, 
corrupt, and violent dictators.  At home, it developed extensive ties in American political and 
																																																						
74 Roger Vaughan, “Education: The Anti-University is the Newest Meeting Place for Young 
Radicals,” LIFE Magazine, May 20th, 1966.  See unpublished PhD dissertation by Toru Umezaki 
titled “The Free University of New York: The New Left’s Self-Education and Transborder 
Activism” (Columbia University, 2013) for a well-researched study of FUNY. 
75 Alpert also took part in some WITCH activities, including the protest of a commercial bridal 
convention at Madison Square Garden in New York City.  For more on WITCH, see Alice 
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business power circles.  In his 2007 history of the company, Peter Chapman writes “United Fruit 
had possibly launched more exercises in ‘regime change’ on the banana’s behalf than had even 
been carried out in the name of oil.”76  When Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz took the 
initiative against the company’s dominance of his country in the 1950s, United Fruit became 
central players in the 1954 CIA-led coup to remove him. A young Che Guevara happened to be in 
the nation to witness the coup firsthand.   
United Fruit had maintained shipping docks in lower Manhattan along the Hudson River 
for years.  At about 12:15AM on the morning of July 26th, 1969, an explosion violently disturbed 
a quiet night in the then-desolate neighborhood.  A bomb had been placed against a large steel 
door securing the north bay of the pier’s warehouse, but the explosion was generally limited.  
Thirty-thousand peat moss planters and the Hudson River absorbed most of the blast, but the 
explosion still twisted the steel door, tore an eighteen by eight-inch hole in the concrete below, 
and blew out windows all along the pier.77  NYPD Bomb Squad detectives determined it to be a 
high-order explosion with a powerful concussive blast, therefore almost certainly not accidental.78 
This was the first “action” of the Melville collective, intended to mark the anniversary of 
the Cuban Revolution.  They bombed what they thought was the United Fruit warehouse, but 
unfortunately for the political message the bombers had intended to broadcast, the pier had in fact 
been long ago leased to a tugboat company.  
 
																																																						
76 See Peter Chapman, Bananas: How the United Fruit Company Shaped the World, (New York: 
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77 Seedman, Chief!, 225 
78 High-order explosions, as discussed in Note 19, page 124, are almost always caused by 
powerful explosives including TNT, dynamite, and military-grade explosives like C4.  See “FBI 
Memorandum, SAC NY to Director FBI, Subject: Samuel Joseph Melville AKA [Redacted], 
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NYPD Chief Albert Seedman was one of the most colorful and visible police officials in New 
York City during the 1960s and 1970s.  Sporting a well-earned tough-guy reputation, tailored shirts 
with “Al” embroidered on the sleeves, jeweled rings on both hands, and a pearl-handled revolver, 
Seedman looked more the part of the gangsters he hunted than of the NYPD Chief of Detectives.  
Yet, that is the role he served in from 1971 until 1972, the first Jewish person to ever hold that 
post.79  In the summer of 1969, fifty year-old Seedman had just been appointed the Chief of 
Detectives for the southern portion of Manhattan Island.  “Frankly, I didn’t pay too much attention 
to the report” of the pier bombing, recalled Seedman.  For some reason, despite a number of 
politically motivated plots and attacks over the past few years including those discussed in this 
study, terrorism was not one of the motives that NYPD’s most senior policeman investigating the 
crime considered at the time.  “During those first weeks I could only imagine one reasonable 
motive: someone had a grudge against United Fruit or the tugboat company that leased the pier.  
In any case, the bombing barely made the papers; the big news was that man had walked on the 
moon.”80  With no injuries, no clues, no claim of responsibility, not even anything stolen, the 
investigation went nowhere fast.81   
What Seedman and his detectives failed to realize was that the bombing occurred on the 
sixteenth anniversary of Fidel Castro’s raid on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, itself 
a failure but widely recognized as the beginning of the Cuban Revolution that brought Castro to 
																																																						
79 Richard Goldstein, "Albert Seedman, Chief of Detectives in New York for Short, Tumultuous 
Time, Dies at 94" New York Times, May 17th, 2013.  Another politically-motivated post by the 
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former mayors like Wagner.  See Cannato, The Ungovernable City.   
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power six years later, at a site connected to a company regularly and loudly criticized for its 
activities in Latin America.  Castro’s movement was even known as the July 26th Movement 
(Movimiento 26 Julio).  That the explosion was so minor and no credit was known to be taken – 
political or otherwise – is perhaps what prevented it from rising to the attention of BOSS, the unit 
at NYPD most likely to connect these dots.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The bombing of the United Fruit Pier went as unnoticed outside of police circles as it was 
dismissed within them.  However, the innocuous event is an important marker nonetheless – after 
years of activism and months of talking and planning, and then the dynamite robbery, Melville and 
members of his collective had turned idea into action.  
The emergence of the Melville collective in New York City in 1969 is an important marker 
in the history of terrorism in Gotham as well as the nation during the long Sixties.  Embracing not 
only the lessons and examples set by the fugitive FLQ members in their midst – part of an 
important Canadian connection to terrorism in the U.S. during this period – as well as the obvious 
example set by organizations like Cuban Power in the months prior to their own terrorism 
campaign, the Melville collective would soon become what Burrough argues is “patient zero” for 
others who would follow them from the political left including, notably, the Weather Underground.    
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PART II – The Melville Collective and the Year of Gigantic Proportions 
Chapter 6 - George Demmerle : Portrait of an Informer
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The Woodstock Festival in upstate New York is a marker in American history for many reasons.  
The most compelling pop-culture event of the era; the nexus between the 1960s and the 1970s; 
Jimmy Hendrix’s famous rendition of “The Star Spangled Banner.”  The three-day festival took 
place only two weeks after the United Fruit Pier bombing, starting on August 15th, 1969.  Among 
the nearly half-million attendees were several members of the Melville collective including, at 
least, Alpert, Palmer, Krebs and Sam Melville himself.    
He hated it.  According to Alpert, Melville felt “oppressed by the utter mindlessness around 
him” and wanted to go back to New York City almost immediately.1   
In addition to the countless musical acts, there were also dozens of booths and tables and 
smaller events occurring within the larger festival; in the “Movement City” section, where various 
leftist political organizations set up camp to distribute literature, a small but notable group known 
as “The Crazies” set up shop to sell buttons, pass out pamphlets, and talk with festival-goers.  
Among the untold other markers in history that resulted of those three days in upstate New York 
was the chance meeting between Melville and George Demmerle, “dressed in his shining purple 
Prince Crazy cape and feathered helmet… hard at work manning the Crazies booth.”2  
 
GEORGE DEMMERLE: PORTRAIT OF AN INFORMER 
 
George Demmerle was a well-known figure in anti-war and various other leftist circles in New 
York City during the late 1960s.  A machinist with a distinct Brooklyn accent, Demmerle was, like 
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Sam Melville and Robin Palmer, somewhat older than most of the activists they surrounded 
themselves with who were usually in their early twenties.  Many others in the movement in New 
York City were barely walking when George Demmerle was arrested in 1949 for going AWOL 
from his duty with the U.S. Air Force, ultimately yielding him a dishonorable discharge.  
Three years before Woodstock, on August 9th, 1966, a message turned up on the desk of 
Special Agent John Robinson at the FBI New York office.  A man he didn’t know phoned to let 
the FBI know that he intended to “infiltrate a subversive group and also attempt to raise himself to 
a policy making position in this group in order to compile subversive information.”  Special Agent 
Robinson, who would become Demmerle’s main contact and advocate at the New York office, 
phoned him back more than a month later, on September 13th, and invited him into the office for 
an interview.  During the interview, Demmerle made clear to Agent Robinson that he was “greatly 
concerned with the present trend of the U.S. toward socialism and possibly Communism, which is 
apparent to him because of recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings and legislation as being passed by 
the U.S. Congress.”  The civil rights rulings of the Warren Court and legislation such as the Civil 
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act were evidently too alarming to Demmerle “to sit idly by and 
let this happen without trying to do something about it” any longer.3  
His phone call and then visit to the New York Bureau office, though, were not the first time 
Demmerle appeared on FBI, or for that matter NYPD, records.  During the then-ongoing 
investigation of the Minutemen, Demmerle’s name appeared on lists of members of that group, 
and BOSS obtained a copy of his Minutemen membership application.  Demmerle admitted he 
																																																						
3 FBI New York field office’s nine-page, December 1966 initial report and request for PSI status 
for Demmerle is tremendously revealing and frank and serves as the source for all of the 
preceding.  See “FBI Memorandum, SAC NY to Director FBI, RE: George Edward Demmerle, 
PSI,” December 20th, 1966; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0   
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had been a member of John Birch Society, and had corresponded with the Minutemen, but 
ultimately found the organizations too far right for his own liking.  That didn’t stop him, however, 
from suggesting to the Minutemen organization in his 1964 membership application that, given he 
was an artist, he could blend in with “leftist” types.  He essentially offered the Minutemen the 
same service that he eventually came to render for the FBI.4  Ultimately, Demmerle concluded that 
his conservative, patriotic ambitions could better be served by infiltrating and compiling 
“subversive information” on left wing organizations and “learning how they operate” than by being 
a part of John Birch Society or Minutemen or other similar right wing organizations who “were 
not doing any good for the U.S.”5   
 
At the end of their interview in the fall of 1966, Demmerle was not yet officially an FBI informant 
and thus Special Agent Robinson could not actually “task” him; what the Special Agent did do, 
however, upon hearing that Demmerle had no specific ideas of what organizations to try to subvert, 
was to ask him if he had ever heard of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), and note that PLP was 
supporting the candidacy of Hal Levin, a Brooklyn communist, for Congress; before too long 
Demmerle had contacted Robinson to let him know that he had volunteered on the campaign and 
was invited to official PLP functions.6  Without officially tasking Demmerle, the FBI had him out 
in the field as a political informant, and the fervor with which Demmerle attacked his first non-
																																																						
4 Demmerle Minutemen Application, found in Demmerle’s FBI records; see “FBI Memorandum, 
SA [Name Redacted] to SAC, RE: Minutemen – Internal Security, Misc.,” July 16th, 1968; FBI 
FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
5 “FBI Memorandum, SAC NY to Director FBI, RE: George Edward Demmerle, PSI,” 
December 20th, 1966; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
6 PLM was also, not surprisingly, a target of NYPD BOSS infiltration.  As Bouza tells it, PLM 
was infiltrated by BOSS undercover Abe Hart, recruited out of Pittsburgh so ties to NYPD would 
be even further obfuscated.  Anthony Bouza, Police Intelligence, 83 
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assignment convinced Robinson that he was committed, and that he had “the initiative and ability 
to infiltrate a subversive group.”  Even Demmerle’s troubled past – his dishonorable discharge, his 
upbringing in foster homes, the three years he spent receiving psychiatric care between 1958 and 
1961 – were seen as possible positive attributes, as Robinson argued, because the majority of PLP 
members and other leftists “have also shown traits of instability themselves.”7 
Yet, the Minutemen arrests in New York City occurred barely six weeks after he first met 
with Special Agent Robinson.  While Demmerle was never indicted on any Minutemen charges, 
he was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury investigating the charges brought against the 
group by Queens District Attorney Hentel, and was subsequently laid off from a job he’d had for 
six years because of his employer’s fear that his connection to the case would negatively impact 
the company.  Despite the New York office’s continuing attempts, FBI Headquarters officially 
denied granting Demmerle status as a Potential Security Informant (PSI) on February 2nd, 1967 
because the “derogatory information developed on Demmerle… presented too great a risk of 
possible embarrassment to the Bureau.”8  When Robinson met with Demmerle to let him know his 
services were no longer needed and can no longer be paid for, but that the Bureau would continue 
to accept any information he voluntarily provided as it would from any other citizen, Demmerle 
responded that he would continue his activities – that it would be “absolute treason” to do 
otherwise.9 
 
																																																						
7 “FBI Memorandum, SAC NY to Director FBI, RE: George Edward Demmerle, PSI,” 
December 20th, 1966; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0     
8 “FBI Memorandum, Director FBI to SAC New York, Subject: George Edward Demmerle, PSI” 
February 23rd, 1967; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
9 “FBI Memorandum, SAC NY to Director FBI, RE: George Edward Demmerle, PSI,” March 
22nd, 1967; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0     
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Demmerle sort of slipped into the leftist community in New York, casually hanging around various 
groups; “no one knew from which of the groups he had come from, one activist later recalled.  
“Everyone assumed he was from some group other than their own.”10  The same person also 
recalled that Demmerle was usually the first one in any particular group to accuse someone of 
being an undercover cop or informant.  Todd Gitlin, in an article published in RAT just as the 
smoke was clearing from the Democratic National Convention in 1968, offered advice that would 
have been useful in hindsight: “Watch the man who casts the first stone,” Gitlin wrote.  “[H]e may 
be a cop.”11   
Continuing his non-sanctioned and unofficial informant activities, Demmerle became 
involved with Revolutionary Contingent (RC), what the FBI called a coalition of radical left groups 
in New York City formed in April of 1967 to “support anti-war activity, (and) recruit Americans 
to aid guerilla warfare anywhere in the world but especially in Central America, and support the 
National Liberation Front.”12  The group participated in protests like the National Mobilization 
Committee to End the War in Vietnam (The Mobe) marches in Washington and elsewhere, and 
traveled to Canada for similar activities.  Because of their extremist bent, however, Demmerle was 
asked to choose between RC and PLP by PLP leadership; knowing the value of the new 
organization he had infiltrated, Demmerle chose RC.  The FBI New York office was intrigued; 
they had no other informants within RC, and they used his elevating status to continue to lobby 
headquarters for PSI status for Demmerle.  Finally seeing things New York’s way, headquarters 
																																																						
10 Lee Merrick, “Life With Crazie George,” RAT, Dec 3 -16 1969 
11 Todd Gitlin, “Plainclothes Hoods,” RAT, page 7, October 4-17, 1968 
12 Description of Revolutionary Contingent from Robin Palmer FBI files; very likely that it was 
furnished by George Demmerle.  See “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to Acting Director, 
FBI, Subject: Richard Robin Palmer, SM – RA (Extremists) (OO : New York),” May 7th, 1973, 
FBI FOIA Case File 100-HQ-417909 
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relented and granted him official PSI status in August of 1967, meaning among other things that 
Demmerle could then be directed and tasked instead of the Bureau passively accepting whatever 
information he voluntarily submitted.  The Bureau elevated him from PSI to Full Security 
Informant on October 3rd, 1967.13 
Their now-official informant had gained considerable trust in the Vietnam protest 
movement through RC at the same time he was impressing his handlers by furnishing not just 
written reports but also leaflets, pamphlets, and other literature from various “subversive and new 
left groups” and even rolls of photos taken at meetings and demonstrations.  In less than a four-
month period from February 14th to June 4th, 1968, Demmerle supplied the FBI with forty-three 
written reports and three oral reports.14  He even supplied the FBI with copies of the keys to 
Revolutionary Contingent’s headquarters on East 1st Street in the East Village.15 
Of particular interest and alarm to the Bureau was Demmerle’s report that members of RC 
had discussed activating a “sabotage ring” between the fall of 1967 and the summer of 1968, when 
the Cuban Power bomb spree was in full swing.  Revolutionary Contingent’s actions were planned 
to coincide with racial disturbances and riots spreading through the country.  Among those present 
at a meeting held in a park on East 16th street and Second Avenue (to ensure no wiretaps) was a 
person who claimed to have “the necessary contacts” to obtain and learn to use explosives, a person 
																																																						
13 “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to Director FBI, [Subject Redacted]” October 3rd, 1967; 
FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
14 “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to Director FBI, [Subject Redacted]” June 4th, 1968; FBI 
FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
15 “FBI Informant Report, [Demmerle – Name Redacted] to SA John W. Robinson, ‘One set of 
two keys to Revolutionary Contingent Headquarters, 41 1st Street, New York City,’” September 
1st, 1967; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
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who claimed to be connected with the 1965 plot to blow up the Statue of Liberty, and a former 
member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC).16   
Instead of launching a terrorism campaign, Revolutionary Contingent disbanded soon after 
for lack of funds and lack of cohesion; other groups, however, were emerging and ascending that 
provided Demmerle with ample opportunity to gather information for his FBI handlers.  The Youth 
International Party – the Yippies - was a somewhat informal, highly theatrical, and even playful 
offshoot of the larger protest movement of the late 1960s, started by a group of already-well-known 
members of the activist community including Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin.  The Yippies would 
become among the most notable groups of the era, closely associated with a particularly off-kilter 
approach to demonstrations, including the nomination of a pig – “Pigasus” – for president, with 
the use of colorful guerilla theatrics in support of the campaign; Demmerle’s FBI reports detail his 
involvement in a number of Pigasus events throughout New York, Delaware, Chicago, 
Washington, D.C., and elsewhere.  Even before “officially” establishing the Yippies, Hoffman and 
Rubin were intimately involved in the 1967 March on the Pentagon, where they and hundreds of 
others mockingly tried to use meditation and chanting to levitate the building (then the largest in 
the United States).  The group, though, was also dead serious about its politics and protest 
activities.  The massive response of activists who showed up in Chicago for the 1968 DNC would 
be in large part a product of Yippie organizing; both Rubin and Hoffman were indicted as part of 
the Chicago 8, the group put on trial for “inciting the riot” that surrounded the Convention and 
became a rallying cause for activists around the nation.17 
																																																						
16 “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to Director FBI, [Subject Redacted]” October 3rd, 1967; 
FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
17 See Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage; see also Jonah Raskin, For the 
Hell of it: The Life and Times of Abbie Hoffman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) 
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More militant and at least somewhat less theatrical than the Yippies was a smaller group 
of activists (most were also associated with the Yippies) calling themselves The Crazies; “Crazy 
George” Demmerle, as he would often be referred to, was perhaps the most visible and memorable 
of this small group.18  “George was the craziest cat around,” Jerry Rubin reflected.  “If you wanted 
anything flippy done, call George.  He lived on the streets and worked with the people.  He never 
took off his yippie button.  When the Crazies were born, in an attempt to get an identity distinct 
from yippe, George nicknamed himself ‘Prince Crazy, Son of Yippie.”19   
It was with the Crazies that George Demmerle would travel to Woodstock, and through the 
Crazies that he would meet Sam Melville.   
 
Sufficiently hooked into the New York protest movement by the August 1968 Democratic National 
Convention, Demmerle was in good enough graces with the Bureau that they paid him an 
informant’s salary and expenses, and covered his missed work wages, for him to travel to Chicago 
as both a member of the Yippies and a group called Veterans and Reservists to End the War in 
Vietnam (VREWV), and supplied him with a codename and a contact at the Chicago FBI office.20  
As a member of the Yippies and VREWV – both organizations that Robin Palmer was a central 
figure in – and as well as in classes he took at the Free University of New York, where Sharon 
Krebs was a key figure – Demmerle became personally familiar with both members of the Melville 
																																																						
18 See Rubin’s We Are Everywhere (Harper & Row, 1971) for a discussion of the Crazies; a 
photo and discussion of Demmerle appears on pages 216 – 217.   
19 Jerry Rubin, We Are Everywhere, 216 
20 “FBI Airtel, SAC New York to Director FBI, [Subject Redacted] (OO : Chicago)” August 8th, 
1968; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
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collective, and in fact seems to very likely have furnished specific informant reports on Robin 
Palmer’s activities with VREWV and the Yippies.21 
That the Democratic National Convention was going to be chaotic, everyone knew.  
Protestors traveling to Chicago were being supplied, by the underground press, with maps of 
protest and rally points, illustrating the hotels where delegates were staying.22  It was not that there 
was violence that shocked anyone; how widespread it was, and the images of it broadcast to 
Americans everywhere on live television, was what the nation took note of.  Demmerle found 
himself in the thick of the protests in Chicago alongside the Veterans group, the Yippies, Black 
Panthers and others, pepper-sprayed in the face and looking down the barrel of an angry Chicago 
policeman’s revolver. 23  During the riot, Robin Palmer threw a chunk of concrete through the 
window of a Cadillac right in front of Demmerle; several protestors at the scene, Demmerle among 
them, were arrested.  Palmer grew suspicious of Demmerle (though clearly insufﬁciently so) when 
the charges against him were mysteriously dropped.24  When he returned to New York City, of 
course, Demmerle reported everything to his FBI handlers. Not coincidentally, many reports on 
Robin Palmer’s activities at the Convention appear in FBI records.25 
																																																						
21 Robin Palmer’s recently declassified FBI records (October 2015) reveal a number of reports 
from informants that, while their identities continue to be redacted, very closely mirror the 
activities that Demmerle’s declassified records prove he was involved in.  See: Various, FBI 
FOIA Case File 100-HQ 
22 RAT Subterranean News, Convention Special, August 22, 1968 
23 Demmerle submitted a very detailed nine-page informant report on activities at the 
Convention; see “FBI Informant Report, [Demmerle – Name Redacted], SAC New York to SAC 
Chicago, Received by SA John W. Robinson, Subject: Veterans and Reservists Against the War 
in Vietnam, Info Concerning (Internal Security), Date Received: September 9th, 1968” 
September 19th, 1968; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
24 Palmer interview with Varon; Varon, Brining the War Home, footnotes number 16, pg 329.  
Ironically enough, Palmer himself would be arrested as the result of an NYPD infiltrator just two 
years later.  See this dissertation, Chapter 8.   
25 See, for instance, the intelligence on Palmer’s activities in Revolutionary Contingent, the 
Crazies, and VREWV, in “FBI Memorandum, SAC New York to Acting Director, FBI, Subject: 
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Demmerle’s protest activities continued, as did his flow of information to the Bureau.  In March 
of 1969, Demmerle was arrested along with Abbie Hoffman for “parading without a license,” 
leading a group of dozens of Crazies and Yippies and flying flags for both organizations.  
Ironically, during the arrest Demmerle was singled out and photographed by BOSS detectives who 
weren’t aware of his status with the FBI.26  Also ironically, he and Hoffman would be represented 
by famed radical liberal attorney William Kunstler, who would be one of the last people to meet 
Sam Melville before he was killed at Attica.27  The arrest, and everything else Demmerle had been 
doing, including setting up Black Panther Party fundraisers, was effectively cementing his 
reputation as a committed member of the protest movement.  In April of 1969, Demmerle advised 
the Bureau that the Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam would be staging a 
demonstration at the Commodore Hotel Ballroom in Manhattan, where Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey was set to appear at a luncheon.  The group had obtained dozens of fake tickets, and 
was going to disrupt the festivities by presenting the Vice President with a real pig head (just as 
Krebs and Palmer did the previous November at another Humphrey event) and releasing hundreds 
of anti-war leaflets into the air.  Given the tip, BOSS arrested several members of the group for 
trying to enter the event with fake tickets.  Demmerle was one of those arrested. The credit for the 
																																																						
Richard Robin Palmer, SM – RA (Extremists) (OO : New York),” May 7th, 1973; FBI FOIA 
Case File 100-HQ-417909 
26 “FBI Informant Report, [Demmerle – Name Redacted], Received by SA John W. Robinson, 
Subject: Demonstration at ‘NY Times’ and Grand Central Station, 3/22/69, Date Received: 
3/27/69” April 30th, 1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
27 “FBI Memorandum, SA John Robinson to SAC, Subject [Redacted],” April 1st, 1969; FBI 
FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
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arrest was given to a ticket-checker, whose eagle-eye supposedly noticed the inferior paper quality 
of the fraudulent tickets and notified police.28 
It wasn’t the only time Demmerle’s information would make it into BOSS detectives’ 
hands – his tip to the FBI that the Crazies and other groups were planning a demonstration at the 
Women’s House of Detention in Greenwich Village was shared with BOSS as well, as was an 
April 1968 Yippie plan to hold a “Loot-in” at the Macy’s department store.29  Even before that, 
Demmerle had helped identify individuals photographed at a January 1967 Committee for 
Independent Politics demonstration; those photographs and the identifications were shared with 
BOSS detectives.30  He reported on a discussion at a Yippie meeting to poison the food at a Long 
Island restaurant that regularly delivered food to NYPD, and the Bureau shared this information 
with BOSS.31  In June of 1967, Demmerle’s report to the Bureau that Revolutionary Contingent 
was going to picket the Armed Forces Induction Center on Whitehall Street – a favorite spot for 
protests of all kinds – was passed along to BOSS as well.32 
In May of 1968 Demmerle was rated as a “very good” Security Informant; by March of 
1969, just as Agent Dowling was about to begin taking a closer look at Sam Melville, Demmerle 
																																																						
28 “FBI Teletype, Urgent, SAC New York to Director FBI, (ATTN: DID),” April 19th, 1969; FBI 
FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
29 See “FBI Memorandum, Director FBI to SAC New York, Subject [Redacted],” June 11th, 
1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0; and “FBI Informant Report, [Demmerle – 
Name Redacted], Received by SA John W. Robinson, Subject: Meeting of the Yippies 4/13/68 at 
Free School,” May 3rd, 1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
30 “FBI Memorandum, SA John Robinson to SAC, Subject: Committee for Independent Politics, 
IS-PLP,” February 1st, 1967; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
31 “FBI Record, Bufile 105166695, NYfile 100-160251, Subject – Revolutionary Contingent,” 
August 21st, 1967; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0; see also “FBI Memorandum, SAC 
New York to Director FBI, [Subject Redacted],” June 4th, 1968; FBI FOIPA Records Request 
#1319364-0    
32 “FBI Teletype, Urgent, SA John Robinson to Director FBI (attn: Domestic Intelligence 
Division), Subject: Revolutionary Contingent, Information Concerning (Internal Security)” June 
26th, 1967; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
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was rated “excellent,” the highest rating the Bureau could give him, by Assistant Director Mark 
Felt – “Deep Throat” himself.33  Demmerle took advantage of every opportunity to burnish his 
activist image; when he was accidentally struck in the face while walking past a construction site 
in Midtown Manhattan, suffering a gash that required nineteen stiches, he told his compatriots in 
the movement that he was attacked by “two right wing fascists who called him a dirty 
communist.”34 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Agent John Robinson spoke with Demmerle and received written reports from him frequently, 
more than twice a month.35  Yet, despite the copious reporting and the substantial amount of money 
paid to him by the Bureau over a number of years, during the ensuing trial the FBI acknowledged 
that, prior to Melville, Demmerle’s information had not resulted in the conviction of a single 
individual.36  
Informants and undercover operatives – from BOSS agents that infiltrated the Statue of 
Liberty plotters, the Panther 21, and Cuban Power, to KKK informant Gary Rowe and informants 
																																																						
33 “FBI Memorandum, Assistant Director Felt to SAC Sullivan, Subject [Redacted],” April 9th, 
1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
34 “FBI Memorandum, SA John Robinson to Director FBI to SAC, Subject [Redacted]” 
November 16th, 1967; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1319364-0    
35 Testimony of FBI Special Agent John W. Robinson (Robinson – Cross), Stenographers Notes, 
page dhe-3, March 6th, 1970; U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 70 CR. 28, (S.D.N.Y. 1970), Box #6, 
Ascension # 021-75F-0468, Location # D4204045, NARA-NYC 
36  “Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Confession,” 
February 10th, 1970; U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 70 CR. 28, (S.D.N.Y. 1970), Box #6, Ascension 
# 021-75F-0468, Location # D4204045, NARA-NYC.  Demmerle’s tip about the pig’s head 
stunt at the Humphrey event was clearly not considered the sole cause for arrest, or the Bureau 
simply didn’t want to reveal the report at the time of the case.   
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within the Minutemen, had been central to how FBI and NYPD countered terrorism in New York 
City and around the nation even before these agencies intentionally countered terrorism during the 
long Sixties.  George Demmerle serves as an interesting example of two distinct categories of 
individual typical of this era.  First, as an individual impacted by the intelligence provided by 
informers – he was fired from his job after his name surfaced in connection to the Minutemen 
arrests in 1966.  And secondly, a paid informant himself, he would have a dramatic impact on the 
lives of the members of the Melville collective and perhaps the entire movement that would come 
to celebrate their actions. 
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PART II – The Melville Collective and the Year of Gigantic Proportions 
Chapter 7 - The Melville Collective : Conclusion
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MARINE MIDLAND BANK BUILDING August 20th, 1969 
 
Just days after Woodstock ended – at 11:00PM on Wednesday, August 20th – a powerful bomb 
ripped through the Marine Midland Bank building at 140 Broadway in lower Manhattan.  Placed 
near an elevator shaft on the eighth floor of the building, the blast was violent enough to move a 
two-ton computer several feet, blow out scores of windows that cascaded down on the streets 
below, and rip open a ten-foot hole in the floor that office machines and debris crashed down 
through.   
This bomb was nowhere near as benign as the one that erupted three weeks earlier at the 
pier on the Hudson River, just a few minutes’ walk away.  Seventeen office workers, processing 
the day’s trades and settling the bank’s accounts, sustained mostly minor injuries before they 
stumbled down the fire stairs and out to the street.  If not for the massive machine separating the 
site of the blast from the bank employees, their injuries could have been much worse.1  
Again with no inkling of the motive of the crime, and aware that this part of the bank 
handled no cash money, with recollections of the long bombing campaign of George “Mad 
Bomber” Metesky coming to mind, NYPD Chief Albert Seedman and his entourage that included 
members of the NYPD Bomb Squad initially oriented their investigation toward possibly spiteful 
ex-employees or customers; “I wanted my detectives to interview every employee on those floors, 
locate every employee who had been discharged under less than happy circumstances, and check 
out every one of the banks customers who had recently been turned down for a loan.”2   
																																																						
1 Narrative of the explosion, the scene, and the injuries culled from Seedman, Chief!, 225, and 
from “Government Response to Motion to Reduce Bail, Jane Alpert,” November 14th, 1969; U.S. 
v. Melville et al, No. 69 CR 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), Box #6, Ascension # 021-76A-0877, Location 
# A8629052, NARA-NYC    
2 Albert Seedman, Chief!, 227 
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Melville had carried out the bombing of Marine Midland by himself, with little preparation.  He 
didn’t notify anyone else in the collective of his plan; he didn’t “case” the building; he just walked 
around the Wall Street area with a bomb in a bag until he happened upon a suitable ‘capitalist’ 
target.  After returning home from depositing the device at the bank, Melville found Alpert at their 
4th street apartment; when he told her that he’d set the bomb to detonate at 11:00PM, Alpert 
alarmingly let him know that night workers were likely to still be at their desks at that time.3   
The Statue of Liberty plotters in 1965 understood that some innocent bystanders would be 
injured or worse by their bomb; the Minutemen undoubtedly did as well.  The FLQ terrorists who 
came into Melville and Alpert’s life did so because they were being hunted by Canadian authorities 
for injuring more than two dozen persons with their bomb at the Montreal Stock Exchange.  The 
Weathermen accepted – even embraced – the concept of bombing persons and not just symbolic 
locations and structures before sharply altering course after the traumatic New York City 
townhouse explosion in March 1970.4  And even though Alpert claims Melville had previously 
argued that the FLN and Algerians, “who carried out revolutionary terrorism in which not only the 
powerful but also innocent bystanders were injured or killed” was rational and acceptable, the 
collective, Alpert later explained, had consciously committed to avoiding injuring anyone – similar 
to Cuban Power, or at least the New York City elements responsible for the terrorism campaign 
the previous year, who had been largely successful at avoiding injury to civilians.5  Alpert’s 
argument that people might be injured by his bomb – or worse – resounded; the couple hurriedly 
																																																						
3 Jane Alpert, Growing Up, 207 
4 The 11th street Weather Underground townhouse bomb; to be discussed at length later in 
Chapter 8. 
5 Alpert, Letters, 29 
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walked to a payphone where they placed a phone call to warn Marine Midland security that a bomb 
was set to go off in less than an hour.  Melville would later tell the FBI and Chief Seedman that he 
couldn’t get through to the Wall Street location so instead called to warn the Hanover Square 
branch just a few blocks away, expecting the warning to be relayed from Hanover Square to the 
Broadway location where the bomb was placed.6  The warning, clearly, was not taken seriously 
enough.    
Melville, Alpert claims, was profoundly disturbed by the injuries his bomb had caused; the 
wider collective was extremely disappointed that they weren’t involved and that people could have 
been killed.  Alpert would later tell the FBI that at least one member severed ties with the collective 
because of the Marine Midland attack.7  
The NYPD investigation into potentially disgruntled employees or customers lead 
nowhere, but the Bomb Squad’s meticulous sifting of the debris turned up what would later become 
important evidence – a damaged mainspring from an alarm clock, a Westclox “Baby Ben,” the 
most popular hand-wound model in the country at the time.8 
In the wake of the Marine Midland bomb, Seedman began checking into the availability of 
dynamite in and around New York City “for the first time in [his] twenty-seven years on the 
force.”9  Setting aside for the moment that Seedman must not have been paying attention to the 
rash of bombings and plots that had occurred in and around New York City in the preceding three 
																																																						
6 Testimony of NYPD Chief Albert Seedman, January 21st, 1970; U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 70 
CR. 28, (S.D.N.Y. 1970), Box #6, Ascension # 021-75F-0468, Location # D4204045, NARA-
NYC 
7 FBI Interoffice Report on Weather Underground / Pat Swinton [Illegible / Redacted], Office of 
Origin: New York, Title of Case: Hanged File (Interoffice), [Redacted], January 2nd, 1975, page 
11; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776-0 
8 Seedman, Chief!, 229.  The Baby Ben model of the time was the Series 8, produced between 
1964 and 1981.   
9 Ibid. 
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or four years, the Chief argues that what he found was disconcerting, and mirrored what Michele 
Duclos has argued prior to her arrest in the 1965 Statue of Liberty case – legally obtaining 
dynamite in the areas surrounding New York City was not a particularly difficult task.  As 
Seedman explains, “[i]n New Hampshire at the time we discovered it was as easy to buy dynamite 
as baby food.”10   
As Melville and his collective discovered months earlier, though, obtaining dynamite in 
New York City itself was a different story.  One needed a permit from the Department of 
Buildings’ Dynamite Division, and then even with it the explosives could only be purchased from 
Expo Industries in the Bronx.  Seedman and his Detectives discovered, to their alarm, that Explo 
had been robbed at gunpoint on July 7th.11   
 
RAT SUBTERRANEAN NEWS AND THE ALTERNATIVE / MOVEMENT PRESS 
 
On August 29th, Detective Pete Perotta walked into Chief Seedman’s office with a copy of most 
recent edition of RAT Subterranean News, a colorfully illustrated and cynically humorous 
underground newspaper committed to the radical left protest movement.  His distaste for all things 
“counter-culture” clear in all of his writing, Seedman’s first response was unsurprising.  “What is 
this piece of crap?”12 It had been just over eight days since the bomb exploded at Marine Midland. 
Perotta grabbed Seedman’s attention, however, when he pointed out the contents of page three.  A 
press release the newspaper published, dated August 20th – the same day as the bomb – proclaimed 
the Marine Midland attack to be an act of “political sabotage” targeting the “security files and 
																																																						
10 Seedman, Chief!, 229 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., Chief!, 230 
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building structure” of the W.R. Grace Company, which the author claimed exploited Latin 
American countries.  The communiqué also took credit for the United Fruit pier bombing, marking 
the anniversary of the Cuban Revolution.13  The communiqué printed in RAT was the first clue 
that the bombings were linked and that they were political in nature, and not the work of 
disgruntled employees or customers; the paper claimed that it received the following letter in the 
mail, a letter that the sender claimed was “for underground media only – there will be no 
communication with the pig media:”   
 
“The explosive device set off at the Marine Midland Grace Trust Company on the 
night of August 20th was an act of political sabotage… There was no intent to hurt 
anyone.  The attack was directed only at property.  An hour before the explosion a 
W.R. Grace guard was telephoned and advised to clear the building at 140 
Broadway…”14  
 
Detective Perrota visited the small offices of RAT in a “broken-down building” on East 14th street 
across from the Palladium, a famed concert hall that hosted iconic acts through the decades like 
the Rolling Stones, the Clash, and Bruce Springsteen.15  Climbing the staircase to the second floor 
offices, Perrota came face-to-face with a surprised Jane Alpert.  Months earlier – on April 16th, 
just as they were planning the hijacking with the Quebecois – Alpert quit her “straight” publishing 
job; the work she did there, she would later claim, was increasingly becoming a part of “a world 
																																																						
13 RAT, August 27 – September 9th, 1969 
14 “Wall Street Bombing,” RAT, page 3, August 27 – September 9, 1969 
15 Neither the building that housed RAT nor the Palladium exist any longer.  Palladium was 
demolished to make way for an NYU dormitory – also, aptly, named Palladium – and the 
building that housed RAT is now a large parking lot. 
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of which I was no longer a part.”16  A week after the successful hijacking, she walked into the 
office of RAT, looking to get involved.17   
Upon questioning by Detective Perrota, Alpert claimed to have received the communiqué 
and an accompanying “fact sheet” but that, after typing up the piece for publication, had retained 
neither, or the envelope they had arrived in.  Perrota would leave with none of the evidence he’d 
hoped to retrieve, but instead with a stack of RAT back-issues.  In one of those back-issues, dated 
August 5th, he found an earlier story that had gone unnoticed by NYPD detectives – “A pier on the 
Hudson River owned by the United Fruit Company was blasted by a bomb… An anonymous caller 
verified that the explosion… was in celebration of Cuban Independence Day.”18 
On September 16th, NYPD obtained a ten-day warrant to search the offices of RAT for the 
Marine Midland communiqué.19  While there, they discovered a rough draft of the press release 
about the bombings; NYPD detectives would soon share this with the FBI, who were on the verge 
of getting involved in the case themselves.  RAT, and the newspaper’s staff, were starting to come 
into focus; Alpert admits that, following the execution of the warrant, “for the first time we began 
to feel watched.”20 
 
																																																						
16 Alpert, Growing Up, 163 
17 In February, 1970, the female contributors of RAT staged a takeover of the paper and it 
became something entirely different than it had previously been.  The new RAT excluded almost 
all of the male former employees including editor Jeff Shero, and the renamed Women’s 
LibeRATion took on an even more militant tone, absent the former paper’s trademark humor.  
The February 6th, 1970 issue had three sections: “sabotage,” “more sabotage,” and “Even More 
Sabotage” detailing various attacks on government buildings, police, and government 
employees.  The following issue (Feb 24) included excerpts from Carlos Marighella’s mini-
manual. Eventually a few men would be allowed back but a collective of women would make 
“all editorial decisions.” (RAT, February 24th, 1970)   
18 RAT, August 5th, 1969 
19 Seedman, Chief!, 236 
20 Alpert, Letters, 31 
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“I suspected (the communiqué) and commentary had originated in the offices of RAT,” Seedman 
claims. “[S]omewhere among RAT’s many contributors, I felt we would find our bomber.”21  
Considering how readily Seedman acknowledges he hadn’t even considered political violence or 
terrorism before this, to believe that he could make such a logical leap at that time sounds more 
boisterous than believable.22   
Premonitions notwithstanding, the masthead of RAT during the short life of the paper listed 
no less than seven individuals involved with, or indicted for, terrorist bombings in New York City 
and elsewhere.  Weatherman Jeff Jones was a long-time employee of RAT, from at least as far back 
as April 1968; staffer Phoebe Hirsch, another future prominent Weather member, would be 
indicted for actions at what would come to known as the “Days of Rage” and participate in the 
December 1969 “War Council” that set Weather on its terrorist path.23  John Cohen published 
articles in RAT.  Pat Swinton and Sharon Krebs would join the staff of the paper in 1969, along 
with a young man named Jonathan Grell, who would himself be indicted for involvement with the 
Melville collective months after the first members were arrested.24  David Hughey also previously 
																																																						
21 Seedman, Chief!, 232, 234 
22 It is worth taking a step back for a moment to consider sources.  Chief Seedman’s recollection 
of the case that appear in his memoir Chief! is, along with Alpert’s, the only published 
accounting of the case from anyone actually involved, save an interview with Robin Palmer that 
appears over a few pages of Jeremy Varon’s Bringing the War Home.  A collection of Melville’s 
prison letters, published after his death, while often compelling, do not speak about the case 
itself, almost certainly in part because they were written while he was still on trial and then 
published while others were still under threat of indictment.  But just as Alpert’s account must be 
interrogated as a source for a bevy of reasons, so must Seedman’s; his account contains multiple 
unbelievable assertions, such as the above noted, and at least a few factual inaccuracies.  The 
Chief was known throughout his career to be self-aggrandizing, and his memoir is just the most 
notable example of this trend. 
23 See Seth King, “Miss Wilkerson Fails to Appear for Chicago Trial,” New York Times, March 
17th, 1970; also, Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws (GPO, 1975), page 71 
24 Their names can be found on numerous mastheads for the magazine in 1969 and 1970. 
	 184	
worked at RAT, and left to take a job as a layout artist at the Guardian in April of 1968 -  it was 
here that he and the older Sam Melville, who also worked there for a short time, became friends.25  
According to historian John McMillan, other radical newspapers were linked to terrorists 
and terrorist groups as well: “Members of some of the most radical papers, like the Berkley Tribe, 
had ties to, and were among the chief sources of information about, clandestine groups such as the 
Weather Underground.”26 Joyce Plecha, who would be arrested for a bombing attempt in 
December of 1970 with Robin Palmer and other Weather Underground members, was a good 
friend of Melville’s, reportedly a member of his collective, and wrote for East Village Other.27   
Jeff Shero, a former SDS organizer and vice president from Austin, had just begun 
publishing RAT the year before when the Columbia University protests and mass arrests, and the 
publication staff’s up close and personal reporting, quickly elevated it to peer status with the long-
running Guardian and the more mainstream-underground East Village Other, and of much greater 
importance to members of the movement who were more concerned with the issues McMillan 
points out.  According to historian Abe Peck, the Columbia protests “made… RAT the underground 
press’s hottest publication.”28    
RAT, more than any other of the underground papers in New York City, would become 
part of the news they covered.  In an August 1968 article titled “Has the Time for Demonstrations 
																																																						
25 Bail Hearing for John David Hughey III, November 19th, 1969, Trial Transcript pg. 25 – 27, 
U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 69 CR 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), Box #6, Ascension # 021-76A-0877, 
Location # A8629052, NARA-NYC 
26 John McMillan, Smoking Typewriters: The Sixties Underground Press and the Rise of 
Alternative Media in America (New York: Oxford, 2011), 135 
27 Joyce Plecha, “Rock,” The East Village Other, Vol. 4, No. 29, June 18th, 1969 
28 McMillan, Smoking Typewriters, 224, n145, and throughout.  The Guardian, despite much 
debate about its politics within the movement, lasted in some form until 1992, making it by far 
the longest lasting of the New York-based national radical newspapers excepting the Village 
Voice (if that paper counts as radical, which nobody in the movement at the time believed it did).  
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Passed?” a RAT contributor proposed “There must be a more meaningful way of defying the 
system.”  Echoing the exploits of George “Mad Bomber” Metesky whose nickname Melville 
himself would inherit, the contributor suggested that “[b]lowing up a con edison (sic) plant would 
be pretty satisfying for a start.”29  Sam Melville might have been thinking the same thing at the 
time, but RAT was publishing it – and Cuban Power was doing it.  Two months earlier, in June of 
1968, RAT carried an article and interview with an unidentified person who had the week before 
bombed Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E, “the Con Edison of San Francisco” as the paper 
described it) – complete with instructions and a diagram of how to build a bomb from ammonium 
nitrate – fertilizer – a rifle bullet, piping and tape.30  A later issue (February 6th, 1970) included 
diagrams on how to build homemade grenades, Molotov cocktails, and exploding booby-traps.   
Almost immediately upon joining the staff of RAT in April of 1969, Alpert began writing 
for the paper.  The following month, a piece Alpert wrote on airline hijackings appeared in the 
paper: “Congress, the airlines and the media have successfully fooled the public into believing that 
hijacking an airplane is a chancey (sic) sort of business involving great risk and not worth 
considering by any sane person.”  She then went on to discuss the various ways that a potential 
hijacker could evade the then-still nascent security paradigm at airports.  She was speaking from 
experience.31  
  
																																																						
29 RAT, “Has the Time for Demonstrations Passed?” by Jennifer Wolf, page 9, August 9-22 1968 
30 Marvin Garson, “PG&E Saboteur, Still at Large, Tells How He Did It,” RAT, page 1, June 1 – 
14, 1968 
31 Jane Alpert, untitled news article, RAT, June 12th – June 18th 1969 
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A FEDERAL CASE – FOLEY SQUARE FEDERAL BUILDING September 19th, 1969 
 
Foley Square is an oasis of sorts, a smallish patch of grass surrounded on all sides by imposing 
court buildings and other federal office towers in lower Manhattan, just a stone’s throw from City 
Hall and the Brooklyn Bridge.  The most imposing building in a square full of them is the Federal 
Building at 26 Federal Plaza; just opened in 1967, the new building immediately became the tallest 
federal building in the United States, with more office space than any federal building short of the 
Pentagon.  The tower housed a long list of nearly sixty federal tenant agencies.32 
At 2:00AM on the morning of September 19th, 1969, a powerful explosion ripped through 
the Federal Building, originating from an electrical room on the fortieth floor – a floor that housed 
U.S. Army offices.33  The bomb was again rigged with a Westclox Baby Ben as a timing device.  
The scene resembled the Marine Midland Bank bomb, excepting, importantly, the lack of any 
injuries.  Pipes burst and tiles shattered in a men’s room near the explosion.  Windows blew out 
and down onto the quiet street below.34   
Following the bombing, the New York Times received a communique denouncing President 
Nixon’s speech at the United Nations the previous day; “As Richard Nixon was talking ‘peace’ at 
the U.N. on Thursday, Sept. 18, and his masters of war were relentlessly dealing out death and 
																																																						
32 History of the Federal Building – presently called the Jacob Javits Federal Building – found at 
the website for the Government Services Agency (GSA), last accessed on August 27, 2015 - 
http://www.gsa.gov.  Also see Thomas A. Johnson, “Explosion Wrecks U.S. Offices Here,” New 
York Times, September 20th, 1969 
33 “Government Response to Motion to Reduce Bail, Jane Alpert,” page 7, November 14th, 1969; 
U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 69 CR 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), Box #6, Ascension # 021-76A-0877, 
Location # A8629052, NARA-NYC    
34 Seedman, Chief!, 235 
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destruction throughout the world, a time bomb was placed in the Federal Building… an act of 
solidarity with our brother and sister revolutionaries all over the world.”35 
Traveling westward into Manhattan from his home on Long Island, Chief Seedman arrived 
at the Federal Building at 3:45am.  This time was different, though – because of the attack on 
federal property, it was a federal investigation; the Melville collective was now in the FBI’s 
crosshairs.  The cooperation between NYPD and FBI on the case began here, almost organically 
– even though it was clearly FBI’s scene, NYPD had capacity, most notably the Bomb Squad, that 
FBI did not.  NYPD Bomb Squad had begun sorting the debris even before Seedman arrived.36 
The very same day as the bombing, the FBI New York office set up a special task force – 
administratively designated “Section 22A,” but commonly referred to within the New York office 
as “The Bomb Squad.”37  The Squad would quickly grow to include more than twenty FBI agents.   
Three Josephs would be at the tip of the spear for the FBI.  Joseph Corless, a twelve-year 
veteran of the FBI, and Joseph MacFarlane, a nineteen year veteran of the FBI, were put in charge 
of the investigation and the Bomb Squad, reporting to Special Agent in Charge Joseph Sullivan – 
a nearly three decade FBI veteran with a long track record of notable cases including the 1964 
KKK murders of civil rights workers in Mississippi.38  Some agents would be culled from the bank 
robbery section, a section that also covered destruction of government property.39 
																																																						
35 “Letter Claims Blast In Federal Building Was a Time Bomb,” New York Times, September 
21st, 1969 
36 Seedman, Chief!, 235 
37 Testimony of FBI Special Agent Joseph Corless, January 23rd, 1970; U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 
70 CR. 28, (S.D.N.Y. 1970), Box #6, Ascension # 021-75F-0468, Location # D4204045, NARA-
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38 Testimony of FBI Special Agent Joseph Corless, January 23rd, 1970; and Testimony of FBI 
Special Agent Joseph J. MacFarlane, December 31st, 1969; U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 70 CR. 28, 
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39 Testimony of FBI Robert D. Fox, December 31st, 1969; U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 70 CR. 28, 
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In a completely unrelated tandem investigation, by the end of September the FBI was 
continuing to develop information on Melville and Alpert as a result of their adventures on the 
U.S. – Canadian border.  Agents had learned that the couple had moved from 11th street to 235 
East 4th street.  Melville and Alpert became aware that they were being investigated, but did not 
know exactly what for.  By sheer coincidence, the morning after the Federal Building bomb 
(literally hours after the explosion), FBI Agent Dowling (who was conducting the investigation 
into Melville) visited the new tenants of the old 11th street apartment and asked to find the young 
couple who previously lived there; the new tenants called to inform Alpert and Melville.  Thinking, 
probably correctly, that if it was related to the bombs they’d already be under arrest, Alpert 
suspected it was a result of the Canadian Mountie who interviewed them during their trip to aid 
the FLQ men.40   
Soon after, Alpert engaged Henry Di Suvero, an attorney with Emergency Civil Liberties 
Committee.  Di Suvero, seemingly an equal opportunity civil rights advocate, defended some of 
the Minutemen members in 1966, and would go on to represent Weather Underground members 
in the coming years.  The attorney first called the FBI as Alpert’s representation on September 30th 
1969, and eventually got in touch with Agent Dowling.  The FBI man let Di Suvero know that he 
was looking into a matter regarding “national security” – not the bombings, but as it would soon 
become clear, the Canadian connection.  Dowling communicated to Di Suvero that the FBI had no 
real interest in Alpert, but was very interested in having a conversation with Melville.41  Di Suvero 
advised that if Dowling could not provide any more information (he couldn’t) than he could not 
																																																						
40 Alpert, Growing Up, 213 
41 FBI Report; Samuel Joseph Melville, [Subject Redacted], Internal Security – Canada,” 
November 17th, 1969; FBI FOIPA Records Request #1315776-0    
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make Alpert available for an interview and to contact him if he wanted to contact his client in the 
future.   
For the time being, the FBI went away.  The Bureau was investigating both Melville and 
now the bombings, but at the moment they had no clue that they were linked; the two never 
converged until George Demmerle eventually entered the picture.  Through his investigation (prior 
to eventually being told, just before the arrests, that Melville was a suspect in the bombings) Agent 
Dowling “turned up no information (that) could tie to Mr. Melville indicating that he was involved 
in any illegal activity.”42  
 
BOMBS OUTSIDE NEW YORK 
 
At 2:05AM on September 26th, a powerful bomb exploded at the Federal Building in downtown 
Milwaukee causing upwards of $100,000 in damage but no injuries; an hour and a half later, an 
explosion blew in the steel doors to a National Guard armory in Madison, again without any 
injuries.43 
The FBI kicked off an investigation with more than twenty Agents on the case; the Bureau 
immediately had a strong suspicion that the explosions were linked to a bomb discovered the night 
before in a telephone booth on the thirtieth floor of the Chicago Civic Center.  The Civic Center 
only escaped damage when a telephone repairman serendipitously found the hidden bomb before 
2:30AM, when it was set to explode, and brought it to a bailiff.  When the bailiff saw the dynamite, 
																																																						
42  Testimony of FBI Thomas J. Dowling, (Dowling cross-direct), Stenographers Notes, page 
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he immediately alerted fire department bomb squad technicians, who defused it.  The intact bomb 
followed the same design as in New York City, and as evidence would show, also the Wisconsin 
bombs – dynamite, battery, blasting cap, Westclox Baby Ben timer.44  The Midwest bombs were 
all driving distance from one other, each location less than a hundred miles from the other.45  Given 
a thousand miles of American heartland separating the bombs in New York City and the Midwest, 
it is perhaps forgivable that the Bureau didn’t, at the time, link all of the attacks they were 
investigating.   
According to Alpert, Melville was in North Dakota for a two-week training session with 
H. Rap Brown, no stranger to bombs himself.  Melville and an accomplice, a stranger to Alpert 
and others in the collective, carried out the Midwest bombs together.46  She wouldn’t learn about 
it until after his return to New York on October 8th; but the collective had news for him when he 
returned, as well.  
 
ARMED FORCES INDUCTION CENTER October 7th, 1969 
 
Thirty-nine Whitehall Street is, today, a towering black-glass skyscraper with an exclusive health 
club occupying the first several levels.  Located barely a stone’s throw from the Staten Island Ferry 
and the southern tip of Manhattan, one feels as if they’re looking down directly into New York 
Harbor and out at the Statue of Liberty and beyond from the top floors.  But in 1969, 39 Whitehall 
Street was the location of the Whitehall Armed Forces Induction Center, an eight-story fortress-
like structure built in the 1880s which had processed millions of New Yorkers into the military 
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over eight decades and several wars.  To those in objection to the Vietnam War, it was among the 
most loathed locations in New York City.  Protests at the Induction Center had been ongoing for 
most of the decade; at one such event in 1967, 2,5000 protested and 264 were arrested in a single 
day, including Dr. Benjamin Spock and Allen Ginsburg.47  Just a few months later, in March of 
1968 – even before Cuban Power began their own terrorism campaign – a dynamite bomb placed 
at the rear entrance of the building shattered more than thirty windows.  The FBI, NYPD, and 
armed forces investigative agencies all failed to name any suspects and the case faded away.48   
Late in the evening of October 7th, 1969, an intense blast ripped through 39 Whitehall and 
echoed through the quiet canyons of downtown Manhattan.  The bomb was placed in a men’s room 
and exploded around 11:20PM, “devastating” the fifth floor, where the explosion occurred, 
according to FDNY Deputy Chief Arthur Laufer.  Even though six military personnel were burning 
the midnight oil on the second floor, no injuries occurred – the explosion did blow out dozens of 
windows (many that had been replaced after the prior dynamiting of the building less than a year 
and a half earlier) and even blew out some bricks from the façade of the building. 49   
The Whitehall Induction Center bombing wasn’t Melville – he was in the Midwest 
conducting his own bombings.  According to Alpert, David Hughey “planned and carried out, 
virtually unaided” the Whitehall Induction Center bombing.50  The most successful of the 
collective’s bombs, Melville himself “had nothing to do with it” other than the initial bomb 
construction training he’d given Hughey.51  Within a day, the New York Times and other media 
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49 “Draft Center Here Damaged by Blast,” New York Times, October 8th, 1969 
50 Alpert, Growing Up, 218 
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outlets received a communiqué from the bomber: “Tonight we bombed the Whitehall Induction 
Center.  This action was taken in support of the N.L.F. (National Liberation Front), legalized 
marijuana, love, Cuba, legalized abortion and all the American revolutionaries and G.I.’s who are 
winning the war against the Pentagon.  Nixon, surrender now.”52   
Again, the NYPD Bomb Squad found a Westclox Baby Ben mainspring amidst the rubble.  
But, again, as it was at Foley Square less than a month earlier, the bombing of the Whitehall 
Induction Center was the FBI’s jurisdiction, and the FBI “Bomb Squad” looking for the Melville 
collective took up the investigation. 
Moved temporarily in the wake of the 1969 bomb, in 1972 the military would finally give 
in to the constant lure that having an induction center on public streets posed to protestors and 
permanently move the function to easier-to-control ground.53  After more than a century and four 
million civilians turned into Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, and Airmen, following generations of New 
Yorkers entering the military (including this author) would get their immunizations and swear their 
oaths at the new Military Entrance Processing Station on the bucolic and secure grounds of Fort 
Hamilton, Brooklyn. 
 
Melville returned to New York from his Midwest training-and-bombing trip the day after the 
Whitehall bombing.54  The morning after his return, October 9th, as he walked up the stairs to his 
and Alpert’s 4th street apartment, Melville encountered Agent Thomas Dowling – who had been 
investigating him since April – and one other FBI man knocking on his door.  Asked if he was 
																																																						
52 “Inductions Shifted to Brooklyn After Blast at Manhattan Center,” New York Times, October 
9th, 1969; and “Bang? Boom!” RAT, October 29th, 1969 
53 “Whitehall St. Center Shuts its Doors,” New York Times, May 18th, 1972 
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Sam Melville, he lied, saying that Melville had moved out some time ago, and – unfortunately for 
him – told Dowling that his name was David McCurdy.55  McCurdy was an alias that he and Alpert 
had fashioned from an illegally-obtained birth certificate,56 and was the name that he had used to 
rent an apartment at 67 East 2nd Street, between First and Second avenues, that was serving as the 
collective’s dynamite storage and bomb construction factory.  The landlord of that building would 
ultimately identify Melville as the tenant he knew as David McCurdy. 
Coincidentally enough, Robin Palmer was also contacted by the FBI that same day.  On 
October 9th, Special Agent Vincent Alvino phoned Palmer at his apartment at 90 Bedford Street in 
the West Village.  Palmer was well-known to the FBI and the NYPD because of informants (very 
likely Demmerle chief among them); known to be a leader in organizations like the Crazies and 
Yippies, and a noted protester in New York “known for his propensity for violence in participating 
in antiwar demonstrations” and was included on the FBI’s “Key Activists Album” that held 
biographical sketches and other information on persons of exceptional interest within the 
movement.57  BOSS also kept tabs on Palmer and regularly shared their information with the FBI.58  
Special Agent Alvino, who was the primary agent who investigated Palmer as a radical protestor 
but who never voiced suspicions that he was involved with the bombings, wanted to speak with 
Palmer in regards to what would become known as the Days of Rage, which had just commenced 
in Chicago; Palmer expressed no interest in speaking with FBI about that or any other issue.  It 
was at least the third time Alvino had attempted to interview Palmer, but that day must have been 
																																																						
55 Testimony of FBI Thomas J. Dowling, January 23rd, 1970; U.S. v. Melville et al, No. 70 CR. 
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especially concerning for him; when he picked up his phone and the FBI was on the other end, just 
a day after the Whitehall bombing, one can only imagine that his heart rate spiked.59 
 
DAYS OF RAGE AND THE MOBE 
 
The bombing at the Whitehall Induction Center was not an insubstantial “action.”  But the 
“Miracle” Mets were on the verge of winning their first World Series, and news from Chicago and 
around the country (and world) was primed to drown out attention to the bombing almost as soon 
as the blast reverberated through the canyons of downtown Manhattan.   
The march toward more extreme political violence had been a part of the Weatherman 
DNA ever since the faction took over SDS in the summer of 1969.  The major protest event (or at 
least Weatherman hoped it would be major) was the “National Action” in Chicago planned for 
October 8th – 11th, 1969.  Weather boldly predicted that tens of thousands would appear in Chicago 
for what would become known as the (Four) Days of Rage.   
It didn’t quite work out that way.  The violence that ensued (mostly on that first night) 
more closely resembled wanton rioting than anything else. The few hundred protestors who 
actually showed up did in fact take unprecedented steps in destroying property in wealthy Chicago 
neighborhoods, and in directly confronting the police, but the well-prepared police dramatically 
outnumbered the protestors and were capable of dishing out much more violence than they were 
																																																						
59 “FBI Report of SA Vincent A. Alvino, ‘Richard Robin Palmer,’ Security Matter – Anarchist,” 
November 21st, 1969; FBI FOIA Case File 100-HQ-417909 
	 195	
subjected to.  Several protestors were shot, beaten, bloodied, and arrested on serious charges, 
creating more a spectacle of violence than a discernable revolutionary movement.60 
Just four days after the Days of Rage concluded, millions around the world took part in the 
October 15th Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam, a series of peaceful marches, protests, and 
demonstrations at hundreds of college campuses and other places organized by the (New) National 
Mobilization Committee (the New Mobe).  The largest of the demonstrations, at Boston Common, 
attracted more than 100,000 demonstrators.61 
 
SCARE CITY 
 
Jane Alpert claims that the Melville collective had debated whether or not to conduct bombings 
around the time of the planned march on Washington on November 15th, what the New York Times 
argues is “believed to be the largest antiwar protest in United States history,” and an 
overwhelmingly peaceful affair.62  The debate was whether or not bombings surrounding the event 
would help or hinder the cause, not a lack of support for the event itself.63  What the collective 
didn’t do, however, was take any cues from Weatherman; it doesn’t appear as if any members of 
the Melville collective (certainly not Melville, Alpert, Hughey, or Swinton) took part in the Days 
of Rage or adjusted the timing of their bombs to avoid the ‘National Action’ in Chicago, or in any 
way support it.  Melville himself, instead of traveling to Chicago to take part in the Days of Rage, 
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left New York City to travel to training sessions with Rap Brown and to conduct his own bombings 
in the Midwest weeks before the Days of Rage, completely separate from the altogether different 
kind of violence the Weatherman faction was initiating in the streets of the Windy City.  Rather 
than the Melville collective taking any cues from Weatherman, it would ultimately prove to be the 
other way around.  
In the end, despite internal differences, some members of the collective decided to conduct 
more bombings in advance of the November 15th March on Washington; in fact, the collective 
pulled off its most dramatic success after midnight when the calendar turned from November 10th 
to the 11th.  Three bombs detonated one after another beginning just after 1:00AM – at the 
Manhattan offices of IBM on the nineteenth floor of the General Motors Building on 5th Avenue 
and 59th Street, at the Chase Manhattan Bank building at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, and the 
twentieth floor offices of Standard Oil at what was then known as the RCA Building at 30 
Rockefeller Plaza.64   
A warning was called into a radio station for the Standard Oil bomb, but the building hadn’t 
yet been evacuated by the time of the explosion – late-night revelers enjoying music by popular 
jazz bandleader Lester Lanin had to be evacuated from the famous Rainbow Room, forty-five 
stories on top of the explosion.  The passenger elevators knocked out by the bomb, the well-heeled 
guests took freight elevators or walked down to the sounds of the band, who in Titanic fashion 
played until the last guest was evacuated.65   
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Heeding the warning before the bomb went off, 1,300 clerks at the Chase Manhattan Bank 
building working in the eighty-story building were evacuated before the explosion, but the bomb 
caused an elevator to fall six floors with a building worker in it before emergency brakes arrested 
the drop; the twenty-six-year old man was unsurprisingly shaken, but he was luckily uninjured.  
The bomb had exploded one floor below the offices of David Rockefeller, the president of the 
bank at the time.66  
Standard Oil had been one of the corporations listed in the earlier communiqué published 
in RAT as a “Hungry Imperialist Corporate Giant.”67  NYPD quickly set up a command center for 
the three bombings at the RCA Building; just a few hours later, at 8:30AM, Chief Seedman 
received a letter from the Associated Press, postmarked the day before and received the morning 
of the bombings.68  The bombs, the letter dictated, were clearly intended to be in support of the 
March on Washington and the other protests going on around the nation and world: 
 
“During this week of anti-war protest, we set off explosives in the offices  
of Chase Manhattan, Standard Oil, and General Motors.  
 
The Vietnam War is only the most obvious evidence of the way this 
country’s power destroys people.  The giant corporations of America have 
now spread themselves all over the world, forcing entire foreign 
economies into total dependence on American money and goods.  Spiro 
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Agnew may be a household word, but it is the rarely seen men, like David 
Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan, James Roche of General Motors and 
Michael Haider of Standard Oil, who run the system behind the scenes.   
 
The empire is breaking down as peoples all over the globe are rising up to  
challenge its power.  From the inside, black people have been fighting a  
revolution for years. 
 
And finally, from the heart of the empire, white Americans too are striking  
blows for liberation.”69 
 
New Yorkers’ nerves were rattled by the bombing spree; the NYPD Bomb Squad was 
overwhelmed with more than 200 false alarms on that single, busy day, including bogus threats to 
the Pan Am building, the New York Stock Exchange, the main Post Office near Herald Square, 
public libraries in Queens, high schools, and a long list of other locations.70  The New York Post 
covered the bombs on the front page in big, bold letters; the New York Times suggested that New 
York was rapidly becoming “Scare City.”71  Mayor Lindsay, phoning in his protest from his 
Barbados vacation home, called the bombings “acts of wanton viciousness.”72 
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The three bombs had occurred on private business locations; it was therefore an NYPD 
case.  Without proof it was the same bombers as the Federal Building and Whitehall Induction 
Center, the bombs did not fall within the jurisdiction of the FBI.  But the coordination and 
communication between the two agencies would in fact escalate, dramatically, that same day.  Just 
hours after the bombs exploded on November 11th, Seedman received word from FBI New York 
office Special Agent in Charge John Malone that an informant had identified the bombers.  
 
DEMMERLE, MELVILLE, & BREAKING THE CASE November 8th – 11th 1969 
 
On Saturday, November 8th, just two days before members of the collective planted their three 
bombs, George Demmerle received an anonymous phone call from someone who asked him to 
meet near his East 1st street apartment.  Intrigued, Demmerle agreed.  When he arrived the man he 
knew only as Sam, who he’d met at Woodstock, was there waiting for him.  Beyond their meeting 
at Woodstock and their common acquaintances – most notably Robin Palmer and Sharon Krebs, 
who Demmerle knew intimately from the Yippies, Crazies, and the Veterans and Reservists to End 
the War in Vietnam (VREWV) – the little else Demmerle knew about Sam was that he had a 
girlfriend by the name of Jane, who he thought worked at RAT.73   
That Demmerle was even in New York City on November 8th was a stroke of bad luck for 
Melville.  The FBI informant had been in Chicago the preceding week as a potential witness in the 
Chicago 8 trial; if called to testify against his friends and colleagues including Jerry Rubin and 
Abbie Hoffman, Demmerle’s cover would have been immediately and forever blown in the most 
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public of fashion.  The U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case, however, after hearing Demmerle’s 
background including his going AWOL while in the military, his former psychiatric therapy, and 
his involvement with the Minutemen, decided against putting him on the stand.  Free to leave 
Chicago, Demmerle returned to New York City on November 6th and capitalized on his time away 
to give others – including, presumably, Melville – the impression that he’d been involved in 
“clandestine activities.”74    
The Melville collective had begun to splinter and fray, according to Alpert, prompting 
Melville to more freely engage others in his plans – just as he had done in the Midwest in 
September, where he conducted the bombings with an individual not even tangentially connected 
to the others in the collective.  Unknowingly sealing his fate, Melville told Demmerle almost the 
whole story, not just about all of the bombs in New York City but also the bombs in the Midwest; 
he also indicated that he was connected to a group in Canada that was responsible for several 
bombings there.  All of the attacks, he told Demmerle, were possible because of the dynamite they 
looted from the Bronx robbery, and that they had about half of it left.75  Fortunately for his 
accomplices, Melville didn’t admit the full extent of who was involved, specifically excluding 
Palmer and Krebs.   
Demmerle, for his part, didn’t actually have any bombings to take credit for, but dropped 
hints that he was involved with “heavy stuff” and that his contacts were involved in bombings in 
Chicago and in New Jersey; it didn’t hurt that his arrest record was well known and that his 
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reputation in the East Village was not insubstantial.76  It also didn’t hurt that he was known to “sit 
at Yippie planning meetings playing with his own toy bombs… and dress up like a dead Green 
Beret” at anti-war rallies.77  According to Alpert, nobody “thought highly of George, though very 
few actually suspected him of being an agent…. No one, not even Sam, who made people nervous 
himself, talked up violence as much as George” who went as far as talking about blowing up the 
Brooklyn Bridge. 78  Seizing on what he must have perceived to be an opportunity and not the trap 
it really was, Sam suggested that their groups could get together.  It was then that Melville invited 
Demmerle to take part in the bombing of U.S. Army trucks with some of the remaining dynamite.  
They agreed to meet at Melville’s apartment on 2nd Street – the David McCurdy apartment and 
bomb factory – on November 12th to prepare the bombs for the action late that night.79   
Demmerle called into the FBI immediately after his conversation with Melville, and was 
soon in the office looking over photographs of individuals named “Sam” in their records; 
Demmerle successfully identified Melville.  Prior to November 8th, Agent Robinson had never 
heard of Sam Melville.  Not only was he not part of the FBI “Bomb Squad” investigating the 
attacks, but he was not involved in the internal security investigations that had been looking into 
Melville that year.80  But he quickly communicated the urgent intelligence to the Bomb Squad.  
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FBI Bomb Squad Commander Joseph Corless then called on Agent Thomas Dowling, who had 
been investigating Melville separately as a result of his activity on the Canadian border, and told 
Dowling that Melville was a suspect in the bombings.  Dowling gave Corless the information he 
had gathered from his own separate investigation – the links to Alpert and Canada and David 
McCurdy and the various addresses all fell into Corless’ lap.81   
 
The Bomb Squad had failed for more than two months to develop any leads on the bombings; the 
internal security investigation, including Agent Dowling, had failed to develop any clues that 
Melville or Alpert were involved in anything illegal, despite taking a close look at them; and 
beyond Demmerle, Melville and his accomplices had managed to keep their secrets from the untold 
number of other informants and undercover agents in and around their community.  But even 
though the Bureau had failed for several months at linking the two cases – the Melville 
investigation and the bomb investigation – now that the two did finally converge, the FBI had a 
wealth of information on Melville to work with.  The links between FBI political intelligence and 
the counterterrorism investigation were being put together.  As had been becoming the norm, it 
was ultimately an infiltrator who cracked a terrorism case in New York City.  The Bureau quickly 
developed an undercover surveillance team to monitor the suspects, bringing in a number of 
additional FBI agents from other divisions to round out the now-robust operation.82 
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Even before the bombs were planted late on the night of November 10th, FBI surveillance 
had commenced.83  In one close call for the investigation, FBI Special Agent Richard Roberts, 
who had commenced his surveillance of the ‘David McCurdy’ apartment at 67 East 2nd street early 
on the afternoon of November 10th, was in the building foyer trying to ascertain which apartment 
#48 was – the apartment where the bomb factory was.  While he was loitering there, a white male 
entered the foyer and rang the buzzer for the apartment in question.  When a voice asked who it 
was, the white male responded “Dave.”  It was Hughey, carrying a large wrapped package.  He 
was buzzed in, barely taking note of what he thought must have been a homeless person in a 
neighborhood full of them.84  Ultimately, the surveillance dragnet was too little, too late, to catch 
the collective in the act of the triple bombings that night, but they felt certain they had their 
suspects. 
The surveillance of the suspects in the East Village continued on November 11th, and in 
fact increased in the wake of the triple bombings and now that NYPD detectives had joined the 
effort; when FBI SAC Malone filled Chief Seedman in on what he knew of Sam Melville and Jane 
Alpert on the morning of the 11th, the two men decided to conduct a joint NYPD – FBI surveillance 
operation of the suspects.85   
Seedman had been granted authorization by NYPD Chief of Detectives Fred Lussen to 
increase the size of his bomb investigation team to twenty-five full time detectives in the wake of 
the triple bombings.  This increased contingent of undercover policemen joined an equal size of 
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undercover FBI agents in quickly fanning out across the Lower East Side in teams of two, three, 
and four.  The surveillance teams had been instructed that morning to watch the comings and 
goings of the suspects, but not to make any arrests.  Some loitered, dressed as drunks, near the 
doorways of the 2nd street bomb factory; some near the 4th street apartment; others took up perches 
in parked cars nearby; some roared by on Harley Davidson choppers in full East Village costume, 
presumably fitting in well enough with the notorious Hell’s Angels local chapter just a block 
away.86  Two FBI men took over a storefront air-conditioning repair shop directly across from 
entrance to 235 East 4th street, scratching out peepholes in the blacked-out windows.87  From their 
surveillance post in a parked car, two other agents kept eyes on the front door and the suspect’s 
apartments – even though it was November, the windows were open and the curtains drawn back, 
and they watched Melville, Hughey, Alpert, Swinton, and one other unidentified white male 
through their binoculars.88 
 
NOVEMBER 12TH, 1969 
 
On the evening of November 12th, not even forty-eight hours after the triple bombing early the 
previous morning, Seedman received an urgent call that a bomb had exploded on the fifth floor of 
the Criminal Courts Building, not a half-mile in a direct line down Centre Street from NYPD 
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headquarters.  The policemen calling Seedman from Headquarters told him that he’d heard the 
explosion himself. 89  The bomb, hidden in a men’s room, ruptured pipes and ripped steel doors 
from their hinges, sending gushing water and shattered windows raining down on the darkened 
lower Manhattan street.  With only a handful of night clerks and only one session of Night Court, 
nobody was injured.90  In discussion with Jeremy Varon decades later, Robin Palmer claimed to 
have personally carried the briefcase with the bomb into the court building.91  
The choice of target was not random; as with other targets, the collective made a political 
statement with this one.  The Criminal Courts Building was where the trial of the Panther 21 was 
currently ongoing.  Picking up the baton of this particular bombing, Weather Underground would 
bomb the house of Judge Murtagh, the presiding judge of the case, just a few months later in 
February of 1970.   
The Criminal Courts bomb was the fourth successful bombing by the collective members 
in less than forty-eight hours.  The pace, the target selection, the atmosphere of fear and the strain 
placed upon police resources to respond to the chorus of false bomb threats being phoned in, had 
all escalated dramatically.  And it all happened under the nose of the FBI and NYPD, who were 
pretty sure they knew who the bombers were.  But despite the escalation, or perhaps because of it, 
the endgame was approaching.   
 
The 69th Regiment Armory on Lexington Avenue between 25th and 26th streets was then, and is 
still now, a striking and notable structure in a neighborhood full of them, including the also-
landmarked New York Life Building.  The Armory has housed the Army National Guard regiment 
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– “The Fighting 69th,” one of the most decorated National Guard units in the country – since the 
building was completed in 1906.  The Armory has long pulled double-duty, hosting cultural and 
sporting events in addition to its service as a military headquarters.  During the 1960s it even hosted 
several home games for the New York Knicks basketball team.92  The Armory is also distinct in 
its civilian neighborhood for the particular type of vehicles constantly found ringing it.  Then and 
now, the streets along Lexington Avenue, 25th street, and 26th street are constantly lined with 
military jeeps and troop transport trucks parked bumper to bumper.   
As Melville and Demmerle moved toward the Armory, the intended target for the night’s 
action, as many as twenty-five FBI and NYPD undercover agents shadowed and kept a close eye 
on the suspects, including at least one FBI agent who was looking down on the scene from the top 
floor of the Armory.93  
Agent Joseph Corless, head of the FBI “Bomb Squad,” was at HQ listening to walkie-talkie 
transmissions of agents keeping Melville under surveillance.94  Before the agents and detectives 
saw Melville place the explosives in the army trucks – what they knew from Demmerle to be his 
plan – the order to move in and arrest Melville and Demmerle came over walkie-talkie by Corless.  
There were so many undercover law enforcement officers that the crowd choked off 26th street 
between Lexington and Park Avenue South when they converged on Melville to make the arrest.  
Agents found him carrying a loaded .38 revolver, a tear gas gun, and a knapsack with a notebook 
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and two dynamite time bombs.95  Pressing his face against the wall, they demanded to know if 
there were any other bombs set to go off; Melville responded that they were not set to go off until 
4:00AM, nearly six hours away.  Sam Melville would never know freedom again.96 
According to Alpert, Melville was somewhat surprised to find that the trucks had been 
parked alongside the residential side of 26th street between Lexington Avenue and Park Avenue 
South – across the narrow street from the Armory.  He didn’t want to cause injury to people who 
lived in those buildings or who might be walking alongside the trucks, and decided to abandon the 
plan, and that was when the FBI and NYPD undercover men moved in on him.  In any case, he 
was arrested with the two bombs on his person, not in the trucks.  This fact might have impacted 
the strength of the case against him and been one of the factors that ultimately lead to the deal that 
he, Hughey, and Alpert would ultimately get from the federal prosecutor. 
  
During the briefings that had been held at the FBI New York office early on the afternoon of 
November 12th, the Agents were told that at least Alpert, Hughey, and Swinton were thought to be 
part of the conspiracy, and that there was probably a good portion of the Explo dynamite left over 
and it might be at any of the apartments in question – two apartments on East 4th street, and the 
“David McCurdy” bomb factory apartment on East 2nd street.97  After Demmerle and Melville 
were arrested, at nearly 10:00PM, FBI “Bomb Squad” leader Joseph Corless instructed his 
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subordinate agents to arrest the others and search their apartments for anything that could be a 
public hazard, especially the remaining dynamite or any more constructed bombs.98 A variety of 
dangerous scenarios cycled through Corless’s mind as his agents prepared to move on the suspects. 
By about 10:30PM enough agents and NYPD detectives had converged on East 4th street 
to affect the arrest, and they moved on #2D, the apartment Alpert and Melville shared.  There, 
Alpert and Hughey were arrested without incident.99 
Swinton, as luck would have it, was on a date at the time and had been away from her fifth 
floor apartment in the same building all day.  She evaded capture and became a fugitive when she 
was tipped off to the arrests.  Going underground, she would not resurface until 1975, when she 
was arrested in Brattleboro, Vermont. 
In the apartment, agents found an envelope stuffed with what they called “guerilla leaflets” 
and tear gas cartridges, along with wire cutters, a wallet with “David McCurdy” papers, and a 1969 
Hagstrom’s New York City atlas, a popular street map of the city that, when unfolded, is several 
feet long and clearly illustrated all of the streets where they had placed bombs.  The FBI also found 
a TM 5-725 Department of the Army Technical Manual for rigging explosive devices, and a binder 
notebook open to a diagram of the RCA building, the site of a bombing not two days prior.100 
As NYPD detectives and FBI Agents swarmed into 235 East 4th street, they also moved 
into Melville’s “David McCurdy” apartment on the sixth floor of 67 East 2nd street.  But instead 
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of finding suspects like they did on 4th street, they instead found a bomb factory and armory – the 
remaining Explo dynamite, blasting caps, primer cord, live grenades, Westclox alarm clocks 
identical to the ones used in the time bombs, batteries, three rifles, and tools for building the 
bombs.101  They even found a recent copy of the New York Post whose headline and lead story 
discussed the collective’s recent bombings.102  They evacuated the building and surrounding area 
and NYPD Bomb Squad detectives secured the explosives.  They were having a busy day; NYPD 
Bomb Squad was also responsible for securing the explosives found on the suspects at the 
Armory.103  
Despite knowing for more than forty-eight hours of the addresses of the various apartments 
the conspirators lived in and used on East 2nd and East 4th streets, the FBI had failed to request, 
much less obtain, search warrants for the premises.  Defended as an emergency search because of 
the danger to the public that explosives posed, this would become an issue at trial.  Melville’s 
attorney William Crain would later attempt to have all of the evidence found at the apartments 
suppressed as evidence, arguing that since there was never a search warrant for the apartments, the 
items were the fruits of an illegal search.  The court disagreed; Judge Milton Pollack found that it 
was “beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an emergency that fully warranted a search of this 
apartment on a forthwith basis and without any delay whatsoever, including a delay which would 
be incident to obtaining a warrant.”104   
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Years after the arrests, Alpert – then on the run and underground – expressed her continuing 
animosity for the authorities: “The pigs reported the arrest to the media as if it were the result of 
months of masterful sleuthing.  In fact Sam couldn’t have made it simpler for them.”105  Her 
arrogance and dismissiveness are off the mark.  The Bureau, like NYPD, had intentionally and 
extensively developed informants and infiltrators for exactly the purpose Demmerle served here; 
that he was in Melville’s orbit was not a mistake.  Also, by following up on the previous political 
activist activity including the intended trip to Cuba, the Bureau had developed an interest in 
Melville; an interest and intelligence gathering that was usually political policing, but in this case 
as in others yielded them a group of terrorists.  
 
EXPOSING AN INFORMANT 
 
George Demmerle was arrested along with Melville on the night of November 12th in order to 
protect his cover as an FBI informant.  Brought in handcuffs to a small room on the ninth floor of 
the FBI New York office on 69th street, the star informant met with his handler, Special Agent 
Robinson, as the clock approached midnight.106  Demmerle had performed exceptionally well and 
both the FBI and the NYPD were pleased.  He would remain in jail another five or six nights in 
order to try to protect his cover (which was ultimately blown) and to perhaps gather additional 
information from Melville while they were incarcerated together (it didn’t work – Melville instead 
physically threatened him when it became apparent Demmerle had informed on him).  
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Demmerle’s unmasking as an FBI informant sent waves through the New York City radical 
left community.  His street cred in the movement was well-established, but the denunciation of 
Demmerle came fast and furious once his true role became apparent.  Publications from RAT to 
the Village Voice echoed what must have been a common refrain in Manhattan’s East Village those 
days, that Demmerle was an disturbed lunatic and a traitor to those who trusted in him; “…crazy 
George Demmerle, a notably unstable human being, a police agent, and a refugee from mental 
institutions and the Minutemen,” as RAT not-so-lovingly referred to him as.107  In his memoir, 
Jerry Rubin recollected that the day after the arrests: “I read that George was released without bail 
on the prosecution’s motion and he was going to testify for the government. My heart stopped.  I 
felt so shitty. George’s emergence as an FBI informer ... dealt a temporary blow to the freaky 
movement in New York.”108  
Demmerle might have even been the subject of more than just harsh and unkind words; not 
able to stay at his own home during the trial, he was put up by the Bureau at the Hotel Margarite 
in Brooklyn.  When several suspicious fires broke out, including one in a broom closet directly 
across from his room, he was moved again.109  Demmerle eventually went on to quietly collect a 
$25,000 award from the Marine Midland Bank for aiding in Melville’s capture and conviction, 
and his cover permanently blown, he ceased to be a paid FBI informant by February of 1970, and 
by 1972 had left New York for Alabama, where he remained for most of the 1970s; he worked for 
a number of years as a private investigator with the Burns Detective Agency, and eventually drifted 
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to the Dallas-Fort Worth area.110  By the time journalist David Bonner met him in 1993, Demmerle 
“was living the life of a small-time artist, creating weblike installations out of some sort of 
synthetic material, upon which he would project multicolored lights… Occasionally, he would 
have an art exhibit, showing up dressed as Prince Crazy... He was a regular at anti-war and other 
protest rallies…”  Never quite sure, it seems, if Prince Crazy or FBI Informant was the real him, 
George Demmerle passed away in October of 2007.111  
 
THE COURT CASE 
 
The case initially went to Federal Court (Southern District of New York) before District Judge 
Milton Pollock.  Melville’s pre-trial testimony began on December 31st, 1969, the very last day of 
the decade; pointing out that the Melville collective ushered in the end of the 1960s is perhaps 
trite, but unmistakably true.112    
As soon as pre-trial proceedings commenced, the defendants found themselves in an 
exceptionally hostile environment; exceedingly more so than the Cuban Power defendants, for 
instance, who were then still working their way through the legal system toward a soft landing.  
Bail for Melville was initially set at an insurmountable half-million dollars; after it was eventually 
lowered to fifty-thousand dollars the amount was surprisingly raised by the New York movement, 
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only to be denied by the court and his bail doubled; the court ultimately demanded Melville be 
held in preventative detention – remanded in custody without bail as a threat to the public – a 
maneuver that legal observers at the time had never seen applied in a non-capital case.113  
Seemingly reasonable objections and motions raised by the defense were routinely and uniformly 
ruled out by Judge Pollack.  At one point during pre-trial proceedings in January, William Crain 
protested what was practically an interrogation of his client by Judge Pollack: “Your Honor, at this 
point I would have to ask that the prosecuting attorney, the Assistant United States Attorney, do 
the cross-examination of the witness and not the Judge.”  Pollock did not take kindly to Crain’s 
objection and curtly defended his capacity to do just that.  But he had no more questions for 
Melville, in any case.114  
 
As the court proceedings began, mainstream publications like the New York Times, Newsweek, and 
TIME praised the authorities for bringing an end to the terrorist bombing campaign.  The 
underground press, however, projected a much more complicated reaction.  RAT, unsurprisingly, 
became intimately involved; publisher and editor Jeff Shero found himself in “the strange role of 
justifying” the bombings; “explaining why people might bomb the corporate headquarters of 
Amerikan (sic) industrial giants.”  RAT went on, in a separate piece, to do just that – justify the 
bombing of the courthouse that “flushes away the men and women who are dysfunctional…” the 
induction center that “takes the men who are needed in Amerika’s wars…” and the Federal 
Building that is “the embodiment of Amerikan government, spreading its bureaucratic pall over 
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the nation” not to mention the private “office buildings and corporate headquarters where the 
business of the Amerikan empire is carried out.”115  Alpert remained on staff at RAT and was 
variably given tongue-in-cheek titles on the masthead like “Headliner of the Week” and 
“Publicity.”  Film screenings were held to raise money, publicized by the paper – one showing 
Emile de Antonio’s Vietnam War documentary In the Year of the Pig and the most heralded of all 
revolutionary films, The Battle of Algiers.116  RAT called on readers to send “anything and 
everything you can” to the defense fund.117  
The East Village Other, just days after the arrests and after the massive November 15th 
March on Washington, published a special issue in conjunction with RAT exploring the dramatic 
news of the week.  RAT, having been dropped by its city distributor in the wake of the indictments 
and arrests of its staff members, could use all the help it could get, and it got considerable support 
from East Village Other.  In the pages of Other, Jeff Shero similarly justified the rationale behind 
the bombings while still arguing that innocence of his friends and colleagues: “If the bombings are 
a rational act of people morally outraged with the US government’s role in the world, then there 
will be no end to the bombings until moral outrage disappears… if Jane Alpert is guilty, then the 
American people are a time bomb.”118  Even if only by publishing articles written by their 
competitors, the much-more-mainstream East Village Other was going on record in support of the 
bombers and their actions.   
Supporters also came out in droves to the court proceedings to support the defendants, once 
even protesting so loudly that Judge Pollack was forced to adjourn for several hours and threatened 
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to clear the courtroom if any further outbursts occurred.119  The radical left anti-war community, 
especially the core of the movement centered in and around the East Village, was squarely in 
support of the Melville collective.  RAT emphatically proclaimed in January of 1970 “Powerful 
our love, power in our will to fight, freedom in our energy.  Sam Melville is free.”120 
Melville, himself, mostly exhibited self-restraint during the proceedings, electing to not 
use the assembled media to make a soapbox out of the courtroom, save perhaps one notable 
occasion when he called Judge Pollack a “jackass” in open court.121  Other than one or two similar 
outbursts from Alpert – one when a motion to lower Melville’s bail was denied: “That was the 
decision of a wealthy fascist!” she shouted122 – it was a mostly civilized affair.  Jane Alpert and 
David Hughey, out on bail while Melville remained in prison, became movement celebrities while 
waiting for the trial to commence.  And it is clear that Melville himself was contemplating a way 
out rather than submission to the system; a surprise shake-down of his cell in the Manhattan 
Detention Complex (affectionately known as “The Tombs”) prior to the opening of the case 
revealed a dynamite blast escape plan he intended to mail to an unknown conspirator on the 
outside;123 Melville, it seems, had a reputation to uphold: “My French cellmate, who speaks no 
English, calls me ‘boom boom.’”124  In March, he overpowered, gagged, and bound (with his own 
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belt and tie) the single U.S. Marshall guarding him at the courthouse, only to be recaptured at 
gunpoint two floors below, just as he approached an exit door leading to the street.125   
Along with the other defendants’ attorneys, Jane Alpert’s attorney Sanford Katz tried 
repeatedly and vigorously to get the court to dismiss (or at the very least delay) the proceedings 
because, he argued, the defendants could not receive a fair trial given the government and police 
leaks to the press about the case, the tremendous coverage in the press, and certainly given the 
atmosphere; “…a hysteria, a fear…” permeating New York City as 1970 continued and the 
bombings in the city escalated.126   Judge Pollack did, in fact, delay the trial on March 13th 1970, 
just one week before it was begin; it was impossible to deny that recent events would not have an 
impact.127  Authorities were still combing through the wreckage and sorting the evidence and body 
parts in the wake of the massive Weather Underground townhouse explosion on March 6th; a series 
of corporate office bombings by a group calling itself “Revolutionary Force 9” – bombings 
strikingly similar to those committed by the Melville collective – kept New York City on edge the 
following week.  Thinking the group might be linked to the Melville collective, the Bureau 
conducted exhaustive handwriting, fingerprint, and typewriter analysis on the communique 
received by the new group but could not develop any links.128  On March 9th, two associates of 
Rap Brown were killed when a bomb they were transporting to the courthouse where Brown was 
to stand trial exploded in the front seat of their car; the next day, the original venue for Brown’s 
trial in Maryland was bombed, and then Brown himself went underground.  Defense Attorney 
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Crain argued “[t]he Rap Brown bombing has been on the front pages for two days.  The townhouse 
bombing has been on the front page for four days.  It will indeed continue on the front page at least 
until Mr. Brown appears and I think probably beyond that.”129  John Doyle, III, the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney prosecuting the trial, in fact agreed that the climate was charged, but used this ‘new 
normal’ to argue for continuance; “I am afraid that we are living in a period when the actions of 
persons resulting in bombings and the trials that result from those actions are not infrequent.  And 
it is difficult to say that the public consciousness of these trials is going to be diminished in any 
significant way in the near future.”130  The “gigantic” year of bombings, to use Police 
Commissioner Howard Leary’s term, was unfolding. 
The new start date for the trial was set for April 29th, 1970, and Judge Pollack assured all 
concerned that, regardless of what bombings may occur, there would be no further delay.  But the 
case would never make it before a jury.  Alpert and John Cohen argue that the government did not 
want a long and costly trial and that the cases against her and Hughey were flimsy; all parties 
agreed to a plea deal where Melville would serve at least fifteen years and Alpert and Hughey 
would serve five each.  The sentences, as previously discussed, were far in excess of those handed 
out to the Cuban Power terrorists the following year.  Melville, Alpert, and Hughey plead guilty 
to the charges as outlined in the deal on May 4th, 1970.131 
Defending their decision to take a plea, a decision that some in the movement considered 
tantamount to surrender, Alpert argued in a piece published in RAT that “[t]here are no battles to 
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be won in the courts of the enemy.  It’s only a question of getting off as soon as you can, as easily 
as you can.”132  After sticking around to plead guilty on May 4th, she immediately went 
underground as a fugitive, linking up with Weather Underground and eventually Pat Swinton along 
the way.133  Melville, Alpert claims, was pleased that he could get out before being too old.134  No 
matter, Melville explained to his ex-wife Ruth, because the corrupt government wouldn’t even last 
that long: “15 years means i could be eligible for parole in about 5 to 7 years. i’m not down about 
it though – the system won’t last even that long.”135  In another letter, this one to John Cohen, Sam 
explained his sentence: “predicted total time: 15 yrs (they haven’t got it to give).136 
David Hughey’s bail was immediately rescinded when Alpert disappeared for fear he 
would also take flight; he would serve two years in prison as a Young Adult Offender before being 
sentenced to monitored probation, but spend several more months in prison for contempt of court 
for refusing to testify in the case against Pat Swinton after she was arrested in Vermont in 1975.137  
Demmerle did take the stand in her trial, claiming that he couldn’t identify Swinton as the same 
person he knew to have discussed violence and guns at Revolutionary Contingent meetings in 
1967.138  Tired of a life on the run, Alpert would turn herself in in 1975 and serve a twenty-seven 
month sentence. 
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At the sentencing proceedings on June 19th, 1970, Judge Milton Pollack read into the 
official court record a statement “commending the Federal Bureau of Investigation for its 
outstanding and efficient work;”139  Director Hoover himself responded to Pollack on July 1st, 
1970, with a personal letter thanking “My dear judge” for his kind words,140 as did New York 
office Assistant Director in Charge John Malone.141  The defendants and defense counsel would 
exchange no such pleasantries with His Honor.  Sam Melville, upon hearing Pollock announce his 
sentence, responded with a clenched fist “radical salute” and was taken off to the Tombs.142  
 
FBI AND NYPD COORDINATION 
 
The FBI pleasantries didn’t just extend to Judge Pollack.  Even before the court proceedings started 
– in fact just a day after the initial arrests occurred – the FBI commended the “splendid team work 
between the informant and the Agent (Robinson) handling him” as well as “the vast joint 
surveillance operation directed at the operation… the coordination and cooperation of the New 
York City Police and the FBI in this operation were truly of the very highest character…”143 
 The close working relationship between FBI and NYPD in matters of political subversion 
and reemerging terrorist threats had been, in recent years, most closely characterized by the 
coordination between FBI and the NYPD Bureau of Special Services.  That relationship, so evident 
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as recently as the Minutemen and Cuban Power plots, was noticeably absent in 1969; instead of 
with BOSS, the FBI coordinated with Chief of Detectives for Southern Manhattan Albert 
Seedman.   
It was Seedman’s detectives who continued the investigation, even after it was discovered 
to be clearly political and “subversive” – the core of BOSS’s work.  It was Seedman’s detectives 
who conducted the joint surveillance with FBI, not detectives from BOSS.  Beyond the several 
NYPD Detectives and Bomb Squad members involved in the arrests, several, including Captain 
Bob McLaughlin and Seedman, were present at the FBI office that night – none, it seems, from 
BOSS.  Seedman was invited into the interrogation room with Melville on the night of his arrest –  
not William Knapp, the formerly ever-present Commanding Officer of BOSS.   
Given the role that BOSS played as an intelligence unit (and not criminal) first and 
foremost, it is certainly possible that since the Melville collective investigation actually started 
with a crime (i.e., the ambiguous bombing of the United Fruit Pier) the case shifted to other units 
in the Detective Division; it was not until August 29th, a month after the pier bombing and nine 
days after the Marine Midland bomb, that the political nature was discovered in the pages of RAT.    
This may seem a distinction without a difference; the robust cooperation between FBI and 
NYPD continued, regardless of which division within NYPD this cooperation manifested within.  
But that the Police Department’s robust intelligence operation, tasked so recently with the political 
policing activities that Frank Donner discusses, a beneficiary of intelligence training from CIA, 
was a nonfactor in the such a high-profile and ongoing campaign of what were clearly political 
bombings, is worth exploration.   
It must be taken into account that the highly public, and highly controversial, Panther 21 
case was working its way through the justice system for the entire duration of the Melville 
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collective activities.  The Bureau of Special Services was the lynchpin in that case – in the 
infiltration, investigation, and indictment of the Panther 21 defendants.  BOSS undercover officers 
Gene Roberts, Carlos Ashwood, and Ralph White were all key to the prosecution.  The indictments 
against the original twenty-one (later reduced to thirteen) defendants were issued in early April of 
1969, just as Melville and Alpert were helping the FLQ fugitives plot their eventual hijacking.144  
Pretrial proceedings, arrests, leaks, press coverage, mass demonstrations at court, and other 
dramatics persisted all the way until the opening of the trial in January of 1970 – just as the Melville 
collective case was going through its own pretrial dramatics.  Given the sensitivity surrounding 
the Panther trial, an increasingly hostile public sentiment toward the police department following 
episodes like the 1968 Columbia protest and the Stonewall Inn raid and riots in June 1969 – just 
weeks before the first Melville collective bomb – and the ongoing friction with City Hall, it is 
perhaps understandable that BOSS was sidelined in the Melville investigation even when it became 
apparent that the bombings were political in nature.145  Whatever the specific reason during the 
Melville investigation, that BOSS would be further sidelined just as terrorism was coming into 
much greater focus in New York City, and ultimately done away with just as proponents such as 
Anthony Bouza argue they were needed most, is a historical fact that will be discussed in the 
coming chapters. 
 
On the other side of this federal-municipal cooperation, and in a measure of consistency with recent 
cases, the centrality of George Demmerle in the capture of the Melville collective illustrates that 
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undercover operatives and infiltrators remained the most effective method of countering terrorism 
not just for NYPD but also for the FBI.  And despite a vast domestic intelligence capability and 
robust infiltration and informant operations, there remained in 1969 no specific terrorism or 
counterterrorism training or organizational capacity within the Bureau to investigate bombings or 
clandestine terrorist groups – BOSS seemed to naturally take on that role for NYPD, but once 
subversion moved into the realm of terrorism the Bureau responded in a more fluid, if improvised, 
fashion.  As discussed, agents were culled from various Bureau functions including bank robbery 
to work on the “Bomb Squad,” the ad-hoc task force established to investigate the Melville 
collective.  A similar ad-hoc response to Weather Underground would soon emerge, with long 
lasting consequence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The NYPD and FBI cooperation exhibited in the apprehension of the Melville collective illustrates 
a particular point in time that found the emerging prioritization to counter terrorists, the sidelining 
of NYPD’s BOSS, and the continuing emphasis and reliance by both organizations on using 
informants and infiltrators in combatting politically motivated violence.  Despite the setbacks that 
both organizations would suffer throughout the 1970s – the impact of the fallout from the Panther 
13 case and a number of scandals, the FBI investigation of Weather Underground, COINTELPRO, 
and other episodes in the history of these organizations discussed in later chapters – the 
counterterrorism cooperation between the two organizations would continue and in fact be further 
formalized just a decade later with the creation of the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force 
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(JTTF) in 1980, the first of what are today more than 100 such JTTFs throughout the nation.146  
Those institutions, cornerstones of the massive domestic counterterrorism infrastructure we know 
today, grew out of the informal, ad-hoc, but usually close cooperation between the agencies in 
New York City cases such as the investigation of the Melville collective.   
The FBI, correctly, never believed that Melville, Alpert, Hughey, and Swinton were the 
entire cast of characters involved in the bombing collective; “[t]here was some indication that the 
aforementioned individuals did not compromise the entire group involved in the bombings as early 
as 1970.  [Demmerle] reported that Melville described such a group, but [Demmerle] never met 
this group.”147  In the coming years, the Bureau interviewed possible candidates for the collective, 
and they inspected various apartments that may have been previously unknown locations of the 
group’s meetings, including in an apartment building on Perry Street in Manhattan’s West Village 
that Alpert claimed meetings had been held in.  Yet, for all of their efforts, by 1975 the FBI 
acknowledged that “…the aforementioned investigation has failed to identify any member of the 
group; in fact, it has not even provided any good suspects…  NY Office has all but exhausted leads 
concerning the 1969 bombing group.”148  In the case of at least Sharon Krebs and Robin Palmer, 
the failure to identify, indict, and arrest members of the collective meant that these persons would 
go on to join groups continuing the trend of terrorism in New York City as the “gigantic” year 
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rolled on, and, notably, with the group most associated with that period in American history – the 
Weather Underground.   
Weather, the unknown members of Revolutionary Force 9, and others within the radical 
left movement in New York City and around the nation were certainly contemplating similar 
actions to what the Melville collective assertively carried out in the middle to end of 1969.  And 
they had templates to mimic in the actions of those like Cuban Power, albeit from the opposite end 
of the political spectrum.  But as Jeremy Varon argues, Sam Melville and his collective “…caused 
New York radicals to speculate about who had so boldly turned talk of revolutionary violence into 
action.”149  Newsweek echoed the same sentiment just weeks after the arrests, arguing that the 
Melville collective “became the first white ‘revolutionaries’ accused of going beyond rhetoric and 
confrontation to the tactics of outright terrorism…  
 
“New York has had its share of mad bombers before, but what made the latest series 
of explosions all the more ominous was the message that accompanied them… 
letters to the press followed, linking the sabotage to the whole current catalogue of 
radical causes from the war in Vietnam and corporate “imperialism” to free love 
and legalized marijuana.”150 
 
Newsweek makes an important point here.  Instances of terrorist plots and even attacks had 
alarmingly reemerged in New York City over the past few years, including most prominently those 
discussed in this study.  But that the loud and highly visible radical left protest movement – largely, 
																																																						
149 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 118 
150 “Terrorism: The House on Fourth Street,” Newsweek, November 24th, 1969 
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the “white” kids that Newsweek points out – had turned to terrorism was a disconcerting 
development.  Cumulatively, it would make for the most prolific space and time of terrorism in 
American history.    
Weatherman was discussing, debating, and considering an approach while Sam Melville 
more simply saw in the FLQ (and perhaps Cuban Power) a model and a path he appreciated, and 
he adopted it.  While those in the movement fiercely debated the openly-confrontational direction 
that Weatherman was taking SDS – leaving many former supporters, SDS members, and even 
Weather faction members. on the outside disdainfully looking in – there is very little contemporary 
internal criticism of the Melville collective to point to.  There is, in fact, a great deal of admiration 
that precedes the emulation that would soon follow.  In one of the final issues of RAT to be 
published, a staff writer would recall: 
 
“Our first reactions to the early bombings by Jane Alpert, Sam Melville and David 
Hughey was RIGHT ON.  We were exhilarated.  It had finally happened.  The war 
had come home and reality had been altered for the entire country.  Revolution was 
no longer an exotic word or thing that occurred abroad, but was happening right 
here – at home.  People, in and out of the movement, had to deal with the fact that 
the children of white middle class Amerika (sic) had crossed that line – 
irrevocably.”  151 
 
																																																						
151 “Wither Weatherman? (all power to the imagination!),” RAT Subterranean News, September 
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The Melville collective, in emulation of the Canadian fugitives it had learned a great deal from, 
offered an approach that others, many who knew them personally, would soon follow.  As Varon 
observes, while Weatherman was “talking boldly of its desire to wage an all-out guerrilla war, the 
New York collective engaged strictly in what it dubbed ‘pacifist bombings.’  Attacking property 
only, and, after the Marine Midland explosion, issuing warnings to prevent injury, it pioneered a 
style of attack that would only later become Weatherman’s signature.”152  
 
 
  
																																																						
152 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 121 
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PART III: A DECADE OF TERROR 
Chapter 8 : The Weather Underground
 
 
  
	 228	
 
Today, it might be easy to walk down West 11th street between Fifth and Sixth avenues and not 
take note of the fact that one townhouse – number 18 – is considerably more modern than the row 
of nineteenth century townhouses that flank it on both sides.  Where the others have cornices, 
graceful wood window frames, and other Federal-style exterior details tightly governed by the 
New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, number 18 is sleek, angular and minimalist; 
distinctly mid-late twentieth century.  Barely notable today as an architectural oddity on the 
beautiful Greenwich Village block, 18 West 11th street is perhaps the most distinct of the non-
distinct markers that New York City and the nation entered into a new era of terrorism as the long 
Sixties progressed.1   
At just about noon on March 6th, 1970, a massive explosion burst from the basement of the 
townhouse, blowing out the façade of the building and even walls of adjoining buildings – one 
which actor Dustin Hoffman and his then-wife lived in – and shattering windows up and down the 
block.  A virtual army of firefighters and police officers arrived within minutes to find rubble and 
debris spread across the street and flames higher than the adjoining roofs; gas lines ruptured by the 
first massive explosion soon caused at least two smaller explosions.2   
As the dust began to settle and the fire was finally extinguished, the human cost of the 
explosion began to come into focus.  The bodies of three members of a New York City collective 
of the Weather Underground – Ted Gold, Diana Oughton, and Terry Robins – were found and 
identified in coming weeks.  At first, before the identities of the badly-mangled bodies, or of the 
																																																						
1 Bernadine Dohrn, a Weather Underground leader, acknowledged “[t]he story of what happened 
there [at the townhouse] really is the history of the whole organization,” when speaking to 
filmmaker Emile de Antonio in the documentary Underground in 1975. 
2 Douglas Robinson, “Townhouse Razed by Blast and Fire; Man’s Body Found,” New York 
Times, March 7th, 1970 
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two young women who escaped the explosion injured and in tatters (later discovered to be Kathy 
Boudin and Cathy Wilkerson, whose father owned the townhouse) were discovered, authorities 
believed that Melville collective member Pat Swinton, then underground and on the run, had 
perhaps been one of the dead victims or young women who disappeared.3  The source of the 
explosion that killed the three young Weathermen, it was quickly discovered, caused great alarm 
to the authorities responsible for investigating the explosion, including NYPD Chief Albert 
Seedman.  A massive cache of dynamite and partially-constructed bombs packed with roofing 
nails was found in the rubble, complicating the long cleanup and razing of the demolished 
townhouse.  “The people in the house were obviously putting together components of a bomb,” 
Seedman told the press, “and they did something wrong.”4  Barely a year and a half earlier, in the 
midst of the Cuban Power investigation, an NYPD Bomb Squad member had speculated that, if 
terrorists keep “setting [bombs] off, somebody’s eventually going to be killed and very often it’s 
the people who are making the bombs.”  His prediction had come true in grisly fashion.5   
Years after the explosion, it was revealed that a dance for non-commissioned officers and 
their dates at the nearby Army base at Fort Dix, New Jersey, the night after the explosion, was the 
intended target.6  Fort Dix, not coincidentally, was a hub of GI resistance to the war, and happened 
to be by far the largest military installation in close proximity (about seventy miles) to New York 
																																																						
3 Mike Pearl and Cy Egan, “New Angle in Village Blast,” The New York Post, March 11th, 1970 
4 Douglas Robinson, “Bombs, Dynamite, and Woman’s Body Found in Ruins of 11th St. 
Townhouse,” New York Times, March 11th, 1970 
5 “Cubans in Exile, A Deadly Way to Make a Point,” New York Times, July 21st, 1968 
6 Now openly admitted by several Weather members including Mark Rudd in memoirs and 
elsewhere, that the target of the bomb was the dance at Fort Dix was first mentioned, according 
to Arthur Eckstein, by Peter Collier and David Horowitz, editors, in “Doing It: The Rise and Fall 
of the Weather Underground,” in Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts about the Sixties 
(New York: Free Press, 1987) 
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City.  More than a hundred GI’s, many imprisoned for refusal to take part in the war effort, had 
rioted in June and the key figures, the “Fort Dix 38” as they would become known, emerged as an 
anti-war movement cause célèbre.  Civilian protestors numbering as many as four to six thousand, 
including Columbia University student veterans of the protests there, Young Lords, and Black 
Panthers, marched onto the base on October 12th, 1969, just five days after the Melville collective 
bombed the Whitehall Armed Forces Induction Center in lower Manhattan.7  Members of the 
Weather Townhouse collective had been actively involved in the planning for the Fort Dix protest 
march, and strongly advocated for a militant East Coast Days of Rage-like action at the Army base, 
but after that event in Chicago (that ended the day before the Fort Dix protest) they were precluded 
from taking part in what ended up being an overwhelmingly peaceful event at the base.8   
The Fort Dix protest march was arranged by movement organizers who opened a pop-up 
coffeehouse just outside the base gates in Wrightstown, New Jersey, that despite constant 
harassment from local and military police, became something of an oasis for soldiers to get away 
from base and relax, listen to music, and read Shakedown and other anti-war GI publications they 
might get in trouble for possessing just a few feet away on base.9  Less than a month before the 
Townhouse explosion, the coffeehouse was bombed (presumably by someone opposed to the anti-
																																																						
7 See "Protest at Fort Dix is Called a Success," New York Times, October 14th, 1969; Jerry Kopel, 
“Ft. Dix: Signs of Political Maturity,” Columbia [University] Daily Spectator, October 14th, 
1969; and Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising: How the Weather Underground Beat the FBI and Lost the 
Revolution, especially Chapter 1, for discussion of Fort Dix anti-war protests and Weather bomb 
planning. 
8 Weatherman Shin’ya Ono discusses, at great length, the schism that emerged between Fort Dix 
Coffeehouse leaders, organizing the protest action, and the New York Weather collective; Ono 
explains that “[t]he coffeehouse people called our suggested plans for a fighting action and our 
stress on the need to break through the weak links in the [Military Police] lines ‘suicidal.’" See 
Ono, "You Do Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows," in Harold Jacobs, 
ed., Weatherman, page 230 (Ramparts Press, 1970) 
9 See “Major Major Major” (author pseudonym), “Shakedown – The Fort Dix Coffeehouse,” 
RAT, May 23 – 29, 1969  
	 231	
war message and activity it supported) while full of soldiers and their dates.  Three soldiers were 
injured, one hospitalized.10  That the Townhouse collective planned the bombing at the dance as 
some kind of retaliation is highly possible – and even that it is possible (and maybe probable) that 
a terrorist bombing was intended as a retaliation for another terrorist bombing illustrates just how 
widespread across the political spectrum the phenomena had become during the tumultuous era.  
The Townhouse collective, as the Weather Underground members who died and were 
injured in the explosion are often referred to as, were building a powerful bomb to not just 
broadcast their political message – they were building a powerful device intended to kill and maim.  
That much was alarmingly clear to the NYPD and FBI officials who sifted through the wreckage; 
it was a disquieting departure from the bombs placed by the Melville collective, Cuban Power, and 
most others involved in terrorism in New York City the previous few years.  The vast majority of 
those devices were intentionally set to explode in symbolic locations, but late at night when injury 
or death could be avoided.  In the case of both Cuban Power and the Melville collective, phoned-
in warnings were an additional failsafe intended to avoid doing harm to people and not just 
property.  Even before the exact target of the Townhouse collective bomb was known, the powerful 
bomb laced with nails was obviously intended to do more than send a message.11  And even though 
the previous two years had brought a number of bombings to New York’s front pages, the deadly 
																																																						
10 “Soldier is Still Hospitalized After Bombing Near Ft. Dix,” New York Times, February 17th, 
1970 
11 The critical moment in the history of Weather Underground, as well central to radical politics 
more generally in the 1970s, the townhouse explosion is discussed at great length in the 
historiography of Weatherman especially, but also in scholarship exploring the tumult of the 
1970s.  See, especially, Varon, Bringing the War Home.  Former Weathermen such as Bill Ayers 
have spoken, much more in recent years, about the tremendous impact of the townhouse; and 
most recently, Burrough’s Days of Rage argues that the New York Collective was by far the 
most violent of all Weather Collectives and could have had a dramatic impact on the direction of 
the organization if it successfully raised the stakes with by killing U.S. Service-members and 
their civilian dates.   
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and powerful blast on 11th street upped the ante; Jeremy Varon argues that “[t]he media and public 
reacted with shock and outrage” to the dramatic escalation.12  A new page had been turned.13   
 
In July, not four months after the townhouse – following the end of the Melville trial, the opening 
of the Panther 13 trial, and a host of other notable bombings (some to be discussed in this and 
following chapters), NYPD Commissioner Howard Leary and several police officials testified 
before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee commission brought together to investigate the epidemic of 
terrorist bombings in New York City and elsewhere throughout the United States.  “The increased 
incidence of bombings and arson which have plagued the Nation during the last year and a half 
clearly indicates that the United States is experiencing a phenomenon unparalleled in our history,” 
argued Senator John McClellan, the Committee Chairman.  “Bombings, terrorism, and sabotage 
are not subjects which have been historically and traditionally familiar to the American people.”14  
As this dissertation aruges, the Chairman’s assertion that terrorism was not historically familiar to 
the United States is false;15 the previous year and a half was, however, a dramatic and 
unprecedented time, at least in New York City.  Commissioner Leary argued that there was just as 
																																																						
12 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 175 
13 Elsewhere around the nation, similar if marginally less dramatic signals of a new direction for 
Weather sprung up that winter and spring.  In February, a San Francisco police station was 
bombed, killing one officer and wounding several.  A Weather Underground collective was and 
is still suspected.  See N 71, this chapter.  In Detroit, informant Larry Grathwohl claimed to have 
alerted his FBI handlers of two bombs located at Detroit Police Department targets on March 6th, 
1970 – the same day as the Townhouse explosion.  See Arthur Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising, 27 – 
31 
14 U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearings on Riots, Civil and 
Criminal Disorders, July 1970. page 5313 
15 The Committee did, at least, acknowledge that groups from across the political spectrum had 
been involved in this wave of terrorism, or at least in promoting it in speech and writing, 
including the Black Panther Party, SNCC, SDS, the KKK and the Minutemen.  See page 5314 
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much a likelihood that bombings would emerge from the political right as from the left,16 and when 
asked to characterize the period in Gotham, explained that the spike in bombings had “reached 
gigantic proportions and… I look for it to accelerate to a greater degree.”17  
Commissioner Leary wasn’t far off the mark; even if the actual number of bombings might 
never quite exceed the historic level that it reached between 1969 and 1970, what he speculated in 
the summer of 1970 was close to the truth – the pace of bombings would barely let up for the entire 
coming decade.18  In a letter to his ex-wife Ruth in April of 1970, Melville made his own 
observation; “apparently there is now an official, revolutionary underground in the mother country 
and folks are getting things together at last.”19  Jeremy Varon argues that if the New York collective 
successfully pulled off the attack on Fort Dix, Americans might well remember the 1970s as a 
“decade of terrorism” much like those in Germany and Italy do because of deadly Red Army 
Faction bombings; “[t]he townhouse explosion was one of the crucial junctures in an era full of 
dramatic turning points… One can begin to assess its importance by speculating on what might 
have unfolded had it not occurred.”20  What I argue in the following chapters is that these waning 
years of the long Sixties were, in fact, a ‘decade of terrorism’ in New York City and throughout 
the nation, even though Varon is correct that Americans, perhaps because of the relatively low 
death toll and the noise of a chaotic era more generally, don’t overwhelmingly remember it as 
																																																						
16 Page 5395: The Chairman: “As I understand your testimony, there is probably just as much 
trouble coming from the extreme right as there is from the radical left, using those terms in the 
context in which they are generally accepted.”  Mr. Leary: “That is right.”  
17 Testimony of NYPD Commissioner Howard Leary, U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Hearings on Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, July 1970. Page 5396 
18 Leary argued that since January of 1969, there had been “368 bombing incidents of the 
explosive and incendiary type,” an exponential increase over similar attacks just a few years 
earlier  (page 5371) 
19 Sam Melville to Ruth, Letters From Attica, 107 
20 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 175   
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such.  Terrorism certainly was on the mind of Americans at the time – even speculating that it was 
terrorism they contended with when it wasn’t.  In 1972, for instance, an explosion on an American 
Airlines flight from Los Angeles to New York’s La Guardia Airport that injured nearly a dozen 
and forced a harrowing emergency landing was immediately deemed a bomb blast – until it was 
discovered, just a day later, to have been the result of faulty cargo-bay doors.21 
 
THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND 
 
What would eventually become the Weather Underground first emerged in 1969 as a militant 
faction – Weatherman – within Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the most notable and 
impactful student organization in U.S. history and a key campus political force during the long 
Sixties.  "You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows," the same Bob 
Dylan lyric that would beget the name of the Weatherman faction and then Weather Underground, 
was the title of a position paper distributed by the faction at the Chicago SDS National Convention 
in June, 1969.22  The position paper, akin to a Weatherman manifesto, urged SDS toward a much 
more militant approach to protest than had characterized SDS up to that point; it 
uncompromisingly implored “militant revolutionary struggle” and, at least implicitly, direct action 
– but without much detail on exactly what that would look like.  The manifesto advocated 
propaganda, newsreels, and leaflets, but more importantly large demonstrations and taking the 
fight to the ‘pigs’ – “[o]ur beginnings should stress self-defense—building defense groups around 
karate classes, learning how to move on the street and around the neighborhood, medical training, 
																																																						
21 “11 Hurt as Bomb Goes Off in Plane,” New York Times, June 13th, 1972; and “Jet Blast Linked 
to an Open Door,” New York Times, June 14th, 1972 
22 Bob Dylan, "Subterranean Homesick Blues," 1965   
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popularizing and moving toward (according to necessity) armed self-defense, all the time honoring 
and putting forth the principle that political power comes out of the barrel of a gun."23  Yet, what 
the manifesto was really lacking was any kind of fleshed out plan, anything resembling details of 
how Weatherman, at the vanguard, would propel the youth of America toward revolution.24    
Weatherman leaders and manifesto authors – including but not limited to Columbia protest 
leader Mark Rudd, former SDS organizer and RAT Subterranean News staffer Jeff Jones, and 
Townhouse collective members Terry Robbins, Cathy Wilkerson and Kathy Boudin – argued that 
SDS must be a “movement that fights, not just talks about fighting” in an effort to galvanize 
support among the youth of the nation, both black and white.25 
The major preoccupation for the Weatherman faction at the time was preparation for what 
would become the Days of Rage in Chicago.  But it was clear that in the wake of the national 
convention SDS was fatally fractured more than controlled by Weatherman; as the fall and winter 
of 1969 approached, Weatherman/SDS began to dismantle the national infrastructure and build 
what David Gilbert, another Weather leader, would later call “an unprecedented, if seriously 
flawed group that carried out six years of armed actions in solidarity with national liberation 
struggles.”26  
As Dan Berger argues, “[i]n June ’69… those who had assumed control of SDS weren’t 
quite sure what direction they would go in – or at least, how far they would go.  But they were 
																																																						
23 Karin Asbley, Bill Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn, John Jacobs, Jeff Jones, Gerry Long, Howard 
Machtinger, Jim Mellen, Terry Robbins, Mark Rudd and Steve Tappis; "You Don't Need a 
Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows," in New Left Notes, June 18th 1969, page 27 
-28,  
24 Dan Berger offers a good narrative of the twists and turns of the last SDS National Convention 
– that brought the Weatherman faction to power and splintered SDS irrevocably – on pages 84 
and 85 of Outlaws of America.  
25 “Bring the War Home,” New Left Notes, July 23, 1969 
26 As quoted in Berger, Outlaws of America, 105 
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excited, even optimistic about what lay ahead.”  Various collectives around the nation engaged in 
violent forms of protest during the fall of 1969; forcibly taking over classrooms in Detroit and 
elsewhere, raiding government-funded think tanks like the Center for International Affairs at 
Harvard and assaulting the staff.27  Some collectives engaged in “minor acts of property destruction 
(largely graffiti).”28  Yet, while the leaders of the Weatherman faction of SDS were still developing 
and refining their approach to revolutionary protest, planning for the Days of Rage, and traveling 
to Cuba to meet the revolutionaries they idolized,29 Sam Melville and the collective around him 
had already initiated their own bombing campaign; a campaign that Weather Underground’s would 
ultimately bear a striking resemblance to.  
 
The days surrounding the Days of Rage include an often-overlooked but quite important marker 
in the evolution of Weatherman; in Chicago on the night of October 6th, a short walk from where 
the Days of Rage would soon begin, a bomb largely destroyed the statue commemorating the seven 
policemen killed in the 1886 Haymarket affair (the affair resulted in a hugely publicized and 
politicized show-trial that saw eight anarchists convicted and four executed – none of whom was 
actually accused of throwing the bomb that killed the policemen).30  The bombing of the 
Haymarket Statue marks the first Weather bombing attack.  The chaotic approach to violent protest 
exhibited by Days of Rage was still, clearly, more of a priority for Weatherman at the time, and 
																																																						
27 Ron Jacobs, The Way the Wind Blew.  See pages 47-49 for some examples.   
28 Berger, Outlaws of America, 95 
29 In the summer of 1969, several Weathermen and women – including Weatherman Manifesto 
co-signer Terry Robbins, Ted Gold and Diana Oughton, who would all die in the Townhouse 
explosion – went to Cuba to meet Vietnamese and Cuban revolutionaries.   
30 See James Green, Death in the Haymarket: A Story of Chicago, the First Labor Movement and 
the Bombing that Divided Gilded Age America (New York: Random House, 2007), an 
exceptional work on the Haymarket affair and the social, political, and historical context 
surrounding it.  
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bombings clearly lesser so.  Almost immediately, the press and the public linked the bombing with 
the planned Days of Rage that was about to commence; they were right, even though Weather 
would not take responsibility for the bomb until 1974.31  Ironically enough, the Chicago Tribune 
included the discussion of the Haymarket bombing with three other nearby “bombing attack[s] on 
symbols of government authority” – the bombings in Chicago, Milwaukee, and Madison, 
committed weeks earlier by Sam Melville.32   
Neither the Haymarket bomb nor the firebombing of police cars on December 6th, almost 
a month after Melville’s arrest, exhibits the technical acumen of the Melville collective; technical 
acumen that perhaps could have saved the members of the Townhouse collective from a violent 
death, technical acumen that Weather Underground would embrace after that tragedy. 
As has been discussed, the Days of Rage itself did not go as Weather had planned.  “Voting 
with their feet,” as Dan Berger puts it, and showing disinterest in the planned National Action, 
only a few hundred instead of the “tens of thousands” Weatherman had hoped would show actually 
did.33  Even Black Panther leader Fred Hampton, perhaps the most respected man in America to 
the Weatherman faction, denounced the National Action as “anarchistic, opportunistic, and 
Custeristic” in reference to Lieutenant Colonel George Custer’s ill-advised and suicidal 
engagement at Little Big Horn.34  Hampton firmly believed it would invite useless arrests and 
injuries and bring about greater repression of activists both black and white.  During the heated 
debate about it, Hampton even knocked Mard Rudd to the ground with a punch.35  The beatings, 
																																																						
31 Not until the publication of Prairie Fire in July of 1974 would Weather Underground take 
responsibility for this, their first bomb attack. 
32 “The Haymarket Bomb,” Chicago Tribune, October 8th, 1969 
33 Berger, Outlaws, 109 
34 John Kifner, “Guard Called in Chicago as S.D.S. Roams Streets,” New York Times, October 
10th, 1969 
35 See Varon, Bringing the War Home, 77 
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arrests, shootings, and indictments that Weathermen were subject to – and the lukewarm to 
negative response it received from even within the movement – made it a strategy unlikely to be 
repeated; “[d]eep down, I knew that the Days of Rage had been a terrible failure,” Rudd admitted 
years later.36   
The Haymarket Statue bombing, at the time, seemed a precursor of sorts to the main event.  
It wasn’t until taking to the streets in Chicago two days later, finding their numbers severely 
lacking, and being beaten bloody by the police, that Weatherman eschewed provocative frontal 
confrontations with authority like the Days of Rage and instead embraced the terrorist bombing 
campaign that continues to define them.  
The final meeting of what was nominally still SDS took place in Flint, Michigan, between 
the Christmas and New Year’s holidays that concluded the 1960s.  The SDS National War Council, 
as it was called, was an SDS meeting in name only; it was a Weatherman guerilla warfare planning 
meeting.  Fred Hampton had just been killed in a highly controversial joint Chicago Police 
Department–FBI raid, the Melville collective members had recently been uncovered and arrested, 
and their public court proceedings were just beginning in New York City.37    
The Flint War Council was “a point of no return” for the approximately 300 Weathermen 
and women who attended.  The organization, long preparing to take its fight underground, 
officially did so, closing the SDS office and essentially putting the last nail in the coffin of that 
																																																						
36 Rudd, Underground, 83 
37 Killed on December 4th in his bed, many observers claim Hampton’s death was nothing more 
than a political assassination.  Weather Underground members, especially Bill Ayers and David 
Gilbert, would argue that the murder of Fred Hampton was a seminal event in their turn to 
radical militantism.  This claim is questionable.  The organization had been on the radical and 
violent path for some time, at least as early as the Summer 1969 SDS National Convention.  See 
Berger, page 121, second paragraph, and Gilbert quoted by Varon; “And probably, if there’s one 
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organization.  The few Weathermen who had survived organizational purges and accepted the 
vastly increased militantism were organized into underground collectives (sometimes referred to 
as ‘tribes’ by the members).38  One such collective – the most militant of them all, led by Terry 
Robbins – was the Townhouse collective.39  
By the time the townhouse exploded in March 1970, Weather had moved underground and 
had embraced a program of bombings as its chief strategy.  But the townhouse profoundly changed 
the approach; what the organization ultimately embraced was, essentially, what the Melville 
collective had been doing all along: bombings that targeted property and symbolic locations, but 
that put substantial effort into at least trying to avoid injuring anyone.40  “In their early days,” 
Jeremy Varon argues, “the Weathermen spun grisly fantasies of limitless destruction and planned 
attacks that would almost certainly harm “civilians.’”41  But this changed after the Townhouse 
explosion, which deeply impacted the key members of the organization; “we referred to the 
explosion as the Townhouse with a capital T,” recalls Bill Ayers.42  "The group’s challenge… was 
to develop an internally constrained practice,” Varon argues. “Weathermen responded to the 1970 
townhouse explosion by imposing limits on their violence.  In short, they made the conscious 
decision not to be killers.”43    
Like the Melville collective and the New York Cuban Power bombers in the two preceding 
years, the “conscious decision” made by Weather Underground leaders in 1970 illustrates an 
important characteristic of terrorism – the political message could be delivered without a body 
																																																						
38 See Rudd, Underground, 189-191 
39 See Rudd, Underground, 197-198 
40 Berger, Outlaws of America, 130-131 
41 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 13 
42 Bill Ayers, Fugitive Days: Memoirs of an Antiwar Activist (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 203 
43 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 13 
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count.  The essential aspect of terrorism is this communication of the political message, and that 
could be delivered without killing or even injuring civilians; and delivered, incidentally, without 
bringing the moral outrage, law enforcement wrath, and lengthy prison sentences that dead bodies 
brought.  Of course, other terrorists of the era would come to a different conclusion; that their 
message was delivered louder, clearer, cut through the noise more sharply, when dead were used 
to broadcast it.44  
The conscious decision to avoid casualties wasn’t the only way Weather Underground 
mirrored the Melville collective.  On March 26th, 1970, FBI agents examined material discarded 
in an abandoned Weather Underground safe house in the Bronx, and found a map with two specific 
locations circled – the Chase Manhattan building and Federal Courts building.  Both were standard 
types of targets of leftist radicals of the time, but the FBI debated the possible linkage between 
Weather and the Melville collective, as both of those targets had been bombed just months earlier 
by them.45  
Despite the internal debate and non-lethal direction that Weather Underground embarked 
on in the aftermath of the townhouse, the organization released its first official communiqué in 
May, titled “Declaration of a State of War,” making explicit what was already abundantly clear in 
the wake of the deadly explosion on 11th street.  “Tens of thousands have learned that protest and 
																																																						
44 For discussion and debate surrounding this evolution of terrorism from an “old” paradigm that 
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especially characterized by religious, mostly radical Islamic-inspired terrorism, see Martha 
Crenshaw, “The Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” The American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, August 30th–September 2nd, 2007, and Rapoport, “The Four Waves of 
Rebel Terror and September 11th” 
45 “FBI Airtel, SAC NY to Director (Attn: FBI Laboratory – Latent Fingerprint Section), FBI, 
Subject: SDS (Weatherman), Explosions 18 West 11th Street, New York City ,March 6, 1970 
[Redacted – Swinton] – Fugitive, Samuel Joseph Melville, etc.,” March 30th, 1970; FBI FOIPA 
Records Request #1315776-0     
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marches don't do it. Revolutionary violence is the only way…  We will never live peaceably under 
this system.”  More than just violence, though, that Weather was moving to bombs was made 
explicit - the communiqué warned that it would soon begin its campaign by attacking “a symbol 
or institution of Amerikan (sic) injustice.”  Two weeks later it successfully bombed NYPD 
headquarters.46 
The Senate testimony by NYPD Commissioner Leary the month after the attack on police 
headquarters shows, almost certainly unintentionally on the Commissioner’s part, how Weather 
had embraced an approach intended to avoid casualties: 
 
“At 6:43pm, on June 9, 1970, the police headquarters communications center 
received the following telephone message from a male, presently unknown: ‘Listen 
closely… This is Weatherman... There is a bomb at [NYPD Headquarters]… You 
have just enough time to get out if you leave now . . . Make sure everybody gets 
out… Do not try to find it… This is for real… We're dead serious.’  Two minutes 
later, at approximately 6:45 p.m., a second call was received in the Chief Inspector's 
office…  ‘A bomb was placed in police headquarters and scheduled to go off.  This 
is a warning so that the building can be evacuated so that no one will be hurt…”  
At 6:57 p.m., 14 minutes after the first call was received, the bomb exploded in the 
second floor men's room.  The explosion demolished the men's room, knocked out 
two adjoining walls and resulted in the injury of three police officers and a female 
																																																						
46 Originally released in May of 1970, the Declaration was the organizations first use of the name 
Weather Underground and dictated its more militant direction.  The Declaration was released 
widely, and can be seen at http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/MRC/pacificaviet/scheertranscript.html 
(last accessed 10/12/2014).  For an account of the NYPD HQ bomb, see Frank Prial, "Bomb at 
Police Headquarters Injures 7 and Damages Offices." New York Times, June 10th, 1970 
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civilian elevator operator…  Despite the severity of the blast, no one was killed and 
those who were injured, though serious, were not critical.”47  
 
That an organization that had, not three months earlier, shown such deadly plans with the massive 
bomb intended to kill and maim that exploded on 11th street, was now placing far-less deadly 
bombs in bathrooms and making multiple warning calls, is worthy of note.   
 
By the time of the NYPD Headquarters bombing, not only had Weather Underground come to, 
even if subconsciously, adopt the modus operandi of the Melville collective, it had even adopted 
some of the members of the collective itself.  Jane Alpert claims to have visited the 11th street 
townhouse before the explosion, meaning she was there sometime between the establishment of 
the Townhouse collective at the turn of the New Year and that fateful day in early March – a 
narrow timeframe when she was out on bail for her own bombing activities.  Further, she would 
go on, as a fugitive, to have an affair with Weatherman Mark Rudd and to connect with Bernadine 
Dohrn and Jeff Jones in San Francisco while they were all underground.48   
Robin Palmer, never indicted (nor, after reviewing his FBI records, seemingly ever 
suspected) as part of the Melville collective, joined the Weather Underground in the summer of 
1970.49  In December of that year, Palmer – along with former Melville collective member Sharon 
Krebs, and Joyce Plecha, another probable member of that earlier organization, were arrested as 
the result of an NYPD infiltrator, Steve Weiner, as they embarked upon a bombing spree that was 
																																																						
47 Testimony of NYPD Commissioner Howard Leary, Senate, Riots, Civil and Criminal 
Disorder, page 5371 
48 Alpert, Growing Up Underground, pages 234, 240, and 244. 
49 Per conversations Palmer had later in life with Jeremy Varon, detailed in Bringing the War 
Home, 91.  
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supposed to include a number of targets including a bank and an NYPD police station under 
construction.50  Even before joining Weather in the summer of 1970, the Townhouse collective 
made an attempt to recruit Palmer – his turning them down may well have prolonged his life by 
decades. After pleading guilty in 1971, Weatherman Robin Palmer eventually found himself at 
Attica alongside Sam Melville.  As fate would have it, Melville died in his friend and former 
colleague’s arms.51 
 
INFILTRATING THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND 
 
As Varon explains, after the Days of Rage, the FBI had become convinced that, “Weatherman 
represented a significant threat to the nation’s security… The Weathermen… became the objects 
of intensive federal investigations and harassment by local police.” 52  That same month – in the 
wake of the Days of Rage in Chicago and the continuing Melville collective bombings in Gotham 
– the FBI alerted its field offices that the New York City Weathermen collective was “going 
underground and forming commando-type units which will engage in terroristic acts, including 
bombings, arson, and assassinations.”53  The FBI’s information was startlingly accurate.   
																																																						
50 Paul L. Montgomery, “Six Identified as Weathermen Seized in Plot to Bomb Bank Here,” New 
York Times, December 5th, 1970; also see The Weather Underground: Report of the 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, 
First Session (Government Printing Office, 1975), pages 37–38.  (Hereafter referred to as “The 
Weather Underground: Report of the Subcommittee.”)  Finally, the arrest and the role of the 
NYPD informant is also discussed in RAT Subterranean News, 12/17/1970 – 1/6/1971 issue. 
51 As told to Varon; see Bringing the War Home, 149 
52 Varon, Bringing the War Home, 153 
53 FBI Airtel, FBI director to SAC ofﬁces, October 23rd, 1969. FBI-WUO files; described in 
Varon, 152-153 
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By the time Weather Underground elected to go underground in 1970, the methods that 
law enforcement had used to break up those like the Melville collective and even non-politically 
aligned groups like Cuban Power were well known to radicals.  After NYPD infiltrator Steve 
Weiner was instrumental in the arrest and indictment of Robin Palmer, Sharon Krebs, and others 
in December of 1970, RAT published an article on the bust compelling those in the movement to 
take greater security against informants and infiltrators.  The “growing awareness of how 
infiltrators work [has] brought us all closer together,” the author argued.  “We must follow through 
efficiently with security checks [the magazine gave detailed instructions for doing so], and learn 
to develop that heightened consciousness and awareness of each other…”54 
Despite substantial activity in the city, though, NYPD never infiltrated Weather 
Underground after the initial success by Steve Weiner.  Crucially, by the time Weather released 
its first communique and bombed NYPD Headquarters in June of 1970, NYPD was going through 
substantially difficult times – the Knapp Commission looking into police corruption had just begun 
highly public (and demoralizing for the police department) investigations that same month, and 
BOSS, so critical in previous infiltration and counterterrorism successes, was mere months away 
from being permanently neutralized – just as it was perhaps needed most. 
To counter this method that law enforcement had found so useful in previous years, 
Weather initiated purges of its membership; the harsh strategy severely reduced Weather’s ranks 
and its abilities, but did mostly achieve the goal of keeping infiltrators and informants out of its 
ranks.55  The lone FBI informant to successfully penetrate the group’s ranks and survive the purges, 
																																																						
54 “Bust Pig,” RAT, December 17th, 1970 – January 6th, 1971 
55 The purges were meant to weed out informants as well as those unprepared or uncommitted to 
the next stage of violence.  On the purges, see Varon, Bringing the War Home, 171; also see, as 
noted in Varon, Larry Grathwohl, Bringing Down America, 112-122 and Susan Stern, With the 
Weatherman, 207-248 
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Larry Grathwohl, was central in the arrest of Weather leader Linda Sue Evans in April of 1970 – 
less than a month after the townhouse explosion – but that arrest placed suspicion on him that he 
was unable to shake despite taking part in a number of illegal activities before finally emerging 
from the underground as an informer in 1973.56 
Eckstein argues that the drive for more intelligence on Weather Underground came all the 
way from the top; in October of 1969, as the Days of Rage approached, Director Hoover had 
assured President Nixon that he had the organization under control.  A half-year later, after the 
Townhouse and then the Declaration of the State of War and the disappearance of the key members 
into the underground, that assessment of the situation was looking clearly mistaken, and the 
President leaned heavily on the Bureau to “provide better and more information on the radicals 
[a]nd from the start… made it clear that he did not care how the FBI got this information.”57  That 
determined insistence would ultimately bring nothing but trouble for the Bureau.    
In June of 1970, President Nixon called on the heads of the nation’s intelligence agencies, 
including Hoover.  The President charged the intelligence chiefs “with getting better information 
on domestic dissenters.”  In a proposal drafted by Nixon aide Thomas Huston, the “dissenters” 
identified were the radicals of the New Left (primarily the Weather Underground) and the groups 
of the “Black Extremist Movement.”  In both cases, what became known as the Huston Plan 
identified the key intelligence gathering tactic as the use of informants; in the case of the groups 
in the Black Extremist Movement, informant “coverage” was generally deemed to be sufficient.  
																																																						
56 See Larry Grathwohl as told to Frank Reagan, Bringing Down America – An FBI Informer 
with the Weatherman, (New York: Arlington House, 1976).  Also see Seymour M. Hersh, "F.B.I. 
Informer Is Linked to Bombings And Protests by Weatherman Groups," New York Times, May 
20th, 1973.  Grathwohl was “a working-class Vietnam veteran from the Midwest.  The 
Weathermen seemed so enamored with his ‘authenticity’ that they looked past clues to his actual 
identity.” (Varon, 78) 
57 Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising, 163 
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In the case of the Nation of Islam, for instance, informant penetration was deemed to be 
“substantial, enabling [the group’s] activities to be followed on a current basis.   
Informant coverage in the case of the New Left was an entirely different matter.  Coverage 
of “the Weatherman group, in particular, is negligible…” Because of the Weather purges, their 
insular nature, and their movement to the underground, the Huston plan argued, “penetration of 
these units through live informants [is] extremely difficult.”  The federal authorities hit the same 
wall that NYPD had; after both the NYPD and FBI’s sole infiltrators were exposed during an 
arrest, further penetration proved impossible.   
To counter the intelligence insufficiency, the Huston Plan proposed a number of aggressive 
intelligence gathering practices including resumption of the “black bag” operations largely shelved 
by the FBI in 1966, covert opening of mail (openly acknowledged to be illegal), and broader 
recruitment of informants to include teenagers and members of the military.  It was a startling plan 
to knowingly violate both the constitution as well as a number of federal statutes.58   
President Nixon approved the plan.   
Director Hoover, however, was blunt and vocal in his objection, even attaching his 
objections in the final draft sent to the President for review.  At the urging of Hoover and Attorney 
General John Mitchell, Nixon rescinded his approval just five days after granting it.  For whatever 
his motives, the Huston Plan lay dead for only the efforts of an individual today widely regarded 
as himself a great twentieth century violator of American civil liberties.59  And for the time being, 
at least, the decision to forego the most egregious tactics kept the Bureau (and the rest of the federal 
																																																						
58 For all of the above references to the Huston Plan, see Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Volume 2, Huston Plan, 
September 23, 24, and 25, 1975, page 1 -5, and Hearing Exhibit #1, “Huston plan” 
59 See Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising, especially pages 111-113, for a discussion of the internal 
debate over the Huston Plan.   
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government) out of trouble, but also kept Weather Underground safe in the underground (not that 
there would be any corollary between illegal intelligence practices and effectively countering the 
organization, as would later be seen).  That would all change in the wake of Hoover’s death in 
1972 and in the fallout of the Watergate scandal that emerged that same year.  As Chapter 10 
explores, the special task force established to investigate the organization – Squad 47 – and the 
methods used against the radicals before and especially after Hoover’s death, would become 
central components of the severe criticism, lawsuits, and new restraints placed upon the Bureau in 
the coming years.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The townhouse explosion is the most memorable of many events in the year of “gigantic” 
proportions in New York, just as Weather Underground is the most remembered organization 
engaging in terrorism during the decade.  The Bank of America building in Manhattan was bombed 
just eleven days after Commissioner Leary and other members of the NYPD delivered their 
testimony to members of the U.S. Senate.60  A courthouse in Long Island City, just a short walk 
straight to the water in the same Queens neighborhood from where Cuban Power launched the 
bazooka at the United Nations five years earlier, was bombed just days after the Haymarket Statue 
in Chicago, 800 miles away, was bombed for the second time.61  That same month, Weather bomb 
threats would shut down or cause evacuations of “hospitals in Boston, of airports in New York and 
																																																						
60 “Bombings Here Reaching 'Gigantic' Proportions, Leary Tells Senators,” New York Times, 
July 17th, 1970 
61 The Weather Underground: Report of the Subcommittee, page 34 
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St. Louis, and a subway station in Harvard Square…”62  In March of 1971, they brazenly bombed 
the U.S. Capitol Building; the late-night bomb caused extensive damage but no injuries;63 the next 
year they would follow up with a bomb somehow smuggled into a secure area of the Pentagon.64  
Months later, the organization bombed the offices of the New York State Department of 
Corrections in Albany in solidarity with “the courageous prisoners of Attica,” including of course 
Robin Palmer and Sam Melville.65  In May of 1973, NYPD was once again a Weather target; 
several patrol cars in Queens were bombed, causing substantial damage and one injury.66   
In the spring of 1974, the leaders of the organization released Prairie Fire - The Politics of 
Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism, a collaborative statement on the trajectory of Weather 
Underground, in which they took credit for no less than eighteen bombings between October 1969 
(the first Haymarket Statue bombing) and federal offices in San Francisco in March 1974.67  
“Inspired by the Black Panthers and other Black fighters,” the writers explained, “many whites 
such as Sam Melville, Cameron Bishop, the New Year's Gang in Madison, and ourselves began 
building armed struggle.”68  
																																																						
62 The Weather Underground: Report of the Subcommittee, page 36 
63 John W. Finney, "Bomb in Capitol Causes Wide Damage," New York Times, March 2nd, 1971  
64 The Weather Underground: Report of the Subcommittee, page 40 
65 The bombing occurred on September 18th, 1971, five days after the prison was violently 
retaken.  The Weather Underground: Report of the Subcommittee, page 40 
66 The Weather Underground: Report of the Subcommittee page 41; May 18, 1973. See also 
Edward Hudson, "Police Car Blast Hurts Passer-By," New York Times, May 19th, 1973 
67 Prairie Fire - The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism (Communications Co., 1974), 4 
– 5 
68 Prairie Fire, 30.  Cameron David Bishop, a former SDS activist and student at Colorado State 
University, in January of 1969 blew up four high-voltage towers supplying power to companies 
building material supporting the war effort in Vietnam.  He was indicted on February 15th, only 
the second American indicted for sabotage under a World War I-era law – a week after the first, 
Michael Siskind, also an SDS activist, plead guilty to attempting to firebomb a ROTC building on 
the Washington University campus in St. Louis. (“Jury Indicts Colorado Man For Sabotaging 
Utility Lines,” New York Times, February 15th, 1969; and “5 Years in Attempted Bombing,” New 
York Times, February 21st, 1969).  Bishop was placed on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives 
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In addition to citing Melville here, they also included a prominent photo and dedication to 
the man – “murdered by (Governor) Rockefeller, Attica, September 13 1971” on the bottom of the 
contents page.  The publication includes a long list of others in the struggle on separate pages, but 
Melville stands out alone and with a photo – second only in prominence to the slightly larger photo 
of Che Guevara that appears a few pages later.  The importance of the Melville collective and their 
actions is not in doubt.69   
The bombings across the country continued after Prairie Fire was published; the offices 
of the California Attorney General, offices of corporations like Gulf Oil and Banco de Ponce; the 
State Department itself in Washington.70  But not a single fatality had occurred since the 
devastating explosion on West 11th street.71  That year, for a host of reasons including the war in 
Vietnam beginning to wind down in earnest, and a window of legal opportunity presented by 
exposed excesses in investigating the organization that were increasingly coming to light, the 
																																																						
list in April of 1969, when Melville was still learning to build bombs with the FLQ fugitives.  He 
would be captured in 1975 in Rhode Island with noted bomber Ray Levasseur.  While Bishop 
indeed took the next step in movement protest in advance of the Melville collective, this author 
would argue that the stage upon which he acted – Colorado – and the context – bombings without 
public statements or publicity – relegate him to a degree of lesser import than the actions of 
Melville and his colleagues; sabotage as opposed to terrorism.  See Bryan Burrough, Days of Rage, 
for more on Bishop. 
69 See Prairie Fire, Table of Contents.   
70 John T. McQuiston, "State Department Bombed in Protest," New York Times, January 29th, 
1975 
71 Weather has also long been suspected by law enforcement officials to be responsible for 
another death prior to the Townhouse, that of San Francisco Police Department Sergeant Brian 
McDonnell in February of 1970; more than a dozen other police officers were wounded, one 
blinded, in the same attack.  Much circumstantial evidence points to Weather’s involvement, 
including the testimony of one former member, Karen Latimer.  A Grand Jury continued to 
investigate Weather’s involvement for more than forty years.  See Burrough, Days of Rage, 542; 
Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising, pages 28-29, and Jim Zamora, “Plaque Honors Slain Police 
Officer,” San Francisco Chronicle, February 17th, 2007 
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organization dissipated and several Weathermen began to emerge from the underground to do 
sometimes little (but usually no) jail time for their crimes.72  
The Weather Underground campaign of terrorist bombings in the United States lasted, 
generally, from October 1969 until 1976.  And while it spanned the United States from San 
Francisco on the West Coast to New York City and Boston on the East Coast, the singular event 
in the history of Weather Underground is the townhouse explosion on West 11th street.  Beyond 
that, the similarities and linkages between the Melville collective and the Weather Underground 
are impossible to ignore, as are the more general New York roots of important Weather 
Underground members like Jeff Jones, Mark Rudd, John Jacobs, and others, thus bringing New 
York City further into focus as a, if not the, center of Weather Underground terrorism.  
The tactics brought to bear by the FBI and NYPD in countering Weather Underground in 
New York City included what by now had become the most effective method, informants and 
infiltrators like NYPD undercover Steve Weiner and FBI informant Larry Grathwohl.  The 
organization and the movement more broadly though, as seen in the pages of RAT, was fully aware 
of this method and very actively countered it.  When informants and infiltrators were unable to 
penetrate the organization, the FBI utilized other methods that would have dramatic legal impacts 
on the Bureau itself. 
 
  
																																																						
72 See Varon, Bringing the War Home, 290 – 297 on the decline of Weather Underground and 
the eventual capture or surrender of the members remaining underground. 
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PART III: A DECADE OF TERROR 
Chapter 9 : The Jewish Defense League
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The Jewish Defense League (JDL) emerged in New York City in the late 1960s and quickly earned 
a name for itself; equally as quickly, it moved past its initial focus on local issues and vocal 
activism to take up the mantle of anti-Soviet advocacy on the behalf of international (largely 
Soviet) Jews by use of a variety of terrorist tactics including the all-too-ubiquitous dynamite 
bombings of the early 1970s in New York City.  
 
In 1968, three Orthodox Jewish New Yorkers, all men in their thirties, formed the JDL.  None of 
the men were new to activist Judaism, at the time somewhat uncommon in the United States; they 
knew each other through membership and active participation in Betar, a militant right-wing 
Zionist youth movement.  Meir Kahane, a passionate, articulate, educated and pugnacious ordained 
rabbi, was the most prominent of the men and would lead the JDL through the turbulent half-
decade ahead.1 
The smoke of Israel’s Six Day War with her Arab neighbors had just begun to clear in 
1968; brought to the brink of destruction by the combined militaries of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, 
Israel turned the tables in what many in the world Jewish community feared could become a second 
Holocaust when the first was still fresh in many memories.  Many like Kahane vocally pronounced 
“Never Again!” – what would become the rallying cry of the JDL.  Despite a global perspective, 
																																																						
1 First called the Jewish Defense Corps, the name was, perhaps ironically, changed to the Jewish 
Defense League to project a less-militaristic image.  The following pages on JDL and Kahane 
have benefited immeasurably from a lengthy, meticulous, and engaging unpublished dissertation 
titled “The Zionist Hooligans: The Jewish Defense League,” by Shlomo Russ (CUNY Graduate 
Center, 1981).  The dissertation, drawing heavily on dozens of oral histories performed by Dr. 
Russ with key and peripheral figures in the history of JDL within just a few years of the period 
under review, is by far and without comparison the most accomplished, complete, and interesting 
history of the organization in existence. 
	 253	
issues close to home initially drove the JDL, from the long and volatile standoff precipitated by 
the firing of largely white (and Jewish) teachers in the mostly African American Ocean Hill–
Brownsville section of Brooklyn and the resultant teachers’ strike, to perceived anti-Semitic 
violence in neighborhoods shared precariously with African American and Puerto Rican 
communities.  These issues at first found the emergent JDL working as community activists 
utilizing the legal process – advocating for Jewish interests through the New York City court 
system, establishing neighborhood security patrols, and the like.  In an era rife with such activity, 
JDL scholar Shlomo Russ argues “[t]he JDL adopted the tactics of the other activist movements, 
using those methods for ethnic Jewish interests.”  Russ quite interestingly argues how the JDL “is 
often a study in paradox: their tactics… were avowedly those of the left, while their ideology 
seemingly was of the right.”2  As we’ve seen with other organizations, the JDL would not be easily 
shoehorned into overly-simplified categories. 
By early 1969 the JDL had begun publically demonstrating and protesting in 
neighborhoods and at events they deemed to be anti-Semitic; they trained in karate and had begun 
neighborhood patrols; they projected an image of vocal, vigorous, and tough Judaism more 
common to Israel than New York City at the time.  In June of 1969, for instance, the JDL ran an 
ad in the New York Times after the organization had begun getting press for its activities. The ad 
posed a question: "Is This Any Way for Nice Jewish Boys to Behave?"  Below the text appeared 
six intimidating young men brandishing clubs and dark sunglasses, and an answer to the question: 
“Answer: Maybe. Maybe there are times when there is no other way to get across to the extremist 
																																																						
2 Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” preface, viii  
	 254	
that the Jew is not quite the patsy some think he is.”3  But despite their tough stance, at the time 
their activities were by and large legal and non-violent, even if sometimes threatening.   
 
By the second year of its existence, JDL leaders began focusing on Jewish issues in foreign affairs: 
American support for Israel, Arab terrorism, Soviet Jewry, and the welfare of Jewish communities 
in Arab and Muslim nations.  
In August of 1969, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a 
TWA flight and diverted it to Damascus, Syria, where the hijackers destroyed the airplane with a 
bomb.  More than 100 passengers and crew were returned to their respective countries by Syrian 
authorities, but six Israeli citizens – including women and children – were detained.  Even after 
the women and children were released, two Israeli men remained in Syrian custody, despite 
international condemnation.4  In response, the JDL stormed the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) office in New York City, beat the few staff members, took their personal 
information, and threatened that if any harm came to the Israelis in Syrian custody, they would 
suffer the same fate.  As Shlomo Russ explains, they also “liberated” sensitive files about Arab 
student leaders of left-leaning college clubs and delivered them to the Israeli Mission to the U.N. 
and to FBI.5   
The JDL had given the police little substantial trouble up until this point, particularly in 
comparison to the wide variety of other protest activities causing untold numbers of NYPD 
overtime hours in 1969; the NYPD was, regardless, growing concerned about the activities of JDL, 
																																																						
3 As described in Russ, 31 
4 “Syria Frees 105 on Hijacked Jet,” New York Times, August 31st 1969 
5 Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” 249 
	 255	
especially in the wake of the PLO office raid and Kahane’s increasingly belligerent language – a 
“black cloud on the horizon,” as one BOSS Lieutenant put it.6   
 
In 1969, BOSS, realizing they had very little information on the League, moved forward as they 
had on previous occasions – they took an individual, not yet a police officer, with a demographic 
composition that made him capable of fitting in with the organization, and attempted to penetrate 
the JDL with an undercover agent.  In contrast to the investigation into the Melville collective – 
which was commenced after a crime was committed (the bombing of the United Fruit Pier) but 
before it was known to be political, the investigation and infiltration of JDL was an intelligence 
(not criminal) investigation, and began just a few months after the Melville investigation (in fact, 
it began in earnest with the successful infiltration just as the Melville collective investigation was 
coming to a climax).  By the end of 1969 investigating terrorist bombings was an all-hands-on-
deck affair for the NYPD.  Clearly, then, while the Bureau of Special Services had been sidelined 
during the Melville investigation, initially at least BOSS took the lead role in investigating the JDL 
using the approach that had yielded significant results over the past years.  
 
A Brooklyn native just returned from four years of active duty as an Air Force intelligence analyst, 
Richard Rosenthal was once again living in Brooklyn and enrolled in junior college, and took the 
NYPD written exam in February of 1969.  Soon after scoring well on the test, Rosenthal’s 
recruitment into BOSS began.  A series of secret meetings, stealthy phone-calls, and seemingly 
strange instructions – including being instructed to tell everyone that knew he was going to join 
																																																						
6 Rosenthal, Rookie Cop: Deep Undercover in the Jewish Defense League (2000), 11, quoting 
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the NYPD that he’d changed his mind – and Rosenthal was secretly sworn into the department on 
October 24th, 1969, just weeks before the culmination of the Melville investigation.  Like Raymond 
Wood, who infiltrated the Statue of Liberty plotters four years earlier, Rosenthal became a police 
officer never having attended a single day of the academy, and was only shown his badge for only 
a moment before it was taken away from him.7   
Rosenthal hadn’t been in NYPD so he used his real name; he took a half-hearted job as a 
taxi driver and registered for courses at Brooklyn College to build a plausible cover.  Then, in 
November of 1969, he attended a rally protesting Mayor Lindsay – who Kahane opposed until the 
end of the rabbi’s life – and obtained some JDL literature and a membership application.  He was 
soon part of the JDL chapter closest to his home in the Midwood neighborhood of Brooklyn and 
quickly began working his way into and up through the organization.   
Another police department applicant who had never been to the academy nor received any 
training – twenty-two year old Richard Eisner – was also sent to infiltrate the JDL some months 
later.8  But neither Eisner nor Rosenthal were told the other's true identity. "It was often amusing 
to compare what they wrote about each other,” Joseph Jaffe, a U.S. Attorney, later commented.  
"If you read both sets of their reports, you'd think the other was a pretty suspicious character. 
Eisner wrote about Rosenthal and Rosenthal reported back on Eisner."9 
Eventually, federal authorities tried the same tactic.  In September of 1970 the Treasury 
Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) planted an undercover agent within 
the organization using the assumed name of Mark Gold; the ATF, responsible for enforcing the 
																																																						
7 Rosenthal, Rookie Cop, 3 – 9, offers a detailed first-hand narrative of the BOSS recruitment 
process. 
8 Ibid., 22 
9 Jaffe as quoted in Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” 210 
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Gun Control Act of 1968, was increasingly concerned about what they believed to be serious 
violations of arms trafficking.  “Gold” was never as successful as the NYPD undercovers; 
Rosenthal describes how the ATF man was almost immediately suspected as a police officer by 
everyone, and Rosenthal himself was convinced he was law enforcement as soon as he met him.10 
 
In hindsight, it is clear that the NYPD infiltration of JDL was serendipitously timed.  Just as 
Rosenthal was getting situated in the organization at the end of 1969, in what Shlomo Russ 
describes as “a sudden move that no one in JDL was prepared for,” Kahane announced that the 
League was going to protest the conditions of Jews in the Soviet Union.  No one opposed the new 
direction.11  The JDL’s Soviet opposition, much like Cuban Power’s opposition of another 
communist adversary of the United States, would be what drew them into terrorism.  As Russ 
astutely observes, “Kahane's problem was that when he switched from local events to Soviet 
Jewry, he gave up the ability to influence events through direct action.”12  The shift would be 
toward symbolic acts – the province of terrorism.  As JDL's direction shifted, so did its 
constituency: less militant members dropped out; other more hardcore individuals joined.  
JDL’s anti-Soviet activities had started, innocuously enough, during the final days of 1969, 
just as court proceedings for Sam Melville were commencing.  On December 27th, twenty-five 
members (including BOSS undercover Richard Rosenthal) protested across from the Soviet 
Mission to the United Nations on East 67th street;13 the Mission would become the site of many 
chaotic protests over the next few years.  The Park East Synagogue, fortuitously situated directly 
																																																						
10 Rosenthal, Rookie Cop, 141 
11 See Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” 149 
12 Ibid., 45.  Also see pages 33, 39-41 
13 Ibid., 150 – 159 
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across the street from the Soviet Mission, gave the JDL an ostensibly legitimate reason for a 
presence on the block, even if proximity to NYPD’s 19th precinct (directly next door to the 
Synagogue) ensured recurring and often violent clashes with the police. 
As the JDL shifted its focus to the Soviet Union, famed concert promoter Sol Hurok was 
one of those singled out for condemnation.  Hurok, a Russian born Jew, owed his fame and a 
considerable part of his profits to booking high-profile Soviet artists like the Moscow Philharmonic 
Orchestra and the Bolshoi Ballet.  In January of 1970, Kahane sent Hurok a telegram: "Insist you 
cancel future Soviet troupes. Your activities give aid and comfort to oppressors of Soviet Jewry. 
Immediate reply requested."14  Regular protesting, often violent, commenced at Hurkok’s 
Manhattan offices and Hurok events, including at Carnegie Hall.  
In the midst of what would become known as “Black September” in 1970 – a dramatic 
month when Palestinian issues ruled the headlines – Palestinian terrorists conducted perhaps the 
most dramatic hijacking operation of the decade.  Four jets were hijacked; one blown up on the 
tarmac in Egypt, one retaken by authorities and a female hijacker was captured only to become a 
minor celebrity, and two others forced to land at Dawson’s Field in Jordan with hundreds of 
passengers onboard.15  The JDL decided to retaliate with a hijacking of its own; twenty-six-year-
old Israeli Defense Force (IDF) veteran Avraham Hershkovitz and his nineteen-year old wife, 
Nancy, were selected for the operation.  On September 27th 1970, the Hershkovitzs embarked on 
a plan to fly to London armed, and there hijack a flight to Cairo and divert it to Israel.  The plan 
																																																						
14 JDL press release of January 20th, 1970, cited from Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” 164 
15 Eric Pace, "Life on Jets Held in Desert Is Harsh," New York Times, September 9th, 1970 
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did not go as planned.  After Nancy was cleared to board, authorities found a loaded pistol on 
Avraham and searched his wife again, finding another loaded pistol and a live grenade on her.16 
But the failed hijacking did not derail JDL’s plan to retaliate in response to Arab hijackings.   
 
On October 6th 1970, an hour before midnight. a bomb exploded in the PLO's midtown Manhattan 
office; ten minutes before the explosion, a cleaning lady had noticed an agitated young man 
nervously trying to leave the third-floor offices, but he’d left his attaché case near the closed PLO 
front door.  
The bomb blast caused extensive damage, knocking holes in the walls and blowing out 
windows and doors. No one was hurt although the fifteen cleaning women in the building at the 
time of the explosion were treated for shock and sent home.  A woman telephoned UPI and 
announced: "The PLO office at 101 Park Avenue has been bombed. Please take down the 
following message – Hijack blackmail freed seven terrorists.  Never again!"17 
It was JDL’s first bomb attack.  It was not three months since NYPD Commissioner Leary 
discussed the year of bombings in “gigantic proportions” in New York City, and one more actor 
was joining in the parade of terrorists making use of explosives in Gotham.  
 
Just eleven days after the PLO office bombing, on October 17th, police were called to investigate 
after a building superintendent, inspecting a water leak, found a massive cache of weapons in an 
apartment on 15th Avenue in the Borough Park neighborhood of Brooklyn, one of the most 
																																																						
16 “Anti-Arab Plane Hijacking Plot Laid to Seized Pair,” New York Times, September 29th, 1970; 
and Russ, 251 – 262  
17 Michael Knight, "Bomb Wrecks Office of Palestine Group," New York Times, October 7th, 
1970 
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thoroughly Jewish neighborhoods, per capita, outside of Israel, and the epicenter of JDL activities.  
Officers found fifty-seven rifles, sixteen handguns, more than ten thousand rounds of ammunition, 
six pipes for making bombs, one hundred and ninety pounds of gunpowder, a blasting cap, and 
five yards of fuse.  They also found a contact list of JDL members, anti-Arab and anti-Black 
Panther literature, and floor plans of a number of United Nations Missions.18  BOSS set up a 
stakeout, but after three days and nobody appearing to enter the apartment that was rented under 
an assumed name, the Detectives gave up.  When news of the arms cache hit the public, given no 
hard evidence of JDL links, it was noted just that the weapons were linked to a “terrorist gang.”19  
Despite any arrests, BOSS was both pleased to get the weapons off the street and at the same time 
alarmed, when coupled with the recent bomb attack, at the definitively more violent direction that 
the JDL was moving in.   
The JDL campaign against Soviet interests continued in the midst of a highly controversial 
trial of Jewish men and women whom the Soviet government accused of attempting to hijack an 
airliner in order to flee to Israel; on November 25th, a pipe bomb hidden in an attaché case was 
placed against the front door of a building on East 49th Street.  The two-story building housed 
only two tenants – Aeroflot, the national Soviet airliner, on the first floor, and Intourist, a Soviet 
travel agency, on the second.  The bomb exploded at 3:20 in the morning, causing damage to the 
façade and shattering windows, but the NYPD Bomb Squad found only minor damage inside the 
building.  About twenty minutes after the explosion, the Associated Press received a telephone 
																																																						
18 "Explosives Cache Mystifies Police," New York Times, October 22nd, 1970; also see Russ, 
“The Zionist Hooligans,” 301 
19 William Federici and William McFadden, “Bare Terrorist Bomb Plot,” New York Daily News, 
October 21st, 1970.  Shlomo Russ argues that JDL member Josh Joffe did in fact approach the 
apartment, but noticed the stakeout and JDL abandoned the stash.  It is self-serving, of course, 
for Joffe to argue this alertness, but probably impossible to prove.  See Russ, “The Zionist 
Hooligans,” 301 – 303 
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call: "Let the world know," the caller said, "that while Jews are on trial in Russia, the Soviet Union 
will be on trial. Never again."20  Leveraging the publicity, JDL held a press conference the next 
day: “The has no idea who bombed those offices, but it applauds the people who bombed them,” 
Kahane told the assembled reporters.  “When there is no resources to democratic protest allowed, 
then other protests to free people who are enslaved is a legitimate form of protest, including 
bombing and other acts of violence.”21  
Despite investigation by FBI and NYPD, no one was ever charged with the bombing.  As 
Shlomo Russ illustrates, BOSS undercover operatives Rosenthal and Eisner, both by then at least 
partially suspected of being policemen or informers, were outside the loop of those planning and 
carrying the bomb attacks out, and thus couldn’t offer any clues.22   
JDL bombs continued to explode as 1970 turned into 1971.  At 4:30 in the morning of 
March 30th, a pipe bomb exploded outside the national offices of the Communist Party at 23 West 
26th Street, blowing in the building's door and shattering windows.  Gus Hall, the chairman of the 
United States Communist Party, had flown to Russia to attend the 24th Congress of the Communist 
Party that had commenced that day.  Moments after the blast, an anonymous male called United 
Press International and the Associated Press: "The Communist Party building has just been 
bombed. Let the tools and lackeys who throw our brethren into jail know that they too are 
responsible for the actions of those who they support. Let our people go! Never again!"23   
																																																						
20 Alfonso A Narvaez, "Bomb Damages Russian Offices Here," New York Times, November 
26th, 1970 
21 Jack Cowley and Mel Juffe, “Russian Offices Are Bombed Here,” New York Post, November 
26th, 1970 
22 See Rosenthal, Rookie Cop, 138 – 139, and 161 - 162 
23 JDL had even recently expanded its bombing campaign to other cities, most notably to 
Washington, D.C., where bombs were causing a great deal of international tension between the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  See Harry Schwartz, "Threats and Bombs – A Nasty Phase For The Two 
Nations," New York Times, January 10th, 1971; Bernard Gwertzman, "Gromyko Gives Beam 
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Just a few hours later, a bomb planted by Cuban exiles exploded at offices of the United 
States Cuban Health Exchange in Union Square, just a half-mile away.  It was a busy day for right-
wing terrorism in New York City.24 
 
On April 22 1971, four JDL members – including Sheldon Seigel, who had joined the JDL in 1969 
and rose to prominence quickly for his aptitude with electronics and bomb design – carried two 
imitation leather briefcases containing timed dynamite bombs to the Amtorg Trading Corporation, 
the Soviet trade representative to the U.S.  They placed the first briefcase in Amtorg's nineteenth 
floor stairwell; the other was put on the twentieth floor. They slipped unnoticed past the two 
policemen stationed in the building.25  
At 5:15PM, the United Press International and the Associated Press received calls from an 
unidentified man: “There have been several time bombs placed in the office of Amtorg… They 
will go off in less than fifteen minutes.  Free all Soviet Jewish prisoners. Let my people go.  Never 
again!”26 
Twenty minutes later, the bomb on the nineteenth floor went off. The blast blew out 
windows and doors, pounded a hole in the cement stairwell and in part of the ceiling, and touched 
off small fires.  The other device, one floor above, failed to detonate.  
 
																																																						
'Stern Protest' on Explosion," New York Times, January 9th, 1971; Richard Halloran, "Blast 
Damages Soviet Building in Washington,” New York Times, January 9th, 1971; and “U.S. Cars 
Damages in Soviet Actions,” New York Times, January 10th, 1971. 
24 “2 Blasts Damage Communist and U.S.-Cuban Offices,” New York Times, March 31st, 1971 
25 See Alan Dershowitz, The Best Defense, (New York: Random House, 1982), page 23.  
Dershowitz’s Chapter 1, “The Boro Park Connection,” is written exclusively on the topic of his 
involvement in JDL members’ defense; Also see Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” 438 – 448 
26 Martin Arnold, “Bomb Explodes in Midtown Soviet Trading Office,” New York Times, April 
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JDL INDICTMENTS AND FBI WIRETAPS – MAY 1971 
 
In the midst of the anti-Soviet attacks, in May of 1971 thirteen members of the JDL were indicted 
on federal weapons charges including Title II of the Gun Control Act – the charges ranged from 
illegally buying and transporting guns to illegally constructing and detonating explosives at the 
JDL’s camp in upstate New York.  The JDL members were not, however, indicted for any actual 
bombings, including the most recent one at the Amtorg office just two weeks earlier.27   
The indictments were largely a result of Rosenthal’s submitted intelligence reports and 
testimony before a federal grand jury.  The undercover policeman’s superiors, knowing his reports 
and testimony were soon to become part of the public record and his true identity (long suspected 
by some in JDL) would become known to all and concerned about retaliation, finally got Rosenthal 
an NYPD badge, had his official NYPD ID photo taken, and instructed him to wear his service 
weapon at all times and take his wife and go into hiding.  They young couple stayed in her family’s 
home in New Jersey for four months.28   
In any case, by the time Rosenthal testified before the grand jury and the indictments came 
down, in a significantly impactful development that will be discussed at greater length in the 
following chapter, BOSS – the organization that recruited and placed Rosenthal in the JDL – no 
longer existed as a result of a far-reaching reorganization of the Detective Division that had 
occurred just months earlier.  BOSS, which had commenced the investigations into the JDL in 
October of 1969, would be a complete nonfactor as the case progressed in 1971 and beyond. 
																																																						
27 David A. Andelman, "7 in J.D.L. Seized as Conspirators,” New York Times, May 13th, 1971 
28 As detailed by Rosenthal to Russ; see Russ, pages 459 – 490 for a highly detailed narrative of 
the lead up to the operation and the actual arrests.  Also see Rosenthal, Rookie Cop, 167 - 169 
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On May 12th, a dozen NYPD Detectives and ATF Agents stormed the JDL offices on 42nd 
street.  Undercover ATF Agent Mark Gold, his cover also hanging on by a thread, took part in 
other arrests in Brooklyn.  Kahane was one of those taken into custody.   
The resulting trial was the most serious legal trouble the JDL had faced so far.  They had 
previously been subject to mostly minor charges such as disturbing the peace; now Kahane and 
the other indictees found themselves charged with charges including conspiracy to make 
explosives and to transport firearms across state lines.29  Immediately, however, their team of 
experienced and respected defense attorneys put the government itself on the defensive; the Nixon 
Administration and the Justice Department were, at that time, already dealing with what would be 
the first rounds of challenges to wiretapping and other intelligence and surveillance practices 
throughout the nation.   
The government would later admit at trial that “acting solely under a direction of then 
Attorney General John Mitchell,” in October of 1970, “the FBI installed a so-called domestic 
security wiretap on the New York office of the Jewish Defense League.  The surveillance, 
conducted without judicial sanction, continued until July 2, 1971. The government concedes that 
these taps were unlawful.”30 The JDL defense team made this a central part of their strategy; 
Nathan Lewin, part of the defense team, was shocked when the government admitted the 
warrantless wiretapping.  “In all other cases, rather than disclosing the wiretaps, they dropped the 
charges.  This was the first admitted warrantless wiretapping.”31  
																																																						
29 Eleanor Blau, “Hearing Open for Kahane Trial,” New York Times, July 7th, 1971 
30 United States of America, Appellee, v. Richard Huss, Appellant.  482 F.2d 38.  United States 
of America, Appellee, v. Sheldon Seigel, Appellant.  United States of America, Appellee, v. 
Jeffrey H. Smilow, Appellant, 2d Cir. 1973, page 1 
31 Lewin, as quoted in Russ, 492.  Fuller narrative of the case appears in Russ, “The Zionist 
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Since the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Executive had claimed that 
warrantless wiretaps not used in criminal prosecution but rather for intelligence and national 
security were not explicitly disallowed, and that practiced continued for a quarter-century.32  
Further, following Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s efforts, the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets (OCCSS) Act was adopted in 1968, more explicitly allowing for “national security” 
wiretap usage in this manner.33  Seen in this light, then, the FBI’s usage of them as such is far from 
being unilateral and unsupported by other aspects of government.   
All of that changed in early 1971.  In Michigan, California, and New York, the practice of 
so-called “national security wiretaps” without judicial approval were being struck down by the 
courts.34  And in what became known as the “Keith Case,” a Federal Judge found that all domestic 
wiretaps, even those that the government asserted were relevant to national security and required 
only the authorization of the president, in fact required the authorization of the courts.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the decision in United States v. U.S. District Court the following year.35   
																																																						
32 See Theoharis, Powers, et al, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, 21, 36.   
33 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (OCCSS) Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789D; see Title 
III of the act, including pages 214 and 223, for discussion of national security communication 
intercepts.  Page 214 states that in an “emergency situation” with “respect to conspiratorial 
activities threatening the national security… wire or oral communication [are authorized to] be 
intercepted before an order authorizing such interception can with due diligence be obtained…”  
34 In San Francisco, for example, an indictment against noted Black Panther leader David 
Hilliard was thrown out because of wiretap issues in May; see Earl Caldwell, "Panther is 
Released Because of Wiretap," New York Times, May 5th, 1971.  
35 See Steven V. Roberts, "Court Requires A Warrant For Domestic Wiretaps," New York Times, 
January 13th, 1971.  For the SCOTUS case, see United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 
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It certainly didn’t help the prosecution that just as the question was being considered by 
the court, the New York Times released the Pentagon Papers, casting further shadows and doubts 
on government conduct.36  
 
Ultimately, the question of the wiretaps for the government, and defense concerns about some 
indictees or witnesses eventually cooperating with the government, brought both sides to a draw.  
The prosecution offered a deal; three of the defendants including Kahane would plead guilty to 
which they expected some leniency in sentencing; the JDL would turn in all weapons and dynamite 
they possessed with no repercussions.37  Soon after, nearly 200 sticks of dynamite showed up on 
the side of the Palisades Parkway overlooking the western bank of the Hudson River.  It was too 
much dynamite for the NYPD to handle; the U.S. Army had to retrieve the explosives and transport 
it to Fort Dix (targeted for dynamite bombing just over a year earlier by Weather Underground) 
by truck.38  A number of guns were transferred by a JDL member to an ATF agent on the Cross 
Island Expressway in Brooklyn; and then the JDL left nearly 20 pounds of smokeless powder, five 
pounds of blasting powder, and a half-dozen blasting caps for authorities at the East Side Airlines 
terminal on 37th street and First Avenue.39  
On July 23rd 1971, Judge Weinstein sentenced the three members – eighteen-year-old 
Stewart Cohen to three years of probation and a fine, Chaim Bieber to three years in prison and a 
																																																						
36 The Pentagon Papers was a secret Department of Defense study of the U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam spanning more than two decades, from 1945 to 1967; beginning on June 13th, 1971, The 
New York Times began publishing articles based on the nearly 7,000 pages of documents leaked 
by Daniel Ellsburg, revealing American leaders’ deception and mischaracterization of the war, 
magnifying what was already an atmosphere of great opposition to the continuing war. 
37 See Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” 509 - 513 
38 Emmanuel Perlmutter, "Dynamite is Left for Authorities,” New York Times, July 12th, 1971 
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fine, and Kahane to five years in prison and a fine – but suspended all the jail time imposed under 
the condition that none of the men were to have anything to do with “guns, bombs, dynamite, 
gunpowder, fuses, Molotov cocktails, clubs, or any other weapons.”40  That the JDL was getting 
off with barely a slap on the wrist, and for charges not even related to any of the bombings in New 
York City, infuriated the prosecution.  But given the facts of the case, they took token convictions 
rather than risk none at all.  The sentences certainly stand in stark contrast to those handed down 
to the Melville collective the previous year. 
Just outside the courthouse after the JDL sentences were announced, a large triumphant 
crowd celebrating with him, Kahane told the gathered supporters that, pursuant to his sentence, he 
couldn’t “talk about guns.”  However, raising his hands mimicking a gun with an extended thumb 
and forefinger, he told them “But I want you to have this.”  Raising his other hand similarly, he 
told them “And not only this, but that.”  He told reporters at the gathering that “[o]ur campaign 
motto will be ‘Every Jew a .22’… Some time or other, there is no other way than violence.  I am 
not against the use of violence if necessary.”41 
 
THE AMTORG ARRESTS 
 
Since no JDL members had been indicted for the bombing in the case that proceeded from May 
1971, any new evidence collected on the March Amtorg bomb case could be considered without 
double jeopardy ramifications.  Investigation of the Amtorg bombing remained a priority for 
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NYPD, although that responsibility shifted from BOSS to the newly created Arson and Explosives 
Squad.  Chief of Detectives Albert Seedman had appointed Detectives Joe Gibney and Santo (Sam) 
Parola from that new Squad as the lead detectives on the JDL / Amtorg case.  Parola would emerge 
as NYPD’s key investigator on the case after BOSS receded from the picture. 
The FBI had also set up a special squad – Squad 312 – to investigate the JDL.  Special 
Agent Robert Nixon was a key member of the squad and liaised at great length with NYPD Arson 
of Explosives Detective Parola; Nixon later testified in court that Squad 312 indeed received a 
great deal of its information from the Detective.42   
Serendipitously, just as the NYPD lost its key undercover asset in JDL – Rosenthal, after 
his true identity became public after the May 1971 indictments were announced – the department 
successfully developed an important informant from within the organization.  
In early August of 1971, NYPD Arson and Explosives Detective Parola successfully 
coerced JDL’s Sheldon Seigel into acting as an informant.  During the investigation of the Amtorg 
bombing, NYPD had seized Seigel’s car and found “fragments of wire, several pieces of plastic, a 
can of mace, a small film capsule filled with gunpowder, a cardboard tube with an attached fuse 
and ten empty alarm clock boxes”43 – bomb-making components that greatly put him in a 
precarious position.  In an effort to extricate himself from trouble he found himself in stemming 
from the search of his car (a search later found to be illegal, which would take on great importance 
down the road), Seigel gave up details about the Amtorg bombing and other JDL attacks over the 
previous year.44  
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44 Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” page 611 
	 269	
The information NYPD acquired through their investigation – and their inside man – was 
routinely passed along to federal authorities including the FBI and the ATF, continuing the NYPD 
– FBI relationship most closely characterized in the past by NYPD BOSS’s liaisons with the 
Bureau.  Seigel was also convinced to testify for the grand jury in what was to be a second federal 
trial following the first that grew largely out of NYPD Officer Rosenthal’s testimony and the 
Bureau’s wiretaps; the grand jury indicted seven JDL members after Seigel’s then-secret 
testimony.45  In reporting the September 1971 arrests in the media, the NYPD misdirected attention 
from their secret informant by crediting the “technical investigation” with yielding the evidence 
the indictments relied upon, and not the testimony of a witness.46  Ultimately, only two JDL 
members (in addition to Seigel, still maintaining his secret status) would plead guilty in relation to 
the Amtorg bomb.47 
 
THE HUROK BOMB  
 
Even before the Amtorg indictments, the JDL began planning for what would become the act of 
terrorism it is most widely remembered for.  Eschewing dynamite, at least temporarily, after 
turning in nearly 200 pounds of it as part of the plea bargain with the government in the 1971 case, 
members of the organization began constructing a massive smoke bomb in January of 1972.  The 
group targeted the offices of Sol Hurok, the concert promoter that had been the target of JDL 
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rhetoric and protests in the past, and Columbia Artists, who were together promoting the U.S. tour 
of the Soviet Union’s Osipov Balalaika Orchestra.  On the morning of January 26th, 1972, a team 
of high school-aged JDL members unleashed the smoke bombs on the Columbia and Hurok offices 
on 57th street and 56th street, respectively, in midtown Manhattan.  But in the Hurok offices, the 
intense heat from the smoke bomb caused fire to break out, quickly engulfing the nearby office 
furniture and trapping several employees in interior offices where they couldn’t smash windows 
to call for help and ventilate the rooms like those in exterior offices were able to do; firemen had 
to battle an intense inferno and deadly smoke conditions to reach those trapped.  All told, thirteen 
members of the Hurok staff including Sol Hurok himself were taken to the hospital for serious 
smoke inhalation, some only after being revived on the scene by firemen.  A well-liked twenty-
seven year old secretary, Iris Kones, died at the scene.48  The only death the JDL was ever directly 
linked to in the U.S. was a devout, practicing young Jewish woman from Long Island.49   
Shlomo Russ argues that everyone in the JDL was “stunned” by the death of Kones; those 
involved were rightfully fearful of the fallout; those not involved were demoralized and even 
disgusted.  “The (earlier) bombings were difficult for some to accept, but murder was 
inconceivable,” Russ argues.  “People left the League in droves and the hard-core either dropped 
out, or shifted direction, devoting their energies to self-preservation.  Avoiding arrest became even 
more important than attacking Russians.  The strident tone of the League was gone.”50   
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On May 7th 1972, more than three months after the death of Kones, and after intense pressure, 
Seigel told Detective Parola everything he knew about the Hurok smoke bomb attack; the 
participants, how it was done, where they got the materials, who made it, etc.  Seigel was panicked; 
he had built the bombs himself, and had even instructed the young JDL high-schoolers what to do 
in placing them.  The bomb, Seigal claimed, was intended to cause a disturbance, but not injury 
and certainly not death.51  
On June 19, 1972, Seigel and two of the high school students who delivered the bombs – 
Stuart Cohen and Sheldon Davis – were indicted in federal court for the Hurok bombing.  On May 
2nd of the following year, just three days before the trial was to begin, prosecutors moved to sever 
Seigel from the other defendants on the grounds that he was “a government informer who had 
provided information leading to the indictments, that he had testified before the grand jury, and 
that he would be called as a witness at trial, under a grant of immunity.”52  Seigel was outed as an 
informer to his compatriots; Seigel, though, had long told Detectives and prosecutors that he never 
had an intention to testify in court, and would not be compelled to do so.  Other than stating his 
name and date of birth when taking the stand, he said nothing.  Beside that obstacle in the 
prosecution’s path, the hearings revealed the existence of two sets of FBI wiretaps; more wiretaps, 
these that even the prosecution itself conceded lacked “any legal authorization.”53  The presiding 
District Judge, Arnold Bauman, also concluded that an automobile search central to the case, 
conducted by NYPD, violated the Fourth Amendment – the search and seizure of the car being of 
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fundamental importance to the case because the automobile belonged to Seigel and was the 
linchpin in how NYPD compelled Seigel into being an informer.  “In sum, [Seigel’s] contention 
[was] that, in one way or another, he was coerced or pressured into cooperation with government 
officials, that such pressure stemmed directly from illegal wiretapping and ancillary constitutional 
violations, and that all prosecution questions asked at trial are tainted and, therefore, subject to 
suppression.”54  Once again, as with the case brought against them in May of 1971, the 
government’s new case against the JDL was on the ropes because of aggressive, illegal 
investigatory methods.   
The case wouldn’t recover.  In June of 1973, after a complex and ultimately highly 
compelling argument made by a young Alan Dershowitz, the U.S. Court of Appeals found the 
wiretaps illegal and inadmissible, and Seigel won the right to not testify and retained the immunity 
he had been granted in the case.55  The court was unhappy letting the defendants off the hook; “Of 
course, we all suffer when, in [former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin] Cardozo's classic 
phrase, the criminal goes free because the constable has blundered.  The remedy, however, is to 
help the constable not to blunder.”56  Despite angry threats from Judge Bauman in the bombing 
case, two witnesses – Richard Huss and Jeffrey Smilow, the other, unindicted high school students 
involved in delivering the Hurok bomb – also refused to testify.  Charges against high schoolers 
Sheldon Davis and Stuart Cohen were dismissed due to lack of evidence.57  The following August, 
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55 Russ, “The Zionist Hooligans,” includes a compelling narrative of the intricacies of the 
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56 482 F.2d 38 - United States of America, Appellee, v. Richard Huss, et al., page 11 
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the two witnesses were sentenced to a year each in prison for refusing to testify.  They would be 
the only JDL members convicted of anything in relation to the Hurok bombing and death of Iris 
Kones.58   
 
Shlomo Russ argues that JDL lost its ability to attract newcomers after the Hurok bombing.  Instead 
of building JDL, members concentrated on saving themselves from the legal fallout.59  But in 
reality that wasn’t the end of JDL terrorism; following the deadly January attack on the Hurok 
office, 1972 was in fact a busy year for the JDL.  Some members, unassociated with the Hurok 
attack, moved on to bombing American Nazis, members of the National Renaissance Party, and 
even accidentally bombed the house of a young Queens couple with their small children inside, 
mistaking it for the home of an elderly woman, Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan, who was a WWII 
German concentration camp supervisor.60  In May of 1972, four JDL members were arrested with 
plotting to bomb the residence of the Soviet Mission to the U.N. in Long Island;61 two years later, 
other members would be arrested for plotting to assassinate Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.62  
 
JDL AND RIGHT WING TERROR IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Russ makes a compelling argument that the JDL was never subject to the kind of belligerent 
investigation and prosecution that other terrorists in New York City and the U.S. of the time were 
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subject to: similar to the argument posed (successfully, it seems) by the attorneys then recently 
defending the Cuban Power terrorists, Russ argues there was a “value congruency” with the ruling 
institutions of American society, “whereby JDL attacked the ideological enemy of the United 
States (communism)… [and] never posed a threat to the social order of American society.”  
Nowhere is this more evident than in considering JDL's original strategy, clearly stated in the 
organization’s manifesto, which states “The Jewish Defense League was created because we think 
that the American dream is worth saving and can be saved”63 – words that could have been echoed 
by other right-wing organizations that had turned to terror to defend their version of the American 
Dream, such as the Minutemen.  This “value congruency” resulted in a degree of tolerance that 
JDL (and other right wing organizations like Cuban Power) enjoyed that other (mostly leftist) 
organizations that attacked the core of the American social and political structure (like the Melville 
collective) did not.64  In furthering Russ’s case, this scholar also argues that JDL as an organization, 
or it’s individual members including Kahane, were never targets of the most robust tool used by 
law enforcement authorities against terrorists and other (mostly law-abiding citizen) perceived 
enemies of the government – the FBI COINTEL Programs. 
It is, however, important to point out what has been shown in these pages, that both NYPD 
and FBI (and others like the ATF) did bring to bear the most potent tools they used against leftists, 
short of the COINTEL Programs (i.e., infiltrators, informants, and electronic forms of surveillance 
later found to be illegal) against the JDL.  As has been argued throughout this dissertation, while 
all counterterrorism efforts of the time were not created equal – those on the political left most 
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certainly bore the brunt of law enforcement efforts across the board – local and federal authorities 
didn’t turn a completely blind eye to those on the right.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In delivering his dissertation to the CUNY Graduate Center in 1981, Shlomo Russ argued that the 
JDL had virtually disappeared by that point in time.  Russ’s obituary of the JDL turned out to be, 
unfortunately, premature.  Although it would never regain the wider recognition, publicity, or 
support that it did in its first two or three years of existence, JDL meandered on and went on to be 
linked with a number of terrorist plots and assassinations in New York City and elsewhere for 
more than a decade.  In 1985, Alex Odeh, a prominent Palestinian-American civil rights activist 
and Regional Director for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), was killed 
by a pipe bomb in his California office the day after engaging in a heated back-and-forth with a 
JDL member on the television program Nightline.  His death, long suspected by authorities to have 
been perpetrated by JDL members, remains officially unsolved to this day.65  Odeh’s death came 
less than one year after Kahane, under his Kach Party banner, was elected to the Israeli Knesset; 
in 1988, however, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that both Kahane as an individual and Kach as 
a party were barred from Knesset for good.  And two years after that, Kahane himself was 
assassinated by a terrorist, gunned down in midtown Manhattan by El Sayyid Nosair, who would 
later be linked to 1993 World Trade Center plot mastermind Omar Abdel-Rahman, the "Blind 
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Sheik."66  And in the wake of September 11th, the FBI arrested and charged the then-chairman of 
the JDL and another member with a plot to blow up Los Angeles-area mosques and assassinate 
Daniel Issa, a California Republican member of the U.S. House of Representatives of Lebanese 
descent.67  The JDL chairman, Irving David Rubin, committed suicide while awaiting trial the 
following year.  After being convicted and sentenced for the conspiracy, Rubin’s accomplice, Earl 
Leslie Krugel, was killed in prison in 2005 by a fellow inmate.68  
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PART III: A DECADE OF TERROR 
Chapter 10 : A Retreating Response
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As the new era of terrorism dawned in New York City during the latter part of the long Sixties, 
both the FBI and the NYPD were poised to respond to it.  As previously discussed, scholars of 
terrorism and counterterrorism have long posited that intelligence was then, and continues to be, 
the most effective tool in countering terrorist threats; future CIA Director Michael Hayden argued 
soon after the 9/11 attacks that “[i]ntelligence – and how we use it – is our first line of defense 
against terrorists…”1  And in the long Sixties, both the FBI and NYPD had robust intelligence 
operations in New York City, operations that among other things allowed them to infiltrate, 
through undercover operatives and informants, many of the movements and organizations that 
would turn to terrorism during the era.  Of course, as Frank Donner explores, they also infiltrated, 
coerced, and intimidated a long list of persons and groups that were not charged or even suspected 
of any illegal activity, but purely for their constitutionally protected political activity.  These extra-
legal practices, and the many civil rights violations that came along with them, would result in 
increasing public and political hostility to the types of intelligence operations that had been used 
by those organizations (and others) with good effect in previous years.   
In May of 1970, notable New York Post columnist James A. Wechsler wrote a piece 
considering George Demmerle’s undercover work against the Melville collective: “Before some 
indignant hard-head apoplectically construes these remarks as an apologia for terrorism, it is 
necessary to state that I concede the need for democratic self defense from mad bombers.  This 
will involve some degree of underground agentry (sic) as well as usual police procedures…”  
However, Wechsler argues, “both the scope and character of such secret exercises have too long 
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been unquestioned and unexplored by any congressional committee.”2  Wechsler’s voice was not 
alone in calling for greater questioning and exploration of these tactics, regardless of how effective 
they may have been.  The next several years would be rife with penetrating investigations and 
often harsh criticism of both the FBI and NYPD (among other law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies) that resulted in a receding response to terrorism in New York City. 
 
CHANGES – NYPD  
 
Just as the year of bombings in “gigantic proportions” was breaking out in New York City, the 
NYPD was on the verge of a long period of scandal, public scrutiny, and reorganization that would 
dramatically alter the way in which it had conducted intelligence and nascent counterterrorism 
operations from the preceding years.   
The relationship between City Hall and the police department – overwhelmingly positive 
during the Wagner administration – had been antagonistic since before John Lindsay even took 
office in January 1966.  Lindsay’s full-throated advocacy of the CCRB was supplemented by his 
appointment of a succession of more progressive, reform-minded Police Commissioners – Howard 
Leary and then, especially, Patrick Murphy – who would themselves have a dramatic impact on 
the department. 
In perhaps the highest profile scandal of his administration, Mayor Lindsay established the 
Knapp Commission in April of 1970 – was compelled by circumstances to do so, really – in order 
to investigate deep and systematic police corruption after allegations by Frank Serpico, an eleven-
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year veteran of the department, were brought to public attention on the front page of the New York 
Times.  Stories of pervasive and alarming corruption – graft, protection rackets, collusion with 
drug dealers – and the investigations of it would litter local and national papers for at least the next 
two and a half years.  As the Times argued when first breaking the story that spring, corruption 
which was even by then generally suspected by many had “undermine[d] the public faith in 
justice.”3  It was the worst possible timing for the department, as far as countering terrorism was 
concerned – the Melville collective had yet to plead guilty to their bombing campaign; new 
organizations like the Jewish Defense League were coming into focus; the Weather Underground 
townhouse investigation was ongoing and they would bomb NYPD Headquarters just as the 
Commission was beginning its wide-ranging inquiry less than two months later.  In what may have 
been a welcome respite from criticism at home, Commissioner Leary would go before the U.S. 
Senate and talk about terrorism just as Knapp investigations were beginning.4   
Ultimately, in their final report in 1972 the Knapp Commission found what many by that 
time expected they would – staggering levels of corruption within the department.  More than half 
of all members of the department, the report would argue, were tainted by some degree of 
corruption.  Even the Mayor and his aides, never accused of being great friends to the police, were 
accused of failing to do more to resolve a problem they knew existed with the department.5 
Intelligence operations and excesses were outside the scope of the Commission’s 
investigation and the final report did not take a position on what was, by then, a heated 
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conversation about civil liberties violations by law enforcement and intelligence not only in New 
York City but throughout the nation.  Even without commenting on it, though, the Commission 
Report added weight to what was by the end of 1972 a police department intensely suspect by a 
city that had lost faith in its police.   
 
Named by Lindsay as the new NYPD Commissioner in October of 1970 – just three months after 
Leary and other police officials testified before Congress – Patrick V. Murphy had himself earned 
a long reputation as a reformer, and one of his immediate initiatives would dramatically impact 
the department’s efforts at countering terrorism through the remaining years of the long Sixties.   
Murphy believed that the Detective Bureau – where the Bureau of Special Services had 
been ensconced since its creation –  was “a scary skeleton in the closet of the department… for 
decades the Detective Bureau had gone its own way, lived by its own rules.  The Chief of 
Detectives,” the Commissioner himself argued “rarely had to answer to the Police 
Commissioner… Only on a neat organization chart was the Detective Bureau a province of the 
larger jungle that was the NYPD.  In reality the bureau was an independent breakaway entity, with 
its own laws, customs, and marching orders.”  Beyond living outside of the department’s chain of 
command, Murphy just plainly didn’t think that detectives were very effective police officers.6   
In a move designed to rein in control of the Detective Bureau and, as importantly, the 
rampant corruption that Murphy believed the Knapp Commission would find there, the 
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Commissioner embarked on a wide-ranging reorganization of the Detective Bureau (or Detective 
Division) that would put BOSS on the road to extinction.7   
The Mayor’s office, Murphy argued, was somewhat incensed at not being kept informed 
of the dramatic reorganization plan, but realizing the potential cost of taking on the powerful and 
influential Detective Bureau, allowed Murphy to proceed with the plan and to own it – along with 
any political cost that the move invited.  Despite his belief that Lindsay didn’t understand police, 
was resentful of them, and often seemed to harbor a personal vendetta against the department after 
the failure of the CCRB plan, Murphy argued that the Mayor’s decision to defer to the 
Commissioner and support him on the Detective Bureau reorganization was “one of the best 
mayoral decisions John Lindsay had ever made.  I was very thankful.” 8 
 
One of the first moves in the reorganization was specifically aimed at BOSS, just as it continued 
to investigate the Jewish Defense League, the Weather Underground, and the litany of other groups 
and individuals turning to terrorism at the time.  In early December of 1970, Commissioner 
Murphy announced a restructuring of the “fragmented” police department intelligence functions, 
combining the subversive and political policing that BOSS focused on with narcotics and 
organized crime intelligence.  Less independence, more visibility, and much greater oversight by 
the Chief of Detectives, and especially by the Commissioner, were the intended and immediate 
results.9  
																																																						
7 Murphy and Plate, Commissioner, 209.  Murphy refers to it as the Detective Bureau, but in 
other places including official NYPD organizational charts it is referred to as the Detective 
Division. 
8 Murphy and Plate, Commissioner, 209, and all of Chapter 8, “The Detective Mystique,” in 
general. 
9 David Burnham, "Police Will Unify Intelligence Arm," New York Times, December 1st, 1970 
	 283	
Even before the reorganization announcement, Murphy later explained, “[w]e had moved 
quietly to remove from the [Detective] Bureau the famed Bureau of Special Services…  for what 
[BOSS] was involved with (intelligence and subversive investigations), the loose supervision of 
the Detective Bureau seemed the worst possible place for it.”10  That “loose supervision” – control 
not by the Mayor, not even by the Police Commissioner – had allowed BOSS to operate in a way, 
for years, that may not have been stopped by men in either office had they had direct control, but 
had most certainly operated in a way that was coming under vastly increasing criticism and legal 
challenge.   
As former BOSS Detective Anthony Bouza tells it, BOSS had undergone a period of 
decline and marginalization as early as 1966 when “liberal mayor” John Lindsay ascended to 
power; the appointment of “tough-minded, liberal police commissioner” Murphy accelerated the 
decline of the special unit.  “Neither man had any previous experience with BOSS,” Bouza argues 
“and the unit was left alone to lapse into a period of decline, confusion, obscurity, and 
ineffectualness.”11  But Bouza mischaracterizes, to a degree, what Murphy – with Lindsay’s tacit 
approval – effected upon BOSS.  The unit wasn’t “left alone” at all – it was intentionally relegated 
to the position it found itself in by the end of 1970.     
The changes essentially meant the end of BOSS as an independent unit within the 
department and a massive de-emphasizing of the kind of work the unit excelled at.   
A related development was the emergence of Arson and Explosives Squad in the spring of 
1971; at the time, as previously discussed, the NYPD Bomb Squad had responsibility for the 
technical aspects of bombing investigations – securing scenes and evidence, subject matter and 
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technical expertise on explosive material and bomb design, and the like.  But individual NYPD 
precincts handled the investigations of bombings that occurred in their jurisdiction.  Investigations 
got complicated when the same person or group was suspected of multiple attacks throughout the 
city, drawing many precincts into looking for the same bomber or group.  This was more of a 
theoretical than practical issue with BOSS in the picture; a unit within the Detective Division, 
BOSS had a jurisdictional mandate over the entire city.  But that was no longer the case.   
The new Arson and Explosives Squad, central to the latter part of the JDL case, unified 
investigations involving these types of crimes in one unit under the Detective Division.  The Arson 
and Explosives Squad was an additional aspect of NYPD reorganization that further divvied out 
functions formerly performed by BOSS.  The new Squad even had an FDNY Fire Marshal attached 
– the first standing joint unit to incorporate New York police and fire investigators, something that 
wouldn’t happen again until the reorganization of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force after the 
1993 World Trade Center attack.  But the Arson and Explosives Squad was decidedly not what 
BOSS was – a political intelligence unit.  And as seen in the collapse of the case against the JDL 
that detectives from the case helped usher in with what the court found to be violations of JDL 
member Sheldon Seigel’s constitutional rights, Arson and Explosives would start off with no better 
of a track record than the one that BOSS ended with.12  
Despite what was by the time Murphy took over an escalating importance surrounding the 
work done by BOSS – the “undercover men… who really have a sense of what might be 
happening,” as even Lindsay aide Jay Kriegel had suggested not two years earlier13 – the new 
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Commissioner essentially closed down the unit.  It is impossible, I argue, to see the move 
exclusively in the context of BOSS’s work to infiltrate and disrupt threats like the Statue of Liberty 
plot and the JDL’s campaign of bombings; in that context, even Lindsay and his close aide seem 
to have acknowledged that BOSS was genuinely capable.  But Murphy was a reformer through-
and-through; over the past eight years he had been brought on to fight corruption in Syracuse, and 
then in Detroit, and done a capable job of effecting change.14  And the winds of change were 
already blowing hard in New York city; the Knapp Commission had commenced what nobody 
doubted would be an eviscerating report on the police department; the same trajectory was 
increasingly evident of the ongoing trial of the Panther 13, and what that case would illuminate in 
regards to BOSS’s “undercover agentry,” as New York Post columnist James A. Wechsler had 
referred to it as.   
Just six months after the Detective Division reorganization commenced, the acquittal on 
all charges for the remaining Panther 13 defendants – a terrorism case built entirely on the work 
of BOSS undercover operatives Ralph White, Carlos Ashwood, and Eugene Roberts – was 
unambiguously illustrative of the unprecedented criticism and legal challenges facing BOSS.  “I 
don’t fault the undercover agents,” one juror explained.  “[T]hey were doing their job where 
society put them, but nobody really saw [the defendants] do the things [i.e., the charges] the 
[undercovers] talked about.”  Defense counsel, reflecting a growing opinion of those concerned 
with civil liberties, was far harsher; denouncing the BOSS agents as “spies,” attorney Charles T. 
McKinney exclaimed that “[n]othing testified to by the three agents was corroborated by a single 
																																																						
14 Al Baker, “Patrick V. Murphy, Police Leader Who Reformed New York Force, Dies at 91,” 
New York Times, December 17th, 2011 
	 286	
disinterested witness.”15  Defense attorney Gerald Lefcourt actually believed that the jurors knew 
that his clients were guilty of something – that there was indeed some terrorist plotting involved – 
but that some jurors “believed the undercovers had lied,” and that the acquittal was a political 
statement.  Ingram Fox, the fifty-three-year old jury foreman, believed the Grand Jury itself should 
have been investigated for bringing charges in the first place.16 
 
Only six months after Murphy’s dramatic changes to the Detective Division, the decision to push 
BOSS into the background seemed incredibly prescient.  Within days of the Panther 13 acquittal, 
a class action suit was filed against the now-defunct BOSS, its leadership including the former 
Commanding Officer, William Knapp, the Mayor, Commissioner Murphy, and “various unknown 
employees of the Police Department acting as undercover operators and informers.”  The federal 
suit – filed on behalf of sixteen original plaintiffs but inviting all New Yorkers who had been 
similarly affected to join – included three of the recently acquitted Panthers, Abbie Hoffman, and 
an activist and attorney by the name of Barbara Handschu whose surname would become 
synonymous with the case and the impactful decisions that would flow from it.  The case would 
ultimately result in what has become known as the “Handschu Decree,” and has had a more lasting 
impact on the way that NYPD conducts counterterrorism than any other policy or court proceeding 
in the history of the police department.17 
The Handschu complaint alleged that BOSS epitomized a long history of illegal police 
surveillance, infiltration, disruption and stifling of constitutionally-protected rights of political 
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expression in New York City.  The plaintiffs alleged seven specific areas of illegal or improper 
police conduct: the use of informers; infiltration; interrogation; overt surveillance; summary 
punishment; intelligence gathering; and electronic surveillance.18   
District Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr., who took over the case as it wound its long way 
through the system, would later characterize the complaint as alleging “constitutional violations 
of NYPD information gathering and surveillance conducted on a whim, in secrecy, without any 
civilian or judicial oversight, whose poisoned fruits were indiscriminately disseminated” to 
organizations like the FBI.19 
Essentially, the suit alleged what Donner argues in Protectors of Privilege.  The intent of 
the case was not to impact how the police department countered terrorism, per se, but to protect 
the civil liberties of New Yorkers from the types of unconstitutional violations the suit alleged that 
were sometimes, and sometimes effectively, brought to bear in countering terrorism.  
In a long, detailed affidavit, Commissioner Murphy acknowledged that NYPD traced the 
roots of the Bureau of Special Services (by the time of the case renamed the Public Security 
Section) all the way back to the NYPD Italian Squad, as this dissertation argues, and that the 
“political unrest” of the era had prompted vastly increased investigations, surveillance, 
undercovers, and infiltrators of "groups that because of their conduct or rhetoric may pose a threat 
to life, property, or governmental administration.”20   
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Essentially, what Murphy argued is that political activity was increasingly monitored for 
fear it would turn into political violence including terrorism. 
In response to Murphy’s affidavit, the counsel for the plaintiffs argued that "Commissioner 
Murphy conceded that the Police Department was engaged in the vast bulk of activities described 
in the complaint, including surreptitious surveillance and undercover infiltration of the political 
activities of individuals and groups." Judge Haight agreed – the Commissioner had, indeed, 
admitted that the practices BOSS was accused of had occurred.  The constitutionality of those 
practices was the only issue at hand.21 
 
In February of 1973 – just as emergent actors like Omega 7 and FALN were preparing to 
commence their terrorism campaigns in New York City –  Commissioner Murphy announced two 
moves that would further degrade the capabilities brought to bear against terrorism in New York 
City.  Both moves, plaintiff’s counsel observed and the court agreed, were clearly “NYPD's self-
serving declaration(s) with an eye toward pending litigation.”22   
NYPD officials understood that their practices stood so far outside evolving standards of 
acceptability, their relationship with City Hall so soured, that even in a time when the threat of 
terrorism was escalating so dramatically, even before the courts forced them to do anything, they 
made the difficult decision to self-impose restrictions on their own operations that had for some 
time been effective, if not entirely in line with the letter of the law, at countering terrorists.  
The Commissioner announced that more than one million files of individuals and 
organizations had been purged from the police department records – those collected over decades 
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by BOSS and its predecessor units.  The index of individuals was reduced 980,000 names (from 
1,220,000 to 240,000), and the organizational listings to 25,000 from 125,000.23 
The records, almost certainly representative of illegal practices and unconstitutional 
invasions of political expression, did nonetheless represent an intimate institutional knowledge of 
the many communities BOSS monitored in the city that had been helpful in breaking up terrorist 
plans like the Cuban exile bazooka attack on the United Nations, the Statue of Liberty plot, and 
the Minutemen plot.  The records had been freely shared – more freely shared than even NYPD 
acknowledged at the time, declassified FBI documents now show – with intelligence partners at 
the FBI and elsewhere, and had on a number of occasions in the past resulted in quick identification 
of suspects and often arrests after bombings and other attacks occurred.  The record sharing, 
however, was not limited to intelligence investigations of crimes – it also included purely political 
investigations as Donner has illustrated, as well as information shared with licensing agencies 
including bar admissions committees, which, the court found, “used such information to evaluate 
the politics of those seeking government licensure.”  Numerous applicants had been turned down 
for important licenses such as state bar association accreditation over a period of decades as a 
result of entirely legal and protected political expressions, such as membership in the communist 
party.24  
At the same time, Murphy also announced a new set of guidelines for intelligence gathering 
and dissemination by the police department – clearly and unambiguously articulating standards 
that may have been generally implied in the past, but came with precious little practical guidance 
or oversight.  As discussed in previous chapters, the actual direction guiding BOSS operations 
																																																						
23 David Burnham, "Lawyers Assail Police on Files," New York Times, February 10th, 1973 
24 Ibid.; see also Handschu v. Special Services Div. /605 F. Supp. 1384/ New York Southern 
District Court, 605 F. Supp. 1384, March 7th, 1985 
	 290	
seems to be limited to a few scant passages in general NYPD Rules and Procedures manuals, and 
as Commissioner Murphy observed and even as Lindsay aide Jay Krieger had suggested in his 
April 1969 letter to the Mayor, oversight and direction of BOSS was not, as a practical matter, in 
the hands of the Mayor or even the Commissioner, but in the Chief of Detectives and more 
realistically in BOSS leadership’s own unrestrained hands.25    
The new procedures specifically lay out a mission – to “provide the police department with 
the intelligence necessary to discharge of its duties to maintain the public order, protect life and 
property, and insure the orderly functioning of the city and its public agencies” – while detailing 
the boundaries within which officers must do so.  “Public Security Activities are to be conducted 
in such a manner that no infringement upon the statutory and constitutional rights of any individual 
or organization is occasioned,” the guidelines specifically stipulate.26  In what is close to being a 
frank acknowledgement of the history of BOSS, the guidelines explain: 
 
“Procedures, priorities, and attitudes which in the past were publicly acceptable are 
now being re-examined and re-defined by society at large, as well as by its 
governmental agencies, and will in a free society continuously be redefined.  Law 
enforcement must strive to keep pace with these developments and to ensure that 
police activities reflect them.  In the operation of an intelligence system, there must 
be special care to avoid interference with constitutionally protected rights of 
freedom to speak and dissent, to write and publish, and to associate for peaceful 
																																																						
25 Again, see this dissertation, Chapter 5, N. 44; “Jay L. Kriegel to Mayor John V. Lindsay, RE: 
Police briefing on the summer,” April 30th, 1969 - Box 15 Folder 176.1, JVL Papers, 
NYMA/LWA 
26 NYPD - Procedures, Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Division, 1973, page 8 - Box 
15 Folder 177, JVL Papers, NYMA/LWA 
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purposes, while developing the intelligence necessary for public officials to 
safeguard life and property.”27 
 
In a departure from many of the practices seen in previous cases – most notably Ray Wood’s 
infiltration of CORE and the Statue of Liberty plotters, and Richard Rosenthal’s infiltration of the 
Jewish Defense League – the 1973 guidelines explicitly directed that all intelligence officers 
“including undercover agents… will receive intensive training in relevant constitutional principles, 
especially those embodied in the First and Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, upon initial assignment to the Section and periodically thereafter.”28  In those earlier 
cases, and perhaps in many others that never became known to the public, there was no such 
training whatsoever before the undercover agents were tasked with what was almost certainly 
infringement of constitutionally protected activity – there was no police or legal training at all, in 
fact, before these particular infiltrators were tasked with their assignments.   
The use of police infiltrators and informants, more broadly, though, was actually defended 
by the court – in principal, and if done without violation of constitutional protections.  "The use of 
secret informers or undercover agents is a legitimate and proper practice of law enforcement and 
justified in the public interest,” argued Judge Edward Weinfeld.  “Indeed, without the use of such 
agents many crimes would go unpunished and wrongdoers escape prosecution. It is a technique 
that has frequently been used to prevent serious crimes of a cataclysmic nature. The use of 
																																																						
27 NYPD - Procedures, Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Division, 1973, page 6 - Box 
15 Folder 177, JVL Papers, NYMA/LWA,  
28 Ibid., page 9  
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informers and infiltrators by itself does not give rise to any claim of violation of constitutional 
rights."29   
The new guidelines also attempted to separate purely political policing as Donner argues 
was the function of BOSS – and which BOSS was certainly guilty of having conducted in the past 
– from legitimate concerns about political violence including terrorism; “the political beliefs or 
preferences of any individual, group or organization are not, per se, of concern to the Public 
Security function.  However,” the guidelines continued, “the activities of various groups and 
individuals are of legitimate interest when there is a substantial possibility that they will result in 
personal injury, property damage, crowd control problems, or disruption of vital municipal 
functions.”30 
The 1973 guidelines, then, are illustrative of the department acknowledging – even if only 
when under the scrutiny that the ongoing federal case brought upon it – that the practices of the 
past were no longer acceptable, not in the public view that police department intelligence now 
stood, regardless of how effective they may have been. 
 
The City and plaintiff’s counsel of the 1971 federal case finalized a compromise, what has since 
then been known as the “Handschu Decree,” in 1985 – fourteen years after the case was brought 
and nearly five years after the terms of the settlement were initially reached.31  Judge Haight, 
																																																						
29 Handschu v. Special Services Div. /605 F. Supp. 1384/ New York Southern District Court, 605 
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30 NYPD - Procedures, Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Division, 1973, page 10 - 
Box 15 Folder 177, JVL Papers, NYMA/LWA 
31 Angel Castillo, "After Long Court Fight, City Police Accept Political Surveillance Curbs," 
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pleased with the compromise, argued that “The [Handschu Decree] Guidelines prohibit police 
intrusions into constitutionally protected activities. The NYPD can no longer commence or 
continue investigations and surveillance secretly and in silence…”32 
Under the agreement, investigations of political activity could only be conducted when 
"specific information has been received by the Police Department that a person or group engaged 
in political activity is engaged in, about to engage in or has threatened to engage in conduct which 
constitutes a crime…"33   There would be no proactive investigations of legal, purely political 
nature – such as the ones that BOSS conducted to investigate CORE, the investigation that 
ultimately yielded the Statue of Liberty plot.  The 1973 self-generated police department 
intelligence guidelines – even though far more restrictive than historical BOSS practice had been 
– established a much lower bar than the Handschu agreement’s need for “specific information” in 
regards to the perpetration of a crime.  The 1973 guidelines, for instance, enabled intelligence 
collection operations for situations that might simply “adversely affect the availability of important 
goods and services to the public.”34 
The Handschu agreement also established a governing “Authority” made up of the First 
Deputy Commissioner of the Police Department, the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters of 
the Police Department, and, importantly (harkening back to the CCRB debate of the mid 1960s), 
a civilian appointed by the Mayor, to provide oversight for NYPD intelligence operations.  The 
Handschu Authority had substantial oversight ability, contrasting to BOSS – which was subject to 
virtually none.  Among those oversight powers was that of the use of undercovers, which was use 
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33 Ibid. 
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permitted "only after approval by the Authority," which the Commanding Officer of the 
Intelligence Division him or herself had to request after setting forth "all the salient facts of the 
case.”35   
Police Commissioner Robert McGuire, who took over the post in January of 1978, said at 
the time of initial settlement in 1980 that the police department had discontinued the allegedly 
illegal surveillance activities (there was never an actual trial or finding of any wrongdoing) in 1971 
and had been operating on internal restraints very similar to those imposed by the agreement.  “The 
new guidelines,” the Commissioner said in a statement, “represent an enlightened approach to 
balancing the rights of political activists and the police responsibility for maintaining public order 
and investigating crime.”36  
 
The Handschu Decree represented the culmination of a long, drawn out roll-back of the ability of 
the NYPD to conduct political policing, and as an unintended consequence, to respond to terrorism.  
The process had begun as early as 1969 when Bureau of Special Services practices during the long 
Sixties – most evidently on display during the highly public trial of the Panther 13 – came into 
increasingly critical public view.  The long series of scandals, external as well as internal pressures, 
from the Panther case to the Knapp Commission to Commissioner Murphy’s initiatives and, 
finally, the Handschu case – coupled with a similar series of events on the national level – made 
NYPD officials less able to rely on previously used effective (if not always legal) practices in 
																																																						
35 Handschu v. Special Services Div. /605 F. Supp. 1384/ New York Southern District Court, 605 
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36 Angel Castillo, "After Long Court Fight, City Police Accept Political Surveillance Curbs," 
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countering terrorism just as the year of bombings in “gigantic” proportions gave way to a decade 
rife with terrorism in Gotham.  
 
CHANGES – FBI 
 
The final years of the long Sixties were for the FBI even more dramatic a time of change than they 
were for the NYPD.  FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover exercised as much political influence, over as 
long a period of time, as just about any other twentieth century American government official, and 
under his leadership the bureau was largely shielded from public pressures, investigations, 
restraints, and criticism more generally.37  But by the time Hoover passed away in May of 1972, 
the era of FBI invulnerability from censure and public condemnation was fast coming to a close. 
Of course, the Watergate scandal and the FBI’s involvement in it, unfolding after the June 1972 
arrest of five men for breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in 
Washington, D.C – just a month and a half after Hoover’s death – cannot be overemphasized in its 
impact on the withering criticism and condemnation soon heaped upon the Bureau.  But even 
before the Watergate break-in, the Bureau had emerged as perhaps the single most reviled 
adversary of those in the left wing protest and anti-Vietnam War movement, most of whom 
believed, with good reason, that the FBI used what seemed to be excessive and illegal surveillance 
																																																						
37 According to Theoharis, Powers et al, Hoover had enjoyed “virtual immunity from criticism 
and congressional scrutiny.  There were some exceptions: the Abraham Lincoln Brigade arrests, 
the Judith Coplon case, the Apalachin incident, the harassment of Martin Luther King Jr., and the 
Fred Black case.  But these controversies proved short lived and did not precipitate any kind of 
in-depth inquiry into the FBI’s operations and objectives.”  Theoharis, Powers et al, The FBI: A 
Comprehensive Reference Guide, 125. 
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and intelligence methods (such as the rampant use of so-called domestic security wiretaps the 
courts found to be illegal)38 to counter their activities.   
 
The COINTEL Programs are the most well-known, and perhaps most egregious, of what was a 
vast range of FBI “domestic intelligence” operations during the long Sixties.  Hoover had cancelled 
the last of the COINTELPROs shortly before his death, in the wake of the March 1971 burglary 
of an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, by a group of left wing activists that threatened to (and 
ultimately did) expose the programs to the public.39  But after Hoover’s death – the moment when 
the “dark ages of the FBI” began, according to Tim Weiner40 – the public spotlight began to fall 
increasingly not only on COINTELPRO operations but all facets of domestic intelligence 
operations.   
On January 27th, 1975 – in the wake of the COINTELPRO revelations and the continuing 
fallout from Watergate, and after explosive allegations of CIA operations by journalist Seymour 
Hersh were published in the New York Times – the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly by a count 
of 82-4 to establish a committee to investigate not only illegal intelligence operations directed 
																																																						
38 See Chapter 9 
39 Beyond other embarrassing revelations, a single stolen document referenced, briefly, the 
previously undisclosed COINTELPRO designation, and a curious NBC News Correspondent, 
Carl Stern, waged a long Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) legal battle to reveal the details of 
the program.  He eventually won, and COINTELPRO information began flooding into the public 
realm.  The Media case and the identity of the burglars remained unsolved, and the case was 
closed by the FBI after the statute of limitations had run out.  Betty Medsger’s 2014 book, The 
Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover's Secret FBI, and the documentary film that was 
largely based on it – “1971” directed by Johanna Hamilton (2014) – revealed the identity of the 
burglars and their stories, as well as Stern’s discussion of the legal path to disclosure of 
COINTELPRO through the FOIA process.  
40 Weiner, Enemies, 308 
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against American citizens, but also allegations of intelligence community (mostly CIA) efforts to 
destabilize foreign governments and even assassinate foreign leaders.41   
What would become known as the Church Committee (named for its Chairman, Senator 
Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho) was mandated to “investigate the full range of governmental 
intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which such activities were illegal, improper or 
unethical…” and to investigate and make recommendations in regards to “the need for improved, 
strengthened, or consolidated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the Congress and 
the need for new legislation.”42  The final reports, released over a year later after public, televised, 
and often contentious hearings, firmly concluded among other things that intelligence agencies 
had vastly overstepped their boundaries in collecting a tremendous amount of information “about 
the intimate details of citizens’ lives and about their participation in legal and peaceful political 
activity.”43   
It was the single largest inquiry into U.S. intelligence practices until the 9/11 Commission 
was established in the wake of the September 11th attacks.44  “The conclusion to be drawn,” the 
																																																						
41 David E. Rosenbaum, "C.I.A.-F.B.I. Inquiry Voted By Senate," New York Times, January 28th, 
1975; see also Seymour M. Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, 
Other Dissidents in Nixon Years" New York Times, December 22nd, 1974, and Seymour M. 
Hersh, "Underground for the C.I.A. in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on Students," 
New York Times, December 29th, 1974 
42 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, An Interim Report, November 20th, 1975, page 1;  Church Committee Investigation 
Reports available on the website of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-related-commissions  (last accessed 
July 26th, 2016) 
43 Church Committee, Final Report (S.Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976), Book II, 
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, page 7 
44 The Church Committee conducted 800 interviews and reviewed 110,000 documents.  The 9/11 
Commission conducted 1,200 interviews and reviewed over 2.5 million pages of information 
before concluding and publishing its own report in July of 2004.  See United States Senate, A 
History of Notable Investigations prepared by the United States Senate Historical Office. 
Available at: 
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report argued, was that  “no longer can the intelligence agencies be exempted from the law or from 
lines of higher authority.”45  The nearly 200 recommendations the final reports offer proposed 
nothing less than a sea change in intelligence practices in efforts to bring them in line with both 
American law and ideals.   
Leaving aside the recommendations that speak to international intelligence operations 
largely directed at CIA and NSA, the dozens of domestic recommendations included serious 
curtailment of intelligence operations within the United States by all the members of the 
intelligence community, including several recommendations curtailing the use of covert human 
sources against U.S. citizens, such as those that had been regularly used in countering terrorism in 
New York City.46 
As a sign of the changing times, the reports and the recommendations generally paid 
considerably more direct attention to the issue of terrorism than had been explicitly discussed by 
either NYPD or FBI when commencing or conducting many of the operations that intentionally or 
(more often) inadvertently disrupted terrorist plots of the era.  The Church Committee final reports 
discuss the subject of terrorism several times, acknowledging what by then had become abundantly 
clear – that by 1975, terrorism had become a major concern for intelligence officials in the United 
States.  The committee found that “terrorists have engaged in serious acts of violence which have 
brought death and injury to Americans and threaten further such acts.”  However, the committee’s 
																																																						
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/pdf/Watergate_investigation
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46 See: Church Committee, Final Report, Book II, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of 
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report continues, “[t]hese [terrorist acts], not the politics or beliefs of those who would commit 
them, are the proper focus for investigations to anticipate terrorist violence.”47   
Here, the final report confronts both sides of the matter – both the invasion of civil liberties 
by intelligence and law enforcement officials on one hand, as well as, on the other, that those 
illegal activities were sometimes utilized to counter actual terrorist acts or uncovered the same, 
and were not always just policing and suppression of benign political beliefs.  Scholars such as 
Donner often focus on one side of this equation without acknowledging the reality of the other.   
 
The Church Committee wasn’t the only body investigating the activities of the intelligence 
community.  Both the volume as well as the legality of FBI operations was under fire from several 
sides.  Between 1965 and 1975, according to a 1976 Government Accounting Office (GAO) study, 
intelligence investigations constituted a massive portion of the Bureau’s workload – approximately 
20%.48  The same GAO study found that, alarmingly, “FBI's authority to carry out domestic 
intelligence operations is unclear.”49  
A Presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller had released its own 
report on domestic intelligence activities in June of 1975, and the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence (known as the Pike Committee, after Chairman Representative Otis G. Pike of New 
York) concluded another report in January of 1976.   All of the reports found great fault in the 
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48 “FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations – Their Purpose And Scope : Issues 
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practices of the various agencies in the intelligence community, both in their actions abroad as 
well as at home.50   
 
The FBI was the largest domestic target of these investigations; the CIA and military intelligence 
agencies were ostensibly tasked with overseas responsibilities, although each of the committees 
scolded these agencies at length for their domestic operations and offered recommendations to 
prevent reoccurrence.   
The Church Committee report included a lengthy review of the FBI’s history of domestic 
intelligence from the earliest days of the Bureau of Intelligence to the Nixon administration and a 
penetrating discussion of the COINTEL Programs; the committee’s revelations, argue FBI 
scholars Theoharis, Powers, et al, “precipitated a policy debate over whether the FBI’s domestic 
intelligence function should be terminated entirely or limited in scope…”51  Ultimately, the major 
overarching recommendation for the FBI offered by the Church Committee was that Congress 
supply a statutory charter for the FBI – something it had never had – thereby specifically 
delineating as well as limiting the roles and responsibilities of the Bureau.  That recommendation 
was not adopted by Congress.   
However, many of the specific recommendations did find their way, in spirit or letter, into 
Attorney General Edward H. Levi’s impactful guidelines for oversight of the Bureau and for FBI 
domestic security investigations, released a month before the committee reports, in March of 1976.   
 
																																																						
50 The Pike Committee’s final report, uncensored by the White House, was suppressed from 
public distribution by an act of congress, following the congressional belief that the report should 
first be reviewed by the Executive prior to release.  It has since been released in part by the U.S., 
and has been leaked and released in full by foreign journalists.   
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The so-called Levi Guidelines had two objectives, according to Theoharis, Powers, et al.; “to 
provide some latitude to permit the initiation of FBI investigations based on political advocacy 
and not criminal conduct, but to limit their scope and duration to a provable intent to commit 
violence or crime, and to subject such potentially noncriminal investigations to the supervision of 
the attorney general.”  Among other things, considerable FBI oversight by the Attorney General 
was formalized, and substantial restrictions were placed on the use of infiltrators and informants.  
The Levi Guidelines, in practice, significantly reined in the ability for the Bureau to conduct the 
kinds of domestic security operations it had used, and abused, in both political policing and 
countering terrorism during the previous decades under Hoover.   
Noted liberal Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Anthony Lewis argued, in the New York 
Times, that “[f]rom here on, such abuses will be much less likely,” because of the Levi Guidelines; 
“not only the guidelines themselves, but the spirit that informs them.  It seems right to note a 
genuinely reassuring development in Washington.”52  
 
SQUAD 47 
 
Months after Attorney General Levi announced the new guidelines and after the Church 
Committee released its findings and recommendations, a scandal infrequently discussed in 
scholarship, but that had perhaps as dramatic an impact on the FBI as either of these other events, 
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became public.  The scandal involved the actions of Squad 47, the special unit established within 
the FBI’s New York office to hunt the Weather Underground.53 
The Squad, commanded by veteran FBI Special Agent John Kearney, consisted of more 
than sixty agents and, in their efforts to hunt down the Weather fugitives, had conducted several 
“black bag” operations including breaking into the residences and opening the mail of friends and 
family of Weather Underground members like Bernadine Dohrn, whose sister Jennifer’s apartment 
in Manhattan was broken into and bugged; after she moved to Brooklyn in 1972 her new apartment 
was also broken into at least three times.54   
According to FBI third-in-command William C. Sullivan, as told to the New York Times in 
1977, Hoover, despite having (ostensibly) explicitly called for an end to the widespread use of 
these practices in 1966 as the political climate changed to an environment less permissible of such 
tactics, had, in 1970, directed agents to use “any means necessary” to hunt down Weather 
Underground.  It was from this directive – communicated to John Kearney – that spawned the use 
of such tactics.55  As Arthur Eckstein argues, Hoover was aware of the black bag practices being 
used again Jennifer Dohrn (and most likely other Weather Underground-related subjects), but there 
was at least a “conceit of legality” since both Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell signed off on 
the operations and, relying on the long precedent established in FDR’s administration and then 
held up in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, it was generally felt the 
Attorney General had the authority to approve, even without warrant, such practices in national 
																																																						
53 Eckstein’s recent Bad Moon Rising: How the Weather Underground Beat the FBI and Lost the 
Revolution is an in-depth scholarly study of the excesses of Squad 47 and the FBI more generally 
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security cases.56  This was especially so in the time before the June 1972 Supreme Court 
unanimous decision in the “Keith case” discussed in Chapter 10.   
In the wake of Hoover’s death, however, whatever restraints (and for whatever reason) that 
the long-time Director had placed upon FBI Special Agents were loosened almost immediately; 
the compulsion to loosen the leash on practices like warrantless wiretaps and black bag jobs came 
from as high as Acting Director L. Patrick Gray and / or Associate Director Mark Felt.57   
Both Hoover and then Gray authorized these practices; Hoover with less frequency as time 
went on and the political climate changed, and even, Eckstein argues, less so than the Nixon 
administration (including Nixon aide Tom Huston) desired.  Hoover, in fact, exhibited a sense of 
the changing times better than almost any other major powerbroker in Washington, one that quite 
resembled that of the NYPD when they proposed their own limitations on intelligence, in order to 
get out ahead of, and control, the restrictions they knew would be forthcoming.  As early as 1965 
Hoover had begun to pull the FBI back from the intelligence and other excesses most clearly seen 
in the COINTELPROs; for instance, to reduce, even dramatically reduce, the number of “black 
bag” operations and warrantless wiretaps – the “Hoover cutoff” as Eckstein explains it was referred 
to within the Bureau in 1966 when it was instituted.  It was a sign of the times that, in vocally 
registering his disapproval of the Huston Plan, Hoover was registering his disapproval of practices 
that not many years before the FBI, under his guidance, had so thoroughly embraced.58  
Gray authorized the tactics, even after the Supreme Court “Keith case” findings that 
specifically forbade the practices that were in much more of a legal gray area (or actually 
permitted) under Hoover.  The FBI, after Hoover, became more aggressive (and less legally 
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protected) in countering the terrorist threat that Weather posed just as the social, political, and 
judicial climate became much less accepting of such practices.  Despite that clarity, in October of 
1972, Acting Director Gray ordered “black bag jobs reinstituted.  So, too, mail coverage against 
possible domestic subversives.” Gray long denied giving permission for the black bag job and 
surreptitious entry campaign against Weathermen and their aboveground supporters, but Eckstein, 
seeing newly-available evidence, finds his denial wholly unconvincing.59 
The FBI knew they were playing with fire in their renewed use of black bag and other 
extra-legal practices, especially in the wake of the Keith case; as Eckstein illustrates, Assistant 
Director Edward S. Miller (who would be indicted along with Felt and Gray) received a memo 
from an FBI Inspector arguing that “[t]he legality of wiretaps against revolutionaries where no 
foreign influence can be shown is highly dubious.  However, we are and will continue using 
innovative investigative techniques [a common FBI euphemism for exactly the kinds of practices 
found to be illegal] to attempt to apprehend Weatherman fugitives and locate other Weatherman 
members.”60  
The Squad 47 black bag operations first came to light in 1976 after an internal Department 
of Justice investigation headed by Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger discovered files 
detailing the operations in an unannounced visit to the New York office in the wake of the ongoing 
Media, Pennsylvania break-in and Church Committee investigation fallout.61  Less than a year 
later, in April of 1977, Agent Kearney, who had retired in 1972, became the first-ever FBI Agent 
indicted on charges relating to the aggressive and illegal types of tactics discussed in this 
dissertation; but the tactics were not in service of the long history of purely political policing that 
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Donner has discussed.  These overly-aggressive and clearly illegal tactics were brought to bear in 
countering a terrorist organization in New York City during the long Sixties.62   
Most of the dozens of members of Squad 47 were granted immunity in exchange for their 
testimony; Attorney General Griffin Bell focused on looking up the chain of command rather than 
down it.  The investigation eventually uncovered illegal activity by a wider and more senior range 
of FBI officials; the Squad’s actions had been authorized by FBI officials at the highest level, 
including Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, Acting FBI Associate Director W. Mark Felt, and 
FBI Assistant Director Edward Miller.  In April of 1978, a federal grand jury indicted Gray, Felt, 
and Miller for conspiring to violate the rights of citizens, and dismissed the charges against 
Kearney after finding that he was acting on orders from superiors.   
It was the first time in FBI history that a Director or senior official was charged with a 
crime – any crime – for actions in the pursuance of their official duties.63 
Ultimately, in November of 1980, Felt and Miller were convicted of the federal crime of 
conspiring to violate the civil rights of American citizens; new President Ronald Reagan granted 
them both full and unconditional pardons only four months later, in March of 1981.64    
When he pardoned the two men, President Reagan recalled that Carter had pardoned 
thousands of Vietnam draft dodgers; “We can be no less generous to two men,” the President 
argued, “who acted on high principle to bring an end to the terrorism that was threatening our 
nation.”  Reagan’s statement is disconcerting, to say the least – equating the leniency applied to 
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young men, many only teenagers, who refused to fight in a war they morally opposed, to senior 
law enforcement officials who not only violated their oath of office to uphold the law but also the 
constitution itself.65   
 
Both the FBI and the NYPD, the central counterterrorist actors in New York City during a period 
of unprecedented terrorist activity, thus found themselves less capable of countering terrorism just 
as terrorism was reaching new levels in Gotham as the long Sixties ended.  But new 
counterterrorism paradigms were not far off on the horizon and the FBI and NYPD would, 
characteristically, be at the center of them.  
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The latter part of the long Sixties was an era of terrorism not just in New York City, but throughout 
the nation and the world.  The Olympics in Munich and “Bloody Sunday” in Northern Ireland, 
both in 1972.  The near-celebrity status of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
terrorists Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (“Carlos the Jackal”) and female hijacker Leila Khaled.  
Germany’s Red Army Faction; Spain’s ETA; Canada’s FLQ.  The list goes on.   
It is New York City, though, that serves as a microcosm of terrorism of the era.  A vastly 
diverse range of actors from across the political spectrum engaged in terrorism in the same physical 
space, in the same narrow window of time.  This dissertation argues that the reality is more 
complicated than the historiography or popular narrative of radicalism and terrorism of the time 
portrays it to be.  It wasn’t just left wing radicals resorting to terrorism at the time in the United 
State; it wasn’t even they who turned to terrorism first.  Characterized by actors as different as the 
Weather Underground and the Minutemen, the Melville collective and the JDL, it was the time 
and place of the most, and the most diverse, terrorism in the history of the United States.  During 
the long Sixties terrorism was embraced by an expansive and inclusive range of actors along the 
entire political spectrum, and they were all active in New York City.1 
Even within scholarship on left radicalism and terrorism itself, there exists an imbalance 
toward Weather Underground.  As Arthur Eckstein compellingly shows, the near-obsession that 
																																																						
1 Despite the imbalance, some notable studies putting left and right radical politics of the era in 
conversation – if not the terrorism that emerged from them – are worth recognizing; see Rebecca 
Klatch, A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), and Michael W. Flamm and David Steigerwald’s Debating 
the 1960s: Liberal, Conservative, and Radical Perspectives (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2007).  Sara Diamond’s Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political 
Power in the United States (New York: Guilford Publications, 1995), is of particular relevance to 
this work, taking a longer view of right wing movements – from the postwar period through the 
1980s – and delving deeper into the radicalism of the John Birch Society and Minutemen than 
almost all other scholarship. 
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the FBI under the leadership of long-time Director J. Edgar Hoover, followed by Acting Director 
L. Patrick Gray after Hoover’s death, as well as President Nixon himself, had with Weather 
Underground is at the root of the preponderance of attention being directed Weather’s way.  The 
Bureau even, for a time in 1970, classified all bombings from the political left as “Weatherman-
type.”2   
Within left terrorism, this dissertation instead emphasizes the actions of the Melville 
collective; it is these young radicals that serve as a nexus between international influence and the 
first manifestation of a major left wing campaign of terrorism in New York City and the U.S. 
during the era.  As Jeremy Varon and Bryan Burrough have previously argued, but didn’t expand 
on in any great detail, despite little real historiography on the Melville collective, there is 
outweighed historical relevance to the bombing campaign they conducted in New York City in 
1969.  It was Melville who was the “Patient Zero” of political left terrorism in the United States 
during the era, even if the political right had long before adopted terrorism.  
The authorities (and then scholars’) focus on the broader political left is not completely 
without basis; despite the violence and even deaths caused by terrorism from the political right, it 
was terrorism from the left that attacked and threatened the very bedrock of both federal and local 
government and American political society – from Melville and Weather Underground bombings 
of military and police installations, to the Pentagon in 1972 (on Malcolm X and Ho Chi Minh’s 
birthday) to the U.S. Capitol building itself (in 1971) and then the headquarters of the U.S. 
																																																						
2 Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising; see especially pages 131 and 182 for this conflation of all 
bombings from the political left as linked to Weather Underground; as Eckstein explains, “On 
October 1, 1970, Hoover rescinded the May 13th directive under which the FBI was to consider 
all bombings by leftist radicals as ‘Weatherman-type.’  It was now recognized that radical 
bombers might not have an organizational affiliation with Weather.  Such bombings would now 
be categorized not as ‘Weatherman’ but merely as ‘extremist.’”  
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Department of State in 1975.  Those on the left vocally advocated for dramatic changes to U.S. 
society – to an end to the U.S. political structure as it was then known.  Those on the political right, 
for all the danger they posed to life and property, never posed a threat to the foundation of the U.S. 
political structure.  If anything, their violence emanated from a militant support of that status quo 
– they were terrorists, but not revolutionary terrorists, like those on the left were perceived to be 
(and perceived themselves to be).  That so many on the left, like Weather Underground and FALN, 
remained so elusive despite robust FBI efforts to capture them – or even identify them – during 
the first years of the decade only added to their mystique and their centrality in the historical 
narrative.3    
 
Equally as important as a more complicated understanding of terrorism of the era (from both the 
right as well as within the left), what is revealed by this dissertation is a dynamic link between the 
authorities and the terrorists they hunted, each substantially impacted by the actions of the other.  
A new age of terrorism in New York City was paralleled by a new age of counterterrorism, most 
significantly seen in the efforts of the FBI and the NYPD.  But the seismic shifts in domestic 
intelligence during the 1970s impacted not only the practice of intelligence collection and 
harassment of American citizens’ lawful political activity, they also had a substantial impact on 
the way that these two organizations responded to terrorism in Gotham.  
The NYPD, in the wake of debilitating scandal, a loss of public confidence, an 
administration in City Hall substantially less friendly than the previous one, investigative 
commissions, internal reorganization, and legal challenges, found itself in a much different 
																																																						
3 FALN - the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (in English, Armed Forces of National 
Liberation), the Puerto Rican nationalist terrorist group and “the most determined bombers in 
U.S. history,” according to Bryan Burrough (Days of Rage, 4) 
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position in regards to fighting terrorism (and the political policing it came along with) just as the 
year of bombings in “gigantic proportions” segued into a continuing era of terrorism in New York 
City.  The specialized unit and methods that NYPD had found most effective as terrorism emerged 
during the long Sixties – Bureau of Special Services’ (BOSS) political policing, informants, 
undercover infiltrators, and liaisons with the FBI – went through dramatic changes as the long 
Sixties progressed that pulled NYPD back from the line of illegal activity that it had most certainly 
crossed, but at the same time made it less effective at countering this growing threat.   
The FBI went through even more substantial changes.  Similar to NYPD’s predicament, 
the public and political criticism levied against the Bureau (and all of the nation’s intelligence 
community) during the era for its violations of civil liberties in the process of political policing 
and intelligence gathering, among other things, resulted in not just a rollback of the domestic 
intelligence operations of the FBI and new, restrictive guidelines, but also found senior FBI 
leadership convicted of federal crimes for the methods used in combatting terrorism.   
That both the FBI and NYPD were compelled toward dramatic change is a matter of fact; 
what is more debated is if the compelled changes had a negative impact on their efforts to counter 
terrorism.  The disconcerting answer is that, yes, the restrictions on both NYPD and FBI probably 
did a negative impact on those efforts.  That is certainly not to say that it was wrong to compel 
authorities to follow the law they are supposed to uphold, just that an honest analysis of the 
situation suggests there was very likely a tradeoff between civil liberties and effectively countering 
the ongoing threat of terrorism.   
Nixon aide Tom Huston and the drafters of what became known as the Huston Plan were 
correct – human infiltration, informers and undercover operatives, were the methods by which 
both FBI and NYPD garnered the most utility in countering terrorists.  Informers and undercover 
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agents were responsible for disrupting plots by the range of actors in New York City during the 
era, from the Melville collective to Cuban Power to the Jewish Defense League to the Statue of 
Liberty plotters.4   
But was there anything inherently illegal or immoral in the use of informants or undercover 
agents?  No, there was and is not.  The federal judge deliberating the Handschu case acknowledged 
as much; "[t]he use of secret informers or undercover agents is a legitimate and proper practice of 
law enforcement and justified in the public interest,” argued Judge Edward Weinfeld.5  Even liberal 
New York Post columnist James A. Wechsler, in considering George Demmerle’s centrality in 
breaking up the Melville collective, acknowledged the necessity of “underground agentry” in 
“democratic self defense from mad bombers.”6 
That is only half of the story, however.  The informants and undercover operatives who 
broke up the Statue of Liberty plot, the Melville Collective, even the Panther 13 and the Jewish 
Defense League, were not investigating or informing on illegal activity.  They were often 
investigating and informing on what almost certainly should have been protected speech and 
political activity – lacking oversight, it is impossible to tell for sure.  NYPD Officer Raymond 
Wood infiltrated CORE, and found himself in Statue of Liberty plotter Robert Collier’s orbit, 
																																																						
4 The historical exploration of the Melville collective allows, also because of the available sources, 
substantial insights into the use of undercover informants and infiltrators during this era.  A case 
study of the Melville infiltrator, George Demmerle, holds lessons that can be used as a lens with 
which to view the practice more broadly. Similarly, Gary May’s study of another FBI informant, 
Gary Thomas Rowe, who was central in breaking the case of the murder of white Civil Rights 
worker Viola Liuzzo - The Informant: The FBI, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Murder of Viola Liuzzo 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011) – illustrates the sometimes very precarious balancing 
act the Bureau attempted in ignoring, condoning, and perhaps even sometimes supporting violent 
criminal acts including terrorism on the part of those that worked for them in the shadows. 
5 Handschu v. Special Services Div. /605 F. Supp. 1384/ New York Southern District Court, 605 
F. Supp. 1384, March 7th, 1985 
6 James A. Wechsler, “Prince Crazy,” New York Post, 27, May 28th, 1970 (Also found in 
Demmerle FOIPA file 1319364-0 Section 2 Serial 1, page 123/202) 
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without any real legal justification; not that he would have had an informed opinion on legal 
justifications, in any case, considering he had never had any legal, constitutional, or even general 
police training prior to his actions as an undercover infiltrator.  Likewise, George Demmerle, in 
his actions as an FBI informant, most certainly crossed the line into protected speech and actions 
of a number of individuals and groups as he gravitated toward the Melville collective.  The same 
could be said of practically any case one chooses to examine during the era – the actions of 
informants and undercovers had a quantifiable impact, but they may have often acted in a quasi-
legal or wholly illegal fashion in order to put themselves in a position to make that impact.  In the 
wake of the changes and restrictions brought by the censures of both agencies during the 1970s, it 
is unlikely that NYPD Officer Ray Wood or FBI informant George Demmerle would have had 
similar opportunities to insert themselves into the positions they did.  The civil liberties violations 
they were probably guilty of would not have been committed; but the terrorism plots they helped 
break up may have continued.  The modern debate of a tradeoff between civil liberties and safety 
from terrorism was just as pertinent to the context of the long Sixties as it is today.    
Tim Weiner, in his scholarship, comes too close to enveloping peaceful and legal, and even 
illegal and violent, political dissidence, with the unique form of violence or threatened violence 
that is terrorism.7  Frank Donner, on the other end of the binary, whitewashes the sometimes 
violent, illegal, and terroristic actions of some anti-status quo actors on the political left that law 
enforcement authorities were legitimately and rightfully investigating.8  This work contributes a 
																																																						
7 Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI (New York: Random House, 2012) 
8 Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).  Donner’s analytical bias is not surprising; an 
accomplished scholar and lawyer, he served as the Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union's (ACLU) Project on Political Surveillance and had worked tirelessly throughout his long 
legal career to further left-leaning, anti-policing, and anti-intelligence practices in the United 
	 314	
very tempered agreement with those like Donner: yes, NYPD did engage in political policing and, 
as the historical record clearly shows, otherwise engaged in highly questionable practices that 
exceeded the boundaries of social acceptability and probably legality.  However, again, a fairer 
view of the sources shows that it wasn’t only political policing that NYPD (like FBI) was engaging 
in, but also a response to the real and reemerging threat of political violence and terrorism, from 
both the political left and the right, that law enforcement practices were evolving alongside.   What 
Donner seems to posit as a binary – only political policing in support of the status quo, and never 
legitimate law enforcement concerns of terrorism, and only against the political left – I argue was 
instead a severe imbalance, that there were indeed sometimes legitimate concerns to investigate, 
and that actors the political right was sometimes also the authorities’ target. 
In furtherance of this qualified agreement with Donner’s argument, the record reflects a far 
less tolerant judicial system in trials and sentences for those on the political left than those on the 
right, and public officials, the press, and the public largely raised much greater alarm when those 
on the left turned to terrorism (and celebrated the convictions of those on the left much more).  
However, just as those terrorists emerging from the political right were not completely immune to 
law enforcement and intelligence operations, nor were they (always) immune to the judicial 
punishment that followed. 
An important distinction between FBI and NYPD as the leash was tightened on both is the 
different reaction to the restrictions.  The changes at NYPD were not just accepted by leadership 
– they were even, in the case of the reorganization of the Detective Bureau and the sidelining of 
BOSS, driven by NYPD leadership (reformist Commissioner Patrick Murphy).  Rather than resist 
																																																						
States.  See Bruce Lambert, “Frank J. Donner Is Dead at 82; A Lawyer in Civil Liberties Cases,” 
New York Times, June 11th, 1993.   
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and attempt an end-run around the changing times and greater restrictions, by all accounts it seems 
that the men and women of the NYPD, like Detective Anthony Bouza, accepted the changes, even 
if only grudgingly so.   
It was a different case at FBI.  Director Hoover saw the writing on the wall and had 
cancelled the COINTELPROs and curtailed the use of “black bag” jobs and other aggressive 
intelligence practices; he even objected to the Huston Plan when it was approved by President 
Nixon himself.   
It was in the wake of Hoover’s death, though, and the continuing, frustrating inability for 
the Bureau to penetrate the Weather Underground with informants and infiltrators, as they had in 
the past, that drove FBI leaders L. Patrick Gray and Mark Felt to disregard the sentiment of the 
public, the pronouncements of the court (the “Keith case”), and even their own internal opinions, 
about continuing or restarting these practices.  Ultimately, that is why leaders of the FBI, and not 
NYPD officials or even Weather Underground terrorists, found themselves convicted of serious 
crimes.  
 
A LONG LIST OF ACTORS AND EVOLVING COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
Despite the argument that the organizations, individuals, and movements discussed in this 
dissertation are central to the study of terrorism in New York City during the long Sixties and 
beyond, it is not meant to be an exhaustive list.  
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Puerto Rican nationalist terrorism emerged with force during the era; a group called MIRA9 
conducted a series of relatively minor bombings commencing in December of 1969 before leader 
Carlos Feliciano was arrested in a BOSS sting.10  The jail cells filling up with bombers by mid-
1970, Feliciano was held in the Tombs just three cells away from Sam Melville, who was then 
awaiting transfer to prison upstate.11   
And Puerto Rican nationalist terrorists FALN – what Bryan Burrough argues are “the most 
determined bombers in U.S. history” – emerged in 1974.12  The FBI credits the organization with 
well in excess of a hundred bombings into the first years of the 1980s, including one in early 1975 
that is rightfully remembered as one of the most vicious of the era.  
On January 24, 1975, an explosion ripped through Fraunces Tavern in lower Manhattan.  
A favorite of the Wall Street crowd, the tavern was a historic landmarked establishment that had 
long ago often been frequented by George Washington.  Four men were killed – one decapitated 
																																																						
9 Movimiento Independentista Revolucionario en Armas, or in English, Armed Revolutionary 
Independence Movement 
10 “Suspect Charged With 35 Bombings,” New York Times, May 18th, 1970.  One of the 
detectives who had been trailing Feliciano and who effected his arrest was Eddie Rodriguez, the 
same BOSS detective who had infiltrated Cuban Power in 1968 and precipitated their arrests. 
11 Melville discusses Feliciano in a letter, found Letters, 113-114.  Feliciano would, like 
Melville, become something of a militant left cause célèbre.  Various fundraisers and 
demonstrations would be held around the country in support of his defense fund, the Weather 
Underground would invoke his name on occasion, and William Kunstler would go on to defend 
him in court.  He was ultimately found guilty on only one charge, and unconditionally released 
by a judge’s order after serving less than 24 months in prison.  See Marcia Chambers, “Judge 
Frees Man Convicted on a Bomb Charge,” New York Times, July 10th, 1975  
12  Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, or in English, Armed Forces of National 
Liberation.   “The most determined…,” Burrough, Days of Rage, 4.  In comparing the statistics 
available in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland’s terrorism 
research center, START, FALN was responsible for 133 bombs during the era, compared to, for 
instance, the 40 by Weather Underground.  (GTD available at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ , 
last accessed on December 1st, 2016).  The exploits, motivations, and investigation of FALN – as 
well as then-President Bill Clinton’s commutation of the sentences of more than a dozen key 
members in 1999 – remains ripe ground for historical research. 
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– and fifty-three injured, some severely.13  The FALN bombing was the deadliest such attack in 
the city since the 1920 Wall Street bombing only a quarter-mile away.   
Despite their relentless pace of bombings, authorities in both the NYPD and FBI found it 
difficult to counter FALN even after the deadly Fraunces Tavern bombing.  Former BOSS 
Detective Anthony Bouza argues that this might not have been the case if BOSS was operating as 
it had before; Bouza tells how he and former colleagues lamented that that the proactive efforts of 
BOSS during the first years of the long Sixties – when they successfully prevented terrorist plots 
like the Statue of Liberty plot – would have been capable of infiltrating and stopping FALN.14   
The macabre record set by FALN at Fraunces Tavern would not stand for long, 
unfortunately. 
 
In an international campaign that spanned the 1970s, Croatian nationalists conducted a number of 
terrorist attacks in support of their desire for independence from the (now-disintegrated) Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  In New York City, Croatian nationalists conducted at least two attacks 
at the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, bombed business interests like banks and travel 
agencies associated with Yugoslavia, and in 1975, were almost certainly responsible for the 
deadliest terrorist attack of the era in New York City and indeed the nation.  On December 29th, 
1975, a massive bomb of at least twenty-five sticks of dynamite detonated at a crowded baggage 
claim area near LaGuardia Airport’s Gate 22; after nearly an hour battling the blaze, firemen, 
police, and federal authorities tallied eleven people killed and seventy-five wounded.  It was the 
																																																						
13 Robert D. McFadden, “4 Killed, 44 Injured in Fraunces Tavern Blast: 4 Killed, 44 Injured in 
Fraunces Tavern Explosion,” New York Times, January 25th, 1975; and Peter Kihss, “Briefcase 
Found at Bombing Site,” New York Times, January 27th, 1975  
14 Anthony Bouza, Police Intelligence, 7-8  
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new record for the deadliest terrorist attack in New York City since the 1920 Wall Street bombing, 
re-setting the grim high established by FALN only earlier that year, and the death toll would not 
be exceeded until September 11th, 2001.15   
This middle year of the decade – with FALN’s Fraunces Tavern bomb on one end and 
bracketed on the other by the LaGuardia bombing – was certainly a most fearful end to the long 
Sixties.   
Finally, terrorism by Cuban exiles didn’t abate after the Cuban Power arrests in 1968 and 
as New Left groups like the Melville collective and the Weather Underground took center stage; 
in fact, right-wing Cuban exile terrorism not only predated New Left terrorism in New York and 
throughout the U.S., but it also outlasted and was consistently deadlier.  The most prominent Cuban 
exile terror organization of the time in New York City was undoubtedly Omega 7, established in 
1974 by thirty-three-year-old Eduardo Arocena and six other Cuban exiles.16   
On December 7th, 1979, Omega 7 bombed the Cuban Mission to the U.N. – it was their 
fifth bombing of the mission (either at the old location on 67th street or the new one on Lexington 
Avenue) since June of 1976, in a span of not even three and a half years.  Two NYPD police 
officers were injured in the attack.17  Just days later, a massive bomb exploded in the garage of the 
Soviet Mission to the U.N. just three blocks east and a five-minute walk from the Cuban Mission.  
The latest attack blew out hundreds of windows up and down East 67th street and injured more 
																																																						
15 See Michael Oreskes, Patrick Doyle, and Harry Stathos, “12 Die in La Guardia Bombing,” 
New York Daily News, December 30th, 1975; Robert D. McFadden, “14 Killed, 70 Hurt at La 
Guardia by Bomb in Baggage-Claim Area,” New York Times, December 30th, 1975; and Al 
Baker, “Terrorist’s Release Reopens Wound of Unsolved Bombing,” New York Times, August 
9th, 2008 
16 United States of America, Appellee, v. Eduardo Arocena, 778 F.2d 943, Federal Circuits, 2nd 
Circuit, December 3rd, 1985 
17 “Bomb At Cuba Mission Injures Two Policemen,” New York Times, December 8th, 1979 
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than a half-dozen people, including three NYPD officers who were walking out of the 19th Precinct 
just across the street from the 12-story diplomatic building.18  
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) 
 
The 1979 bombing of the Soviet Mission by Omega 7 is especially notable for one fact in 
particular.  The following spring, the FBI proclaimed Omega 7 the most dangerous terrorist 
organization in the United States and attached the “highest priority” to shutting them down.19  In 
a move with considerable long-lasting impact, NYPD Commissioner Robert McGuire publically 
proposed a standing joint NYPD – FBI investigatory task force to investigate terrorism; what 
would become the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). 
Organizations such as Omega 7, often operating across city and state lines, complicated the 
ability for a municipal police force to investigate, given their limited jurisdiction.  In New York 
City, bombings carried out by groups like the Melville collective and the JDL crossed jurisdictional 
lines of various NYPD precincts, but police units in the Detective Division (like BOSS and the 
Arson and Explosives Squad) had citywide jurisdiction.20  However, by 1979, the Cuban exile 
terrorist groups (like the Weather Underground before them) were based in the New York City 
area but crossed well beyond city lines into New Jersey, south to Florida, and clear across the 
country to California.  The new joint initiative by the FBI and NYPD would be more capable of 
																																																						
18 Robert McG. Thomas Jr., “Bomb Damages Russian Mission on East 67th Street,” New York 
Times, December 12th, 1979 
19 Robin Herman, "'Highest Priority' Given By U.S. To Capture Of Anti-Castro Group," New 
York Times, March 3rd, 1980 
20 There of course was a unit within the Detective Division – the Bureau of Special Services – 
that had a citywide mandate, but as discussed, with the dissolution of BOSS this expansive 
jurisdictional capability disappeared.   
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responding to that nationwide threat.  Beyond an obvious need, there was even precedent for such 
a task force – the year before, NYPD and FBI established a standing joint bank robbery task 
force.21 
The FBI–NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force would become the backbone of 
counterterrorism in the United States, the first and most important of more than a hundred such 
JTTFs that exist nationwide today.  By September 11th, 1980 – when Omega 7 assassinated a 
Cuban diplomat as he drove along a busy Queens street – there were twenty-two combined FBI 
agents and NYPD detectives working on the Joint Terrorism Task Force, with rounding up Omega 
7 as one of their prime objectives.22  By the following September, the task force had grown to 
sixteen FBI agents and fourteen NYPD detectives.23  In the wake of the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center there were a number of other federal and local agencies also present on the 
New York City JTTF, including FDNY fire marshals.24 
 
THE RETURN TO COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
The emergence of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces is not just a coda to the story of terrorism and 
counterterrorism in New York City during and after the long Sixties.  Instead, the emergence of 
																																																						
21 Leonard Buder, “The FBI and City Police Plan Anti-Terrorist Squad,” New York Times, May 
15th, 1980 
22 Robert McFadden, “Cuban Attaché At U.N. Is Slain From Ambush On Queens Road,” New 
York Times, September 12th, 1980; and Selwyn Raab, “FBI Says Cuban Aide’s Murder May 
Mark Shift in Terror Group,” New York Times, September 13, 1980 
23 “U.S. Presses Two-Year-Old Omega 7 Inquiry,” New York Times, September 27th, 1981 
24	See Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI (New York: 
William Morrow & Co., 2003).  FDNY Fire Marshal Ronald “Ronnie” Bucca, a former member 
of Army Special Forces and Military Intelligence, was among the first members of FDNY on the 
JTTF; Fire Marshal Bucca died in the line of duty at the World Trade Center on September 11th.  
In 2003, the Department of Defense named the primary detainee facility in Iraq “Camp Bucca” 
in his honor.  	
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the JTTF is one important aspect of a resurgent response to terrorism both at the local and national 
level as the era of terrorism ended and another began to eventually emerge.   
The dramatic levels of terrorist violence in Gotham eventually receded.  The end of the war 
in Vietnam, the resignation of President Nixon, the Church and Pike Committees – a great many 
developments cooled the heated protest that spawned much of the left wing violence.  The relative 
cooling of anti-communist and anti-Castro rhetoric dampened those movements.  New laws 
governing the sale of explosives like dynamite impacted the ability of even those who continued 
to want to engage in terrorism.  New security paradigms at airports and state and federal buildings, 
still in place today, hardened potential targets and further eroded terrorism as a possible tactic.  
But throughout the 1980s, despite the recession of the long Sixties wave of terrorism in the 
United States, the Iranian Revolution and the rise of political Islam, and international acts of terror 
such as the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 – resulting in the death of more 
than 300 and compelling a retreat from that nation by the Reagan administration – elevated 
terrorism to an even higher priority for policymakers than it had previously been.  Scholar David 
Wills has explored counterterrorism policy under the Reagan Administration and argues that it was 
actually after the long Sixties ended that the first explicit and comprehensive national 
counterterrorism policy emerged.25   
By the mid 1980s, in fact, much of the restraint that had been placed on law enforcement 
and intelligence organizations during the era of public criticism that characterized the end of the 
long Sixties was starting to be reversed. 
																																																						
25 David C. Wills, The First War on Terrorism: Counter-terrorism Policy During the Reagan 
Administration (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) 
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In 1983, Congress reexamined what critics argued unduly restricted the FBI’s ability to 
monitor and counter terrorism in the United States.  The Senate Subcommittee on Security and 
Terrorism concluded that while the FBI still needed guidelines from the Attorney General, those 
guidelines should be revised to do without the standard that required a criminal act for starting a 
domestic security investigation, and to “relax restrictions on the recruitment and use of new 
informants; and authorize investigations of systematic advocacy of violence, alleged anarchists, or 
other activities calculated to weaken or undermine federal or state governments.”  The so-called 
Smith Guidelines that emerged (named for then-Attorney General French Smith) also provided for 
a new category of investigation – the "domestic security/terrorism investigation," that allowed for 
"a view to the longer range objective of detection, prevention, and prosecution of the criminal 
activities of the enterprise” – preventative policing of terrorism, in other words.  Intelligence and 
law enforcement actions before there was a crime to investigate, and in the terms of terrorism 
investigations, directly linked to political action.26   
By 1983, then, much of the restraint that had been placed upon the FBI by the Levi 
Guidelines was loosened when the Smith Guidelines were released.  And as higher profile 
investigations now explicitly designated as terrorism investigations emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s – such as the Unabomber case, and then the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing – counterterrorism became a higher priority for agents of the Bureau and 
there was an increasingly codified system of guidelines to apply to these kinds of investigations.  
Gone were the days of ad-hoc task forces, bringing together criminal investigation agents and bank 
robbery agents, to investigate terrorism cases like the Melville collective.  And, with the JTTF now 
																																																						
26 Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations (Smith Guidelines): 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1 (1983) 
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formalized, gone were the days of ad-hoc liaisons with NYPD and other law enforcement and 
intelligence organizations tasked with countering terrorism. 
As the era of terrorism in New York City receded in the late 1970s and especially into the 
1980s, NYPD counterterrorism efforts – previously so robust with the existence of the Bureau of 
Special Services and the political policing that came along with it – withdrew to the point of being, 
in a practical sense, exclusively characterized by the police department’s involvement with the 
JTTF.  The framework of what would eventually become the Handschu Guidelines was in place 
by as early as 1973, and certainly by 1980.  By 1985, when the city and plaintiff’s counsel finally 
settled the Handschu Decree, the political policing and aggressive intelligence operations that had 
at first unintendedly enabled NYPD counterterrorism, had become nearly nonexistent.  NYPD 
terrorism investigations, even in the wake of first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, were 
practically the exclusive prerogative of those members serving on the JTTF. 
That would change dramatically in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  Former federal 
prosecutor-turned-mayor, Rudolph Guiliani, and NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly, 
embarked upon a post-9/11 reinvention of NYPD intelligence and counterterrorism operations that 
would exceed those in practice even during the heyday of BOSS.  The skeletal NYPD Intelligence 
Division would be rebuilt into a modern, technically savvy, proactive counterterrorism unit 
utilizing informers and undercover policemen, with liaisons with federal agencies, poaching 
civilian experts from organizations like CIA and NSA, with members stationed in foreign 
countries, and – after 2003 – with their Handschu leash substantially loosened.  That year, Judge 
Charles S. Haight, Jr., the same federal judge who signed off on the guidelines in 1985, 
considerably relaxed the restraints despite loud protests from organizations like the ACLU, to 
enable for more effective efforts to battle terrorists in the new post-9/11 world.  The following 
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decade found the new NYPD Intelligence and Counterterrorism Division experiencing a similar 
trajectory as the Bureau of Special Services – success in thwarting a number of terrorist plots 
against New York City, weighed against allegations of excessive, invasive, and ultimately 
unconstitutional activity, followed by greater restrictions placed upon the department.27   
Further, the risk/reward calculation of choosing to be a terrorist was something of an 
aberration during the long Sixties.  In the earlier era of anarchist terrorism, it could cost your life 
(execution), long jail sentences, or deportation.  And in the years after 9/11, harsh and extended 
prison sentences are often handed out for frighteningly broad charges like “Providing material 
support for terrorism” that sometimes seem to involve nothing more than discussing terrorist 
plots.28  But during the long Sixties those caught in the act as terrorists were subject to what were, 
relative to earlier and later periods in American history, comparatively light punishment.  This 
was, exceedingly, especially true for those on the political right.  The members of the Melville 
collective were charged with destruction of government property, interference with national 
defense, and firearms and explosives charges29 – in other words, the Melville collective (like the 
Statue of Liberty plotters before them) were charged with what they actually did.  They were not 
charged with what many argue is a harsh post-9/11 system of laws that can send a person to prison 
																																																						
27 See Apuzzo and Goldman, Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and bin 
Laden’s Final Plot Against America, for an in-depth discussion of NYPD’s counterterrorism 
efforts, and excesses, in the years since 9/11.  Apuzzo and Goldman also discuss, for reference 
and context, many of the historic instances discussed herein including the Panther 13 and 
Hadschu cases. 
28 18 U.S. Code § 2339A - Providing material support to terrorists – includes such broad 
language to include “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice 
or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be 
or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials…” 
29 Prosecutor’s Affidavit, U.S. v. Melville et al, March 3, 1970, (found at “List of charges 
Melville et al.) 
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for life before they’ve ever committed a single, identifiably dangerous or violent act.  In short, if 
an American citizen were to be a terrorist, even a politically left terrorist, the time to do so was 
during the long Sixties and certainly not in the years since September 11th and the emergence of 
the PATRIOT ACT.  The Statue of Liberty plotters got off relatively easy, the only one receiving 
a jail term being Robert Collier, who was himself free in less than three years.  None of the right-
wing Cuban Power admitted terrorists or Minutemen accused plotters were sentenced to so much 
as a single day in jail; the members of the Melville collective, despite harsh sentences relative to 
those before them during the long Sixties in New York City, would likely never have seen freedom 
again if convicted in the post-9/11 era, even if they were lucky enough to escape being sent to 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  
 
Beverly Gage argues in the Journal of American History that, while “we have a better 
understanding of terrorism’s history [in the United States] than we did a decade ago… it would be 
hard to classify this surge of work as a flourishing subfield or even a coherent historiography.  
Almost a decade out from 9/11, most U.S. historians remain hard-pressed to explain what terrorism 
is, how and when it began, or what its impact has been.”30 
This dissertation is meant as part of the corrective, to shed light on what I argue is the time 
and place of perhaps the most prolific use of terrorism in the American experience.  This 
dissertation by itself does not make the study of terrorism in the American experience a 
“flourishing subfield” or even a “coherent historiography,” but it endeavors to add valuable 
																																																						
30Gage, “Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the Field,” Journal of American 
History, 74, June 2011. 
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research and scholarship to that subfield, to add coherence to that historiography, and hopefully to 
open up further research questions for scholars who follow.   
Many continuing historical questions remain in regards to the several topics this 
dissertation has explored.  FBI and NYPD BOSS records relevant to this dissertation were 
declassified (in the case of the FBI) and discovered to not have been destroyed (in the case of the 
NYPD) only after the conclusion of this dissertation.  Further engagement with these historical 
documents may enhance, complicate, or disprove the arguments made herein in regards to both.31   
In regards to the terrorists explored in this work, further and deeper exploration of the 
Melville collective, of the Cuban exile terrorism campaign, and of other actors discussed – and 
their links to the larger (and non-violent or at least non-terroristic) political movements they were 
tangentially related to – will only deepen our understanding of why those who resorted to terrorism 
did in fact do so.   
The uncomfortable truth this work explores is that, again, sometimes terrorism works.  In 
New York City, the media capital of the nation and the world, extremists from the political left 
and political right saw the endeavors of those they sympathized with, as well as those they strongly 
opposed, gaining attention to their causes through terrorism; and as this dissertation argues, at least 
part of the intent of terrorism is the broadcasting of that political message.  Shedding greater 
historical light on the impact of these various terrorist movements – how and when they furthered, 
and how and when they damaged, the political causes they supported – is a historical question 
worth greater consideration.  And as Gage argues, if these questions are approached not only as 
																																																						
31 Eckstein considers many of these new records in Bad Moon Rising, the most recent publication 
on the Weather Underground and the FBI; the newly discovered BOSS records, at the New York 
City Municipal Archive, have not yet been made available or publically announced but this 
researcher certainly eagerly awaits that day.   
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“discrete interventions” in the narrow sense, but with a broader eye toward terrorism in the 
American experience, we can begin to more fully understand the impact that terrorism has had on 
the trajectory of the history of the United States.   
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